# MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF POONA ETC v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (INDIA) LTD. ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 765
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 2009 and 2081 of 1969
- **Bench:** S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. Shinghal, A. D. KosHAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/municipal-corporation-for-the-city-of-poona-etc-v-bijlee-products-india-ltd-etc-7533
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

B
Bo111bay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Sections 127(1), (2),
(3) rJw S. 149 of the Act-Exeniption froni payn1ent of octroi·duty ijuashedWhetller proposed repeal of rule 5(8) contrary to the exemption granted-
\.
Interpretation of Govt. Resolution dated 30-7-68.
-
The appelloo.t Corporation sometime in the year 1957 invited apphcations
for a1lotment of plots in the industrial estate guaranteeing that for a period
of 12 years no octroi duty wi11 be levied as provided in rule 62-B and Hlso
specifically inserted a clause at item (B) of the conveyances executed by the
respondents to that effect. Some years later, the appellant passed a resolution
dated 30-5-68 recommending to the Govt. to bring about an amendment In
rule 62-B which, inter alia, contained: "octroi rule 5(8) is hereby repealed.
Provided that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption already granted shall
continue until the expiry of the respective periods of their grants". However,
the State Government, while accepting the recommendation of the corporation,
in para 2 of its resolution dated 30-7-78 "specified 1st September 1968 as the
date on which its sanction sha11 become operative". The respondents who
felt that they were adversely affected filed separate writ petitions in the Bombay
High Court, which were allowed.
Allowing the appeals by certificate, the Court
c
D
E
HELD: 1. Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of
the
Bon1bay
Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 gives three aJten1ative courses to the Government. After the matter is submitted by the Corporation to the Government
) (1) i.t may refuse to sanction the rules recommended, or (2) it may refer
f
back to the Corporation any rule for further consideration or (3) it may saneF
tion the rule as recommended or with certain modifications as it thinks fit.
There can be no doubt that the Government had the power to make modifi.ca~
tions in the recommendation submitted by the Corporation,
but the express
provision by which the Government could refer the matter back to the Corporaition is clearly suggestive of the fact that the Government would refer the
matter to the Corporation if it wanted to modify the proposal.
[774A-CJ
G
Jn the instant case :
(a) While exercising its power to delete rule 5(8) the Government had the
following materials before it, (I) It knew that Rule 5(8) bad grat!led exemption for a period of 10 years to some industrialists, who on the basis of the
representation made by the Corporation had set up their industries;
(2) the
B
Municipal Corporation had made an eXpress recommendation that while deleting
rule 5(8) the previous concessions regarding exemption from octroi dvty liiiiSt
A
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1979] I s.c.R.
continue, (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise of tile
powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of section 149 an<l
:-ub~
>ection ( J) of section 455 of the Act.
!77JE-FJ
(b) The Government has done nothing of the sort as required by S. 149C~)
of the Act, but has clearly passed the· order purely in terms of the recommendation. Therefore, the Government never intended to make any changes in the
B
rule recommended by the Corporation particularly because the question of net
accepting the condition recommended by the Corporation, namely, thnt the
existing concessions must continue would entail taking away of vested right.'i
and put the Corporation in a wrong box inasmuch as it v.·ould tha11 hnve '.o
go back from its Ov.'11 assurance.
[774B-D]
2. The Government order dated 30th July, 1968, n1ust he so interpreted as
C
to include the proviso recommended by the Corporation while deleting rule
5(8), namely, that the concessions already granted to the industrialists \\'On!d
continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not sa-y so in sn m;111y
words, but having regard to the language in which it was couched and expre,;;s
reference: to the letter dated 2nd July, 1968 of the Municipal Commiss1oncr
contained in the order itsel

## Text

765
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF POONA ETC.
A
v.
BIJLEE PRODUCTS (INDIA) LTD. ETC. ETC.
September 14, 1978
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. N. SHINGHAL AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]
B
Bo111bay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, Sections 127(1), (2),
(3) rJw S. 149 of the Act-Exeniption froni payn1ent of octroi·duty ijuashedWhetller proposed repeal of rule 5(8) contrary to the exemption granted-
\.
