# MOHSIN ALI & ORS v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1975] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 240
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-04-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1968
- **Bench:** V. R. Krishna Iyer, R. S. Sarkaria, A. C. Gupta ]J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mohsin-ali-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-6514
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Sovereign grants-Construction of-Surrounding circrunstances
as aid of
construction-Occasion of grant as aid of constn1ction.
By Firman of 1934, the then ruler of Bhopal in appreciation of Jong and
distinguished service of Sir Liaqat Ali gave him, in addition to the grant of
pension,- the residential house in question and a sum of Rs. 400 /- per month
C
out of the Privy Purse of the Ruler.
D
E
F
G
Liaqat Ali died in March 1947 without Jeaving any issue or widow.
In
May, 1947, Syed Mohammed Ali, an heir .of Liaqat Ali, who was n;:siding in
the said house was· forcibly ejected by the Government of Bhopal.
In 1957,
the present appellants being the heirs of Syed Mohammed Ali filed the present suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh for the recovery of the possession o~ this house on the ground that the Firman gifted the house absolutely to Liaqat Ali and that they were entitled to inherit the house. The suit
was resisted by the respondent on the ground that the ruler's Firman did not
confef absolute title on Liaqat Ali, but only a life interest in the house. The
Firman inter-alia stated "and you are granted your residential house situated
at Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad as a gift." The Trial Court decreed the suit
on the ground that the suit house was gifted by the ruler to Liaqat Ali absolutely.
The High Court on appeai reversed the finding and held that on a
true construction of the Firman Liaqat Ali was given only a life estate. On
appeal to this Court, it v.·as contended by the appeJlants :-
1. The last sentence of the Firman declares in unambiguous terrms that
the grant of the house is an out and out gift.
2. Since the granter and the grantee are Muslims, the gift would under
Mohammedan Law have the effect of conveying an absolute heritable
estate.
3. In a letter
addressed by thr Chief Engineer and Secretary to
the
P.\V.D., Bhopal, issued in the year 1938, it was mentioned that the
building in question was in the
possession and ownership of this
Liaqat Ali.
Jt was contended by the respondents
1. The grant of the house is not to be disassociated from the penslonary
grants.
2. The Firman repTesents a grant made by an absolute ruler in fa\1our
of his subjt:L:t a1Jd wa~ not a hiba n1ade bv CJne Muslim to another
lvfuslim under Mohammedan Law.
3. The grant being a sovereign grant has to be construed strictly against
the guarantee and imperfection in the language of the Firman had
to be resolved in favour of the Government by reading it as a whole
in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
H
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : In case of sovereign grants, \vhere two interpretations are possible,
that V.'hich is mo~t favourable to the sovereign is to be· pri~ferred. [244B-CJ
HELD FURTHER--The Firman does not convey in precfre and unequi_vocal
terms full and absolute ownership of the suit house to the grantee. The Firman
does not use the word like heritable estate or that the grant would take effect
from generation to generation or grant to the grantee and his heirs.
[246FJ
..
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MOHSIN ALI v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria; !.)
24t
fl.eld further-The Firman has to be read as. a \Vhole.
It cannot be disA
sected into three water-tight compartments. It is permissible to consider the
surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which this grant was made as
legitimate aids to .construction of the Firman. The Firman confers three-fold
benefits; pensiQn, Rs. 400!- per month and beneficial interest in the residential
house. The object of conferring these benefits was the same, namely, to secure
to the retiring servant a handsome maintenance and comfortable residence for
the rest of his life. The surrounding circumstances, namely, the grantee had no
issue nor ony near relation and was already residing at the suit house, also
B'
c.:infirm thisi interpretation. [246G, 247A-B].
fIELD FURTIIER-The grant is not a hiba
made. in
accordance
with
ivtohan1n1eCan Law. It was a grant ma.de by an absolute ruler to his subject.
[?.48D-E] .

## Text

r 240
A
MOHSIN ALI & ORS.
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
April 22, 1975
B
[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA ]J.J
Sovereign grants-Construction of-Surrounding circrunstances
as aid of
construction-Occasion of grant as aid of constn1ction.
