# MUNICll'AL BOARD, HAPUR v. RAGHUVENDRA KRll'AL AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 950 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1965-09-23 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1962 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah Ands. M. Sikri - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/municll-al-board-hapur-v-raghuvendra-krll-al-and-others-3668 - **Pages:** 24 ## Headnote U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). ss. 131 to 135-Sections 131 to 134 whether mandatory-Section 135(3) whether ultra vires-Whether suffers from excessive delegation or discrimination-Whether bad as con· Je"ing judicial functions on State Government. The appellant Board passed a special resolution on September 28, 1956, imposwg water-tax in Hapur and a notification by the Uttar Pradesh Government was published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazelle under s. 135(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) notifying the resolution. Fifteen house-owners of llapur "·ho received notices from the appellant lloard for the payment of the tax petitioned to the High Court under Art. 220 of the Constilution and asked for a writ or order preventing the appellant Board from realising the tax. 'lne main objections were (a) that the resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not published in a local paper of Hapur published in Hindi and ( b) that the rules framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution which was affixed on the notice board at the office of the appellant Board in purported compliance with the requirement> for publication. The imposition was also challenged on the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution were violated. A single judge of the High Court held that the tax was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the Municipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board while imposing the tax and thats. 135(3) of the Act (which cures all defects in the imposition of the tax by making the notification of Gover1)ment conclusive evidence of 1hc legality of the imposition) was iiltra vire.-r Art. 14 of the Constitution because it created a bar against proof and left no remedy to the lax payers thereby making a discrimination hetwecn them and other litigants. He further held that the sub-section by making Government the sole judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial power on Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. The appellant Board appealed under the Letters Patent. The Di\isional Bench upheld the order of the single judge. The case was however certified as fit for appeal under Art. 133 and the Board appealed to thio Court. The contentions raised in appeal were : (i) s.135 (3) shut> out all enquiry into the procedure by which a tax had been imposed and therefore suffered from exce-;sive delegation of legislative function: (ii) The tAX had not been validly imposed as there had been non--0bservance of rnandatorv provisions; (iii) s. 135(3) was discriminatory; and (iv) the aulHlection was also bad because it conferred judicial functions on the State Government. HELD : Per Gajendragadkar, C.J .. Hidayatullah, Shah and Sikri. JJ.-(i) The rule of conclusive evidence in s.135(3) does not 'hut out all enquiry by court_s. There are certain matters which cann~ b~ estab~ lished by a notification under s.135(3). For example no nollficatton can issue unless there is a special resolution under s. 134. The special resoluA JI c D E F G II A ' B c D ' G ·' H MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA 951 tion i.o a sine qua non for the notification. Again the notification cannot authorise the imposition of a tax not included in s. 128 of the Municipali· ties Act. Neither the Municipal Board nor the State Government can exercise snch power. What the section does is to put beyond question the procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say the various steps taken to impose it. A tax, not authorised, can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may be challenged, not with reference to the manner of imposition but as an illegal impost. [958 A-DJ (ii) There can be no doubt that some of the provisions of ss. 131 to 134 of the Act are mandatory. But all of them are not of the same character. In the present case, as in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. and in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati, the provisions not observed were of a directory chara ## Text _Characters 0–39,965 of 65,691. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39965 for what follows._ MUNICll'AL BOARD, HAPUR v. RAGHUVENDRA KRll'AL AND OTHERS September 23, 1965 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SIKRI, JJ.) U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916). ss. 131 to 135-Sections 131 to 134 whether mandatory-Section 135(3) whether ultra vires-Whether suffers from excessive delegation or discrimination-Whether bad as con· Je"ing judicial functions on State Government. The appellant Board passed a special resolution on September 28, 1956, imposwg water-tax in Hapur and a notification by the Uttar Pradesh Government was published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazelle under s. 135(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916) notifying the resolution. Fifteen house-owners of llapur "·ho received notices from the appellant lloard for the payment of the tax petitioned to the High Court under Art. 220 of the Constilution and asked for a writ or order preventing the appellant Board from realising the tax. 