# MRS. SARAH MATHEW v. THE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & ORS - **Citation:** [2013] 12 S.C.R. 674 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 2013-11-26 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005 - **Bench:** P. Sathasivam, Dr. B.S. Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, RANJAN GOGOi, S.A. Bobde - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mrs-sarah-mathew-v-the-institute-of-cardiovascular-diseases-by-its-director-dr-28641 - **Pages:** 61 ## Headnote Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 468 and 469 rlw s. 473 - Bar to take cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Commencement of period D of limitation and extension thereof - Held: For the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance - In view of s. 469, period of limitation in relation E to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence or from the date when the offence is detected - If the complaint is filed after the period of limitation, complainant can make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 - Court will have to issue notice to accused and after hearing the · accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the F delay or not - If the complaint is filed within the period of limitation and court takes cognizance after the period of limitation then complainant cannot be expected to make an application for condonation of such delay - s.473 postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the G complaint - It is the date of filing of the complaint which is material - ss. 468 and 469 will have to be read with s. 473 - Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent - Limitation. Chapter XXXVI - s.468 r!w ss. 469 and 473 - Bar to take H 674 SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 675 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Taking of A 'cognizance' - Connotation of - Held: 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court - Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed - This is the special B connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI - The only harmonious construction which can be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 is that Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the complaint in respect of it c is filed within the prescribed limitation period - He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable - Besides, Cr.P.C. is a procedural law to be construed liberally to serve justice - There is no scope for application of doctrine of casus omissus - Interpretation of 0 statutes - Harmonious construction - Liberal construction - Doctrine of casus omissus. Interpretation of Statutes: Purposive construction - Held: There is no ambiguity in E the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. - But, the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation - A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal F meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with legislative purpose - If in a case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the G legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will ..have to be adopted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI. Doctrine of reasonable construction - Court would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity H 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A of Jaw by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. Heading of Chapter - Held: 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to 8 sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in construction of statutes - They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of sections if the meaning is oth ## Text _Characters 0–39,849 of 112,052. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39849 for what follows._ A B c [2013] 12 S.C.R. 674 MRS. SARAH MATHEW v. THE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005) NOVEMBER 26, 2013 [P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, RANJAN GOGOi AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 468 and 469 rlw s. 473 - Bar to take cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Commencement of period D of limitation and extension thereof - Held: For the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance - In view of s. 469, period of limitation in relation E to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence or from the date when the offence is detected - If the complaint is filed after the period of limitation, complainant can make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 - Court will have to issue notice to accused and after hearing the · accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the F delay or not - If the complaint is filed within the period of limitation and court takes cognizance after the period of limitation then complainant cannot be expected to make an application for condonation of such delay - s.473 postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the G complaint - It is the date of filing of the complaint which is material - ss. 468 and 469 will have to be read with s. 473 - Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent - Limitation. Chapter XXXVI - s.468 r!w ss. 469 and 473 - Bar to take H 674 SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 675 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Taking of A 'cognizance' - Connotation of - Held: 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court - Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed - This is the special B connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI - The only harmonious construction which can be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 is that Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the