By Firman of 1934, the then ruler of Bhopal in appreciation of Jong and
distinguished service of Sir Liaqat Ali gave him, in addition to the grant of
pension,- the residential house in question and a sum of Rs. 400 /- per month
C
out of the Privy Purse of the Ruler.
D
E
F
G
Liaqat Ali died in March 1947 without Jeaving any issue or widow.
In
May, 1947, Syed Mohammed Ali, an heir .of Liaqat Ali, who was n;:siding in
the said house was· forcibly ejected by the Government of Bhopal.
In 1957,
the present appellants being the heirs of Syed Mohammed Ali filed the present suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh for the recovery of the possession o~ this house on the ground that the Firman gifted the house absolutely to Liaqat Ali and that they were entitled to inherit the house. The suit
was resisted by the respondent on the ground that the ruler's Firman did not
confef absolute title on Liaqat Ali, but only a life interest in the house. The
Firman inter-alia stated "and you are granted your residential house situated
at Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad as a gift." The Trial Court decreed the suit
on the ground that the suit house was gifted by the ruler to Liaqat Ali absolutely.
The High Court on appeai reversed the finding and held that on a
true construction of the Firman Liaqat Ali was given only a life estate. On
appeal to this Court, it v.·as contended by the appeJlants :-
1. The last sentence of the Firman declares in unambiguous terrms that
the grant of the house is an out and out gift.
2. Since the granter and the grantee are Muslims, the gift would under
Mohammedan Law have the effect of conveying an absolute heritable
estate.
3. In a letter
addressed by thr Chief Engineer and Secretary to
the
P.\V.D., Bhopal, issued in the year 1938, it was mentioned that the
building in question was in the
possession and ownership of this
Liaqat Ali.
Jt was contended by the respondents
1. The grant of the house is not to be disassociated from the penslonary
grants.
2. The Firman repTesents a grant made by an absolute ruler in fa\1our
of his subjt:L:t a1Jd wa~ not a hiba n1ade bv CJne Muslim to another
lvfuslim under Mohammedan Law.
3. The grant being a sovereign grant has to be construed strictly against
the guarantee and imperfection in the language of the Firman had
to be resolved in favour of the Government by reading it as a whole
in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
H
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : In case of sovereign grants, \vhere two interpretations are possible,
that V.'hich is mo~t favourable to the sovereign is to be· pri~ferred. [244B-CJ
HELD FURTHER--The Firman does not convey in precfre and unequi_vocal
terms full and absolute ownership of the suit house to the grantee. The Firman
does not use the word like heritable estate or that the grant would take effect
from generation to generation or grant to the grantee and his heirs.
[246FJ
..
' -
I
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•
- .
\
MOHSIN ALI v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria; !.)
24t
fl.eld further-The Firman has to be read as. a \Vhole.
It cannot be disA
sected into three water-tight compartments. It is permissible to consider the
surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which this grant was made as
legitimate aids to .construction of the Firman. The Firman confers three-fold
benefits; pensiQn, Rs. 400!- per month and beneficial interest in the residential
house. The object of conferring these benefits was the same, namely, to secure
to the retiring servant a handsome maintenance and comfortable residence for
the rest of his life. The surrounding circumstances, namely, the grantee had no
issue nor ony near relation and was already residing at the suit house, also
B'
c.:infirm thisi interpretation. [246G, 247A-B].
fIELD FURTIIER-The grant is not a hiba
made. in
accordance
with
ivtohan1n1eCan Law. It was a grant ma.de by an absolute ruler to his subject.
[?.48D-E] .
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1968.
From the. judgment a11d decree dated 5th September, 1962 of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. 1 of 1956.
Hardaya/ Hardy and S. S. Hussain, for the appellants.
c
'>
Ram Panjwani, H. S. Parihar and f. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.--By a firma11, dated October 25, 1934, Nawab Sir
Hamidullah Khan, the then Ruler of Bhopal State, in appreciation of
the long and distinguished services of Sir Liaqat Ali, gave to the latter,
in addition to the grant of pensions, the residential house in question
as "inayat ataa". Sir Liaqat who was already residing in this house,
E
continued therein till he died, issueless and widowless, in March 1947.
