# Monypenny v. Mo11ype11ny 1861 9 H.L.C 114 and Re Mered - **Citation:** [1974] 1 S.C.R. 535 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1973-08-28 - **Case number:** Civil Regular First Appeal No. (0.S. 16 of 1970 - **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, M. H. Beg - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/monypenny-v-mo11ype11ny-1861-9-h-l-c-114-and-re-mered-6002 - **Pages:** 13 ## Headnote Dtrd--C 01&structio11 of. 535 The Secretary of State for India had entered into a lease with the respondent ·in 1931. 'J'he lease was for a term of ninety years. The leased land was cntrust- (d for management on behalf of the Government of India to the Delhi Improve· ment Trust and thereafter after abolition of the Trust to .the appellant, the Delhi Development Authority. The lessee had paid a permiulii. in considerat!on of the lc""'i and had agreed to pay an annual rent of Rs. 465 /- for the duration of the· lease. Covenant 9 of the deed provided· that "_the lessor. will at the request and ccist of the l~'e at the end of the term hereby granted and so on from time to time theif-aftef -at t~ end of each &uch successive further ter1n of years as shall be granted .. execute to the lessee a new lease of the premises demised by way of renewal for 20 ·years at the first renewal and 20' years for the second renewal and 30 years for· the third renewal. The proviso to covenant 9 stipulated "that of each such rCnewed term of "years as shall be granted shall not with the original term of the years· and any previous renewals exceed in the aggregate the period of ninety years... Covenant 10 made the rent subject to enhancement on the st:cond renewal. The appellant enhanced thC rent "tluring the period.. of ninety ynrs and demanded arrears of rent. The respondent then sued for a declaration · that the annual rent payable by him could not be enhanced during_ the subsis· tence of the lease·. · The High Court decreed the suit. In the appeal to this Court it was contended that the proviso to covenant 9 made the -enhancement clause operative within the admitted l.'eriod of the lease of ninety years bacause t9e "original ternt" mentioned therein not only stood for the initi3t ninety years but after the expiry of the. first period of ninety years. [54J.F] Dismissing the appeal, HELD : That on an interpretation of the Jease deed on its own languag!:· and ter~s the enhancement clause could only o~rate upon the grant of a fresh lease after the e:xpiry of the first period of ninety years. [541 F] The initial term of lease of ninety years could not exist with the renewal of that very lease within ninety years. A renewal of a leaese is really a grant of a ~resh lease. .I~ as the words in covenant 9 clearly signify enhancement of rint 1S D_lade cond1t~o!1~l .upon. grant of a fresh lease, it could only take place on .the expiry of the initial lease. and not before ~hat i.im.e. [5J8G1 The_ f!!~aning of the words "original term" as used in the proviso could not be the 1n1tt1?1 term of 90 yea.rs because if that is added to the periods of rer,e\val of lease the total must obviously and necessarily exceed 90 years. It is quite natutal to r~trict this express~on used in the context of renewals to a term of re~wal. This would be a log1cal course to adopt as the whole covenant 9 deals with rene\vals of leases. The difficulty in tearing the few words in the proviso aw~y from ~e cont~xt of the_ rest of the covenant as well as from all other parts of the d~ IS, f!:tat it could, ~f that were. d_o_ne override not merely the words of the demi~,. gi~ng the duration of the initial lease as ninety years, but would also conflic_t with the contents of covenant 9 itself. Nothing in the proviso to. CO\o~nt 9 couJd reasonably be used ttlY be said to· bt mapplicable today. In the present case the lease Wll! for val.uable consideration. D fS44D·F. 545F-HI Dahebzada Mohd ... Kamgar Shah v. lagdish Chandra Rao Dhabal Dw (1960J 3 S.C.R. 604 und Raja Rajendra Chand v. Mst. Sukhi A.l.R. 1951 S.C. 286 ·teferred ~o. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No_ 298 of 1973. From the Judgment and Decree dated the 26th May, 1971 of the .Delhi High Court in Civil Regular First Appeal No. (0.S. 16 of 1970)· L. M. Singhvi, Sardar Br:i.hadur Saharya, Keshar Dayal, Vishnμ B . . Sdharya and Yogendra Khushalani, for the appellant. V. M. Tarkunde, B. Dutta and Ramesh Chandra, for respon.D.A. V. D.C. KAUSHISH (Beg, J.) 537 him. Furthermore, the plaintiff prayed for an injuncti~n to restrain the appellant, acting on behalf ot the lessor, from realising an annual rent in excess of Rs. 365 /- for the duration of the lease claimed to be for 90 years. The defendant-appellant pleaded, inter-a/ia, that the suit was barred by the provisions of Sec. A53(B) (2) of the Delhi Development Act. Want of notice under Sec. 80 C.P.C., upon the Union of India a codefendant, was also pleaded. These questions were decided agai~st the defendants by a learned judge of the Delhi High Court, who tried the case and dismissed the. suit on merits, as well as by the Division Bench which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed by the suit