Interpretation of Govt. Resolution dated 30-7-68.
-
The appelloo.t Corporation sometime in the year 1957 invited apphcations
for a1lotment of plots in the industrial estate guaranteeing that for a period
of 12 years no octroi duty wi11 be levied as provided in rule 62-B and Hlso
specifically inserted a clause at item (B) of the conveyances executed by the
respondents to that effect. Some years later, the appellant passed a resolution
dated 30-5-68 recommending to the Govt. to bring about an amendment In
rule 62-B which, inter alia, contained: "octroi rule 5(8) is hereby repealed.
Provided that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption already granted shall
continue until the expiry of the respective periods of their grants". However,
the State Government, while accepting the recommendation of the corporation,
in para 2 of its resolution dated 30-7-78 "specified 1st September 1968 as the
date on which its sanction sha11 become operative". The respondents who
felt that they were adversely affected filed separate writ petitions in the Bombay
High Court, which were allowed.
Allowing the appeals by certificate, the Court
c
D
E
HELD: 1. Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of
the
Bon1bay
Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 gives three aJten1ative courses to the Government. After the matter is submitted by the Corporation to the Government
) (1) i.t may refuse to sanction the rules recommended, or (2) it may refer
f
back to the Corporation any rule for further consideration or (3) it may saneF
tion the rule as recommended or with certain modifications as it thinks fit.
There can be no doubt that the Government had the power to make modifi.ca~
tions in the recommendation submitted by the Corporation,
but the express
provision by which the Government could refer the matter back to the Corporaition is clearly suggestive of the fact that the Government would refer the
matter to the Corporation if it wanted to modify the proposal.
[774A-CJ
G
Jn the instant case :
(a) While exercising its power to delete rule 5(8) the Government had the
following materials before it, (I) It knew that Rule 5(8) bad grat!led exemption for a period of 10 years to some industrialists, who on the basis of the
representation made by the Corporation had set up their industries;
(2) the
B
Municipal Corporation had made an eXpress recommendation that while deleting
rule 5(8) the previous concessions regarding exemption from octroi dvty liiiiSt
A
766
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1979] I s.c.R.
continue, (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise of tile
powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of section 149 an<l
:-ub~
>ection ( J) of section 455 of the Act.
!77JE-FJ
(b) The Government has done nothing of the sort as required by S. 149C~)
of the Act, but has clearly passed the· order purely in terms of the recommendation. Therefore, the Government never intended to make any changes in the
B
rule recommended by the Corporation particularly because the question of net
accepting the condition recommended by the Corporation, namely, thnt the
existing concessions must continue would entail taking away of vested right.'i
and put the Corporation in a wrong box inasmuch as it v.·ould tha11 hnve '.o
go back from its Ov.'11 assurance.
[774B-D]
2. The Government order dated 30th July, 1968, n1ust he so interpreted as
C
to include the proviso recommended by the Corporation while deleting rule
5(8), namely, that the concessions already granted to the industrialists \\'On!d
continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not sa-y so in sn m;111y
words, but having regard to the language in which it was couched and expre,;;s
reference: to the letter dated 2nd July, 1968 of the Municipal Commiss1oncr
contained in the order itself which clearly mentions that rule 5(8) should
11~
repealed provided the exemption already granted shall continue until the expiry
D
of the respective periOds of their grants, the aforesaid
condition would
be
deemed to be· included in the order dated 30-7-1968 by necessary intenUrncnt.
Such an interpretation will be ful1y in consonance v.1ith the· \Vell settled rule
of interpretation of sta-tutes that any amendment to ;1 statute affecting the legnl
rights of an individua.J must be presumed to be prospective unless it is m<llle
expressly or is impliedly retrospective.
This principle is contained in section 7
of the Bombay General Clauses Act.
(774E-Gl
E
F
G
H
In the instant case, the result of a different view \\Ould he that a vaJu;)bic
right vested in the respondents and others \vonld be taken away nnd there 's
no evidence in the langua.ge of the Government order to indicate any suc!1
intention.