One Syed Mohammed Ali who was the son of Sir Liaqat's father's
sister, also used to reside in this house with the deceased. After Sir
Liaqat's death, Syed Mohammed Ali continued in occupation of this
house as· one of the nine heirs of the deceased, till he was "forcibly
and unlawfully" ejected in May 194 7 by the, then Government of
F
Bhopal.
Paying a "deaf-ear" to
the
repeated
demands of Syed
Mohammed Ali for restoration of possession, the Government "persisted in the act of trespass" and continued in illegal possession of
the house.
After his ouster, Syed Mohammed Ali also 'died sometime
in 1947.
On April 30, 194 7, the N awab of Bhopal signed the Agreement
G
of Merger and the State of Bhopal was taken over by the Chief
Commissioner on behalf of the Government of India on June !, 1949.
Thereafter, on November 1, 1956 the territory of the former Bhopal
State became a part of the re-organised State of Madhya Pradesh.
On August 21, 1957, after serving a notice under s. 80, Code of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs 1 to 3, who are the son, daughter and H
widow, respectively, of Syed Mohammed Ali, instituted the suit against
the State of Madhya Pradesh for recovery of possession of the house,
on the footing that under the firman, it had been gifted absolutely by
the Nawab to Sir Liaqat Ali who died possessed of it as full owner,
and on the donee's death, it was inherited by Syed Mohammed Ali
who, in turn, was succeeded by the plaintiffs. It was further pleaded
r
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] SUPP· s.c.R.
A that Syed Mohammed Ali was "forcibly and unlawfully" dispossessed
by the Government in May, 1947.
The suit was resisted by the defendant State on the ground, inter
...
alia, that the Ruler's firman "did not confer absolute title
on late
Liaqat Ali", but only a lifo-interest in the house.
B
The Additional District Judge who tried the suit, found on a
construction of the firman (Ex-P-1), that the suit house had been
gifted by the Ruler to late Sir Liaqat Ali, absolutely, and, in consequence, decreed the suit.
On appeal, a Division Bench of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed that finding and held that "on a
true construction of the Firman (Ex.P-1), the grantee, the late Sir Syed
c Liaqat Ali, was given only an estate for life in the suit property, and
the plaintiffs as ·his heirs had no right to inherit it as his property."
In the result, the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.
On a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. !33(1)(a)
of the Constitution read with Sections 109 and JI 0 of the Code of
D Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have now come in apl"'al to this Court.
E
F
The main issue framed by the trial court was in these terms :
"Was the house in dispute given by the Ruler to Shri
Liaqat Ali deceased absolutely or for life only."
The decision of this issue turns on an interpretation of the Firman
(Ex.P-1), dated October 24, 1934 whereby the Ruler gave this house
to the deceased.
The original Firman is in Urdu.
As rendered into English by the
courts below, it reads:
"Hon'ble Motamid-u-Sultan Nasir-ul-Mulk S)'ed Sir Liyaqat
Ali".
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H
"Lookin~ into considerations with
gratitude
your
valuable services and faithful sacrifices which you have rendered for more than 30 years and considering the economic
condition of the State you have served without remuneration
for the last 2 years, your application (for pension) is granted.
You are granted permission lo retire in lieu of your valuable
services from 1st October 1934.
You should hand over
charge of Mushir-ul-Muhami Rubkari Khas to Honourable
Shoeb Qureshi.
Besides that pension you are entitled to receive under
the Pension Rules of the State Treasury, you are also entitled
to receive a sum. of Rs. 400/- as monthly pension from Treasury of Dcodh1 m lieu of valuable services of Deodhi Khas
an_d you are (further) granted your residential house situated
at Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad, as gift."
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MOHSIN ALI v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
243·
..!'
The original of the crucial sentence, which has been underlined,
A
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reads :
"Aur aapka sakoonti makan waqya Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa kiya jata hai."
