# MOR CHA v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 744
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-13
- **Bench:** Jaswant Singh, P. s. KAILASAM, A. D. KosHAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mor-cha-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-7531
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Culpable hondcide-Accused causing several injuries on the person of the
deceased, out of which one iniury which had injured the liver and caused the
perforation of the larger colon was sufficient to cause the death in the ordin,rry
course of nature-Medical opinion further was to the effect "that if immedi1lte
expert treatment had been available and tfle emergency operatlon had been
performed, there were chances of survival of the deceased"-Whether it alters !he
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nature of offence
from one under Section 302 l.P.C. to one under Section '.:104
Part II l.P.C.
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Penal Code, Sections 299, 300, 302, 304 r jw Evidence Act, Section 45 and
Section 291 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
The appellant was charged and tried for the offence under Section 302 LP.C
for causing the murder of his wife. The Sessions Judge though on a consid1~ra·
tion of the evidence led in the case including the direct te:>timony of Mst. Jelki
(PW 3) and Mst,jlModan (PW 8) found that the ~ppellant attacked his wite.
Mst. Gajri with dagger (Ext. I) and caused injuries on her person out of
which injury No. 2 which had injured the liver and caused the perforation of
the large colon was sufficient to cause her death in the ordinarry course of nature,
convicted him under Section 304 Part II l.P .C. and acquitted him of the charge
under Section 302 Penal Code, in view of the fact that Dr. Laxmi Narain
(PW 1) \vho conducted the postmortem examination of the body of Mst. (Jajri
had said in the course of hi!! examination that "if immediate expert treatrnent
had been available and emergency operation had been performed there were
chances of the survival". In State apepal, the High Court altered the conviction
of the appellant from one under Section 304 Part II LP .C. to that under
Section 302 1.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Hence the
appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Cri1ninal

## Text

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744
MOR CHA
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
September 13, 1978
[JASWANT SINGH, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]
Culpable hondcide-Accused causing several injuries on the person of the
deceased, out of which one iniury which had injured the liver and caused the
perforation of the larger colon was sufficient to cause the death in the ordin,rry
course of nature-Medical opinion further was to the effect "that if immedi1lte
expert treatment had been available and tfle emergency operatlon had been
performed, there were chances of survival of the deceased"-Whether it alters !he
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nature of offence
from one under Section 302 l.P.C. to one under Section '.:104
Part II l.P.C.
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Penal Code, Sections 299, 300, 302, 304 r jw Evidence Act, Section 45 and
Section 291 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
The appellant was charged and tried for the offence under Section 302 LP.C
for causing the murder of his wife. The Sessions Judge though on a consid1~ra·
tion of the evidence led in the case including the direct te:>timony of Mst. Jelki
(PW 3) and Mst,jlModan (PW 8) found that the ~ppellant attacked his wite.
Mst. Gajri with dagger (Ext. I) and caused injuries on her person out of
which injury No. 2 which had injured the liver and caused the perforation of
the large colon was sufficient to cause her death in the ordinarry course of nature,
convicted him under Section 304 Part II l.P .C. and acquitted him of the charge
under Section 302 Penal Code, in view of the fact that Dr. Laxmi Narain
(PW 1) \vho conducted the postmortem examination of the body of Mst. (Jajri
had said in the course of hi!! examination that "if immediate expert treatrnent
had been available and emergency operation had been performed there were
chances of the survival". In State apepal, the High Court altered the conviction
of the appellant from one under Section 304 Part II LP .C. to that under
Section 302 1.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Hence the
appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Cri1ninal
Appellate Jurisdiction) Act (Act 28) 1970.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : I. Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code clearly
Iavs down that where death is caused by bcxlily injury the person who causes
such bodily injury ~hall be deemed to have caused the death, althou_gh by
resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death mii:ht have been
prevented.
The mere fact that if immediate expert treatment had been availa-ble
and the emergency operation had been performed, there \\'ere chances of survival
of the deceased can be of no avail to the appellant.. [749H, 759A1
2. The ·injury in the opinion of the doctor being sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause deaith of the deceased, the case squarely fell within
the ambit of cl&use, Thirdly of Section 300 l.P.C.