J774G-H]
(b) Even assuming that the order of the Government deleted rule 5t 8)
without any condition and \vithout retaining the exemption granted to the respondents, the order \VOUld suffer from a very serious legal infirmity.
Section 149(2)
.of the Act en1powers the Government to modify the recommendation uf the
Corporation provided it doeS not involve any increase in the rate or rates ct
the levy or the extent thereof. There can be no doubt that if the conc.(!&">itJn
of exemption from octroi duty given to the respondents is unconditionally wilhdrll!wn v.•ith effect from 1-9-1968 then this \Votlld have the effect of cxten<TI.n~
the application of the rul~s to an area where they did not apply.
This is ye-t
another reason why the Government's impugned order should be read dO\\'n
so as to provide for deletion of rule 5(8) with the exception that the concession
already granted will continue. The deletion of Rule 5(8) has not taken rnvay
the ccncession already granted to the respondents.
[775.i\-Dl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :
Civil Appeal Nos. 2009 and
2081 of 1969.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18-3-1969 of the Bombay
High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 541/69 and 483/69 and
•
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. '
•
• •
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.i.
'
·)
. MUNICIPAL CORP. POONA v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (Fazal Ali, !.) 767
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 355 and 356 of 1970
A
From the Judgments and Order dated 18-3-1969 and 12-3-1969
of Bombay High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 542/69 and 2149/68 respeclively and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 94 of 1971
B
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
21-12-I970 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 2081/70.
Y. S. Chitale, J. L. Nain (In C.A. 94/71), C. K. Ratnaparkhi and
A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants in C.As Nos. 2009, 2081/69,
355, 356/70 and Respondents in C.A. 94/71.
c
A. K.Sen, (InC.A. 2009/69) V. S. Desai (C.A. 94/71) A. B.
Devan (in C.A. 356 of 1970 and also intervener in C.A.
94/71)
V. M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen, S. M. Thakore, I. N. Shroff, H. S.Parihar
and R. P. Kapur; for the Respondent in CAs. Nos. 2009, 2081/69,
355, 356/70 and Appellant in C.A. 94/71 and Interveners in C.As.
D
2009, 2081/69 and 355-356/70.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J.-These appeals have been brought by certificate•
of fitness granted by the Bombay High Court against the mder of the
High Court in S.C.A. No. 2149 of 1968 dated 12th March, 1969. By
E
an order dated 12-7-1970 this Court directed the four appeals to be
consolidated because the points involved were the same. The appeals
have been filed by the Municipal Corporation for the City of Poona
(hereinafter. called the Corporation) against whom a writ filed before
the Bombay High Court was allowed and the orders demanding the
octroi duty from the respondents were quashed.
F
The facts of the case insofar as they are pertinent to the decision
d the points in issue lie within a very narrow compass. The entire
case turns upon the interpretation of some of the provisions of the
Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949
(hereinafter
called the Act) and certain notifications issued thereunder. It appears
G
that under section 127(1) of the Act the
Corporation bas got the
power to impose proprety taxes and taxes on vehicles, boats and
animals. By sub-section (2) it has the option to impose other kinds
of taxes one of which is octroi with which we are primarily concerned
in these appeals
Sub-section (3) provides that the Municipal taxes
shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of the
H
Act and the rules. Section 149 sub-section (1) enjoins the Corporation to make detailed provisions in connection with the asse~sment and
IS-549 SCJ/78
A
B
c
768
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[J 979] 1 S.C.R.
collection of any of the taxes and sub-section (2) of section 149 enables the Government either to refuse to sanction the rules and refer
the same back to the Corporation for consideration or to sanction the
same with or without modifications,
We shall extract the relevant
section·s in a later part of our judgment.
It appeaa-s that some time in the year 1957 the Corporation in
order to boost industrial dyvelopment and to encourage tM
industrialists to establish an industrial estate in the city had decided
to give certain concessions in the nature of exemption of octroi duty
on certain products under certain conditions.