The Firman was by order published in the Bhopal Government
Gazette dated 31-10-1934, under the Heading : 'Pension to·Aali
Mortab~t Sir Syed Liaqat Ali Saheb'. Rendered into English, its
material part runs thus :
"Now the said Hon'ble again requests for grant of his
previous application on account of rendering service for more
than thirty years.
Hence His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal
Khuld-Allah-Mulkahum considering his
valuable
services
and his faithful sacrifices that he had served without remuneration for the last two years, taking into consideration the economic condition of the State. Considering (all his valuable
services) with gratitude (His Highness the Ruler of State)
grauts him permission to retire from 1st November, 1934 and
also grants him his residential house situated at Bara Mahal
Shahjahanabad as gift.
His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal State further orders
that Hon'ble Syed Sir L\aqat Ali Saheb be paid Rs. 400/-
monthly pension from the Treasury of Deodhi Khas in respect of services of Deodhi Khas besides his regular pension
under the Rules 'of the State Treasury for which he is entitled
to receive from the Treasury of State".
The original of the underlined sentence, in the Gazette N otification reads :
"aur unko sakoonti makan waqya Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad inayat marhmat pharmale hain."
It is to be noted that the disposition evidenced by the Firman,
Ex. P-1, is a tripartite grant made by an autocratic ruler to his subject
in recognition of !Dng, meritorious services rendered by the latter.
This grant belongs to the category of disposition, which under the
English Common Law are known as "Crown grants".
The tenor and language of the Firman, particularly the words
"aapko lnayat Kiya Jata Hai" unmistakably mark it out as a Sovereign grant. According
to Steingass' · Persian-English
Dictionary
"inayat" (Noune) signifies a favour, a gift, a present, a bounty";
c:
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G
and "Ataa" (Verb) means "to give, to confer a benefit or present with",
H
"Ataa~' (Noun) implies "Giving, a present, gift, donation, favour, a
grant,- endowment, concession; consideration".
In the widest sense,
'grant' may comprehend everything that is granted or passed from
one to another by deed.
But commonly the term is applied to rights
,. created or tra~ferred by the Crown, ~.g .. , grants of pensions, patents,
charters franchise (See 'Earl Jowtt's D1ct1onary of English Law).
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244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] SUPP· s.c.R.
A
In England, contrary to the ordinary rule applicable to grants by,
i.,
a subject, grants by the Crown are usually construed most favourably
B
for the Crown.
The rule in case of Royal Grants is that general
words will not pass prerogative rights by implication.
This general rule is, however, capable of important relaxations in
favour of the subject. If the intention of the Soverejgn is obvious from
the document which in precise, unequivocal terms defines the extent
and nature of the benefit conferred, it must take effect. No question
of seeking extrinsic aid to its construction arises.
If the grant is for
valuable consideration it must be construed strictly in favour of the
grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign and where two constructions
are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought
C
to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit. Where, however, two interpret;a,tions
may be given to the grant, both of which are good, that which is most
favourable to the Crown is in many cases preferred (see Halsbury's •
Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 7, Paragraphs 669 and 670 pages 314316).
D
E
These rules of interpretation have been applied to Sovereign grants
in India, also (see Raja Rajinder Chand v. Sukhi( 1), Gulabdas Jagjivandas v. Collector of Surat( 2 ), Sheikh Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmoddin(3), Azziz-un-nissa v. Tasadduq Husain Khan(''), Ram Narayan
Sing/• v. Ram Saran Lal(").
It is in the light of the above principles that we have to determine
whether by tire Firman, Ex. P-1, the Ruler intended to grant a life
estate or an absorute estate in the suit house.
Mr. Hardy, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the
disposition in di~pute would not fall within an exception to the general
F
rule according to which a Sovereign grant is construed in favour of
the Sovereign, because firstly, the last sentence of the Firman, the
interpretation of which alone is in question, declares in plain, selfcontained and irnambignous terms that the grant of house is an out
and out gift to the grantee, and secondly, the grantot and the grantee,
being Muslims, the gift would, under Mohammedan Law, have the
effect of conveying an absolute heritable estate. In this connection,
G support has been sought from certain observations of the Privy Council in Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan v. Sardar Ali Raza( 6), which are
as follows :
H
"In general, Muslim Law draws no distinction between
real and personal property, and their Lordships know of no
authoritative work ......... which affirms that Muslim Law
recognizes the splitting up of ownership of land into estates,
(1)11956] SCR 889 as per S. K. Das J. at p. 902.
