# MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI v. SURESH CHANDRA JAIPURIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 10
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-11-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1202 of 1976
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, M. H. Beg, Jaswant Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-v-suresh-chandra-jaipuria-anr-7005
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

.
Civil Procedure Code Sec. 115-Concurrent decisions 011 question of facts;.
znterfere11ce by High Court, whether justified-Specific Relief Act, 1963
S.
41 (h) applicatio11.
The re~pondent purchased a house, and under the sale-deed became respon·
sible for paying the house-tax subsequent to the purchase. On his failure to pay
the same, the appellant corporation started proceedings agairu;t him
for
the ·
realisation of dues.
In the course of a suit for permanent injun~tion, the respondent's application for an interim injunction was rejected by two courts.
On
further appeal, the High Court granted him interim injunction on the ground
that there was a prima facie case even though agreeing with the appellate court
that the balance of convenience was against such grant.
Allowing the appeal the Court,
HBLD : 1. Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, lays down that an
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injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an
...
equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any otht'.lr usual mode or proceedings
except in cases of breach of.trust. [13E-F]
2. While exercising its jurisdiction under s. 115 the High
Court is
not
competent to correct assumed erroneous findings of fact. The High Court had
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itself erred plainly both in holding that the courts below had not taken a correct
view of the prima facie case which existed here and that the question of bafance
of convenience was irrelevant. [12C-D, 13F-G]
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3. High Court had overlooked legally possible grounds of interference under
section 115 C.P.C.
[14-A-B]
Balderdas Shiv/al & Anr. v. Fi/mistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd. & Ors.
[1970] 1 SCR 435; D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. P. Ltd. New Delhi v.
Sarup Singlt & Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 368; The Managing Direcror !MIG) Hindustan Aero11otics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad & Anr. v.
Ajit Prnsad
Tarway,
Manage,. (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan A eronotic,, Ltd. Balana11ar, Hyder·
abad, A.LR. 1973 S.C. 76; applied.
Mis Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Mis Basic Equipment Corporation [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1060 referred to.
Dewan Dau/at Ram Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Committee
&
Am·.
ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 363 distinguished.

## Text

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10
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
v.
SURESH CHANDRA JAIPURIA & ANR.
November 3, 1976
[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]
.
Civil Procedure Code Sec. 115-Concurrent decisions 011 question of facts;.
znterfere11ce by High Court, whether justified-Specific Relief Act, 1963
S.
41 (h) applicatio11.
The re~pondent purchased a house, and under the sale-deed became respon·
sible for paying the house-tax subsequent to the purchase. On his failure to pay
the same, the appellant corporation started proceedings agairu;t him
for
the ·
realisation of dues.
In the course of a suit for permanent injun~tion, the respondent's application for an interim injunction was rejected by two courts.
On
further appeal, the High Court granted him interim injunction on the ground
that there was a prima facie case even though agreeing with the appellate court
that the balance of convenience was against such grant.
Allowing the appeal the Court,
HBLD : 1. Section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, lays down that an
, I
injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an
...
equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any otht'.lr usual mode or proceedings
except in cases of breach of.trust. [13E-F]
2. While exercising its jurisdiction under s. 115 the High
Court is
not
competent to correct assumed erroneous findings of fact. The High Court had
E
itself erred plainly both in holding that the courts below had not taken a correct
view of the prima facie case which existed here and that the question of bafance
of convenience was irrelevant. [12C-D, 13F-G]
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G
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3. High Court had overlooked legally possible grounds of interference under
section 115 C.P.C.
[14-A-B]
Balderdas Shiv/al & Anr. v. Fi/mistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd. & Ors.
[1970] 1 SCR 435; D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. P. Ltd. New Delhi v.
Sarup Singlt & Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 368; The Managing Direcror !MIG) Hindustan Aero11otics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad & Anr. v.
Ajit Prnsad
Tarway,
Manage,. (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan A eronotic,, Ltd. Balana11ar, Hyder·
abad, A.LR. 1973 S.C. 76; applied.
Mis Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. Mis Basic Equipment Corporation [1977] 1 S.C.R. 1060 referred to.
