# Muller & Phij1ps .(India) Ltd v. · K. C. Sud Das Gupla ]

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 513
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/muller-phij1ps-india-ltd-v-k-c-sud-das-gupla-1736
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

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3 S.C.R.
SUlJREME COURT REPORTS
513
gratuity for other modes' oi
termination of
service.
That was the method followed in the award that fell
for comideration fr1 Brahmachari's case.
That method
has however not been followed in the award that we ·
have to. consider here.
ln this case there is no specific
reference 'in the award to retrenchment as such:
The
reasonable conclusion from the scheme as · drawn up
is that the gratuity that could be claimed under this
award by retrenched
workmen because of the fact
that retrenchment is also one kind of termination !l'of
service vl'ithin the meaning of the award was intended
to be in addition to the retrenchment compensation
and not in lieu thereof.
The decision in
Brahmachari.'s case on the special
facts of the award therein is therefoi;e of no assistance
to the appeUai1t.
\Ve are bound to hold on an examination of the
award in the · present case
that the
gratuity which the respoi1dent claims on the basis of
the award is distinct
from and
in addition
to the
retrenchment compensatioh he has received.
v\Te are
of opinion therefore
that the Tribunal was right in
holding that the respondent· is e1ititlecl to such gratuity
e11en though
he has
already
received
payment of
compensa'tion ·for
retrenchment in
accordance with
the provisions of
s. 25F of the
Industrial Disputes
Act.
The appeal 1s accordingly' dismissed with costs.
A jJ/JCal disntissed.
COMivIISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY
I
v .
(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR and/M. 1-TmAYATULLAtt,JJ.)
Income-tax-Association of persons-Meaning o(-Indian Incume-tax Act, 1922 (XI of .1922), s. 3.
A Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law
died leaving three widows as his legal heirs.
The widows took
the estate as joint tenants and
did not exercise their right to
separate possession and enjoyment.
The main income was from -
dividends and from
immovable property.
The latter was held
under s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act not to be assessable as income
1960
Muller & Phij1ps
.(India) Ltd.
v.
· K. C. Sud
Das Gupla ].
1960
Af,ril 14.
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
of an association of persons.
The question was whether the three
-
,,r widows could be assessed as an association of persons in respect
Commissioner
UJ
of the rest of the income :
lncomr-lax,
Bomba_)'
Held, that the three widows did not have, the status of an
v.
association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the IncomeSmt. Indira
tax Act.
An association of persons is one in which two or more
Balkrishua
persons join in a common purose or common action and, for
purposes of the income-tax law,
one of its objects
must be to
produce income,
profits· or
gains.
It must be a
combination
of persons formed for the
promotion of a joint
enterprise for
pr.oducing income.
In the
present case
except for
receiving
the dividents and
interest jointly the
widows had done no act
which helped to produce the income.
S. K. Das].
In re: B. N. Elias,
[1935] 3 1.T.R,. 408,
Commissioner of
l11cume-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937.] 5 J.T.R. 484
and Re.Dwarakanath Harishchandm, [ 1937] 5 J.T.R. 716, approved.
CI\'IL APPELLATE Ju1usmcno;.;: Civil Appeals Nos.
219 & 250 of J 958.
Appeals by special leave from
the judgment and
order dated ;\larch 7, EJ56, of the Bombay High Court
in l.T.R. Nos. C,2 and 53 of 1955.
K. N. RajagojJal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appcl·
!ant (in both the appeals).
N. A. Pulkhivala, S. N. Andlcy and .f. B. Dadachanji,
for the respondent (in both the appeals).
1%0.
April M.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS, J-These two appeals with special leave
have been heard tog·ether.
They arise out of similar
facts and the question of law arising therefrom is the
sa1ne.
The short facts are these.
One Balkrishna Puru·
shottam .Purani died on November ll, 1947.
He left
behincl him three widows and two daughters.
The
three widows
were named Indira,
Ramluxmi
and
Prabhuluxmi.
These widows as legal heirs inherited
the estate of the deceased, which consisted of immo

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3 S.C.R.
SUlJREME COURT REPORTS
513
gratuity for other modes' oi
termination of
service.
That was the method followed in the award that fell
for comideration fr1 Brahmachari's case.
