# MUNICIPAL COUNCIL PALA:! v. T.]. JOSEPH AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 87 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, J. R. Mudholkar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/municipal-council-pala-v-t-joseph-and-others-2848 - **Pages:** 18 ## Headnote 87 Motor Vehicles-Public Bus Stand constructed by M unici·' pality-Demand of charges from operator8 using the standValidity-Statutory provisions, if repealed by implicationTravancore District Municipalities Act, (XXIII of 1116 M. E.), (Corresponding to A. D. 1914), ss. 286, 287-TravancoreCochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125, s. 72. · The appellant passed a resolution providing for the use of a public bus stand constructed by it for stage carriage buses starting from and returning to the Municipal limits of Palai or passing through its limits. It also prohibited the use of any other public place or public street within the Municipal limits as a bus stand or a halting place. The respondents who were using that bus stand, were served with notices demanding the payment of the charges due from them. They preferred writ petitions before the High Court challenging the validity ~f the action taken by the appellant and praying for quashing the notices issued against them. The High Court accepted the contention of the respondents that the provisions of ss. 286 and 287 of the Municipalities Act stood repealed by implication by virtue of the provisions of s. 72 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act. On appeal by special leave this court held:- Held, that at the basis of the doctrine of implied repeal is the presumption that the legislature which must be deemed to know the existing law did not intend to create any confusion in the law by retaining conflicting provisions on the statute book and, therefore, when the court applies this doctrine it does no more than give effect to the intention of the legislature ascertained by it in the usual way. Daw v. The M•tropolitan Board of Works, (1862) 142 E. R. ll04, Great Central Gas Consumers Co. v. Clarke, (1863) 143 E. R. 331, and Goodwin v. Phillipa (1908) 7 C. L. 1l. 16, !lis\in~ished, 1963 Febl'llllry U. !96:1 11uniripcl Coundl Pafai v. T. J. J o_rt·/1h .\flulho/J:~r J. 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. Jn the presrnt case, the proper construction of the two sets of provisions would be to r~ard s. 72 of tlir: ·rravancorc~ Cochin !\1'otor \'chicles Act as a provision in C')ntinuity \\•ith ss. 286 and 287 of the ·rravfincore District_ Mu11ir.ipali1ies . .\ct so that it r.oukl he availed of by the appropr iatc authority as -.nd \\·hen it chose. Thr: intention of the legic;lature \Vas to allow the t\VO sets of provisions to co-exist, b~r."\u~e both arr. c:-nahling ones and in such a position, it r.ould not imply repeal. Dal' Chand v. Stair. of Uttar l'rade.oh, (1959] Supp. 2 S. C.R. I!, Shyamkrint Lal ''· Raml1hajnn Singh, [1939] ~C.R. 193, and .4ttonu:y-Gtneral for Ontari•J \' . .1tttJrnl!,!fGe~eral for !lie Dominion, j 1896] A. C. 34B, referred to. Alli no action under s. 72 had so far hc:en takr.n b1.: the Govern1nent, it could not be sairi that a co;iflict \V)ttld ·arise and, therefore, the resolution> of the Municipal C mncil still hold good a_nd the appeals must be allowed. Crnr. APPI'LLATF: Jua1sn1CT1oi.- Civil Appeals Nos. 7!) to 81 of I !lGI. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 18, l!J59, of the Kerala High Court in 0. P. No. 57!l, 580 and ti.Ii of I !l:i!l . .M. U. Isaac, Giri.~h Chandra and Scmlm· Baltadur. for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. 1963. February 14. The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by :VluonOLKAR .J.- The Municipal Council, Palai, the appellant before us, passed a resolution on September 12, 1958 providing for the use from October I, 1958 of a public bus stand constructed by it for stage carriage buses starling from and returning to the municipal limits of Palai or passing through its limits. ,\ fee of Re. 1 per day was to bl' charged _ .... - 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 89 on every such bus and 50 nP. per day on buses which merely pass through the municipal limits. The resolution also prohibited the use after that date of any other public place or the sides of any public street within Palai municipal limits as a ## Text .. J_ 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL PALA:! v. T.]. JOSEPH AND OTHERS (K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, and J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) 87 Motor Vehicles-Public Bus Stand constructed by M unici·' pality-Demand of charges from operator8 using the standValidity-Statutory provisions, if repealed by implicationTravancore District Municipalities Act, (XXIII of 1116 M. E.), (Corresponding to A. D. 1914), ss. 286, 287-TravancoreCochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125, s. 72. · The appellant passed a resolution providing for the use of a public bus stand constructed by it for stage carriage buses starting from and returning to the Municipal limits of Palai or passing through its limits. It also prohibited the use of any other public place or public street within the Municipal limits as a bus stand or a halting place. The respondents who were using that bus stand, were served with notices demanding the payment of the charges due from them. They preferred writ petitions before the High Court challenging the validity ~f the action taken by the appellant and praying for quashing the notices issued against them. The High Court accepted the contention of the respondents that the provisions of ss. 286 and 287 of the Municipalities Act stood repealed by implication by virtue of the provisions of s. 72 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act. On appeal by special leave this court held:- Held, that at the basis of the doctrine of implied repeal is the presumption that the legislature which must be deemed to know the existing law did not intend to create any confusion in the law by retaining conflicting provisions on the statute book and, therefore, when the court applies this doctrine it does no more than give effect to the intention of the legislature ascertained by it in the usual way. Daw v. The M•tropolitan Board of Works, (1862) 142 E. R. ll04, Great Central Gas Consumers Co. v. Clarke, (1863) 143 E. R. 331, and Goodwin v. Phillipa (1908) 7 C. L. 1l. 16, !lis\in~ished, 1963 Febl'llllry U. !96:1 11uniripcl Coundl Pafai v. T. J. J o_rt·/1h .