on merits. Questions decjded against the defendants at both stages in the Delhi High Court are not before us for decision. The only question argued before us was whether the interpretation of the lease deed (Ex. P2), dated 17-9-31, between the Secretary of State for India and the appellant, by the learned judge who tried the case and held that rent could be enhanced within the period of 90 years, was correct, or the interpretation adopted by the Division Bench, which allowed plaintiff's appeal after holdmg that the enhancement clause could only operate upon the grant of• a fresh lease, after the expiry of the first period of 90 years under the lease, was correct. We think that the most significant feature of the case is that the assertion, in paragraph 1 of the plaint, that the lease commancing on 1-4-31 was for the term of 90 years, is admitted to be correct in paragraph 1 of the replies on merits in the written statement on behalf of both the defendants, namely, the Union of India and the Delhi Development Authority. It was, however, not admitted by the defendants that the yearly ground rent of Rs. 365 /- could not be enhanced within a period of 90 years. Paragraph 4 of the joint written statement of the defendants shows that the real dispute betwce'l. the parties was whether the deed dated 17-9-31, under which the lease commenced from 1-4-31, provided for an enhancement of the rent within the period of 90 years by reason of covenants numbered 9 and 10 of the lease deed; or, the power of enhancement was to be exercised only on the grant of a fresh lease after the determination of the initial period of 90' years. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the plaintiff asserted : "12. 'That according to the terms of the Lease dated 17th September, 1931 the land has been leased to the plaintiff for a term of 90 years at the rate of rent of Rs, 365/- per year. The rent during the said term of the lease cannot be enhanced and has not in fact been enhanced by defendant N'o. 1 or defendant No. 2." The reply in the written statement in paragraph 12 on merits was : "12. That para 12 of the amended plaint is not admitted as stated. The lease dated 17th September, 1931, was granted to the plaintiff for a total period of 90 years at the rate of ground rent of Rs. 365/- per annum, subject to the renewal of the lease and at enhanced rate as provided under terms of the lease." SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 1 s.c.R. The difficulty in which the defendants were placed, possibly due to a defective drafting of the lease deed which failed to bring out whatever may have been the real intention, was that they could not get out of the categorical statement in the lease deed of 17-9-31 that it was for a total period of 90 years at Rs. 365 per annum. Hence, the defendants admitted this to be correct. But, immediately thereafter, the defen- -1!ants were faced with the problem that a natural interpretation of covenant 9 of the lease deed, dealing ~ith bOth with the enhancement and -renewal of the foase, laid down that the renewal was to take place only "''at the end of the term hereby granted" (i.'e. 90 years), and covenant 10 made it clear that the right of enhancement" could be exercised as is naturally to be ex_pected, only when the lease is renewed. Hence, 1o meet this difficulty, the defendants, immediately after admitting that the lease was for a period of 90 years, asserted, in paragraph 12 of replies ·on merits in the written statement, that it was "subject to renewal .of the lease at the enhanced rate as provided under the lease". Jn other words, the "renewals" were also covered by the initial period of ·ninety years; but, this makes no sense according to law as explained :by us below. It is also clear that the issues framed did not indicate that the defen- -Oants' case anywhere was that the initial lease was for a period Jess than 90 years. In fact, there could be no issue on that point because the defendants had admitted the plaintiff's statement to be correct that the !lease was for a period of 90 years. Therefore, the issues framed on merits indicated that the dispute between the parties was confined to the question whether the defendants could exercise a right of enhancement within the period of 90 years. The relevant issue No. 5 was framed a3 follows : "W,hether on the construction of paras 9 and 10 of the lease deed dated 17-9-1931 the defendants are entitled to enhancement of rent as claimed by them and if so, whether any such enhancement has been lawfully made by them ?" If the plaintiff was not entitled initially to a lease of 90 years for 1he rent agreed upon but the rent was liable to be increased within that period, as appeared to be the real case of the defendants in the High 'Court, there was no question of grant of a fresh lease. A renewal of a lease is really the grant of a fresh lease. It is called a "renewal" simply because it postulates the existence of a prior lease which generally provides for renewals as of right. In all other respects, it is really a fresh lease. Thus, the initial term of a lease of ninety years could not co-exist with the renewals of that very lease within ninety years. Hence, the appellant's counsel was compelled to argue that the initial period of the lease must be deemed to be 20 years. If the argument advanced by the appellant is correct, the plaintiff-respondent would be m~rely a tenant "holding over" after expiry of twenty years. But, 1hat is not the defendants' case .in their written statement. If, as the words used in covenant No. 9 clearly signify, enhancement of rent is made conditional upon !!fant of a fresh lease, it could only take place ·on the expiry of the initial lease ancJ not before that time. That could b~ either ninety years or twenty years but not both simultaneously. