# MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v. BIRLA COTION, SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS, DELHI AND ANOTHER - **Citation:** [1968] 3 S.C.R. 251 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1968-02-23 - **Bench:** K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S. M. S!Kri, V. Ramaswami, J.M. Shelat, C. A. Vaidial!Ngam - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-v-birla-cotion-spinning-and-weaving-mills-delhi-4362 - **Pages:** 61 ## Headnote Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1951 ss. 113 and 150-Powcr to Corporation under ss. 113(2) and 150 to levy optional taxes subject to Ce111ral Governmenfs approval-if excessive delegation and therefore ultra vi:res. Dtlhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act 35 of 1966-Wlrether effectively validated levy of tax between July I, 1959 and March 31, 1966. Constitution of India, Art. 11-Centrcl Governmenfs sanction signed by Deputy Secretary without the words "By order oJ the President'• or similar words-Whether deficiency made up by subsequent affidavit sta.tin~ approval given by minister-If Deputy Minister assigned certain work can give effective approval-or whether matter must go to Cabinet Minister also. On February 9, 1959, the appellant Corporation passed a resolution under section 150(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 66 of 1957 for the levy of certain taxes including a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity, Under s. 150(2) the Central Government sanctioned the l'!J< with'effect from July I, 1959 and also modified the rates of tax. The Corporation resolved on June 24, 19S9 under s. 150(3 )' to determine the rates sanctioned by the Central Government as the rates at which the tax would be leviable for the year 1959-60. The respondent challenged the levy of the tax by a writ petition which was allowed in appeal and it was held, inter alia, that the Central Government could not modify the rates but only withhold .or &fant sanction. Parliament th<'n passed Act 35 of 1966 te> validate the levy of the electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966. On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates. The respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the levy of tax by the resolutions of February 17, and December 27, 1965, and the vires of the Validation Act. The High Court allowed the petitions holding that though the Validation Act validated the levy and collection of tax from July !. 1959 to March 31. 1960 it did not do so for the period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966. It also held that section 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra virt.~. The respondent appealed to this Court. · HELD: (i) (By the Full Court) : The Validation Act 35 of 1966 validly levies and imposes tax on consumption Or sale of electricity till March 31, 1966. (Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the 252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.R. period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act meiely validatc,d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period. When ~cction 2(1) lays down that the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966 it must be understood to sanction the Icvy and collection of tax at the rates· fixed. This is implicit in the word ''actual'' which governs the words 11rates oj the tax". Even if there was some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2(1), that doubt is resoJv .. cd by the words of s. 2(2), which lays down that "all taxes on the con .. sumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have h.::en Jevie validate the levy of the electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966. On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution under s. 150(1) providing for the maximum rates fdr the Ievv of tax on electricity and after obtaining the Central Governmenes sanction, passed a second resolution on Decen1ber 27, 1965, under s. 150(3) fixing the maximum rates as the actual rates. The respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the levy of tax by the resolutions of February 17, and December 27, 1965, and the vires of the Validation Act. The High Court allowed the petitions holding that though the Validation Act validated the levy and collection of tax from July !. 1959 to March 31. 1960 it did not do so for the period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966. It also held that section 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra virt.~. The respondent appealed to this Court. · HELD: (i) (By the Full Court) : The Validation Act 35 of 1966 validly levies and imposes tax on consumption Or sale of electricity till March 31, 1966. (Per Wanchoo, C. J.. and Shelat, J.) : The High Court was in error in holding that levy and collection of the tax was not validated for the 252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.R. period from April I, 1960 to March 31, 1966 and that the Validation Act meiely validatc,d the fixation of the rate of tax for that period. When ~cction 2(1) lays down that the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24, 1959 shall be the actual rates of tax for the entire period from July l, 1959 to March 31, 1966 it must be understood to sanction the Icvy and collection of tax at the rates· fixed. This is implicit in the word ''actual'' which governs the words 11rates oj the tax". Even if there was some doubt in the matter from the words of s. 2(1), that doubt is resoJv .. cd by the words of s. 2(2), which lays down that "all taxes on the con .. sumption or sale of electricity levied or collected or purporting to have h.::en Jevied the rates deducible from the resolution of June 24. 1959 and authorised the levy and collection thereof for the entire period from July I. 1959 to March 31. 