\flulho/J:~r J. 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. Jn the presrnt case, the proper construction of the two sets of provisions would be to r~ard s. 72 of tlir: ·rravancorc~ Cochin !\1'otor \'chicles Act as a provision in C')ntinuity \\•ith ss. 286 and 287 of the ·rravfincore District_ Mu11ir.ipali1ies . .\ct so that it r.oukl he availed of by the appropr iatc authority as -.nd \\·hen it chose. Thr: intention of the legic;lature \Vas to allow the t\VO sets of provisions to co-exist, b~r."\u~e both arr. c:-nahling ones and in such a position, it r.ould not imply repeal. Dal' Chand v. Stair. of Uttar l'rade.oh, (1959] Supp. 2 S. C.R. I!, Shyamkrint Lal ''· Raml1hajnn Singh, [1939] ~C.R. 193, and .4ttonu:y-Gtneral for Ontari•J \' . .1tttJrnl!,!fGe~eral for !lie Dominion, j 1896] A. C. 34B, referred to. Alli no action under s. 72 had so far hc:en takr.n b1.: the Govern1nent, it could not be sairi that a co;iflict \V)ttld ·arise and, therefore, the resolution> of the Municipal C mncil still hold good a_nd the appeals must be allowed. Crnr. APPI'LLATF: Jua1sn1CT1oi.- Civil Appeals Nos. 7!) to 81 of I !lGI. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 18, l!J59, of the Kerala High Court in 0. P. No. 57!l, 580 and ti.Ii of I !l:i!l . .M. U. Isaac, Giri.~h Chandra and Scmlm· Baltadur. for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. 1963. February 14. The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by :VluonOLKAR .J.- The Municipal Council, Palai, the appellant before us, passed a resolution on September 12, 1958 providing for the use from October I, 1958 of a public bus stand constructed by it for stage carriage buses starling from and returning to the municipal limits of Palai or passing through its limits. ,\ fee of Re. 1 per day was to bl' charged _ .... - 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 89 on every such bus and 50 nP. per day on buses which merely pass through the municipal limits. The resolution also prohibited the use after that date of any other public place or the sides of any public street within Palai municipal limits as a bus stand or a halting place. At the request of the bus operators the Municipal Council, by a resolution dated September 24, 1958 reduced the rates from Re. 1 to 80 nP. per day and from 50 nP. to 40 nP. per day. By a further resolution dated November 22, 1959 the l'vfunicipal Council modified the resolution of September 12, 1958 and instead imposed a prohibition on using as a bus stand or halting place a public place or side of a public road within a radius of six furlongs from the Municipal bus stand. Some of the operators who were using that bus stand did not pay the charges due from them for the use of the bus stand. Demand notices were, therefore, issued against them. The respondent in this appeal, Joseph, as well as the respondents in the other two appeals, Anthony and Eapen, who were recipients of such notices preferred writ petitions before the High Court of Kerala challenging the validity of the action taken by the Mnnicipal Council and praying for quashing of the demand notices issued against them. lt may be mentioned that the various resolutions of the Municipal Council to which we have adverted were passed by it in exercise of the powers cunferred upon it by ss. 286 and 287 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, XXIII of 1116 M. E. (which corresponds to A. D. 1941). Those provisions read thus : "286 (I) The Municipal Council may construct or provide public landing places, halting places and cart-stands and may levy fees for the use of the same. · (2) A statement in English and a language of the district of the fees fixed by the Council for 1963 Municipal Council Palai v. T. J. Joseph Mudholkar J, 1963 Muniripal CounciJ Pafui v. T.J. Joupiz Mudho/kar J, • 90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. the use of such place shall be put up in a conspituous part thereof. Explanation : A cart-stand shall, for the purposes of this Act include a stand for carriages and animals. 28i : Where a Municipal Council has provided a public landing place, halting place or cart. stand, the executive authority may prohibit the use for the same purpose by any person within such distance thereof, as may be determined by the l\fonicipal Council, of any public place or the sides of any public street." The reason given by the l\{unicipal Council for taking action under these provisions is that about 80 stage carriage buses start, halt in, or pass through the municipal limits of Palai and the members of the public using them were being put to serious inconveniences for want of a proper waiting room and other necessary conveniences. Further, the unsyste· matic manner in which the buses were parked and plied affected the sanitation of the town. I:! order to improve matters the Municipal Council claims to have utilised a plot of land worth Rs. 50,000 located almost at the centre of the town and constructed a bus stand at a cost Rs. 80.000 wherein, among other things, it has provided separate waiting rooms for men and women, sitting accommodation, electric fans, sanitary conveniences, drinking water etc., as also garages and booking offices free of cost for bus operators using the bus stand. It is claimed on behalf of the Municipal Council that by establishing the bus stand it has not only acted within the scope of the powers conferred by the Act but also in public interest and for pre· serving the health and sanitation of the town. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the provisions of ss. 286 and 28i of the - I ' 2 S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 91 Travancore District Municipalities Act stood repealed by implication by virtue of the provisions of s. 72 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act, 1125 M. E .. (corresponding to A. D. 1950) which came into force on January 5, 1950. That section reads as follows : "Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by Government may, in consultation with the local authority having jurisdiction in the area concerned, determine places at which motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time, and may determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers." Incidentally we m.iy mention that this section continued in force until the Travancore-Cochin Motor· Vehicles Act was replaced partially by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) on its extension to Travancore Cochin by Part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (Central Act 3 of 1951). The Central Act, of course, has no bearing upon the argument advanced before us because if in fact ss. :!86 and 287 were repealed by implication by s. 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act the effect of the partial replacement of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act by the Central Motor Vehicles Act does not fall to be considered. The High Court accepted the contention urged by the respondents in these three appeals and observed : "The T.C. Motor Vehicles Act, 1125 was enacted, as the preamble shows, in order to provide 'a uniform Jaw relating to motor vehicles' and we see no reason why sections 1963 Municipal' Council Palai v. T. J. Joseph Mudlwlkar J. 1963 Alurricipol . R. 16. .- - /· v: .. "':I I - .. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 97 take place in the event of clear inconsistency or repugnancy, is pointed out in Crosby v. Patch ('), and is as follows :- "As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to inter· fere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. Bowen v. Lease ( 5 Hill 226). It is a rule, says Sedg · wick, that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irre· concilably inconsistent. 'The reason and philosophy of the rule,' says the author, 'is, that when the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute in general terms, or treating the subject in a general manner, and not expressly contradicting the original act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular or positive previous provisions, unless it is absolu· tcly necessary to give the latter act such a construction, in order that its words shall have any meaning at all." r For implying a repeal the next thing to be considered is whether the two statutes relate to the same subject matter and have the same purpose. Crawford has stated at p. 684 : "And, as we have already suggested, it is essential that the new statute covers the entire subject matter of the old; otherwise there is no indication of the intent of the legislature to abrogate the old law. Consequently, the (1) 18 C.i.lif, 438 quoted by Crawford ''Statatory Construction'' P• 633. 1963 }.{unicipal Council Pallfi v. T.J. Joseph .Mulho/kar J. • 1963 Municibal Ctitmcil Palai •• T.J. Jo,,ph Mu'1lo/k4r /, . ./ Q8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. later enactment will be construed as a continuation of the old one''. The third question to be comidered is ll'hether the new statute purports to replace the old one in its entirety or only partially. Where replacement of an earlier statute is partial, a question like the one which the court did not choose to answer in Daw's case ('),would arise for decision. It must be remembered that at the basis of the doctrine of implied repeal is the presumption that the legislature which must be deemed to know the existing law did not intend to create any confusion in the law by retaining conflicting provisions on the statute book and, therefore, when the court applies this doctrine it does no more than give effect to the intention of the legislature ascertained by it in the usual way ·i. e., by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments, the earlier and the later. The further question which is to be considered is whether there is any repugnancy between the old and the new law. In order to ascertain whether there is repugnancy or not this court has laid down the following principles in Deep Chand v. 'l'he State of U ttar Pradesh (') : 1. Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions ; 2. whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law ; 3. whether the two laws occupy the same fi~. r Another principle of law which has to be home (I) (1862) E,R, llot. (2) [IV59J 2 s.c.a. e. n. • - - ··~· . ··+· 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 99 in mind is stated thus by Sutherland on Statutory Construction (1) : "Repeal of special and local statutes by general statutes : The enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and application to cover the field of operation of a special or local statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law, or to a particular locality within. the jurisdictional scope of the general statute. An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted to statutes of the same general nature since the legislature is presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject-matter