That method
has however not been followed in the award that we ·
have to. consider here.
ln this case there is no specific
reference 'in the award to retrenchment as such:
The
reasonable conclusion from the scheme as · drawn up
is that the gratuity that could be claimed under this
award by retrenched
workmen because of the fact
that retrenchment is also one kind of termination !l'of
service vl'ithin the meaning of the award was intended
to be in addition to the retrenchment compensation
and not in lieu thereof.
The decision in
Brahmachari.'s case on the special
facts of the award therein is therefoi;e of no assistance
to the appeUai1t.
\Ve are bound to hold on an examination of the
award in the · present case
that the
gratuity which the respoi1dent claims on the basis of
the award is distinct
from and
in addition
to the
retrenchment compensatioh he has received.
v\Te are
of opinion therefore
that the Tribunal was right in
holding that the respondent· is e1ititlecl to such gratuity
e11en though
he has
already
received
payment of
compensa'tion ·for
retrenchment in
accordance with
the provisions of
s. 25F of the
Industrial Disputes
Act.
The appeal 1s accordingly' dismissed with costs.
A jJ/JCal disntissed.
COMivIISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY
I
v .
(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR and/M. 1-TmAYATULLAtt,JJ.)
Income-tax-Association of persons-Meaning o(-Indian Incume-tax Act, 1922 (XI of .1922), s. 3.
A Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law
died leaving three widows as his legal heirs.
The widows took
the estate as joint tenants and
did not exercise their right to
separate possession and enjoyment.
The main income was from -
dividends and from
immovable property.
The latter was held
under s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act not to be assessable as income
1960
Muller & Phij1ps
.(India) Ltd.
v.
· K. C. Sud
Das Gupla ].
1960
Af,ril 14.
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
1960
of an association of persons.
The question was whether the three
-
,,r widows could be assessed as an association of persons in respect
Commissioner
UJ
of the rest of the income :
lncomr-lax,
Bomba_)'
Held, that the three widows did not have, the status of an
v.
association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the IncomeSmt. Indira
tax Act.
An association of persons is one in which two or more
Balkrishua
persons join in a common purose or common action and, for
purposes of the income-tax law,
one of its objects
must be to
produce income,
profits· or
gains.
It must be a
combination
of persons formed for the
promotion of a joint
enterprise for
pr.oducing income.
In the
present case
except for
receiving
the dividents and
interest jointly the
widows had done no act
which helped to produce the income.
S. K. Das].
In re: B. N. Elias,
[1935] 3 1.T.R,. 408,
Commissioner of
l11cume-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937.] 5 J.T.R. 484
and Re.Dwarakanath Harishchandm, [ 1937] 5 J.T.R. 716, approved.
CI\'IL APPELLATE Ju1usmcno;.;: Civil Appeals Nos.
219 & 250 of J 958.
Appeals by special leave from
the judgment and
order dated ;\larch 7, EJ56, of the Bombay High Court
in l.T.R. Nos. C,2 and 53 of 1955.
K. N. RajagojJal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appcl·
!ant (in both the appeals).
N. A. Pulkhivala, S. N. Andlcy and .f. B. Dadachanji,
for the respondent (in both the appeals).
1%0.
April M.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
S. K. DAS, J-These two appeals with special leave
have been heard tog·ether.
They arise out of similar
facts and the question of law arising therefrom is the
sa1ne.
The short facts are these.
One Balkrishna Puru·
shottam .Purani died on November ll, 1947.
He left
behincl him three widows and two daughters.
The
three widows
were named Indira,
Ramluxmi
and
Prabhuluxmi.
These widows as legal heirs inherited
the estate of the deceased, which consisted of immov·
able properties situate in Ahmedabad, shares in Joint.
Stock Companies, money lying in deposit,
and share
in a
registered firm.
For ·the
two assessment years
1900-51 and l!J51-:'i2 (the corresponding account years
being the Sam bat years 200:> and 2006) the I ncomctax Oniccr . issued notices to
the legal
heirs of Balkrishna
Purusl1011am
Purani.
Pursuant
to
those
notices, rcnti'ns were !lied under i-11e heading, "Lcg·al
heirs ol' Balkrishna Purushottam Purani", in one case
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
1960
and in the name of t:J1e estate of Balakrishna in the
other; the status was shown as "individual"' in one
case and ''association of persons" in the other.