'lne main objections were (a) that the resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not published in a local paper of Hapur published in Hindi and ( b) that the rules framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution which was affixed on the notice board at the office of the appellant Board in purported compliance with the requirement> for publication. The imposition was also challenged on the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution were violated. A single judge of the High Court held that the tax was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the Municipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board while imposing the tax and thats. 135(3) of the Act (which cures all defects in the imposition of the tax by making the notification of Gover1)ment conclusive evidence of 1hc legality of the imposition) was iiltra vire.-r Art. 14 of the Constitution because it created a bar against proof and left no remedy to the lax payers thereby making a discrimination hetwecn them and other litigants. He further held that the sub-section by making Government the sole judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial power on Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. The appellant Board appealed under the Letters Patent. The Di\isional Bench upheld the order of the single judge. The case was however certified as fit for appeal under Art. 133 and the Board appealed to thio Court. The contentions raised in appeal were : (i) s.135 (3) shut> out all enquiry into the procedure by which a tax had been imposed and therefore suffered from exce-;sive delegation of legislative function: (ii) The tAX had not been validly imposed as there had been non--0bservance of rnandatorv provisions; (iii) s. 135(3) was discriminatory; and (iv) the aulHlection was also bad because it conferred judicial functions on the State Government. HELD : Per Gajendragadkar, C.J .. Hidayatullah, Shah and Sikri. JJ.-(i) The rule of conclusive evidence in s.135(3) does not 'hut out all enquiry by court_s. There are certain matters which cann~ b~ estab~ lished by a notification under s.135(3). For example no nollficatton can issue unless there is a special resolution under s. 134. The special resoluA JI c D E F G II A ' B c D ' G ·' H MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA 951 tion i.o a sine qua non for the notification. Again the notification cannot authorise the imposition of a tax not included in s. 128 of the Municipali· ties Act. Neither the Municipal Board nor the State Government can exercise snch power. What the section does is to put beyond question the procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say the various steps taken to impose it. A tax, not authorised, can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may be challenged, not with reference to the manner of imposition but as an illegal impost. [958 A-DJ (ii) There can be no doubt that some of the provisions of ss. 131 to 134 of the Act are mandatory. But all of them are not of the same character. In the present case, as in Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. and in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati, the provisions not observed were of a directory character and therefore the imposition had the protection of s. 135(3). [958 HJ Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur. [1965] l S.C.R. 970 and Berar Swades/Ji Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee, Committee Sheogaon & Anr. [1962] 1 S.C.R. 596, relied on. (iii) Mandatory provisions must be fully complied with, and directory provisions should be substantially complied with. In either case 1he agency for seeing to this compliance is the State Government. It is hardly ro be expected that the State Government would not do its duty or that it would allow breaches of the provisions to go unrectified. In cases of minor departure from the letter of the law especially in matters not fundamental, it is for the Government to see whether there bas been substantial or reasonable compliance. Once GC>Vernment COO· dones the departure, the decision of the Government is rightly made final by making the notification conclusive evidence of the compliance with the requirements of the Act. [959 H-960 DJ (iv) The power to tax belongs to the State Legislature but is exercised by the local authority under the control of the State Government. It is impossible for the State Legislature to impose taxes in local areas because local conditions and needs must vary. The power must be delegated. The taxes ho\vever are predetermined and a procedure for consulting the wishes of the people is de\ised. But the matter is not left entirely in the hands of the Municipal Boards. As the State Legislature cannot supervise the due observance of its laws by the municipal Boards power is given to the State Government to check their actions. The proceedings for the itn~ position of the tax must come to a conclusion at some stage after \vhich it can be said that the tax has been imposed. That stage is reached, not when the special resolution of the Municipal Board is passed but when the notification by Government is issued. After the notification all en ... quiry must cease. This is not a case of excessive delegation unless one starts