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H D.D.A. V. D.C. KAUSHISH (Beg, /.) 539 If the initial lease was for a period of 20 years only su!>ject to rights of renewal and liability to enhancement of rent on a renewal, there was nothing to prevent the grantor from saying so in the lease-deed. Again, if the period of lease of 90 years on payment of an annual rent of Rs. 365/- was subject to a periodic increase of rent within this initial period of 90 years, the grantor could have easily said so and would have done it. We all know that, in such cases, a grantee has little choice if he really wants to obtain a lease. The terms and conditions are really laid down by the grantor, which is the Sovereign or the State in such cases, and these terms are generally of a uniform type. If the language adopted in granting the lease is defective, so as to fail to bring out the real intention of the grantor, whatever that intention may have been, the grantee cannot be made to suffer for the defect. Before actually dealing with the principles of construction involved, we will set out the relevant terms of the lease deed rn as to indicate what the grantor did here. The operative part of the deed containing the words of demise reads as follows : "Now this indenture witnesseth that in consideration of the rent hereinafter rr.served and of the covenants on the part or the said Lessee hereinafter contained the said Lessor does hereby demise unto the said Lessee all that plot of land containing by measurement 5444 square yards situated at Ara Kashan, Paharganj, in the Municipality of Delhi which said plot of land is more particularly described in the schedule hereunder written and with the boundaries thereof has, for greater clearness, been delineated on the plan annexed to these presents and thereon coloured blue, together with au rights, e1LSements and appurtenances whatsoever to the said Lessee fpr the term of 90 years commencing from the l st day of April, 1931 rendering therefore during the said term the yearly rent of Rs. 365 /· only clear of all deductions, by equal half yearly payments on the first day of January and first day. of July at Rs. 182/8/- each at the Nazul Office of the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi or of such officer as may from time to time be appointed by the L-ocal Government in this behalf. The first of such payments to be made on the first day of July next." Thereafter, begins a fresh paragraph with the words : "Subject always to the exceptio,ns, reservations and c?nd1ttons .and. covenants hereinafter contained". These covenants con tam the obhgatton of the lessee to pay Rs. 18,154/- in 4 instalments on or before ~{}9-32, a provision for forfeiture of the lease on a breach of the cond1tton relating. to payment of premium, the right of the lessor to re.cover th~ outstanding amount as arrears of land revenue, the reservation. of mmer~l rights by the lessor, an undertaking by the lessee to pay "dun~g tile s'.'1d term" all rates taxes charges and assessments of every_ escnptton u . ' ' t time hereafter du,"ZHf? tne said ter!n which ~re now or _may a ~Jiereof" the other duties of the lessee be assessed.· · ·: · · . m r1s~c 1 th~ obligations of the lessee to ~~~~;r ~~ ~~~~IS~C:~~h~ de~r~fn~tion of the said term", and, if the 540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 1 s.c.R. land is required fur a public purpose "during the period of the lease", to accept compensation only for the buildings on the value of which the decision of the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi was to be final and conclusive. After detailing the conditions, mentioned above, applicable for the duration of the lease, t9 which references axe repeatedly maM, follow the controversial conditions or covenants 9 and l 0 which read as follows : "9· The Lessor will at the request and cost of the Lessee at the end of the· term hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at the end of each such successive further term of years as shall be granted, execute to the Lessee a new Lease of the promises herby demised by way of renewal for a further term as follows :- (a) At the first renewal (b) At the second renewal (c) At the third renewal Twrnty years. Twemty years. Thirty years. Provided always that each such renewed term of years as shall be granted shall not with the original term of the years and any previous renewals exceed in the aggregate the period of ninety years." "10. The rent of the said premises