They
were signed by Indira. one of the three widows.
For
'
Commissioner of
' the assessment vear 19.'lO-:) l the total income was shown
as under-
,
·
Property
Share from registered
firm
Dividends
Interest
Ground rent
Total
...
For the assessment year 1951-52,
was shown as--
Property
Share from registered
firm
Dividends
Interest on deposits
Ground rent
Total
the
Rs.
11,011
4,071
51,796
22,343
125
---
69,346
----
\
total -income
Rs.
10,879
460
80,426
536
125
92,426
For both years the I ncorne-tax Officer took the status
of the assessee as an "association of. ·persons" and
on that footing ·made two assessment orders.
There
was an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and two of the points taken before him were-
(a) that the three widows ought to have been assessed
separately and not as
an
"association of .persons",
and (b) that ~n any event, the income from property
ought to have been assessed separately in the haiids.
of the three widows by reason of the provisions in
s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
The Appellate
Assistant Commissioner rejected point ·(a) but accepted ,
point (b).
Then, there was a further
appeal to' the
Incomt·tax,
Bomba;•
v.
Smt. Indira
Balkrislmn
S. K: Da.< J.
1960
rommissioner n.f
l11comt-tax,
flmnba_f
\'
Smt. l11riira
Balakri slmfl
S. K. D.m: J.
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1960]
I nco111c-1ax Appellate Tribun:d, Bombay. The Tribunal held that the entire estate of deceased Balkrishna
Purushoitam Purani was inherited and possessed by
the three widows as joint tenants and its income was
liable 10 be assessed in their hands in the status of an
associatio'n of persons.
The Tribun:il further held
that the Appellate Assistanr Commissioner was wrong
in holding that the shar<>s of the' three widows were
definite and determinable and s. 9(3) was applicable.
The assessec then moved the Tribunal to refer certain
questions of law which arose out of its orders to the
High Court of Bombay.
The Tribunal referred four
su.ch questions, but: we arc now concerned with only
one of them, viz .. question No. 3 which was in the
following terms :
"(.~) "Whether on the facts and in the circum- -
stances of the case the Tr,ibunal was right in holding that the assessment made on the three widows
of Balakrishna Purushottam Purani in the status of
an association of persons is legal and
valid
111
Ia1,·?"
Two references were made 'to the Hig·h Court
111
respect of the orders passed for two assessment years
and they gave rise to Income-tax References Nos. !\2
and r,g of I !l:"1T>.
The leading jmlgrnent was given
in I. T. R. r,2 of I D!i5.
The 1-1 igh Comt held that the
Tribunal 10s in en'or in coming to the conclusion
that the three widows could be assessed in the status
of an association of persons with regard to the income
which thcv earned as-heirs of their deceased husband.
Therefore: it answered question No. H in the negative.
The department represented by the Commissioner of:
T ncorlie-tax, Bombay, then applied to this Court and
obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment
and orders of the High Court of Bombay in the two
References.
These two appeals have been filed in
pursuance of the special leave granted bv this Court.
The appellant is the Commissioner of Income-tax,
B01nbay, and the assessee is the respondent.
The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the
High Court was in error when it said that "what: is
required before an association of persons can he liable
to tax is"not that they should receive income hut that
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
they should earn or help to earn income by· reason of
their association, and if the case of the Department
stops short at mere receipt of income, then the Department rriust fail in bringing home the liability to tax of
individuals as an asoci'ation o( persons."
It is submitted that the High Court did not, in the statement
quoted above, lay down the correct test for determining
what is an "association of persons" for the purposes of
the Income-tax Act.
Before we go on to discuss the argument presented
on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to clear the
ground by stating what is the position of co-widows
in Mitakshara, succession and what are the findings
arrived at by the Tribunal. The position of co-widows
is well-settled.
Thev succeed as co-heirs to the estate
· of their deceased h{1sband and take as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship and equal beneficial enjoyment; they arc entitled as
between themselves to.
an equal share of the income. Though they take as
joint tenants, no one of them has a right to enforce an
absolute partition of the estate against the others so
as to destroy their right of survivorship.