In pursuance of thi~
objective the Corporation made the following rule 62B :
"62-B : 'Industrial Estate or Area"
means the areas
which Corporation may from time to time demarcate for the
purposes of the rule as the area in which industries can be
suitably located in the interest of industrialisation of the city
of Poona.
)
D
In respect of any raw materials or machinery imported by
any industrial manufacturing concern established or to be
established in the industrial estate solely for the purpose of
manufacturing finished articles in the said Industrial Estate,
the commissioner shall not, for a period of twelve years only,
from the date on which this rule comes into force, levy
E
octroi. . · ...... "
F
G
H
The Corporation invited applications for allotment of plots in the
industrial e·state guaranteeing that for a period of 12 years no octrol
will be levied as provided in rule 62-B. Acting on the representation
made by the Corporation, the respondents, namely, the Bijli Products
(India) Ltd., Henley Cilbles India Ltd., Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. \_
and Kirloskar Pneumatic Co .Ltd. applied for the allotment of plots
-
and sale deeds were executed as mentioned below
Name of the
Company
Bijlee
Products
·India Pvt. Ltd.
Henley
cables
India Ltd. Bombay
India Hume Pipe
co. Ltd. Bombay
Kirloskar
Pneu~
matic
Co.
Ltd.
Poona~3
Area purchased
86064
1566006
164960
553795
754436
Sum for
which area
was
Purchased.
Rs.
34. 425. 60
399331.53
42064.88
134838.71
112093.53
Date
of
purchase
10. 9. 65
29. 6. 60
10. 10. 69
16. I. 59
23. 5. 58
. .
..
•
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·}
MUNICIPAL CORP. POONA v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (Fazal Ali, J.) 769
Tlrn conveyances executed by the respondents contained the following
clause at item (B) :
i. ..
'
"(B) Octroi will be excused following and according to
the rule made by the Poona City Municipal Corporation from
the date 1-11-1957 in respect of Octroi for Hadapsar .Industrial Colony Sche.me. We have agreed and hereby assure that
we will not rescind or alter the octroi rule made' by the Poona
City
Mi.Jnicipal
Corporation during the
pe.riod
upto
10-10-1969 in such a way as to reduce the facilities given to
you according to the said rule".
The Corporation however made rule 5(8) which runs thus :-
"In respect of auy new materials or machinery belonging
to and imported by any industrial, manufacturing, processing
or assembling concern estab!fshed or to be established in the
Industrial Estate or Area for the purpose of manufacturing
processing or assembling finished articles in the said Industrial
Estate or Area the Commissioner shall not levy octroi for a
period of 10 years from the date of demarcation of such area
as an industrial estate or area; provided that this exemption
shall not be given in respect of any raw materials imported
for the purpose of refilling packing or repacking only.
Provided that no exemption from octroi shall be given or
claimable unless the importer produces at the time of import
but not afterwards a certificate in the form prescribed
in
Schedule 'P' signed by the proprietor or the manager of the
said industrial concern certifying that the raw materials or
the machinery that are being imported are the property of
t11e ownership of the said industrial concern and that the said
materials or machinery are to be u'sed or are intended to be
used by the said industrial concern for the purpose of manufacturing processing or assembling finished articles in the said
Industrial Estate or Area".
The combined effect therefore of rule 62-B and rule 5 (8) was that the
industrialists who were allotted plots in the City of Poona were to be
exempted from octroi duty on any new material's or machinery belongA
B
c
D
F
F
G
ing to them and imported by them in the industrial estate or Area for
manufacturing, processing or assembling articles in the said area. The
H
exemption was to last for a period of 10 yea.rs from the date of demarcation of such area.
A
B
c
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
Some years later the Corporation by a resolution dated 30-5-1968
recommended to the Government to bring about an amendment in rule
62-B. This resolution may be extracted thus :-
"Considering the reasons and recommendations given by
the Municipal Commissioner in his letter under reference and
considering ti)e objections and suggestions received
from
citizens in response to the notification, it is resolved that concessions already granted by the Corporation should not be
stopped before deletion of the Octrcii Rule 5(8). However,
uew demarcation of industrial areas should not hereafter be
made on the llfOUnd of Octroi Rule 5 ( 8) and no new concession of Octroi Rule 5 ( 8) hence forth be granted to any
industry.