with the notion that the State Government may collude with the Municipal Board to disregard deliberately the provisions for the imposi· tion of the tax. There is no warrant for such a supposition. The pro-- v1s1on making the notification conclusive evidence of the proper imposition of the tax is conceived in the best interest of compliance of the provisions by the Board and not to facilitate their breach. [960 F"961 E] Excessive delegation is most often found when the legislature does not perform all the essential legislative functions and leaves them to some other agency. The Legislature here performs all essential functions in the imposition of the tax. The selection of the tax for imposition in a muni ... cipal area is by the legislative will expressed in s. 128. Neither the Muni ... eipa1 Board, nor the Government can go outside the list of taxes therein includedl. The procedure for the imposition of the tax is also laid down 952 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS (1966] I S.C.R. by the Legislature for the Municipal Board lo follow and the State Govern· mcnt is there to ensure due ob9Crvance of that procedure. In view of all this :here was no excessive delegation or conferral or legislatlve functions on the appellant Board or the State Government. [961 F-962 CJ (v). There a:e numerous statutes including the Evidence Act, in which a fact is taken to be conclu.'>ively proved from the c."tisrenl.'.e of some other fact. The law is full of fictions and irrehuttable presumptions which also mvol~e proof of facts. 'fhe t~LX payers in the t\.1unicipality arc alto\ved '? object to the proposal for the tax and the rules and to have their objecUons considered. They cannot be allowed to keep on agitating. Section U5('J. which only concludes objections against the procedure followed 1n the 1mpos1uon of the tax cannot be said to be discriminatory and ,;oJa~ ;ive of Ari. 14. [962 D-H] l vi) The ( ujecrion that the impugned sub-section involves the exercise of judi~ial functions not open to the legislature is wholly erroneous. The sub-section only shuts out further enquiry and makes the notification final. [962 HJ /'er Wanchoo. J. (dissentin~) (i) Sec'ion 135(3) bars enquiry by courts into all p~occdural provhions relating to imposition of taxes and lhereforc it ba·s enquiry into any motter covered bys. 131 10 •· f35(1) of the Act. It cannot be read down as barring enquiry only into some procedural provisions i.e. from s. 131 to s. 133 and not into the other procedural prov;sions i.e. s. 134 ands. 135(1). [968 Dl Section 135(3) is not a rule of evidence; it is a substantive pro\ision wh;ch lay\ d0\\'11 in effect that once a notific-..ition under s. 135 (2) L'i illucd it will be conclusively presumed that the tax is in accordance with all the procedural provisions with respect to the impoeition thereof. [969 El lslzar Ahmad Khan v. Urriorr of India. [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 235, r~ !erred to. The effect of s. 135(3) is that the procedural provisions are given the go by in the ma:tcr of irnoosition of tax and as soon as a notifica"ion under s. 135(2) is shown to the court, the court is helpless in the matter oven though none of the provisions of s. 131 to s. 135(1) may have been complied with. [969 I!] (ii) In the field of local taxation relating to municipal boards and district boards and similar other bodies there aro reasons for delegating fixation of rote to such bodies subject to proper safeguards. This is aactly what has been done under the Act subject to the safeguards con,. ta.ined in s~. 13 l to s. 135 ( 1). If those safeguards are folknvcd the delegation would he proper de~eg:Hion and could not be challenged as ultra vires on the grolmd of excessive dclega'ion. But if the legislature after laying down with great care saf~uards .as to the impositi?n of tax including its rate makeo; a blanket prov1s1on likes. 135(3), which at one stroke does away with all tho.e safeguards-and this is whats. 135(3) has done in the present case-the position that results is that there i.') delegation of even the essential function of fixing the rate to the subordinarc au1hority without any safeguard. Such a delegation would he excessive delegation and would be ultra vires. (972 D-Fl (iii) Section 135(31 inasmuch as it makes the delegation con•ained ill ss. 128 to I 35 (2) e'cessive must be severed from the rest of 1he eectioru \\:hich are othen~:ise a proper delegation of legislative au 1hority and should be struck down on the ground of ex.,.,ssivc delegation. [973 BJ A B c D E F G •. H • -· - A B c MUNI. BOARD V. RAGHUVENDRA (Hidayatullah, J.) 953' CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1962 . Appeal by special leave from the judgi;nent and o!'1er, dat?'1, November 23, 1959, of the Allahabad High Court m Special Appeal No. 524 of 1958. S. V. Gupte, Solicitor-General, Guru Dayal Srivastava and T. Satyanarayana, for the appellant. B. R. L. Iyengar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent$ Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8 & 12 to 14. C. B. Agarwal and 0. P. Rana, for Intervener No. 1. A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. 