[749G]
In the instant case, the appellant appears to have intended to cau~e the
death of Mst. Gajri otherwise there was no necessity for him to carry the
dagger with him when he went to the village of his in·la\VS to fetch his wifo.
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MORCHA v. RAJASTHAN (Jaswant Singh, J.)
745
That the appellant intended to cause the death of the deceased is further clear
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from the fact that he inflicted a through and through penetrating wound on
the pooterior axillary line which seriously injured the vital organs of the deceased
viz. the liver and the large colon leading to internal haemorrhage afld shock.
[749F-G]
Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1958] S.C.R. 1495 and State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 601; reiterated.
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 43 of
!972.
From the Juagment and Order dated 11-5-71 of the Rajasthan
\, High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 478/67.
Nemo : for the Appellant.
S. M. Jain for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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JASWANT SINGH, J.
This appeal under section 2(a) of the Snpreme
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Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970
(Act 28 of 1970) raises a short question as to the nature of the offence
made out against the appellant on the basis of the evidence adduced
in Sessions Case No. 64 of 1966.
The Sessions Judge, Udaipur, who tried the appellant found on a
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consideration of the evidence led in fhe case including the direct testimony of Mst. Jelki (P.W. 3) and Mst. Modan (P.W. 8) that the
appellant attacked his wife, Mst. Gajri with dagger (Exh. 1) and
caused injuries on her person out of which injur,y No. 2 which had
injured the liver and caused the perforation of the large colon was
' sufficient to cause her death in the ordinary course of nature. Despite
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this finding, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under section
304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code and acqnitted him of the charge
under section 302 of the Penal Code in view of the fact that Dr. Laxmi
Narain (P.W. !) who conducted the post mortem examination of the
body of Mst. Gajri had said in the course of his examination that if
immediate expert treatment had been available and emergency operation had been performed, there were chances of her sun'ival.
The
Sessions Judge agreeing with the contention raised on behalf of the
defence also found that according to th_e case of the prosecution itself,
the accused had gone to the village of his in-laws to fetch Mst. Gajri
and it was only on her refusal to accompany him that the incident
took place; that he had no intention to kill Mst. Gajri and that at best
what could be attributed to the appellant was the knowledge that the
injury he was inflicting on the deceased w~ likely to cause her death.
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746
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979) 1 s.c.R.
On the matter ~eing taken in appeal by the State, the High Court
found that the Sessions Judge was in error in acquitting the appellant
of the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code ignoring
the evidence to the effect that a penetrating wound 1 t" X t'' was caused
by the appellant with a dagger on the posterior axillary line 1 O" from
the top of the shoulder and 5" from the spine which had caused injury
to the liver and perforation of the large colon and was sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Accordingly, the High
Court altered the conviction of the appellant from the one under section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code to that under section 302
of the Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life ..
Mr. K. K. Lutbra who was appointed as amicus curiae in the case
not having cared to appear despite long and anxious waiting, we have
gone through the entire record with the assistance of counsel for the
respondent.
The grounds of appeal submitted by the appellant which
are very inartistically drafted can at best be interpreted to urge only
one thing viz. that the High C9urt went wrong in upsetting the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge and convicting the appellant
under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code instead of under section
304 Part II of the Penal Code as ordered by the Sessions J udgc.
This
contention, in our judgment, is entirely misconceived.
It completely
overlooks the circumstances attending the commission of the ot!ence
viz. that the appellant went armed with a dagger and despite the willingness expressed by Mst. Gajri to accompany him next morning, he
inflicted without the slightest provocation two injuries on her person
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( 1) which landed <in her right palm i" above the second metacarpo
phalangeal joint in the process of warding off the blow and (2) a
penetrating wound, as stated above.
The whole affair appears to be \,
pre-planned and pre-meditated and as such the case squarely falls
within the purview of clause thirdly of section 300 of the Indian Penal
Code.
We are fortified in this view by two decisions of this Court
viz. Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab( 1)
and State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.(2 )
In Virsa Siiigh v. The
State of Punjab (supra) where the accused thrust a spear into the
abdomen of the deceased which resulted in his death and in the opinion
of the doctor, the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature, it was held that even if the intention of the accused
was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cau.se de~th
in the ordinary course of nature and did not extena to the mtentJon
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(!) [1958) S. C. R. 1495.