Hence, the Octroi Rule 5 (8) should be deleted
and instead the following amendment is hereby sanctioned.
Sanction of the Maharashtra State Government to this
0
amendment should be obtained by the Municipal Commissioner as required undersection 455 ( 1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949.
E
Proposed Octroi Rufo 5 ( 8) .
Octroi Rule 5(8) is hereby repealed. Provided that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption already granted shall
continue until the expiry of the respective periods of their
grants"-
It appears that this resolution was passed on the recommendation of
F
the Municipal Commissioner as the purpose of giving initial conce6sions
had already been achieved and rule 5(8) had become snperf!uous.
The resolution however took care to keep the commitment of the Corporation intact and it was therefore recommended that there >hould
be a proviso to the effect that the exemptions already granted under
rule 5 ( 8) were to continue until the expiry of the respective periods
G
of the grants. Thus, the reconunendation for maintaining the exemption
from octroi duty to industrial areas which had already been demarcated
and allotted, was made by the Corporation. When the matter reached
the Government of Maharashtra it passed a resolutiop dated 30-7-1968
to be effective from 1-9-1968 which runs thus :-
R
"Government Resolution, Urban Development,
P~blic
Health and House, Department No. PMC/2862/15/C dated
28th January, 1963.
'
I
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MUNICIPAL CORP. POONA v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (Fazal Ali, J.) 771
Government Circular, Urban Development, Public Health
and Housing Department No. MUN/1164/58163/ A dated
25th February, 1966.
Letter No. MC/101dated2nd June, 1968 from the Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipal Corporation.
"Resolution : In exercise of the powers conferred by subsections (2) and (5) of section 149 and sub-section (1) of
section 455 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation
Act, 1949 Government is pleased to accord sanction to the
deletion of Clause (8) of Rule 5 of the Q,·troi Rules of the
Poona Municipal Corporation.
2. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section
(3) of section 149 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 Government is pleased to
specify 1st
September, 1968 as the date on which thi's sanction shall beA
B
c
come operative.
D
By order and in the name of the
E
Governor of Maharashtra
Sd./ C.F. Mathias
Under Secretary to the Government
of Maharashtra, Urban Development,
Public Health and Housing Department".
Thus, the Government ac<;epted the recommendation of the Corporation
and granted sanction to the deletion of clause (8) of rule 5 of the
Octroi Rules of the Corporation. The Corporation in pursuance of the
Government sanction sought to realise the octroi duty from the respondents and other industrialists. The respondents therefore filed separate
writ petitions in the Bombay High Court for quashing the order on the
ground that the Corporation having allotted the plots to the respondents
on the distinct assurance and representation that the octroi duty will
not he levied, was estopped from realising the octroi duty on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
F
G
It was also argued before the High Court that the Government order
H
in question could not take away the vested rights of the respondents.
The plea taken by the respondents in the High Court found favour
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
772.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I s.C.R.
with the Court which allowed the petitions and quashed the Government order and injuncted the Corpilration from realising any amount
from the respondents by way of octroi duty. The High Court, however,
gave certificates of fitness and hence these appeals before us.
Dr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation,
raised two main points before us. In the first place, it was argued that
the High Court erred in law in giving effect to the doctrine of promissory
cstoppel when there could be no estoppel against a statute. The ·
Government order deleting rule 5(8) being of a statutory character
could not estop the Corporation from realising octroi duty which it was
bound to realise under the mandate of the law. Secondly, it was submitted that there could be no question of taking away vested rights
because the Government order must be deemed to have been passed on
the recommendation of the Corporation. As against this, counsel for
the respondent submitted that so far as the Corporation is concerned it
will be bound by the doctrine of p.romissory estoppel and it can refuse
to realise octroi duty as en joined by the Government order or if it
realises the same, it would have to refund the same in order to keep
up its commitment.