hereby demised is hereby expressly made subject to enchancement on the second renewal shall not exceed one hundred per cent of that reserved at the first renewal. Leases re~wed for the third period provided for in the last preceding clause may be granted at the then prevailing market rate of rents for building land in the vicinity." The appellant's contention is that the proviso to coven.ant No. 9 makes the enchancement clause operative within the admitted period of the lease of 90 years because the "origin.al te@" mentioned there not only stands for the initial 90 years bnt also includes the periods of rene· wals within it. It is pointed out that the total period cannot exceed 90 years. This means that the "original term" is to be equated with the total period for which the initial lease and the renewed leases oould be granted. The language, if interpreted in this way, lends to patent absurdities mentioned above. The plaintiff contends that the appellant's construction of the prnviso would completely nullify the most essentfal part of the lease contained in the words of demise for a period of 90 years at a yearly rent of Rs. 365/- It was emphasized that the right of the lessee to a renewal accrues only "at the end of the term hereby granted", and that the right to enhanced rent was to be a condition in the renewed or fresh leasL 'thereafter". The period of demise is repeatedly referred to throughout the. deed, and, as already pointed out, is actually admitted by the defendants to be 90 years. Hence, it iB contended that the proviso to covenant No. 9 could not possibly be so interpreted A D E F G H A D E G H D.D.A. v. D. C. KAUSHISH (Beg, /.) 541 as to destroy the effect of the demise itself and reduce the initial lease ffQll1 one for 90 years to a lease for 20 years only initially. This sooms to us to be the more reasonable view. The learned counsel for the appellant ha.s contended : that, words of demise in the ealier part of the deed are made expressly subject to the. reservations, conditions and covenants in the subsequent parts; that, 'ovenant No. 9 does not destroy the character of the demise but }J'Jy qualifies it by subjecting it to liability for enhancement; that. ·eix;ated. references to the "term hereby granted" must be read in the context of the whole deed; that, there are no words indicating that the lease is not terminable before 90 years, or, in other words, not renewable after 20 year~; that, the word "with" in the proviso to covenant 9 has been wrongly interpreted by the Division Bench to mean "placed·side by side" instead of signifying an aggregation as it ordinarily the 1espondent more than the ordinary meaning suggested by the appellant which is also.given there. It is: "inclusive of". Other meanings possibly more helpful to the respondent, are: "(1) (a) in opposition to or against"; "(b) away from, so as to be separated or detached from ... We are un.able to say in what exact sense the word "with" was really uso;d in the proviso. It is used to contrast and compare or oppose, by placing side by side, as well as. to add up or include what is indicated as so placed. In either case, if the "original term" were really to stand for the period of ninety years, the aggregation would carry us 9-382SupCI[74 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 1 s.c.R. be:yond ninety years and make the limitation to that period appear qwte absurd. So, the meaning of "with" suggested by. the appellant is aJBo quite unhelpful. The meaning of the word "with" generally gathered from the context and has to be considered in con junction with word which precede and the6e which follow it. It is the exact meaning of the words "origin3l term", as used in the proviso, which is far more important. It is not unlikely that the draftsman, due to an imperfect knowledge of a foreign language, which English is for us, used the expression in some special sense of his own. .Its meaning could not, as pointed out above, be the initial term of ninety years, because, if that is added on to the period' of renewal of lease.s the total must obviously and necessarily exceed ninety years. Hence, we are compelled to resort to guesswork to make some sense out of tlie expression "original terms" as used in the proviso. It may be that the draftsman described the period of the first renewal as the "original tertn". Or, perhaps be used it to describe the actual period of a renewal as constrasted with subsequent or previous renewals. It is quit~ natural to restrict_ this expression used in th!! oontext of renewals to a term of a renewal. This would be a logical course to adopt as the whole .of covenant 9 deals with renewal of leases.. In any casi;; this is the only way in which we can make the proviso intelligible, and, therefore, unless the expression is discarded as incomprehensible. or meaningless ln the context, we have to read it in that sense. The difficulty ,in teariog the few words in the proviso away from the context of the rest of the covenant as well as from all other parts of the deed is that it would, if that were done, .override not merely the words of demise, giving the duration of the initial l~ as 