complaint in respect of it c is filed within the prescribed limitation period - He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable - Besides, Cr.P.C. is a procedural law to be construed liberally to serve justice - There is no scope for application of doctrine of casus omissus - Interpretation of 0 statutes - Harmonious construction - Liberal construction - Doctrine of casus omissus. Interpretation of Statutes: Purposive construction - Held: There is no ambiguity in E the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. - But, the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation - A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal F meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with legislative purpose - If in a case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the G legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will ..have to be adopted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI. Doctrine of reasonable construction - Court would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity H 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A of Jaw by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. Heading of Chapter - Held: 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to 8 sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in construction of statutes - They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. c Maxims: Relevance of legal maxims in interpreting a provision - Held: Though legal maxims are not mandatory rules, but they 0 seNe as guiding principles - Maxims - (i) 'nu/furn tempus aut locus occurrit regi', (ii) 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt', (iii) 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' - Applicability of. There being conflict in the views taken in two-Judge E Bench decisions in Bharat Kale' and Japani Sahoo2 on the one hand, and a three-Judge Bench decision in Krishna Pillai3, on the other, on the question whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the F relevant date would be the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date would be the date on which the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, the mater was ultimately referred to the Constitution Bench. G Answering the reference, the Court 1. Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559. 2. Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 (8) SCR 582. H 3. Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. (1990) supp. SCC 121. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 677 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN HELD: 1.1 The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply A to criminal proceedings except for appeals or revisions for which express provision is made in Articles 114, 115, 131 and 132 thereof. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 contained no general provision for limitation. Though under certain special laws there are provisions B prescribing period of limitation for prosecution of offences, there was no general law of limitation for prosecution of other offences. This position underwent a change to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was introduced in the Cr.P.C. [para 15-16] [709-C-E; 708-F-G] c The Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L.R. Melwani & Anr. 1969 SCR 438 =AIR 1970 SC 962 - referred to 1.2 The object of Chapter XXXVI was to quicken the D prosecutions of complaints and to .rid the criminal justice system of inconsequential cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or indolence. The effort was to make the criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation for certain offences. E However, the law makers did not want cause of justice to suffer in genuine cases. Therefore, in Chapter XXXVI, provisions have been made out for exclusion of time in certain cases [s. 470], for exclusion of date on which the court is closed [s.471], for continuing offences [s.472] and F for extension of period of limitation in certain cases [s. 473]. Section 473 is crucial. It is an overriding provision which enables courts to condone delay where such delay has been properly explained or where the interest of justice demands extension of period of limitation. It G empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, Chapter H 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A XXXVI is not loaded against the complainant. [Para 18 and 19] [715-G-H; 716-A, E-G] B State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh AIR 1981 SC 1054 - referred to. 1.3 It is true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial and this right is a facet of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. does not undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by providing for limitation it does not want all C prosecutions to be thrown overboard on the ground of delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the accused. It is significant to notice that where the legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation D in the section itself [e.g. ss.198(6) and 199(5)]. However, it chose to make general provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first time and incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. [para 19] [716-G-H; 717-A-C] E 1.4 Section 467 defines the phrase 'period of limitation' to mean the period specified in s.468 for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 stipulates the bar of limitation. Sub-s. (1) of s.468 makes it clear that a fetter is put on the court's power to take cognizance of F an offence of the category mentioned in sub-s. (2) after the expiry of period of limitation. Sub-s. (2) lays down the period of limitation for certain offences. Section 469 