(') 6 I.A.5· 4
(') 30 I.A. 50.
1(<) 28 I.A. 65.
(5) !LR 46 Cal. 683 (P.C.).
(6) 75 I.A. 62 at 77.
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MOHSIN ALI v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
or in point. of quality like legal and equitable estates, or in -
point of duration like estates
in fee sample in tail,
for
life, or in remainder. What Muslim Law does recognize and
insist on, is the distinction between the corpus of the property
itself (ayn) and the nsufruct in the property (manafi). Over
the corpus of the property the law recognizes only absolute
dominion, heritable and unrestricted in point of time, and
where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition
inconsistent with such absolute dominion the conditfon is rejected as repugnant, but interest limited in point of time can
be created in the usufruct of the property, and the dominion
over the corpus takes effect subject to any such limited interests."
(emphasis added)
245
A
c
Mr. Hardy refers to the letter, dated 29-6-1938 (Ex. P-3) of
the Chief Engineer and Secretary, P.W.D., Bhopal whereby two maps
of the 'house, Nawab Manzi! were sent to the grantee. The portions
shown in light red colour in these maps were referred to in this letter as
in the "possession and ownership" of th'e grantee according to the
Gazette Notification No. 7, dated 31st October, 1934.
D
As against the above, Mr. Panjwani, learned Counsel for the
Respondent submits that the grant of the house is not to be dissociated from the pensionary grants; that even the last sentence of
the Firman, read in the context along with its preamble reaso.tiably
bears only one construction viz., that a right of residence for life,
to be conveyed by the Ruler to the grantee. Stress has been laid on
to be conveved by the Ruler to the grantee, Stress has been Jaid Oh
the fact that there are no words· such as, nasa/an-dar-nasalan, pushatdar-pushat etc. in the language of the Firman showing that absolute
heritable rights in the property were conferred on the grantee. CounJsel further maintains that the Firman represent' a
grant made by
an absolute Ruler in favour of his subject on the occasion of the latter's
retirement from service and that it was not a mere hiba made by one
Muslim under Mohammedan Law to another Muslim. Reference to
Mohammedan Law, proceeds the argument, has no relevance. It is urged
that the grant being a SoYereign grant, had to be construed strongly
against the grantee, and imperfections in the language of the Firman
had to be resolved in favour of the Government, by reading it as a
whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances and even the subsequent conduct of the then
Bhopal Government in
ejecting, Syed
Mohammad Ali from
the house in May,
1947.
That ejectment,
according to the Counsel, amounted to resumption of the grant-(by
the grantor) who was then alive and was still the absolute Ruler of
Bhopal state.
Counsel has referred to several authorities in support
of these contentions.
We are not persuaded to accept the appellant's contention that
the Firman conveys, in precise and unequivocal terms, full and absolute ownership of the suit house to the grantee. In our opinion, the
language of the last sentence of the
Firman, which\ is the
sheetanchor of this contention, even by itself; does not indubitably and
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246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] SUPP· s.c.R.
A unequivocally indicate that the intention of the Ruler was to grant
an absolute estate. The Firman .is conspicuous by the non-employment
of any words declaring that thenceforth the grantee would have a
heritable estate in the house or that the grantpr had transferred all
bis rights in the property, absolutely in favour of the grantee. There is
no use of such words that the grant would take effect as "nasalan-darB_ nasaln", "from generation to generation" "towarsan, kaiam u qaman"'
"to grantee and his heirs" etc. pointing towards the creation of a
heritable estate. Even the use of such terms by itself, has been held
to be an inconclusive indication of the grantor's intention to confer
absolute, heritable rights. Thus, in Gulabdas Jagjivandas's case (supra)
despite a reference in the sanad to the children or descendants' of the
C
grantee, the Judicial Committee held that the grant bad not been made
"on terms which would make them hereditary".