90 years, but would .also conflict with the contents of covenant 9 itself. As we have siμd earlier this covenant clearly says that it will operate only at the end of the first 90 years. If, according to covenant No. 9 itself, the provisions relating to the renewal of the lease and enhancement of rent are to come into effect only at the end of ninety years' grant, how can we shorten it, without ignoring the most essential part of the lease, and give effect to some merely presumed or guessed intention in such way as to override the plain meaning of the. language used? Nothing in the proviso to onvenant 9 could reasonably be used to destroy the meaning of the unambiguous opening words of the coveriant showing that the whole covenant is meant to ooerate only "at the end of the term hereby granted" (i.e. after 90 years). Both sides have relied upon certain passages in Odgers' "Construction of Deeds and Statutes" (5th ed. 1967). There (at pages 28-29), ·the First General Rule of Interoretation formulated is : "The meaning of the document or of a oarticular part of it is therefore to be sought for in the document itself". That is, undoubtedly. the primarv rule of construction to which Sections 90 to 94 of the Indian Evidence Act give statutorv recol!llition and effect. with certain exceotions contained in Sections 95 to 98 of the Act. Of course, "the document" means "'the document" read as a whole and not piecemeal. A B c D G H 1 A B c D E G D.D.A. v. D. C. KAUSHISH (Beg, /.) 543 The rule stated above follows logically from the Literal Rule of Construction which, unless its application produces absurd results must be resorted to first. This is clear from the following passages cited in Odgers' short book under the Frrst Rule of Interpretation set out above: Lord Wensleydale in Monypenny v. Monypenny( 1) said: "the question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the meaning of the words used in that deed: a most important distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards 0f which often leads to erroneous conclusions." Brett, L.J., in Re Meredith, ex p. Chick(2) observed: "I am disposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Demnan and Baron ·Parke ... They said that in construing instruments you must have regard. not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they have used." Another rule which seems to us to be applicable here was thus stated by this Court in Radha Sunder Dutta v. Mohd. lahadur Rahim & Others(>) : Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if there be admissible two constructions of a document, one of which will give effect to all the clauses therein while the other will render one or more of them nugatory, it is the former that should be adopted on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat". Assuming, however, that there is some conflict between an earli,;;r part of the ·deed containing a demise of land clearly for a period of 90 years on an annual rent of Rs. 365, and the proviso of covenant No. 9, annexed to the demise, in a later part of the deed, which can· not be resolved without discarding or disregarding some word or words, the respondent's counsel contended that the earlier words of demise, consistently supported by the contents of other parts of the deed, should prevail over the inconsistency found in the proviso to one of the conditions in the later part of the deed. He relied for this proposition on : Sahebzada Mohd. Kamgar Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Rao Dhabel Deo ('); Ramkishote Lal v. Kamal Narian(•); Forbes v. Git(•). He also relied on Smt. Bina Das Gupta and Others v. Sachi11dra .\Johan Das Guvta(7 ), where the following statement of law in Savill Eros., Ltd. v. Bethell(8), by Sterling L.J. was cited with approval bv this Court : ' , "It is a settled rule of construction that where there is a grant and an exception out of it, the exception is to be taken H 0) (1861) 9 H. L. C. 114 at p. 146. (2) [1879] 11 Ch. D. 731 at p. 739. (3) A. I. R. 1959 S. C, 24 at p. 29. (4) [1960] 3 S. C. R. 604 at p, 61 l. (5) [19631 Supp. 2 S. C.R. p, 417 at p. 425. (6) [1922) 1 A. C. p. 256 at p, 259. (7) A.lR. 1968 S. C. p. 39 at p. 42. (8) [1902]·2 Ch. p, 523 at pp. 537-538. 544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974] 1 s.c.R. as inserled for the benefit of the garntor and to be construed in favour of the grantee. If then the grant be clear, but the exception be so framed as to be bad fot uncertainty, it appears to us that on this principle the grant is operative and rhe exception fails." We think that the proviso to covenant No. 9 could be said to suffer from the vice of an uncertainty which can only be removed by ignoring the words: creating this uncertainty. We think that, in such a case, the ambiguous words can be disregarded so that the terms of the earlier operative part of the demise, which are clear, must prevail. Learned· Counsel for the respondent also relied on the following passage from Glynn and Ors. v. Margetson & Co.