states when the period of limitation commences. It is dexterously drafted so as to prevent advantage of bar of G limitation being taken by the accused. It states that period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence or from the date when the offence is detected. [para 21] [719-A-D] H Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, 1996 SARAH MATH!OW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 679 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN (10) Suppl. SCR 347 = (1997) 2 SCC 397 - referred to. 1.5 Thus, Chapter XXXVI is a code by itself so far as limitation is concerned. All the provisions of this Chapter will have to be read cumulatively. Sections 468 and 469 will have to be read with s.473. [para 21] [719-G] 2.1 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court. The term 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. A Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind A B or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said C to have been committed. This is the special connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter 36. Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. D It may be delayed because of the Magistrate's personal reasons. [para 22 and 25] [719-H; 721-H; 722-A-B] S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.& Ors. 2008 (2) SCR 36 = (2008) 2 SCC 492; E Jamuna Singh & Ors. v. Bhadai Shah 1964 SCR 37 =AIR 1964 SC 1541, Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr. 1961 AIR 986; State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre & Ors. 1994 Suppl. (4) SCR 378 = (1995) 1 SCC 42-Referred to. 2.2 There has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of limitation relating to criminal offences. Therefore, the date on which complaint is filed has to be taken as material for computing the limitation. F If the complaint is filed after the period of limitation, the G complainant can make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 of the Cr.P.C. The court will have to issue notice to the accused and after hearing the accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the delay or not. If the court takes cognizance after the period of H 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 s.c.q. A limitation then, the complainant cannot be expected to make an application for condonation of such delay. Therefore, the only harmonious construction which can be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 of the Cr.P.C. is that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if B the complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed limitation period. He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable. Examined in light of legislative intent and meaning ascribed to the term 'cognizance' by this Court, it is clear that s.473 of the C Cr.P.C. postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the complaint. It is the date of filing of the complaint which is material. In taking cognizance subjective element comes in. Therefore, it cannot be held that relevant point for computing limitation would be the 0 date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. A court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. [para 26-28] [722-E-H; E 723-E-F; 724-C-E, H; 725-A] U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra 2008 (13) SCR 373 = (2008) 10 SCC139 ; Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and others F 1993 (3) SCR 287 = (1993) 3 SCC 4; Dau Dayal vs. State of U.P. 1959 Suppl. SCR 639 =AIR 1959 SC 433 - referred to. 2.3 The object of the criminal law is to punish G perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well known legal maxim 'nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi', which means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim 'vigilantibus et non H dormientibus, jura subveniunt'. Chapter XXXVI of the SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISE. BY ITS 681 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types A of offences for which lesser sentence is provided, draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as s.384 or 465 of the IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. Provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating the B date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation u/s 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' which means that the act of court shall prejudice no man. The court's inaction in c taking cognizance i.e. court's inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal maxims. Though legal maxims are not mandatory rules, but they 0 serve as guiding principles. Use of legal maxims as guiding principles in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo is perfectly justified. [para 14 and 30] [707-E; 708-E; 726-DH; 727-A] Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh E (2003) 8 sec 559 Japani Sahoo v. Chand (8) SCR 582 - Upheld. Mohanty 2007 Vanka Venkata Reddy and others 1993 (3) SCR 287 = F (1993) 3 sec 4- referred to. Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edn. 1939 - referred to. 3.1 There is no ambiguity in the provisions of Chapter XX.XVI of the Cr.P.C. But, the word 'cognizance' has not G been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation. A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is H 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that if in a case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the legislative B intent or is leading tcl"absurdity, purposive interpretation will have to be adopted. [para 32] [727-G-H; 728-A, C] National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut 2007 (3) SCR 579 = (2007) 3 SCC 700; New India Assurance C Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and another etc. 2007 (13) SCR 598 = (2008) 3 sec 279 - referred' D Francis Bennion on Statutory Interpretation; and 'PCinciples of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh's 13th edition - 2012 -referred to. 3.2 Besides, while construing rules of limitation, the approach should be in consonance with this Court's observation in Mela Ram that "it is well established that rules of limitation pertain to domain of adjectival law and E that they operate only to bar the remedy but not to extinguish the right". [para 35] [729-F] Mela Ram v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab 1956 SCR 166 - referred to. F 3.3 There is no scope for application of doctrine of casus omissus. It is not possible to hold that the legislature has omitted to incorporate something which this Court is trying to supply. The primary purpose of construction of the statute is to ascertain the intention of G the legislature and then give effect to that intention. After ascertaining the legislative intention as reflected in the 42nd Report of the Law Commission and the Report of the JPC, this Court is only harmoniously construing the provisions of Chapter XXXVI along with other relevant H provisions of the Cr.P.C. to give effect to the legislative SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR D!SE. BY ITS 683 DIR.-DR. K.M. CHERIAN intent and to ensure that its interpretation does not lead A to any absurdity. It is not possible to say that the legislature has kept a lacuna which is to be filld up by judicial interpretative process so as to encroach upon the domain of the legislature. This Court also concurs with the observations in Japani Sahoo, where the Court has B examined this issue in the context of Art. 14 of the Constitution and opted for reasonable construction rather than literal construction. [para 36-37] [730-A-E] Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 C (8) SCR 582 = (2007) 7 sec 394- Upheld. Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers & Ors. 2003 (3) SCR 762 = (2003) 6 SCC 659 - referred to. Law Commission of India, 42nd Report - referred to. 3.4 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in the construction D of statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with E thereunder but they do not control the meaning of the sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that heading of Chapter XXXVI is an indicator that the date of F taking cognizance is material. [para 38] [731-D-E; 732-A] MIS Frick India Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors, (1990) 1 SCC 400 - referred to. 3.5 It is true that penal statutes must be strictly G construed. However, in the instant case, looking to the legislative intent, this Court has harmoniously construed the provisions of Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of the accused. Besides, Chapter XXXVI is part of the Cr.P.C., H 684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A which is a procedural law and it is well settled that procedural laws must be liberally construed to serve as handmaid of justice and not as its mistress. [para 39] [7328, C-0] B Muralidhar Meghraj Loya & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1977 (1) SCR 1 = (1976) 3 SCC 684 and Kisan Trimbak Kothula & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra 1977 (2) SCR 102 = (1977) 1 SCC 300; Sardar Amarjeet Singh Katra (dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Promod Gupta (dead) by LRs. C & Ors. 2002 Suppl. (5) SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272; N. Balaji v. Virendra Singh & Ors. 2004 Suppl. (5) SCR 96 = (2004) 8 SCC 312; Kai/ash v. Nanhku & Ors. 2005 (3) SCR 289 = (2005) 4 SCC 480; - referred to 4.1 Therefore, in the light of the legislative intent, D authoritative judicial pronouncements and established legal principles, this Court is of the opinion that Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period . E of limitation u/s 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily, because in that case, the Court was dealing with s.9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. There is no reference either to s.468 or s.473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer to ss.4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. F which carve out exceptions for Special Acts. The Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. [para 40] G · [732-E-F; 733-A-B] Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. (1990) supp. sec 121 - disapproved. A.R. Antu/ay v. Ramdas. Sriniwas Nayak 1984 (2) SCR H 914 = (1984) 2 SCC 500, held inapplicable. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISE. BY ITS 685 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN 4.2 It is, therefore, held that for the purpose of A computing the period of limitation u/s 468 of the Cr.P.C., the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. [para 41] [734-A-B] B Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 (8) SCR 582; and Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559 - Upheld. UP. Power Corpon. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Anr. 2008 (13) SCR 373 = (2008) 10 SCC 139; Udai Shankar C Awasthi v. State of U.P. & Anr. 2013 (3) SCR 935 = (2013) 2 SCC 435; Sushi/ Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar 1975 (3) SCR 944, Sardar, R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1951 SCR 312 = AIR 1951 SC 207; Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 2012 (2) SCR 696= (2012) 5 sec 424; D State of Madras v. Gannon Dukerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. 1959 SCR 379; Raghunath Rai Bareja and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 287 = (2007) 2 SCC 230; and State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt & Anr. 