by the general enactment. Therefore, where the later general statute does not propose an irreconcilable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general law." Of course, there is no rule of law to prevent repeal of a special by a later general statute and, therefore, where the provisions of the special statute are wholly repugnant to the general statute, it would be possible to infer that the special statute was repealed by the general enactment. A general statute applies to all persons and localities within its jurisdiction and scope as distinguished from a special one which in its operation is confined to a particular locality and, therefore, where it is doubtful whether the special statute was intended to be repealed by the general statute the court should try to give effect to both the enactments as far as possible. For. as has been pointed out at p. 4 70 of Sutherland on Stah1tory Construction, Vol. R I where the repealing effect of a statute is doubtful, "the statute is to be strictly (1) Vol, I, 3rd Edu, P• .W6; 1963 ,\!unicijJal Cor.ncit Palai v. T,J, Josrph Muih1/kar J. 1963 ,\fu11icrPal C1Ju.ortil Palai v. TJ. Jouph Mudho/k01 J. 100 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1964) vat. construed to effectuate its consistent operation with previous legislation." In the case before us the contentiun is not that the whole of the District :\fo11icipalities Act has been abrogated by the Motor Vehicles Act but thats. 72 of the latter Act is the complete law on the subject of dt>termining parking places for motor vehicles and that in so far as ss. 286 and 28i of the Travancorc District Municipalities Act arc in conflict with that law, they must give way to it or in other words they must be deemed to have been repealed by implica· tion. The general principles which apply to a consideration of the question whether the later enactment repeals an earlier one by implication will also have to be applied to the kind of case which is before us. We have already quoted s. i2 of the TravancoreCochin Motor V chicles Act. It empowers 1he Government or an authority authorised by it to determine in consultation with a local authority places at which motor vehicles may stand or halt. Section 28!i of the Travancore District :\lunicipalities Act l.'mpowers the :\lunicipal Council to construct or provide public halting places and cart stands and levy fees for their use. On the face of it, we do not see any inconsistency between the two provis.ions because it is open to the Municipal Council to exer· cise its powers under s. 28tl and charge fees from bus owners making use of the conveniences provided by it. Simultaneously with the exercise of the power under that section by the 11unicipal Council the Govern· ment or other appropriate authority may exercise the power under s. 7:! and there will be no conflict in the exercise by them of their respective powers. Since the powers under this pro\'ision arc to be exercised in consultation with a lucal authority. in practice actual conflict may be obviated by the Government not excrci;ing its powers under s- 72 of - 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 101 the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act where the Municipality has taken action under ss. 286 and 287 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act. Even assuming that it does, it will have to do so in consultation with the Municipality and it may be legitimate to expect that the ultimate action would be such as not to bring about any conflict. It has also to be borne in mind that s. 72 of the Tra van core-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act was enacted for the purpose of enabling· the.Government and the appropriate authority to make provisions for parking places not only in municipal areas but in non municipal areas as well as also in municipal areas where the municipality has taken no action under s. 28fL Would it then be proper to say that there is a conflict between s. 286 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act and s. 72 of the TravancoreCochin Motor Vehicles Act ? The latter provision has a wider territorial application than the former and can· in that sense be said to be a general one, while the former being applicable only to municipal areas is a special one. Being a special provision s. 286 cannot readily be considered as having been repealed by the more general provision of s. 72 of the Travancore Cochin Motor Vehicles Act. But we must bear in mind that s. 286 does not stand by itself and in order to effectuate the purpose underlying it the legislature has enacted s. 287, apparently intending that when action is taken by a municipality under s. 286 it may also take consequential action under s. 287. Could it, therefore, be said that there is conflict between ss. 286 and 287 on the one hand ands. 72 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Act on the other because while under s. 287 a municipality can prohibit the use as a halting place of any place within a specified distance of the bus stand constructed by it, the Gcwernmcnt or other appropriate authority can by order permit places within the prohipited 1963 Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph Mudhclkar J. 196.1 ,.\1unicipal r:o11ncil "Pala1 •• 1. J. }1Jtph ,}f .. dhoil ar J. 102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. area to be used as halting places ? It is urged before us on behalf of the .Ylunicipal Council that until action is · taken under s. i2 of the Travancore Cochin i\fotor Vehicles Act which will have such result, it cannot be said that a·conflict will arise and that until such conflict actually takes place, the old provision must stand. In support of this contention learned counsel refers us to the decision of Sulaiman .J., in Shya11wkc111t Lal v. Ramblwj