2. G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, for the State of Rajasthan· and R. N. Sachthey, for Intervener No. 3. D I. N. Shroff, for Intervener No. 4. The Judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., HIDAYATULLAH, SHAH AND SIKRI, JJ was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. WANCHOO· J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. E Hidayatollah J. The Municipal Board, Hapur (shortly the appellant Board) passed a Special Resolution (No. 296) on September 28, 1956 imposing water tax in Hapur from April l, ~957 and a notification by the Government of Uttar Pradesh was. published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette under s. 135(2) of the U. P. Municipalities Act (Act 2 of 1916) dated December 11, JI' 1956 notifying the resolution. Fifteen house owners of Hapur who received notices from the appellant Board for the payment of the tax assessed in respect of their houses, petitioned to the· Htgh Court at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution and' asked for a writ or order preventing the appellant Board from realising the tax. Their contention was that the ta"{ was illegal as G it was imposed in contravention of the provisions of the Municipalities Act. The main grounds of objection were (a) that the resolution of the appellant Board framing the proposal was not published in a local paper of Hapur printed in Hindi, and (b) that the rules framed for the imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution which was affixed on the notice board at the office H of the appellant Board in purported compliance with the requirements for publication. The imposition was also challenged on the ground that Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution were violated .. 954 SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1966] I S.C.R. The petition was heard by Mr. Juslice James who decided all A the points against the appellant Board. He held that the tax was illegal inasmuch as the mandatory requirements of the Municipalities Act were not complied with by the appellant Board while imposing the tax, and that s. 135(3) of the Act (which cures all defects in the imposition of tax by making the notification of Government conclusive evidence of the legality of the imposiB lion) was ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution because it created a bar against proof and left no remedy to the tax payers thereby making a discrimination between them and other litigants. He further held that the sub-section, by making Government the sole judge of compliance with the Act conferred judicial power on Government contrary to the intendment of the Constitution. The C appellant Board was accordingly ordered not to collect the tax from the petitioners. The appellant Board appealed under the Letters Patent. The Divisional Bench hearing the special appeal agreed with Mr. Justice James. The present appeal has been filed by special leave of this Court. Since it will be necessary to consider whether the appellant Board complied with the requireD ments of the. Municipalities Act or not and, if not, to what extent, it is necessary to analyse the provisions in the Municipalities Act for the imposition of a tax and then to follow that up with a narration of the steps taken by the appellant Board. Section 128 of the Municipalities Act confers on the Municipalities in Uttar Pradesh the power to levy taxes and enumerates the kinds of taxes. One such tax mentioned in cl. ( x) of sub-s. E ( 1) of the section reads : "a water tax on the annual value of the building or land or both". This was the tax which the Municipality had attempted to impose in Hapur. There can be F no question that the appellant Board had the competence to impose this tax and so the first question is whether it went about the business in the wrong way and, if it did, what is the effect. Section 129 specifies certain restrictions on the imposition of water tax. We need not refer to them because no objection wa.s raised that the restrictions there prescribed had not been observed. G Sections 131 to 135 lay down the procedure for the imposition of the tax. Section 131 provides that when a Board desires to impose a tax it shall, by special resolution, frame a proposal specifying the tax, the person or class of persons to be made liable and the description of the property or other taxable things H or circumstances in respect of which they arc to be made liable, the amount or rate leviablc from such person or class of persons and any other matter which the State Government may require MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA (Hidayatullah, !.) 955 A by rules to be specified. The same section requires the Board to prepare a draft of the rules which it desires the State Government to make and the Board is required to publish the proposal, the draft rules so framed, and a notice in the prescribed form, in the manner laid down by s. 94. That section says that every resoluB tion passed by a Board at a meeting, shall, as soon thereafter as may be, be published in a local paper published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in such manner as the State Government may, by general or special order, direct. After the notice etc. are published, s. 132 enables any inhabitant of the Municipality to submit to the Board an objection in writing to c all or any of the proposals framed by it and the Board is required to consider the objection so submitted and to pass order thereon by special resolution. If the Board decides to modify its proposals or any of them it must publish the modified proposals and (if necessary) the revised draft rules with a fresh notice, for objections. Any new objection so received has to be dealt with n in the