1966 notwithstanding anything contained in any judgm~nt, decree or order of any court to the contrary. I :!76 H-278 BJ (ii) (Per Wanchoo, C.J. and Shelat, J.) : On a consideration of the various provisions of the Act, it must be held that the power conferred by section 150 of the Act on the Corporation is not unguided and cannot be said to amount to excessive delegation. Although the delegation made in relation to the optional taxes under ss. 113(2) and 150 is wide, there arc sufficient guidelines, limits, controls or safeguards provided by the legislature in view of the fo11owing: la) The dele.gation has been made to an elected body respons'blo to ~he people including those who pay the taxes; 1his is an important check on the elected CounciJlors acting unreasonably and fixing unreasonable rates of taxation; (b) the limit to which the Cor·· poration can tax is cifcun1scribed by the need to .finance the functions, obligatory or optional, which it has to or mal' un E G H 1• MUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 255 • . .\ the Corporation are administered by the elec!ed representatives responsibleto lhe people is wholly irrelevant in determining whether the rule against excessive delegation may be departed from. If that excr.ption be tme, the Parliament may justifiably delegate its power to enact laws to other bodie5 merely by the expedient of constituting those bodies from among the representatives of the people. B c D E Case Jaw r-:viewed. (iii) (Per Wanclwo C.J. and Size/at, J,) : There was no force in the contenlion that the sanction of the Central Government given under section 150(2) was .not in accordance with the Constitution as it was: glven by a Deputy Secretary to the Government wlio had no authority to do so. Although the words ""by the orders of the Central Government" or "by the order of the President" were not used above the signature of the Deputy Secreta'ry and the authentication therefore was not quite in accordance with the provisions of Art. 77 of the Constitution, that deficiency had been made up by the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government in which it was stated that the resolution was approved by the then Deputy Home Minister and the Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs to whom 1he work relating to the Corporation was assigned by the Home Minister. Furthermore, i.'. is not necessary \\'here business has been as·signed by a Cabinet Minister to a Minister or a Deputy Minister that the malt·!r should he put before the Cabinet Minister also after the Minister or the Deputy Minist~r has approved of it in accordance, wi_th the assignment made in his favour. [275 E-276 DJ CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISD!CTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1857 and 1858 of 1967. Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 9, 1967 of the Delhi High Comt in Civil Writ No. 105 of 1967, and Writ Petition No. 564-D of 1966 respectively. C. K. D£!phtary, Attorney-General, H. R. Gokhale, D. D. Chawla and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant (in both the appeals). A. K. Sen, B. Parthasarthy, J. B . .,Dadachanji and Ravinder F Narain, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals). G H R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals). M. K. Nambiyar, D. R. Thadani, Da/ip K. Kapur, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. !. . N. A. Palkhiva/a, J. B. Dadachanji, and Ravinder Narain, for in'erveners Nos. 2. 5 and 6. Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for intervener No. S-. S. T. Desai and I. N, Shroff, for intervener No. 4. The Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J. and SHELAT, J, was delivered by WANCHOO, CJ,, HIDAYATULLAH, J. delivered a separate Judgment on behalf of himself and RAMASWAMI, J., SnrnI, J. delivered a separate Judgment SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and VAID!ALINGAM, J. 256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 S.C.R. Wanchoo, C.J. These two appeals on certificates granted by the High Court of Delhi raise common questions relating to the constitutionality of delegation of 'taxing powers to municipal corporations and the effect of the Validation Act, passed by Parliament, in connection with tax on the consumption or sale pf electricity levied by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) from July 1, 1959 to March 31, 1966. The fac'.s are not in dispute and may be briefly narrated. On February 9, 1959, the Corporation passec a molution purporting to be under sub-section (I) of s. 150 or the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, No. 66 of 1957. (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for levy of three taxes, includini; a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity. Section 113 ot the Act which confers powers on the Corporation to impose taxes has divided them into two kinds, namely, obligatory taxes. which the Corporation must impose [s. 113(1)], and optiona'. taxes which the Corporation may impose [section 113(2)]. Fur:her s. 150(1) of the Act provides that maximum rate of la"" to be levied in the case of optional taxes will be specified by '' resolution of the Corporation. After the maximum rate has 1hu.i been specified, the resolution. has to be submit'.ed to the Centra: Government for sanction under s. 150(2), and if sanctioned by Government, the rate comes in'.o force on and from such dat~ as may be specified in the Order of. sanction. Under subsection ( 3) of s. 150 the Corporation lhen passes another resolu:ion determining the actual rates at which the tax is l.~vied and the tax comes into force on the first day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolutio11 is pa5'ed. The Corporation forwarded the resolution dated February 9. 1959 which was somewhat defect.iv.