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 514 = (2000) 1 SCC 230; Municipal Corporation of E Delhi V. Gurnam Kaur 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 = (1989) 1 SCC 101; R.R. Chari and Darshan Singh Ram Kish an v. State of Maharashtra 1972 (1) SCR 571 = (1971) 2 SCC 654; Tolaram Relumal & Anr. v. The State of Bombay 1955 SCR 439 =AIR 1954 SC 496; State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. F Ambay Cements & Anr. 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 125 = (2005) 1 SCC 368;, Bharat Aluminum Co. etc. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services etc. 2012 (12) SCR 327 = (2012) 9 SCC 552; Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II, Bangalore & Ors. v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. & Anr. 2003 (3) Suppl. G SCR 763 = (2003) 11 SCC 405; Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat & Anr. 2004 (3 ) Suppl. SCR 202 = (2004) 6 SCC 672; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak . 1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 325 = (1992) 1 sec 225; Raj Deo Sharma (//) v. State of Bihar 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 124 = H 686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A (1999) 7 SCC 604;, PK. Choudhary v. Commander, 48 BRTF, (GREF) 2008 (4) SCR 976 = (2008) 13 sec 229 Krishna Sanghai v. State of M.P. 1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP);Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia ·1980 ( 1) SCR 910 = (1980) 1 SCC 158; P.P. Unnikrishnan B & Anr. v. Puttiyottil Alikutty & Anr 2000 Suppl. ( 3 ) SCR 142 = (2000) 8 sec 131 - cited. c D E F G H Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte De Paris (1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314 - referred to. Case Law Reference: upheld upheld para 1 para 1 (2003) 8 sec 559 2007 (8) SCR 582 (1990) supp. sec 121 2008 (13) SCR 373 1956 SCR 166 disapproved para 1 referred to para 4 referred to 2013 (3) SCR 935 cited 1975 (3) SCR 944 cited 2002 Suppl. (5) SCR 350 referred to 2005 (3) SCR 289 referred to 1951 SCR 312 2012 (2) SCR 696 1959 SCR 379 cited cited cited 2006 Suppl. (10) SCR 287 referred to AIR 1981 SC 1054 referred to 1993 (3) SCR 287 referred to 1999 Suppl. (4) SCR 514 cited para 4 para 4 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 para 5 SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 687 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN 1988 Suppl. (2) SCR 929 cited para 5 A 1972 (1) SCR 571 cited para7 2004 Suppl. (6) SCR 125 cited para 7 (2013) 11 sec 405 cited para 7 B 2004 Suppl. (3) SCR 202 cited para 7 2012 (12) SCR 327 cited para 7 2003 Suppl. (3) SCR 763 referred to para 7 c 2004 Suppl. (3) SCR202 cited para 7 1991 Suppl. (3) SCR 325 cited para 7 1999 Suppl. (3) SCR 124 cited para 7 2003 (3) SCR 762 referred to para 7 D 1994 Suppl. (4) SCR 378 referred to para 7 2008 (4) SCR 976 cited para 7 1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP) cited para 7 E 2008 (2) SCR 36 referred to para 8 1980 (1) SCR 910 cited para 8 (1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314cited para 8 F 2000 Suppl. (3) SCR 142 cited para 8 1996 Suppl. (10) SCR 347 referred to para 9 1984 (2) SCR 914 held inapplicable para 9 1969 SCR 438 cited para 15 G 1964 SCR 37 referred to para 23 1961 AIR 986 referred to para 23 H A B c 688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. 1959 Suppl. SCR 639 2007 (3) SCR 579 2008 (13) SCR 373 (1990) 1 sec 400 1990 (1) sec 400 1977 (1) SCR 1 1977 (2) SCR 102 2004 Suppl. (5) SCR 96 referred to referred to referred to referred to relied on referred to referred to referred to para 28 para 29 para 33 Para 38 Para 38 para 39 para 39 para 39 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005. · D From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. O.P. No. 12001 of 1997. WITH E SLP(Crl.) Nos. 5687-5688 and 5764 of 2013. Sidharth Luthra, ASG, Amarendra Sharan, S. Gurukrishna Kumar, K. Swami, Prabha Swami, Nikhil Swami, Amit Anand Tiwari, Kushagra Pandey, Avinash Tripathy, A.K. Kaul, Charul F Sarin, Supriya Juneja, Arjun Dewan, D.S. Mahra, V. Mohana, B. Raghunath, K.V. Vijayakumar, R. Anand Padmanabhan, Amritha Sarayoo, Nikunj Dayal, Pramod Dayal for the appearing parties. G H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by (SMT .) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. While dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005 a two-Judge Bench of this Court noticed a conflict between a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 689 DIR. - DR. K.M CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] v. State of Andhra Pradesh' which is followed in another twoA Judge Bench decision in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty2 and a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr.3 • In Bharat Kale it was held that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date is the date of filing of complaint or initiating B criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of a process by court. In Krishna Pillai this Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Child Marriage C Restraint Act, 1929 after the expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. The three-Judge Bench held that since magisterial action in the case before it was beyond the period of one year from the date of commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent D to take cognizance when he did in view of bar under Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. Thus, there was apparent conflict on the question whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.') in E respect of a criminal complaint the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takE;IS cognizance. The two-Judge Bench, therefore, directed that this case may be put up before a three-Judge Bench for F an authoritative pronouncement. When the matter was placed before the three-Judge Bench, the three-Judge Bench doubted the correctness of Krishna Pillai and observed that as a coordinate Bench, it cannot declare that Krishna Pillai does not lay down the correct law and, therefore, the matter needs to be G referred to a five-Judge Bench to examine the correctness of the view taken in Krishna Pillai. Accordingly, this appeal along 1. (2003) a sec 559. 