same way. After the Board has finally settled the proposals, it has to submit the proposals, the objections (if any) and the orders made in connection therewith, to the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority under s. 2 ( 17) (ii) means an officer or a body corporate appointed by the Stat~ Government in this behalf E F by notification in the official Gazette, and, if no such officer or body corporate is appointed, the Commissioner. It may be stated that the proposal we are considering was accepted by the Commissioner. Then follows s. 133 and it gives power to the State Government or the prescribed authority to reject, sanction or modify any proposal. When the proposals are sought to be modified they have to be referred back to the Board f.;-r further consideration. When the proposals are sanctioned by the State Government or the prescribed authority s. 134 of the Act requires that the State Government, after taldng into consideration the draft rules submitted by the Board, shall proceed to make such rules, under its powers under s. 296 of the Act, in respect of G the tax, as the Government may consider necessary. After the rules have been made, the order of sanction and a copy of the rules are sent to the Board and thereupon the Board by special resolution directs the imposition of the tax with effect from a date which it specifies in the resolution. This is stated in s. 13~ which may be reproduced here fully : H "135. Imposition of tax,- ( 1) A copy of the resolution passed under Section 134 shall be submitted to the State Government, 956 SCPREME COURT REPORTS [1966) I S.C.R. if the tax has been sanctioned by the State Government, and to the Prescribed Authority, in any other case. (2) Upon receipt of the copy of the resolution the State Government, or Prescribed Authority, as the ca e may be, shall notify in the official Gazette, the impocal paper, a copy of every resolution passed hv a Board at a mee•ing 'hall. within ten days from the date of the meeting, be paO'ing it sundry procedure is gone through and section 135 (3) says that the notification by Government is conclusive proof that the procedure was correctly followed. It is argued that ss. 131 to 134 use mandatory language and G it is the intention of the Legislature to secure obedience to its wishes and therefore it is for the couns to say whether those provisions were followed by the Municipal Board and the State Government. There can be no doubt that some of the provision> are mandatory. But all provisions are not of the same character. In Raza B1111/a11d Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal Board. RamH pur(') ss. 131 to 134 were considered in the light of the tests ·--- ---- (!) [19651 I. S. C. R. 970. • ... , I J MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVENDRA (Hidayatullah, /.) 959, A usually applied to determine whether a provision of law is mandatory or directory. It was there pointed out that all the sections ino spite of the language used in them were not mandatory. The majority opinion considered that the first part of s. 131 ( 3) requiring publication of proposals was mandatory and the second part which required that publication should be in the manner B required by s. 94(3) was only directory. In one of the minority opinions no such distinction was made but s. 94(3) was held to be directory. In the other minority opinion distinction was made between provisions for the protection of tax payers which were stated to be mandatory and provisions for promoting despatch, publicity and efficiency were stated to be directory requiring subC stantial but not literal compliance. In that case the notice imposing water tax in Rampur was published in Hindi but in a newspaper published in Urdu. The majority treating the latter part of s. 131 ( 3) as directory held that there was substantial compliance. The minority treating s. 131 ( 3) to be mandatory upheld D the tax treating s. 94 ( 3) as directory. One of the minority views. relied upon s. 135 (3) as shutting out enquiry . In Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee Sheogaon & Anr. (1) the Municipality passed a resolution under s. 67 (1) of the C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Subsections (1) to (7) incorporated provisions similar toss. 131-135 E of the U. P. Municipalities Act. An attempt to question the tax on the ground that the procedure prescribed by s. 67 was not followed was repelled. It was observed : F G " ...... This notification itherefore ;clearly is one which directs imposition of octroi and falls within subs. (7) of s. 67 and having been notified in the Gazette it is conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it cannot be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken." The defect in the imposition of the tax here being of the same character as in the two cases of this Court above cited, the imposition would have the protection of s. 135(3) and the tax must be deemed to be imposed according to the procedure laid down in the Act. As observed already, some of the provisions controlling the H imposition of a tax must be fully complied with because they are ~.> ' vital and therefore mandatory, and the others may be complied (I) [1962] I S.C.R. 596. 