~ inasmuch as it die not specify the maximum rates, but merely the rates, which were to be enforced for the ensuing year, to Government for sanction On June 20, 1959, the Central Government sanctioned the tax on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from July I, 1959 In giving the sanction the Central Government modified the rates On June 23, 1959, the Standing Committee took the Government sanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporatim'. that rntes of tax as sanctioned by Government be detenninec under sub-s. (3) of s. 150 as !he actual rates at which the ta:- would be leviable for the year 1959-60. On June 24, 1959, the Corporation resolved that the recommendations of lhc :>tanding Committee regarding tax on consumption or sale of ,~Jectricity be approved. Then followed demands by the Corporation on the basis of the imposition of tax from July 1, 1959. When the tax was demanded from the respondent, it filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the levy of the tax This writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. Th~ A B c 0 E F G H A B c D E F G H MUNL, CORPN. PELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) ·257 respondent then went in appeal, and the appeal court allowed the appeal holding inter a/ia (i) that the Central Uovernment could not modify the rate; spedied in the resolution under s. 150 ( 1) but could only either withhold sanction thereto or sanction them, and (ii) that the liability to pay tax could not commence earlier than April 1, 1960. in view of the provisions contained in s. 109(2) read withs. 150(4) of the Act. On December 3, 1966, Parliament passed the Delhi M\!nicipal Corporation (Validation of Electrici'ty Tax) Act, No. 35 of 1%6 (hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act). By :his Act, it purported to validate the levy of electricity tax from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1966 (both days inclusive). In view of the Validation Act, fresh demands were made by the Corporation on the respondent. On February 17, 1965, the Corporation passed another resolution in pursuance of s. 150(1) and this time provided maximum rates for the levy of tax on consumption or sale of electricity. These rates were higher than the rates fixed by the resolution of February 9, 1959. This resolution was submitted to Government and was sanctioned, on December 8, 1965. Thereafter the Corporation passed the second resolution under s. 150(3) of the Act resolving that the maximum ratei should be adopted as the actual rates for the levy of tax. This resolution was passed on December 27, 1965. Then followed two writ petitions by the respondent. By the first writ petition it challenged the levy of tax by resolutions of February 17 and Dec.ember 27, 1965, and by the second writ petition the appellant challenged the vires of the Validation Act. We may now refer to the grounds of the challenge. So far as the Validation Act is concerned, it is contended that the Validation Ac't has failed in its object inasmuch as it did not provid~ for the levy of tax and merely validated the rates fixed by the resolution of June 24, 1959. Other grouncjs were also stres•ed in this connection but it is unnecessary to refer to them as they have not been pressed before us. As to the aitack on the. resolu~iqns dated February 17, 1965 and December 27, 1965, the main contention is thats. 150 is unconstitutional inasmuch as it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and is therefore ultra vires and no tax could be levied by the Corporation thereunder. There are some other minor points raised in this connection to which we shall refer later. The High Court held, so far as the Validation Act is concerned, that though it validated the levy and collection of tax from July I. 1959 to March 31, 1960, it failed to validate the levy and collection from April 1, 1960 to March 31, 1966 on 258 SuPRBMB COUllT REPORTS the ground that there was no ·Jevy of tax for this latter period, even though the rates were specified in the Validation Act. On the question of excessive delegation, 'the High Court held that s. 150 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power and was therefore ultra vires. In consequence, the two writ petitions succeeded except as to the period from July I, 1959 to March 31, 1960. The Corporation then applied for and obtained certificates and that is how the rna~ter has come up before us. Before we deal with the main question that has been argued before us, namely, whether s. 150 of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation, we may briefly refer to certain provisions of the Act whiCh are material for our purposes. Section 3 of the Act creates a Corporation from such date as the Central Government may by notification in the official i:azet•e, appoint and this Corporation is charged with the municipal government of Delhi and is to be known as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Section 7 of the Act provides that the persons entitled to vote at elections of co11ncillors shall be .the persons registered by virtue of the provisions of the constitution and the Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1950, as voters at elections to the House of t.'1e People. It wilJ be seen therefore that the Councillors of the Corporation are elected by universal adult suffrage. The total number of councillors is 80 and to these are added 6 eldermen, and they to~ether form the Corporation. Section 42 Jays down certain obligatory functions of the Corporation. It is not necessary to refer to them in detail; it is enough to say that the main obligatory functions of the Corporations are . the supply of water for public and private purposes, the constructlOll, maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works and of public latrines, the scavenging, removal and disposal of fil!h, the consiruction or purchase, maintenance, extension, management and conduct of (i) any undertaking for the generation or supply 11nd distribution of electricity to the public, and (ii) any undertaking for providing road transport servi~s by mechanicaDy propelled vehicles, the establishment and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity and child welfare ~entres ~nd carrying out of other measures necessary for public medical relief, the construction and rnain•enance of municipal markets and slaughter houses and regulation thereof, the construction, maintenance, alteration and irn provements of public streets, bridges, culverts, cau5eways and ihe like, the lighting, watering and cleansing of public streets and other public places, the es~ablishment, maintenance of, and aid to, schools for primary education and the maintenance of a fire-brigade and the protection of life and property in case of fire. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H MUNL. CORPN. DELHI v. BIRLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 259 Section 43 provides for optional functions of the Corporation which it may in its discretion prqvide and a large number of such functions are enumerated therein. Some of these optional func• tions are : the establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, libraries, museums, art galleries, boianical or zoological collections, the providing of music or other entertainments in public places or places of public resort and the establishment of theatres and cinemas, the construction and maintenance of (i) rest houses, (ii) poor houses, (iii) infirmaries, (iv) children's homes, (v) houses for the deaf and n. Then com~ s. 150, which deals with optional taxes and with which we are particularly concerned. It reads thus : "(1) The Corporation may, at a meeting, pass a resolution for the levy of any <>f the taxes specified in sub-section (2) 6f secti<>n 113, defining the maximum rate of the tax to be levied, the class or cla!!Ses of 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1968] 3 S.C.R. persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and the exemptions, if any, to be granted. (2) Any ~esolution passed under sub-section (1) shall be submitted to the Central Government for its sanction, and if sanctioned by that Government shall come into force on and from sue!\ date as may be specified in the order of sanction. (3} After a resolution has come into force under sub-section ( 2), the Corporation may, subject to the maximum rate, pass a second resolution determining the actual rates at which the tax shall be leviable; and the tax shall come into force on the> fi!'St day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolution is passed, ( 4) After a tax has been levied in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section, the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 109, shall apply in relation to such tax as they apply in relation to any tax imposed under sub-section ( l) of section 113." A B c D It will be seen that sub-section (1) of s. 150 leaves it to the Corporation, at a meeting, to pass a resolution for the levy of any of the optional taxes by prescrib:ng the maximum rate. The Corporation is also given the power to. fix the class or classes E of persons or the description or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, for this purpose. It has also the power to lay down the system of asseisment and exemptions, if any, to be granted. Th' contention of the respondent is that s. 150 ( 1) delegates completely unguided power to the Corporation in the matter of optional taxes and suffer from the vice of excessive delegation and is upcopstitutional. We may also refer. to certain o'.her sections which deal with revenue and expenditure of the Corporation. Section 99 deals with the constitution of the municipal fund, in which all moneys of the Corporation go. Section 109 provides for adoption of budget estimates. It lays down that the Corporation shall on or before the 31st day of March of every year adopt for the ensuing year four budget estimates, namely, (iJ budget estimates (general), (ii) budget estimate (electric supply), (iii) budget estima~ (transport) and (iv) budget estimate (water supply and sewage disposal). Section 109(2) lays down that on or before the 15th day of February of each year, the Corporation shall determine the rates at which various municipal taxes, rates and cesses shall be levied in the next following year. Section 102 inter alia provides that no payment of any sum out of the F G H A B c D E F G H MUNL. CORPN. DELHI I". BIRLA MILLS (Wane/Joo, C.J.) 261 municipal fund shall be made unless the expenditure of the sume is covered by a current budget-grant. It is in the light of these provisions that we have 10 consider whether the delegation made to the Corporation by s. 150 in the mat!er of imposing optional taxes is within the penuissible limits of delegation. The contention on behalf of the appellant is !hat in view of these provisions there is sufficient guidance to the Corporation in the matter of fixing the rates of optional taxes and levying them on the inhabitants of the area and it cannot be sa'd that Parliament by enacting s. 150 transgressed the limits of pennissible delegation. · The question as to the limits of permissible delegation of legislative power by a legisla'.ure to a subordinate authority has come before th's Court in a number of cases and the law as laid down by this Court is not in doubt now. Considering the complexity of modern life it is recognised on all hands that legislature cannot possibly have time to legislate in every minute detail. That is why it has been recognised that it is open to the legislature to delegate to subordinate authorities the power to make ancillary rules for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the leg:slature indicated in the law which gives power to frame such ancillary rules. The matter came before this Court for the first time In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912( 1), and it was held in tha: case that it could not be sa'd that an unlimited right of delegation was inherent in. the legislative power itself. Th:s was not warranted by the provisions of the Cons'.itution. which vested the power of legislation either in Parliament or Sta'.e legislatures and the le2itimacy of delegation depended upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature considered to be necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effec'.ive'ly and completely. Tht.: legislature must retain in its own hands the essential Jeg'slative functiop. Exactly what constitu1ed "essential legislative function", it was held further, was difficult to define in general tenus, but this much was clear that the essential legislative function mnst at least consist of th.