(1) in the judgment of Lords Halsbury : Looking at the whole of the instrument, and seeing that one must regard, for a reason which I will give in a moment, as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract." If the ambiguity created by the words used in the proviso to the 9th covenant can_ be resolved, assuming that two interpretations of it are reasonably possible, as it seems possible, the principle to apply would be that the interpretation fa~oming the grantee as against the grantor should be accepted. This was also one of the grounds for the deeision of this Court in Kamgar Shah's case (supra). Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that this principle itself is out of date and inapplicable in this country today. He submitted, at the same time, that the deed must be construed in favour of the appellant, !representing the grant.or, on grounds of public interest. No authority is cited to substantiate such a proposition. But, learned counsel relied, for this submission, on the British rule regfilating grants by the Sovereign : a grant should be construed in favour of the Soveregin and against the subject when it is susceptible of two meanings. We think that the argument that the rule that a grant, capable of A B c D E F two interpretations should be constrned in favou.r of the grantee, i• obsolete and that we should employ some test of public interest amounts to a plea that we should depart from established cannons G of construction of deeds containing grants on grounds of public policy which has been described as an "unruly horse." It is more appropriate to address arguments based on public interest and public policy to. a legislature where such policies are given legal expression. Our task,. as we conceive it in the present case, is merely to construe an agreement embodied in a lease, in which the lessor is the grant')r, accord· ing to ordinary well recognised rules of construction one of which is H found stated in Smt. Bina Das Gupta's case (supra). !l) [1893] A. C. p. 351 at p. 357. ;I "' l"' ~ B c D E G H D.D.i\.· v. D. C. KAUSHISH (Beg, J.) 5-15 w,e may al&:> cite here Raja Rajendira Chand v. Smt. Sukizi('), where it was pointed out that the English rule a grant should . be construed most favourably to the Sovereign was subject to the exception that, in cases of grants made for valuable consideration, as is the position in the lease before us, the Sovereign's honour must take precedence over the Sovereign's profit. This Court said (at page 292) there: "It is, we think, well settled thssible, one valid and the other void that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought "° be more regraded than the Sovereign's profit (see para 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury's Laws-- of England Vol. VII, S.12, Simonds Edi ton)." We doubt whether a lease granted by the Secretary of State for India even before 1950 could be interpreted today by relying upon anY special rule of constfuction applicable to leases by _or on behalf of the British Sovereign. _Indian citizens are now governed by the Indian Constitution on matters relating to Sovereignty. It may be that a rule of constrution traceable to the prerogatives of the Sovereign, in the feudal age, is no longer applicable in a Democratic Repub· lican State, set up by our Constitution, when dealing with its citizens. There appears to be no just and equitable ground why the State as the lessor grantor, with all its resources .and experienced draftsmen and legal advisers and enjoying a practically invincible -®rgaining position as ag~ citizen lessee grantee, should enjoy the benefit of some nebulol!S' and unjust rule of cons1ruction so as to enable Courts to rewrite its defectively drafted deeds in its favour. We think that it is not the ordinary rule of construction, applicable to grants capable of two constructions, which could be oblolete in this counlrY today, but, it is the reversal of that rule in the cate of the grant by the Sovereign-- a feudal relic--whjch could moce aptly be said to be inapplicable here today. And, as we have already pointed out, even that feudal relic was subject to the exception that it could not stand in the way bf evenhanded justice where the Sovereign bid receiwd valuable consideration. The lease before us was for valuable consideration. {I) A. I. R. 1957 S. C. P: 286. 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1974 J 1 s.c.R. It may be mentioned here that not only was consideration in the form of premium of Rs. 18,154/- received at the time of grant of the lease, but a further sum of Rs. 10,888/- was paid by the lessee to the Delhi Improvement Trust under an agreement to which both President of India and the Improvement Trust were parties as lessors. As already m~ntioned earlier, this agreement (Ex. P4), headed a 'lease agreement', was, in fact, intended for the payment of development and betterment charges for building according to a plan sanctioned by the Improvement Trust. But, the document giws the histo~ of the lease from 1931, and, in paragraph 6 of the agreement goes on to provide : "In spite of this agreement, the parties hereto shall have the same rights as heretofore under the aforesaid lease dated the 17th September, 1931." The plaintiff-respondent had, in paragraph 4 ·of the plaint, laid d