Again, in Sheikh Sultan v. Shekh Ajmoddin (supra), delivering
the judgment of the Board, Lord Hannen quoted with approval, a
minute dated 15-3-1922, recorded by Sir Thomas Munro in which he
states that the terms .in such documents ( sanads) 'for ever' from geneD
ration to generation or in Hindu grants, 'while the sun and moon endure', 'are mere forms of expression', and were neve1 supposed either
by the donor or receiver 1o convey the durability which they imply
or any beyond the will of the Sovereign. On the authority of another
minute recorded by Sir Thomas Munro, it was further observed "that
while the seizure of private property by the native princes would have
E been considered unjust by the country, Jagir grants were not regarded
by the people in the light of private property".
It is not necessary to multiply authorities with regard to the construction of such customary terms which could possibly be indicative
of the grantor's intention to make a heritable grant, because the Firman Ex. P-1, is benefit of all such terms. It will be sufficient to sav
F
that the language of the Firman does not in clear and unambiguous
terms express an intention to create an absolute estate'· in favour of
the grantee and bis heirs. The Firman has therefore to be construed
in accordance with the well-established rule of construction applicable
to Sovereign grant.
Another cardinal canon of interpretation to be borne in
mind
G is that in order to ascertain the real intention of the grantor, the Firman
has to be read as a whole. It will not be correct- as the appellants want
us to do to dissect the Firman into three water-tight compartments or
to read last sentence of the Firman out of the context. It is also permissible to consider the surrounding circumstances and the occasion
on which this grant was made, as legitimate aids to construction of
the Firman (see Gu/abdas Jagjivandas v. Collector of Surat (supra).
H
The occasion for the grant as apparent from the preamble of the
Firman, Ex.P-1, (reproduced in the Notification Ex.P-2) was that the
grantee, Sir Liaqat Ali, having attained the age of superannuation,
was retiring with the permission of the grantor, after putting in "valuable" and "faithful" service for more than thirty years,
including
two years for which he served without remuneration, in view of the
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MOHSIN ALI v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
247
poor economic condition of the State .• An analysis of the Fir'!'a11 will
A
show that it confers three-fold benefits on the grantee. Firstly, 1t grants
him such pension as would be admissible under the Service Rules. This
he would draw from the State Treasury.
S.econdly, in addition to
the first, it gran!s him pension at the. ra~e of Rs. 400 /- per mont~
which the p~ner would be entitled to dr~w fr~m the Dwdh1
Treasury i.e.,
Privy Purse of the Ruler. Tlnrdly, It grants hun a . B
beneficial interest in the residential house, in these terms : "A ur aapka
sakoonti makan waqya Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa
kiya jata hai''.
As is indicated in the Fil man (Ex.P-1) (P-2J NolihcatJon i11 1naking c
this tripartite grant the Ruler was actuated by consideration of. _gratitude for the valuable services rendered by the grantee.
The object of
conferring these three-fold benefits was the same, namely, to secu~e
to the retiring servant a handsome maintenance and comfortable residence for the. rest of his life.
In other words, all the three benefits .
granted under this Fil'lnan were cognate benefits, arising out of the , "D
same occasion, and made with the same object in view viz., to enable
the grantee to live comfortably in retirement. These related benefits
could be compendiously described as "retirement benefits". The first
t\vo benefus were indisputably pensionary benefits enuring only
for
the life-time of the grantee. All the three kindred benefits, including the one in question, were exprei;sly meant for the person of the
grantee. This is clear from the word 'apkd' which means "to you" in
E
the phrase "apko inayat aiaa kiya jata hai'" The .conjunc.tion
"aur"
(and) at the commencement of the last-sentence of the Firman inextricably Jinks the grant of interest in the residential house, with
the
pensionary benefits conferred in the foregoing parts of the Firman. Jn
short, ail
the three-fold benefits granted under this Firman are offspdng of the same genus. The language of the Firman relating directF
ly to the grant in question therefore takes its colpur from the preceding
parts of the Firman relating to the pensionary benefits conferred on the
grantee for life. Thus if the crucial words quoted above, are construed in
the context of the akin grants, and~according to the general tenor of the
Firman as a whole, it becomes clear that the. intention of the Ruler
was to grant only a right of residence limited to the life time of the
grantee-and not an absolute estate in the. house.