Thirdly, it was submitted by the respondents as
also by the intervener that having regard to the history and the circumstances in which rule 5(8) and 62-B were introduced the order of the
Government dated 30-7-1968 was to be so read as to incorporate the
proviso suggested by the Corporation, namely, that the concessions
already granted to the industrialists would not be disturbed. Mr. Dewan
submitted that even if the Government order dated 30-7-1968 sought
to take away the exemption, the order itself was without jurisdiction
inasmuch as the conditions required by section 149(2) of the Act had
not been complied with.
We have given aur anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before us by counsel for the parties.
We feel that in the circumstances of this case and in the view that we take, it is not at all necessary
for us to travel into ihe domain of promissory estoppel. We are clearly
of the opinion that reading the order dated 30-7-1968 against tho history and background of the recommendation of the Corporation, the
first contention of the respondents must prevail.
It is not disputed that the Corporation in its resolution dated
30-5-1968 while recommending to the Government to delete rule 5(8)
expressly recommended that the exemption already granted would
continue. The last paragraph of the resolution runs thus :-
"Octroi Rule No. 5 ( 8) is hereby repealed.
Provided
that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption
already
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MUNICIPAL CORP. POONA v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (Fazal Ali,!.) 773
granted shall continue until the expiry of the respective
periods of their grants".
Before this, the Corporation itself had taken a policy decision that the
industrialists choosing to set up industries in the demarcated area
would be given exemption from octroi duty as contained in rule 62B.
It was on this representation that the respondents applied for allotment
of the plots and spent huge amounts of money for the import of machinery and the materials and set up industries.
A
B
The resolution of the Government deleting rule 5 (B) read as a
whole also clearly indicates that it did not intend to depart from the
recommendation made by the Corporation or to modify the same in
C
any manner.
On the other hand, the reso!uton clearly indicates that
it was being passed on the basis of the letter of the Municipal Commissioner dated 2nd June, 1968 as would be manifestly clear from the
citations in the resolution which may be extracted thus :
"Read : Government Resolution, Urban Development,
Public Health and House Department No. PMC/2862/15/C
D
dated 28th January, 1963.
Government Circular,
Urban
Developmeut
Public
Health and Housing Department No. MUN/!164/58163/ A
dated 25th Febru2ry, 1966.
Letter No. MC/101 dated 2nd June, 1968 from the
Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipal Corporation".
It is, therefore, evident that while exercising its power to delete rnle
5 (8) the Government had the following materials before it,
(1) It
knew that Rule 5(8) had granted exemption for a period of 10 years
to some industrialists, who on the basis of the representation made by
the Corporation had set up their industries; (2) the Municipal Corporation ha.ct made an express recommendation that while, deleting rule
5(8) the previous concessions regarding exemption from octroi duty
must continue, (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8)
in
the
exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of
section 149 and sub-section (1) of section 455 of the Act.
Section 149(2) runs thus:
"The mies shall be submitted by the Corporation to the
Provincial Government and the Provincial Government may
either refuse them or refer them back to the Corporation for
further consideration or sanction them either as they stand
or with such modifications as it thinks fit, not, however,
involving an increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the
extent thereof'.
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] I s.c.R.
This sub-section gives three alternative courses to the
Government.
After the matter is submitted by the Corporation to the Government
( 1) it may refuse to sanction the rules recommended, or (2) it may
refer back to the Corporation any rule ~or further consideration or (3)
it may sanction the rule as recommended, or with certain modifications
as it thinks fit.
There can be no doubt that the Government had the
power to make modifications in the recommendation submitted by the
Corporation, but the express provision by which the Government could
refer the matter back to the Corporation is clearly suggestive of the
fact that the Government would refer the matter to the Corporation if
it wants to modify the proposal.
In the instant case, the Government
has done nothing of the sort but has clearly passed the order purely in
tenns of the recommendation.