Dewan Dau/at Ram Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Committee
&
Am·.
ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 363 distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1202 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
21st Feb. 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 479 of
1974.
F. S. Nariman, B. P.
Maheshwari and Suresh
Sethi,
for thee
(
Appellant.
.M.C. DELHI v. SURESH CHANDRA (Beg, J.)
11
Mahendra Narain Advocate of Rajendra Narain & Co., for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG. J. After issuing a notice to show cause why special leave
should not be granted, this Court granted, on 13th October, 1976,
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the leave prayed for to appeal agilinst the judgment and order of a
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learned Judge of the Ddh.i High Court.
That Court had interfered
under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, with the concurrent findings
of the Trail Court and the Appellate Court in this case that, as the
plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case, no interim injunction
could be granted to the respondent to restrain the
appellant,
the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi, from realising a sum of Rs. 27,216/-
on account of house tax from the plaintiffs pending the disposal of a c
suit for a permanent injunction. This Court directed a hearing of this
appeal on 28th October, 1976.
Accordingly,, the appeal is
now
before us.
The plaintiff had purchased a house in South Extension, New
Delhi, on 21st February, 1969, free from all encumberances, demands, or liabilities under the sale deed, and the vendor, Mohan
Siagh, had undertaken to discharge these dues.
It was, therefore,
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decided in a previous suit that the defendant-appellant could not
recover the whole amount sought to be recovered as house tax from
him.
The respondent was absolved from liability for the period before the sale.
But, the
plaintiff was liable to pay the tax for the
period after the purchase.
He had also paid Rs. 6,992/-. It appears that proceedings for realisation of dues subsequent to tile purchase had
then been taken by the
appellant
corporation.
The
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plaintiff's suit for a permanent injunction was brought on the ground
that this assessment of house tax had
proceeded on an erroneous
basis.
It is mattoc of admission between the parties that the house on
which the home tax was levied had not been let to any tenant since
its construction.
The Trail Court had found that, from the plaintiff's
statement of accounts of tax, it appeared that the demand which was
Fbeing recovered from him was in respect of the period subsequent to
31st March, 1969 and was based on a rateable value of Rs. 37800/-
pcr annum which had been provisionally adopted subject to results
of proceedings in Courts of appropriate jurisdiction as to what the
correct basis of assessment was.
The Trial Judge had granted an
interim injunction initially, but, after hearing parties, had vacated it
on 18th October, 1973, as he had found that no prima facie case was
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made out to grant it.
On an appeal by the plaintiff, the Appellate Court, after considering all the questions raised before it, dismissed the appeal.
It
gave the following finding on the question of balance of convenience
raised before it :
"The balance of conveniences is also in favour of the
defendant.
The defendant renders services as a civic body
most of the amount which it
spends has to
come from
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
owners of property in the form of property taxes.
If the
plaintiffs do not pay the property tax then the defendant
might not be able to carry out its
duty.
The plaintiffs
have also been
unable to
show that they
would suffer
irreparable injury if an injunction is not granted to them.
If they ultimately prove that they are not liable to pay
full amount demanded by the defendant as property
tax then the plaintiffs could compel the defendant either
to refund the amount realised in excess or to adjust the
amount recovered in excess towards property tax for
future years.
The plaintiffs do not suffer irreparable injury
if they are not granted the temporary injunction."
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The High Court, while agreeing with the view of the Appellate
Court that the balance of convenience was in favour of discharging
the interim iniunction, held that, as there was a prima facie case
that the assessment had been
erroneously
made, the principle of
balance of convenience
did not apply
here.
The learned Judge
thought that the •principles of assessment applicable to such cases
had been already laid down by the Full Bench of the Delhi High
Court in Dewan Dau/at Ram Kapur v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Am•.(')
He observed :
"One of the principles laid down by the Full Bench
decision is that where pren~ises were never let at any time,
Annual value be fixed in accordance with section 6 ( 1) (A)
(2) (b) or S. 6(1) (B) (2) (b) by ascertaining market
value of land and
reasonable
cost
of
construction.