960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966) l S.C.R. with substantially but not literally, because they arc directory. Jn either case the agency for seeing to this compliance is the State Government. It is hardly to be expected that the State Government would not do its duty or that it would allow breaches -0f the provision to go unrectificd. One can hardly imagine that an omission to comply with the fundamental provisions would ever be condoned. The law reports show that even before the addition of the provision making the notification conclusive evidence of the proper imposition of the tax, complaints brougbt before the courts concerned provisions dealing with publicity or requiring ministerial fulfilment. Even in the two earlier case' which reached this Court and also the present case, the complain1 is of a breach of one of the provisions which can only he regarded as directory. In cases of minor departures from the letter of the law especially in matters not fundamental, it is for the Government to see whether there has been substantial or reasonable compliance. Once Government condones the departure, the decision A 8 c of Government is rightly made final by making the notification D conclusive evidence of the compliance with the requirements of the Act. It is not necessary to investigate whether a complete lack of observance of the provisions would be afforded the same pr<.>- tcction. It is most unlikely that this would ever happen and before we pronounce our opinion we should like to see such a case. It was, however. contended that there has been excessive delegation, inasmuch as the State Government has been given th~ power to condone breaches of the Act and thus to set at naught the Act itself. This is not a right reading of the relevant provisions. E We have already pointed out that the power to tax i' conferred F on the State Legislature but is exercised by the focal authoritv under the control of the State Government. The taxes with which we are concerned are local taxes for local needs and for which local inquiries have to be made. They are rightly left to the representatives of the local population which would bear the tax. Such taxes must vary from town to town, from one Board to G another. and from one commodity to another. It is im,.,ossible for the Legislature to pass statutes for the imposition of such ta'te-; in local areas. The power must be delegated. Regard bcin!! had to the democratic set-up of the municipalities which need the proceeds of these taxes for their own administration. it 1s proner to leave to these municipalities the power to imnose and collect H these taxes. The taxes are, however, predetermined and a procedure for consulting the wishes of the people is devised. 13ut the ,, \ • ;.' ·~· ~" - - • A B c MUNI. BOAl\D v. llAGHUVENDllA (Hidayatullah, I.) 961 matter is not left entirely in the hands of the MuriiCipal Boards. As the State Legislature cannot superv~ the due observance of its laws by the Municipal Boards, power is given to the State Government to Clieck their actions. The imposition of the tax is left to the Municipal Boards but the duty to see tliat the provisions for publicity, and obtaining the view~ of the persons to be taxed are fully complied with, ii laid upon the State Government. The proceedings for the imposition of the tax, however, must come to a conclusion at some stage after which it caiJ. be said that the tax has been imposed. That stage is reached, not when the special resolution of the Municipiil. Board is passed, but when the notification by Government is issued. Now it is impossible to leave the matter open so that complaints about the imposition of the tax or the breach of this rule or that may continue to be raised. The door to objections must at some stage be shut and the Legislature considers that, if the State Government approves of the special resolution, all enquiry must cease. This is not a case D ohncessive delegation unless one starts with the notion that the State Government may collude with tho Municipal Board to disregard deliberately the provisions for the imposition of the tax. There is no warrant for suck a supposition. The provision making tho notification conclusive evidence of tho proper imposition of tax is conceived in the best interest of compliance of the proviE sions by the Boards and not to facilitate their breach. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is excessive delegation. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. Excessive delegation is most often found when the Legislature docs not perform all the essential legislative functions and leaves them l'<' to some other agency. The Legislature here performs all essential functions in the imposition of the tax. The selection of tax for imposition in a Municipal area is by the legislative will expressed in s. 128. Neither the Municipal Board, nor the Govenunent can go outside the List of taxes therein included. The procedure for the imposition of the tax is also laid down by the Legislature G for the Municipal Board to follow and the State Government is there to ensure due observance of that procedure. We have already shown above that it would be impossible for the Legislature to legislate for the numerous Municipal Boards and local authorities with a view to raising taxes for them. The provisions, such as they are, are the best means of achieving consultation of II the local population and close scrutiny of the actions of their representatives in imposing the tax. The notification which issues is given finality by the voiee of the Legislature. It would, thereLBSup.CI/65-18 962 SUPREME COURT il!POiTS [1966] 1 S.C.R. fore, appear that in the selection of the tax and its imposition the A Legislature plays a decisive part and also lays down the method by which the tax is to be imposed. The Legislature does not make local enquiries, hear objections and decide them-functions which :ire most inappropriate for the Legislature to perform. 