~ de'.ermination of the legisiative policy and its fonnulation as a bind'ng rule. of conduct. Thus where the law passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays down '.he standard which is enacted into a rnle of law. it can leave· the task of subordinate leglslation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies. i.e., the makin•r of rules, regulations or bye-laws. The subordinate authority must do so within the frame-work of the law which makes the delegafon, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent with ~he law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the (I) [1951] S.C.R. 747. 262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1968] 3 s.cR limits of the policy and standard laid down in the Jaw. l'rovidetl the legislative policy is emmciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the ·extent of delegation necessary in a particular case. In Raj Narain Singh v. The Chairman Patna Administration Committee(') the same question arose and it was held that "an execuilve authority can be authorised by a statute to modify either existing or future Jaws but not in any essential feature. Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciat· ed in general terms but it is clear that modification cannot in· elude a change of policy. Essential legisla1ive function consists in the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct." In Han'shankar Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh('). s. 3, of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. In that case reliance was placed on the re in Delhi Law Act(') where the majority held ¢hat "the essential powers of legislation carmot be delegated and that the legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body empowered to execU'te the law. Applying these pri11ciples this Court held that the Act there impugned had laid down the principle and that principle was the maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availabi· lity at fair prices. It was further held that this sufficienily fonnu· lated the legislative policy and the ambit and ·the character of that Act was such that the details of that policy could only be worked out by delegating that power to a subordinate authority within the frame-work of that policy. The Court therefore held that s. 3 of the-impugned Act was not ultra vires the legislature on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. In the Western India Theatres Limited v. Municipal Corpo· ration of the City of Poona('), a question arose with respect to the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, which gave power to the municipality to levy "any other tax to the nature and object of which the approval of the Governor in Council sha!J haVll been obtained prior to the selection contemplated in sub-cl. (i) of cl. ( ~) of section 60". This provision was attacked as unconstitu · tional on the ground .that the legislature had completely abdicated its function and delegated essential legislative power to the municipality to determine the nature of the tax to be imposed (1) [1955] l S.C.R. 290. (2) [1955] l S.C.R. 3~0. (3) [t95l] S.C.R. 747. (4) [1959) Suppl. 2. S.C.R. 71. A B c D E F G -. MUNCL. COR.PN ... OELHI v. BlllLA MILLS (Wanchoo, C.J.) 263 A on the ratepayers and that power was unguided, uncanalised and vagaranit. The delegation was upheld b.J this Court on the ground that s. 59 authorised the municipality to impose tax thereunder for the purposes of the Act. The Act there under consideration defined tho obligations and functions cast upon the municipality and it was observed that taxes could only be B levied for implementing those purposes and not for any other purpose. It was finally observed that the impugned section did lay down the procedure which the municipality had to follow in imposing a tax and the legislature could not in the circumstances be said to have . abdicated Its function in favour of the municic pality. Jn Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India('), this Court struck down one provision of the impugned Act as the legislature had established no critedon or standard and had not prescribed any princ'ple on which the particular disease or condition was to be specified. It .will be seen that the same principle that the legislature could not delegate unguided D power to a subordinate body was the basis of this decision. F G Jn Vasant/al Maganbhai Sanjanwal v. The State of Bom• bay('), the question of delegation of legislative power arose. This Court . enunciated the principle thus : 1 "Although the power of delegation is a CO!!Stituent element of the legislative power, it is well-settled that a legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case and before it can delegate any subs!diary or ancillary powers to a delegate of its choice, it must lay down the legislative policy and principle so as to afford the delegate proper guidance in implementing the same. A statute challenged on the ground of excessive delegation must therefore be subjected to two tests, ( i) whether it delegates essential ·legislative function or power and (2). whether the leg'slature has enunciated its policy and principle for the guidance of the delegate." In Jyoti Pershad v.