The facts noticed above, hut missed by the Courts below,
prima facie establish that the property was never let ou:;
the prima facie materials which are available, inclusive of
what the D.M.C. itself had conceded, show the plainti1-fs
were occupying the
property for
their oi.vn use.
Th<:
plaintiffs' case therefore, prima facie, falls within the above
principle.
Failure to perceive the above had resulted
in the Court5 below declining to exercise jurisdiction vested
in them in the manner it should have been exercised".
Hence, the learned Judge interfered and granted the interim injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.
Mr. F. S. Nariman, appearing for the
appellant Corporation,
points out that Dewan Daulat Ram Kapur's case (supra) was one
where premises had been let, but, in the case before us. it was a
matter or admission by both sides that the premises had n-:ver b:=en
let out to a tenant.
Section 6(1) (A) (2) (b) of the D.-lhi Rent
Control Act relate'!> to case1s where standard rent has to b.: fixed of
residential premises let out at any time on or after 2nd Jun<:, 1944.
And, Section 6(1) (B) (2) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act relates to premises other than residential premises which had ~e~n let
out at any time after 2nd June, 1944.
The Full Bench dec1s1on of
the Delhi High Court in Dewan Dau/at Ram Kapur's case (supra)
(f)I.L·R. 1973 (1) Dehl(p.-:363.
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. M.C. DELHI V. SURESH CHANDRA (Beg, J.)
13
was that it was not incumbent on the Corporation to ascertain the
hypothetical standard rent of premises in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act in order to fix the annual value or rateable
value where premises had been let but no standard rent had been
fixed and assessment was sought to be made on the basis of agreed
rent. It was also decided there that in cases before t!lrn High Court
on that occasion, reasonable cost of construction as well as the market price of land to be taken into account in assessing the property
tax.
It is difficult for us to see what bearing the provisions cited from
the Delhi Rent Control Act or the Full Bench decision of the High
Court could have on the case now before us.
It seems to us that
Mr. Nadman is correct in submitting that the learned Judge of the
High Court had himself misapprehended the law in holding that the
Courts below had failed to find a prima facie case because of a misconception of law.
However, as no one has appeared on the date of
the final hearing on behalf of the respondent, who had appeared
through Counsel to answer the show cause notice issued by this
Court before granting special leave, we refrain from deciding the
question whether the provisions cited by the learned Judge of the
Delhi High Court have any bearing on the case befor\) us or not'.
This is a matter which will be decided in the suit itself. We, therefore,
leave it expressly open for determination.
Mr. Nariman, learned Counsel for the Corporation, is, we think,
on very firm ground in contending that balance of convenience could
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not be ignored in such cases and that the learned Judge of the High
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Court erred in holding that it could be.
It also seems that the attention of the learned Judge was not directed towards section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which lays
down that an injunction, which is a discretionary equitable relief, cannot be granted when an equally efficacious relief is obtainable in any
other usual mode or proceeding except in cases of breach of trust.
Learned Counsel for the appellant Corporation points out that there
was the ordinary machinery of appeal, under section 169 of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, open to the assessee respondent. It
had not even been found that the respondent was unable to deposit the
necessary amount before filing the appeal.
However, we abstain from
deciding the question whether the suit is barred or not on this ground.
All we need say is that this consideration also has a bearing upon the
question whether a prima facie case exists for the grant of an interim
injunction.
Tn M/s. Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers
v.
M/s.
Basic
Equipment Corporation('), also we found very recently that, as in ihe
case before us now, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court had ')Verlooked the principles governing interference under Section 115
Civil
Procedure Code laid down by this Court in Baldevdas Shiv/al & Anr.
v. Filmistan Distributors (Tndia) (P) Ltd. & Ors.('); D. L. Housing &
(1) [19771 1 S.C.R. 1060.
(2) [1970] I S. C.R. 435.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. Sarup Singh & Ors(').; The
Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
Balanagar,
Hyderabad & Anr. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase & Stores)
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad. (2).
We direct
the attention of the learned Judges concerned to the law declared by
this Court.
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We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the
Delhi High Court and restore that of the Appellate Court.
The
parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
M.R.
(I) (1970] 2 S.C.R. 368.
(2) A.LR. 1973 S.C. 76.
Appeal allowed.
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