But they
are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions
of the property so that each may enjoy her equal
share of the income accruing therefrom. The Tribunal
found that the widows in this case did not exercise
their right to separate possession and enjoyment and
"they chose to manage the property jointly, each
acting for herself and the others and receiving the
income of the property which they were entitled to
enjoy in equal shares."
Learned counsel for the
appellant has emphasised before us the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal and has contended that on the
finding of joint management, the widows fulfilled even
the test laid down by the High Court and constituted
an "association of persons" for taxing ·purposes.
The Hig·h Court, however, rightly pointed out that
lhe only property which. the widows could have
managed jointly was the immovable property which
fetched an income of about Rs. 11,000, and as to
that property, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
had held that s. 9(3) applied.
There was no appeal
by the Department against that finding and it was not
'f-6 SCI/ND/82
1960
Commissioner of
lncome~tax,
Bombay
v.
Smt. Indira
Balkrishna
S. K. Das J.
1960
C()mmi5siontr of
lncorm-ta.-;,
Bomb4v
v.
Smt. Indira
Balkrishna
S. K. Das J.
518
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
open to !he Tribunal to go behind it.
Even on merits
the Tribunal was 1nong in thinking that the respective
shares of the widows "·ere not definite and ascertainable.
They had an equal share in the income, viz.,
one-third each, and the provisions of s. 9(8) clearly
applied in respect of the immovable property.
v\'ith regard to the shares, dividends and interest
on deposits there was no finding of any act o( joint
management.
l ndeed, the main item consists of the
dividends ancl it is difficult to understand what act of
management the widows performed in respect thereof
"·hich produced or helped to produce income. On the.
·Contrary, the statement of the case shows that the
assessce filed lists of shares, copies. whereof arc marked
annexed C and form part of the case. which showed
that the shares stood separately in the name of each
one of the three widows and I his was not denied by
the Department.
"Ve now come to the main question in this appeal.
\\That constitutes an
"association of persons" within
the meaning of the
Income-tax Act' It has
been
repeatedly pointed out that the Act does not define
what constitutes an
association of persons, which
under s. ~ of the Act is an entity or unit of assessment.
Previous to the year 1924, the words of s. 3 were "individual, company, firm and Hindu undivided family."
By the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act of 1924
(Act XI of 1924) the words "individual; Hindu undivided family, company, firm and other association
of individuals" were substituted for the former words.
By the Income-tax Amendment Act of 1939 (Act VII
of 1939) the section was again amended and it then
said:
'"Where any Act of the Central Legislature enacts
that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any
rate or rates. tax at that rate or those rates shall be
charged for that year in accordance with, and subject ·
to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual. Hindu
undivided family, company and local authority, and
of every firm and other associations of persons or the
partners of the firms or members of the association in-
(\ividnally."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
By the same Amending Act (Act VII of 1939) subs. (3) of s. 9· was also added.
Now, s. 3 imposes a tax "in respect of the total income ........................ of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of
every' firm and other association
of persons or the
partners of the firm or members of the association individually."
In the absence of any definition. as to
what constitutes an association of persons, we must
construe the 'vords in their plain ordinary meaning
and we must also bear in mind that the words occur in
a· section which imposes a tax on the total income of
each one of the units of assessment mentioned therein
including an association of persons.
The meaning to
be assigned. to the words must take colour from the
context in which they occur.
A number of decisions
have been cited at the bar bearing on the question, and
· our attention has been drawn to the controversy as
to whether the words "association of individuals"
which occurred previously in the section should be
read ejusdem generis with the word immediately
preceding, viz., firm or with all the other groups of
persons mentioned in the section.
Into that controversy it is unnecessary to enter in the present case.
Nor d0 we pause to consider the widely differing characteristics of the three other associations mentioned in
the section, viz., Hindu undiv}cled family, a company
and' a firm, and whether , in view of the amendments
made in 1939 the words in question can be read
ejusdem
generis
with
Hindu
undivided
family
or company.
It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and
Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra
Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')
Perbyshire, C. ]., rightly pointed out that the word
·"associate"
means,
according to the Oxford dictionary, "to join in common purpose, or to join in an
.action."