The snrronnding
G
crrcumstanc.es also confirm the interpretation, adopted by us.
The
first sue~ circumstance was that at the time of the grant, the grantee
~ad no issue, nor any near relation. Indeed, he died widowless and
1ssne-Jess. In this context, co11pled with the omission, of any wores
s~ch as to "grantee and his heirs" or "nasalan-dar-nasalan" indicatmg the grant to be heritable, it would be reasonable to hold that the
gra~t was intended to be for life only.
~ .
The_re is yet. another circumstance which points towards the same
co~clus1~11. It JS. that at the time of the grant the gr~ntee was alread
res1d.mg !n the smt house. In this context, the word "sakoonti" ('resl
denl!al) m the last l?art of the Firman used in aS!>ociation with 'makan'
(honse) assumes significance.
It suggests that the intention of th
IOSC/75-17
e
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] SUPP· s.c.R.
A grantor was to convey to the grantee no more than a right of residence in the house which the latter was already enjoying.
The letter Ex.P-3 written by the Chief Engineer on 29-6-1938 is
of hardly any assistance in construing the grant made three or four
years earlier. It could not be treated as contcmperaneous conduct of
B the grantor or his agent, which could legitimately be taken into consideration in construing the grant.
On parity of reasoning, it is doubtful whether the fact of eviction of
Syed Mohammed Ali from the suit house, about two. months after
the death of the grantee and about 15 years after the grant, could justifiably be called in_,}id as a "surrounding circumstance" to interpret
C the Firman dated 24-10-1939. The High Court has taken this circumstance also into account.
We need only say that even after excluding
this circumstance, there remains sufficient and sound foundation in
the language of the Firman and the contemperaneous surrounding circumstances, including the common genus, the same occasion and purpose of the three-se1ided grant, to hold that the Rule1 had conferred
D
only a limited estate in the suit property for
the life-time of the
grantee.
The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the grant
in question was a 'hiba' made in accordance with Mohammend1~n Law
by one Muslim toanother, has been stated only to be rejected. To all
intents and purposes, it was a grant made by an absolute Ruler to his
E subject who,had rendered long meritorious services, on the eve of his
retirement. Reference to Muslim law is herefore misconceived.
We
may, however, say in passing that even according to the observations
of the Privy Council relied upon by the C..ounsel. creation of an
interest limited in point of time, in the usufruct of the property is
not necessarily repugnant to Muslim Law.
F
G
Mr. Panjwani has advanced an alternative argument also, to suppcrt
the decision of the High Court.
The contention is that even if it is
assumed that the house had been given to Sir Liaqat Ali absolutely,
then also the grant had come to an end on resumption of the possession of the house by the Government of Bhopal in 194 7, and thereafter the grant continued to be non-est because after the merger of
the State of Bhopal on 1-6-1949, it was not recognised by the Government of India or by the new Government of Madhya Pradesh after Bhopal became a part of that State on 1-11-1951. Rather, as per Ex.P-6,
the new Government after the disappearance of Bhopal State from the
scene, repndiated the grant.
In these circumstances, submits
the
Counsel, the appellants did not carry with them the right, if any, they
had under the grant as subjects of the Ex-Sovereign Ruler of Bhopal
H
and after the extinction of Bhopal State and its Ruler, they had only
such rights as were granted or recognised by the new Sovereign i.e.
the Central Government. According to the Counsel, the plaintiffs'
claim was not enforceable in the municipal courts. Reliance
has
been placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Vora
F]difali Badn1_ddin !.fit_hibarwale('); ·
,
1[1964] 6 S.C.R. 461 at 551.
• ·
•
' . -
•
..
•
•
\ J
MOHSIN ALI. v. M.P. STATE (Sarkaria, l.)
249
There is no foundation for the plea either in the pleadings or in the
A
issues.
We therefore do not ·allow it to he raised for the first time in
this Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and ·is dismissed with
costs.
P.H.P .
Appeal dismissed.
B
l