2. (2001) 1 sec 394. 3. (1990) supp. sec 121. H 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A with other matters where similar issue is involved is placed before this Constitution Bench. B c D E F G H 2. No specific questions have been referred to us. But, in our opinion, the following questions arise for our consideration: A. Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence? B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down the correct law. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length and carefully read their written submissions. We may give gist of their submissions and then proceed to answer the questions which fall for our consideration. 4. Gist of submissions of Mr. Krishnamurthi Swami, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005. a. Krishna Pillai was rendered in the context of Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. There is no reference to either Section 468 or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in this judgment. This judgment merely focuses on the meaning of the tenn 'taking cognizance' and has accordingly interpreted Section 9 without reference to any provisions of the Cr.P.C. Hence, this judgment cannot be considered authority for the purposes of interpretation of provisions of Chapter XXXVI. On the other hand Bharat Kale considers various provisions of Chapter XXXVI. All the provisions have been SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 691 DIR - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J] cumulatively read to conclude that the limitation A prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or prosecution is initiated within the period of the limitation prescribed under the Cr.P.C. This 8 judgment lays down the correct law. b. Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. has to be read keeping c. in view other provisions particularly Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. A person filing a complaint within time cannot be penalized because the Magistrate did C not take cognizance. A person filing a complaint after the period of limitation can file an application for condonation of delay and the Magistrate could condone delay if the explanation is reasonable. If Section 468 is interpreted to mean that a D Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation without any reference to the date of filing of the complaint or the institution of the prosecution it would be rendered unconstitutional. A court of law would interpret a E provision which would help sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than accepting an interpretation which may make such provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. [U.P. Power Corpon. F Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Anr4]. Chapter XXXVI requires to be harmoniously interpreted keeping the interests of both the complainant as well as the accused in mind. G d. The law of limitation should be interpreted from the standpoint of the person who exercises the right and whose remedy would be barred. The laws of 4. (2008) 10 sec 139. H 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S.C.R. A limitation do not extinguish the right but only bar the remedy. [Me/a Ram v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab]. 5 e. If delay in filing a complaint can be condoned in 8 terms of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. then. Section 468 of the Cr.P.C cannot be interpreted to mean that a complaint or prosecution instituted within time cannot be proceeded with, merely because the Magistrate took cognizance after the period of limitation. c f. The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration while arriving at a final decision. However, the same may not by itself be a ground D for dismissing the complaint at the threshold. [Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P. & Anr.6]. In certain exceptional circumstances delay may have to be condoned considering the gravity of the charge. g. The contention that Section 468 should be E interpreted to mean that where the Magistrate does not take cognizance within the period of limitation it must be treated as having the object of giving quietus to petty offences in the Indian Penal Code is untenable. Some offences which fall within the F periods of limitation specified in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C are serious. It could never have been the intention of the legislature to accord quietus to such offences. G h. Procedure is meant to sub-serve and not rule the cause of justice. Procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid. Technical 5. 1956 SCR 166. H 6. (2013) 2 sec 435. SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 693 DIR - DR K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J] objections which tend to defeat and deny A substantial justice should be strictly discouraged. [Sushi/ Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar7, Sardar Amarjeet Singh Kalra (dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Promod Gupta (dead) by LRs. & Ors.•, Kai/ash v. Nanhku & Ors. 9] B 5. Gist of submissions of Mr. S. Guru Krishnakumar, learned senior counsel and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned counsel · for respondent 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005. a. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo do not represent C the correct position in law. Krishna Pillai rightly holds that the relevant date for considering period of limitation is the date of taking cognizance. b. The settled principies of statutory construction o require that the expression 'cognizance' occurring in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. has to be given its legal sense, since it has acquired a special connotation in criminal law. It is a settled position in law that taking cognizance is judicial application E of mind to the contents of a complaint/police report for the first time. [R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh'°, Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 11). If an expression has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionary or general meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Such an expression must be given its legal meaning and no other. [State of Madras v. Gannon Dukerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. 12}. 7. 1975 (3) SCR 944. 8. 2003) 3 sec 212. 9. (20051 4 sec 480. 10. AIR 1951 sec 424. 11. (2012) 5 sec 424. 12. 1959 SCR 379. F G H 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 12 S C.R. A c. The heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences is clearly reflective of the legislative intent to treat the date of taking cognizance as the relevant date in computing limitation. Pertinently, Section 467 B defines the expression 'period of limitation' as the period specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence. The express language of Section 468 makes it clear that the legislature considers the relevant date for computing the date c of limitation to be the date of taking cognizance and not the date of filing of a complaint. Further, the situations in Section 470 of the Cr.P.C. providing for exclusion in computing the period of limitation are again relatable to taking cognizance and D institution of prosecution. So also, exclusion under Section 471 of the Cr.P.C. relates only to taking cognizance and Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. also provides for extension of period of limitation in taking cognizance. E d. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. envisages cognizance to be the point of initiation of proceedings. Chapter XIV of the Cr.P.C. which contains provisions of taking cognizance is titled "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings". All provisions contained F therein use the expression 'cognizance'. They do not refer to filing of complaint at all. e. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the G principles of interpretation other than the literal rule. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience it has to be followed (Raghunath Rai Bareja and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. 13). On a plain and literal interpretation of H 13. (2007) 2 sec 230. SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 695 DIR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.] Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. read in the background A of object of Chapter XXXVI the intention of the legislature is clearly evident that bar of limitation is only for taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period specified therein. f. Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. sets out procedure to be B followed in respect of complaints filed directly to a Magistrate. It reflects a well laid out scheme which envisages judicial application of mind to be a prerequisite for initiation of proceedings. The definition c· of the term 'complaint' contained in Section 2(d) also makes this evident. Thus, initiation of proceedings in criminal law can only be upon taking cognizance. It is clear, therefore, that under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. legislature has barred taking of D cognizance as envisaged by Chap,t,ers XIV and XV after expiry of period of limitation. Hence, the date for purpose of limitation would be the date of taking cognizance. Mere filing of a complaint does not result in cognizance being taken, for the law requires the court to apply its mind judicially even E before deciding to issue process. g. There was no period of limitation under the old Cr.P.C. A long delay led to serious negligence on the part of the prosecuting agencies, forgetfulness F on the part of the prosecution and defence witness and mental anguish to the accused. Infliction of punishment long after the commission of offence impairs its utility as social retribution to the offender. To obviate these lacunae Chapter XXXVI was G introduced in the Cr.P.C. h. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo have missed the object of introduction of Chapter XXXVI in the Cr.P.C. namely to serve larger interest of H A B c D E F 696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. i. j. administration of criminal iustice keeping in view the interest of the accused and the interest of prosecuting agencies. Ttiese judgments fail to advert to the prejudice that will be caused to the accused if benefit of delay in taking cognizance is not given to them. The likelihood of prejudice being caused to the complainant which weighed with this court in the above two decisions can be taken care of by Section 473 which provides for condonation of delay. [State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh 14, Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and otflers' 5 and State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt & Anr. ' 6] Object of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. has not been considered in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo. They ar~sub-silenti