In these circumstances, therefore, the
inference is irresistible that the Government never intended to make
any changes in the rule recommended by the Corporation particularly
because the question of not accepting the condition recommended by
the Corporation, namely, that the existing concessions must continue
would entail taking away of vested rights and put the Corporation in a
wrong box inasmuch as it would then have to go back from its own
assurance. The Government mullt certainly have been aware of these
complications and if it thought that in spite of all this rule 5 (8) should
re deleted unconditionally, it would have referred the matter back to
the Corporation in order to get its revised views in the matter. But
that was not done.
In these circumstances, therefore, we are of the
opinion that the Government order dated 30th July, 1968 must be so
read as to include the proviso recommended by the Corporation while
deleting rule 5 ( 8), namely, that the concessions already granted to the
industrialists would continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not say so in so many words, but having regard to the language in which it was couched and to the express reference to the letter
dated 2nd July, 1968 of the Municipal Commissioner contained in the
order itself which clearly mentions that rule 5 (8) should be repealed
provided the exemption already granted shall continue until the expiry
of the respective periods of their grants, the aforesaid condition would
be deemed to be included in the order dated 30-7-1968 by necessary
intendment.
Such an interpretation will be fully in consonance with
the well settled rule of interpretation of statutes that any amendment
to a statute affecting the legal rights of an individual must be presumed
to be prospective unless it is made expressly or is impliedly retrospective.
This principle is contained in section 7 of the Bombay General
Clauses Act. In the instant case, if we were to take a different
view the result would be that a valuable right vested in the respondents
and others would be taken away and we are unable to find any evidence
in the language of the Government order to indicate any such intention.
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MUNICIPAL CORP. POONA v. BIJLEE PRODUCTS (Fazal Ali,!.) 775
•
Even assuming that the order of the Government deleted rule 5{&)
without any condition and without retaining the exemption granted to
the respondents, the order would suffer from a very serious legal
infirmity.
Section 149(2) of the Act empowers the Government to
modify the recommendation of the Corporation provided it does not
involve any increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof.
There can be no doubt that if the concession of exemption from
octroi duty given to the respondents is unconditionally withdrawn with
effect from 1-9-1968 then this would have the effect of extending the
application of the rules to an area where they did not apply. This
is yet another reason why the Government impugned order should be
read down so as to provide for deletion of rule 5(8) with the exception that the concession already granted will continue.
For the reasons given above, we interpret the Government order
mentioned above in the manner aforesaid and hold that the deletion
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of rule 5 ( 8) has not taken away the concession already granted to the
respondents and, therefore, the respondents are not affected by the
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order. In view of this, it is not necessary to quash the order of the
Government because the respondents get the relief they wanted if we
interpret the Government order as we have.
The order of the High
Court quashing the Government order is, therefore, set aside and the
appeals are disposed off accordingly, in the circumstances without any
order as to costs.
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S.R.
Appeals allowed.
C.A. No. 94 of 1971
FAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the
order of the High Court dated 21st December, 1970 dismissing the
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petition in limine.
In view of the findings given and the decision
rendered by us in Civil Appeals No. 2009 and 2081 of 1969 and 355
& 356 of 1970 it is not necessary for us to go into the details of the
facts of this case as we have already held that the Government order
dated 30-7-1968 must be read to this effect that rule 5(8) is deleted
but the previous concessions given to the industrialists concerned will
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continue. It appears, however, that so far as the appellant is concerned, it has not executed any sale--deed though it was allotted a plot
which was also demarcated. Apart from the point which we decided
in the other appeals there being additional points of law involved in this
case, we do not think that this was a fit case which should have been
dismissed in Umine by the Bombay High Court.
We, therefore, allow
H
this appeal and remit the case to the High Court for re-admitting and
disposal of the writ petition according to law. The point regarding the
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776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
interpretation of Government order dated 30-7-1968 has already been
decided by us in Civil Appeals No. 2009 and 2081 of 1969 and 355
& 356 of 1970 referred to above and will apply to the present case
also, if the appellant is able to prove that it falls within the four corners of the Government order.
S.R.
Appeal allowed & remitted.
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