(2) [1977] I S. C.R.. 601.
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MORCHA v. RAJASTHAN (Jaswant Singh,!.)
747
of causing death, the offence would be murder.
The following observations made by this Court in that case are wotth quoting :-
"If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the
intention is to kill and in that event, clause 'thirdly' would
be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part
of the section, namely-
"If the act by which the death is caused is done with
the intention of causing death."
In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate.
The firs~ is subjective to the offender :
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury
to any person."
It must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was
caused and the nature of the injury must be established, that
is to say, whether the injury is on the leg or the arm or the
stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs
were cut and so forth.
These are purely objective facts and
leave no room for interference or deduction : to that extent
t]Je enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question
of intention, that is subjective to the offender and it must be
proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury
that is found to be present.
Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to
the
next
clause-
·'and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."
The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of
the section, namely, the infliction of bodily injury with the
intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict
a blow on the lower part of the leg, or some lesser blow, and
it can be shown that the blow landed in the region of the
heart by accident, then, though an injury to the heart is shown
to be present, the intention to inflict an injury in that region,
or of that nature, is not proved. In that case, the first part
of the clause does not come into play.
Bui once it is proved
that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found
to be present, then the earlier part of the clause we are now
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748
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 1 S.C.R.
"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted" is merely
descriptive.
All it means is that it is not enough to prove
that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition
. be shown that the injury is of the kind that falls within the
earlier clause, namely, that the injury found to be present
was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it
was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
is a matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts
about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with
the question of intention.
In considering whether the intention was to inflict the
injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily
proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was
an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and
•t,ber with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found
to ha>•e been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to
enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the
prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he
intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart.
Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could
never be coμvicted, for if he does not know that ther.e is a
heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them.
Of course, that is riot the kind of
enquiry, It is broadbased and simple and based on commonsense : the kind of enquiry that "twelve good men are
true" could readily appreciate and understand.
To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following
facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, "thirdly";
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily
injury is present;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These
are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was
not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of
injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further and,
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MORCHA v. RAJASTHAN (Jaswant Singh, J.)
7 49
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type
just described made up of the three elements set out above
is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
Once these four . elements are established by the prosecution ( aud, of course, the burden is on the prosecution
throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, thirdly. It
does not matter that there was no intention to cause death.
It does not matte_r that there was no intention even to cause
an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there
is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to
cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury
actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry
is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a
matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature ta, cause death. No one has
a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim
that they are not guilly of murder. H they iufiict injuries
of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can
only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that
the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."
Similar view was expressed by this Court in Stale of Andhra
Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr. (Supra).
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In the present case, the appellant appears to have intended to
cause the death of Mst. Gajri otherwise there was no necessity for him
to carry the dagger with him when he went to the village of his in-laws
to fetch. his wife. That the appellant intended to cause the death of
the deceased is further clear from the fact that he inflicted a through
and through penetrating wound on the posterior axillary line which
seriously injured the vital organs of the deceased viz. the liver and the
large colon leading to internal haemorrhage and shock. The injury
in the opinion of the doctor being sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause the death of the deceased, the case squarely fell within
the ambit of clause thirdly of section 300 of the Indian Penal Code
as held by this Court in the decisions referred to above.
The mere fact that if immediate expert treatment had been available and the emergency operation had been performed, there were
chances of survival of the deceased can be of no avail to the appellant.
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750
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] l s.c.R.
Explanation 2 to section 299 of the Indian Penal Code clearly lays
down that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who
causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death,
although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the deal>h
might have been prevented.
For the foregoing reaso)IS, we are of the view that the Sessicns
Judge was wholly wrong in convicting the appellant under section 304
Part II of the Indian Penal Code and acquitting him of the charge under
section 302 of the Penal Code and the High Court was wholly right in
convicting the appellant under section 302 of the Penal Code instead
of under section 304 Part II of the Penal Code.
In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed.
S.R.
Appeal dismissed. •
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