111is task: is delegated to the appellant Board which is the representative body of the local population on whom the tax is levied. In other B words, all the essential functions of Legislation are perfom1ed by the State Legislature and only the minor functions necessary for the imposition of the taX and the enquiries which must be made to ascertain local opinion are left to the Municipal Boards. An additional check is available as Government can veto the actions of a Board if it docs not carry out the mandate of the Legislature. C In our judgment, there was no excessive delegation or a conferral of Legislative functions on the appellant Board or th~ State Government. It remains to consider two other arguments in the case. The first is the question of discrimination which is said to arise from D the proviso which makes the notification conclusive in respect of " the procedure by which the tax is imposed. There are numerous 'T statutes, including the Evidence Act, in which a fact is taken to be conclusively proved from the existence of some other fact. TI1e law is full of fictions and irrcbuttable presumptions which al.so involve proof of facts. It has never been suggested before E that when the Legislature says that enquiry into the truth or otherwise of a fact shall stop at a given stage and the fact taken to be conclusively proved, a question of discrimination arises. The tax payers in the Municipality are allowed under the Municipalities Act to object to the proposal for the tax and the rules and to have f their objections considered. They cannot. of course, be allowed to keep on agitating and a stage must come when it may be said that the provisions of the 'Act have been duly observed. Th.it ~tage is reached after Government has scrutinized the proposal, the rules, the objections and the orders and ha.s approved of the proposal, a special resolution is passed by the Municipal Board G and a notification is issued. It cannot be said that sub·s. ( 3) of s. 135 which leads to the conclusion that the imposi!ion of the tax is according to the Municipalities Act is discriminatory because it only concludes objections agaimt the rrocedure followed in the imposition of the tax. The next objection that the impugned sub·scction involves the 11 exercise of judicial functions not open to the Legislature, is wholly 4.' erroneous. The sub-section only shuts out further enquiry and - • ' } • MUNI. BOARD v. RAGHUVEND!lA (Wanchoo, I.) 963 A makes the notification final. There is no exercise of a judicial function. In our country there is no rigid separation of powers and the legislature often frames a rule such as is incorporated in !he third sub-section of s. 135. The Evidence Act is full of such provisions. In the United States of America where the separation of pewers is extremely rigid in some of the constitutions of the B States it may be open to objection that the Legislature in shutting out enquiry into the truth of a fact encroaches up0n the judicial power of the State. Such disability has never been found to exist in our country although legislation of this type is only too frequent The objection is, therefore without substance. c D E In the result we are 'of opinion that the judgment of the High Court under appeal must be set aside. We accordingly set it aside and order the dismissal of the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution from which the present appeal has arisen, In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Wanchoo J. I regret I am unable to agree. This appeal by special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court raises thc:,"1'Uestion of vires of s. 135(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, NO'. 2 of 1916, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts in the case are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. The appellant, namely, the Municipal Board Hapur, decided to impose water tax from April 1, 1957. In consequence, steps were taken under ss. 131 to 135 of the Act to effebt!Jate that purpose. However, proposals and draft rules were never published as required by s. 131 ( 3) of the Act. All that was done was that a notice in the form set F forth in Sch. III was pasted on the notice-board and there was some beat of drum with respect to the notice. Even so, the draft rules were not appended to the notice which was put up on the notice-board and in effect there was more or less no compliance with the provisions relating ito ,the publication of proposals and draft rules. Eventually a notification was issued G under s. 135 (2) of the Act by the relevant authority about the imposition of the tax from April 1, 1957. Thereafter collection of tax began. The respondents who are residents of Hapur received notices for payment of tax. Thereupon they filed a writ petition in the High Court, and their main grievance wa~ H that the provisions of s. 131 relating to publication of proposals and draft rules were not complied with and thus they were de· prived of an opportunity to file objections as provided under s. 132 of the Act. They contended that the publication as pro- 964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1966) I S.C.R. vided in s.