Therefore, an association of persons must
be one in which two or more persons join in a common
purpose or common action, and as the words occur in
(I) [1935] I.T.ll. 408
(2) [19S7] .5 I.T.R. 484
(3) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 716
1960
Commissioner of
Income·ta,Y,
Bomba;
V,
Smt. Indi·a
Balkrish11a
S. K. Das].
1960
Commissioner of
b1come~tax,
Bombay
V.
Smt. Indira
Balkrishna
S. K. Das].
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce
income, profits or gains.
This was the view expressed
by Beaumont, C.J., in
Commissioner of Income-tax,
Born bay v. Laxrnidas Devidas and A not her (') at page
589 and also in Re: Dwarakanatlt 1-iarishchandra Pi:tale
and Another ('). In re: B. N. Elias (') Costello, .J., put
the test in more forceful languag·e. He said:
"It may
well be that the intention of the legislature was to
hit combinations of individuals who were engaged
together in some joint enterprise but: did not in law
constitute partnership...........................
\Vhen we
find ........................ that there is a combination
of
persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise ...... then I think no diflio.dty arises in the way
of saying that these persons did constitute an association .................. ".
\Ve think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay
down the crucial test for determining what is an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Income-tax Act, and they have been
accepted and
followed in a number of later decisions of different
High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call
attention.
It is, however, necessary
to add' some
words of caution here.
There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them
and of what nature, arc necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within
the meaning of s. '3; it mu'st depend on Lhe particular
facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the
conclusion can be drawn or not.
Learned counsel for the appellant has suggested
that having regard to ss. :J
and 4 of the Indian
Income-Lax Act, the real test is the existence of a
co1nrnon .so1Lrce of incon1e in v.'hich t'vo 01· n1ore per~
sons arc interested as owner or otherwise and it is
immatericli whether their shares are specific
and
de!inite or whether there is any scheme of management or not. He has submitted that if the persons so
interested come to an arrangement, express or tacit,
by which they divide the income at a point of time
before it emanates from the source, then Lhc association ceases; otherwise it continues to be :m associ:ition,
:') [1937] 5 I.T.R. 481
(') [193715 l.T R. 716
(') [1935] 3 I.T.R. 408.
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-521
vVe have indicated above what
is
the crucial test
in determining an association of persons within the
meaning of s. 3, and we are of the view that the test
suggested by lea1•ned counsel for the appellant are
neither conclusive nor determinative of the question
before us.
Corning back to the facts found by the Tribunal,
there is no finding that the three widows have corn_bined in a joint enterprise to produce income. The
only finding is that they have not exercised their right
to separate en joyrnent, and except for receiving the
dividends and interest jointly, it has been found that
they have clone no act which has helped to produce
income 111 respect of the shares and deposits.
On
these fmdings it cannot be held that the three widows
had the status of an association of persons within the
meaning of s. 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act.
The High Court correctly answered question No. 3
in the negative.
Accordingly, the appeals fail and are
dismissed with costs.
There will be one set of hearing
fee in the two_ appeals.
Appeals dismissed .
DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA SU RAG 'y ALA,
1960
Commission<r of
Income-tax,
Bomba;•
v.
Smt. Indira
· Balkrishna
S.K. Das J.
I
VADIA
1960
v.
'
THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA (NO-W BOMBAY)
(jAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS, ]. L. KAPUR,
A. K. SARKAR and M. HrnAYATULLA, JJ.)
Grant by Ruler to younger son as Bhayat-Son becoming Ruler
-Whether grant resumable-"Bhayat", Meaning of.
In the Indian State of
Vadia succession was
governed by
primogeniture. The Ruler in 1943
granted to his younger son,
the petitioner, a village in the State in perpetuity and in heredity
for enjoyment as 'Kapal-Giras' as 'Bhayat'. ln -1947 the State
of Vadia acceded to the Dominion of India and by subsequent
constitutional deve!opments it became
merged in the State of
Saurashtra. After the coming into force of the Constitution the
elder son of the Ruler and then the Ruler died, and the petitioner
was recogni~ed as the Ruler.
Thereupon· the State of Saurashtra
issued a notification resuming the grant as it was deemed to have
lapsed and revened to the
former Vadia State.
The petitioner
contended
that the grant
was absolute
and
unconditional for
April 14.