# MUNIR SAYED IBNA HUSSAIN v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 687
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-11-12
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 191 of 1971
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/munir-sayed-ibna-hussain-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-anr-6869
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Sec. 421 uf Criminal Procedure Code-Practice of High Court in dismissing
criminal appeals wit/lout giving ll/JY rec.sons disapproved-Power of High Court
/.0 dismiss a criminal appeal in limine.
The appellant an owner of a hotel was prosecuted along with five others
for forcibly dispossessing the complainant who was the M:tnager of the Hotel
and further for misappropriating certain properties inCluding some money be·
longing to the complainant. According to the appellant, the complainant was
merely a licensee. The Trial Court acquitted accused Nos. 3 to 6 and convicted accused No. 1 and 2.
The High Court admitted the appeal of accused
No. 2 and acquitted him. The appeal of the appellant accused No. 1 was,
however, rejected by the High Court in limine without giving any reasons for
the rejection.
On an appeal by Special Leave,
c
HELD : 1. There is a whole catena of cases which have come up to this
Court from the Bombay High Court in which this Court has consistently disD
approved oi' the practice followed by the Bombay High Court of not giving
reasons when exercising its power of summary dismissal of criminal apPeals
which lie both on questioJlS of fact and law. In other High Courts such appeals
are automatical!y admitted. The power of summary rejection
under
section
421 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be only exercised when the Court
is satisfied from n perusal of the judgment as well as the record that there is
absolutely no reasonable possibility of its success for reasons to be mentioned
in the order of dismissal. In the present case, it cannot be said that there are
E
no arguable points. It is difficult to believe tliat the judgments of this Court
have neither come to the knowledge of the Bombay High Court nor were cited
on behalf of' the appellant. In any case, the law haviQg been declared by this
Court. it is the duty of the Bombay High Court to act in accordance with Article
I 41 of the Constitution and to apply it by giving proper reasons to justify whatever
be its view.
The judgment of the Bombay High Court was set aside and it was
directed that the case should be treated as admitted for regular hearing in the
Bombay High Court .and should be disposed of in accordance with law. [688-C,
E, F, G, H 689-AB]
F

## Text

)
---·
•
687
MUNIR SAYED IBNA HUSSAIN
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.
November 12, 1975
[M. H. BEG AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
Sec. 421 uf Criminal Procedure Code-Practice of High Court in dismissing
criminal appeals wit/lout giving ll/JY rec.sons disapproved-Power of High Court
/.0 dismiss a criminal appeal in limine.
The appellant an owner of a hotel was prosecuted along with five others
for forcibly dispossessing the complainant who was the M:tnager of the Hotel
and further for misappropriating certain properties inCluding some money be·
longing to the complainant. According to the appellant, the complainant was
merely a licensee. The Trial Court acquitted accused Nos. 3 to 6 and convicted accused No. 1 and 2.
The High Court admitted the appeal of accused
No. 2 and acquitted him. The appeal of the appellant accused No. 1 was,
however, rejected by the High Court in limine without giving any reasons for
the rejection.
On an appeal by Special Leave,
c
HELD : 1. There is a whole catena of cases which have come up to this
Court from the Bombay High Court in which this Court has consistently disD
approved oi' the practice followed by the Bombay High Court of not giving
reasons when exercising its power of summary dismissal of criminal apPeals
which lie both on questioJlS of fact and law. In other High Courts such appeals
are automatical!y admitted. The power of summary rejection
under
section
421 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be only exercised when the Court
is satisfied from n perusal of the judgment as well as the record that there is
absolutely no reasonable possibility of its success for reasons to be mentioned
in the order of dismissal. In the present case, it cannot be said that there are
E
no arguable points. It is difficult to believe tliat the judgments of this Court
have neither come to the knowledge of the Bombay High Court nor were cited
on behalf of' the appellant. In any case, the law haviQg been declared by this
Court. it is the duty of the Bombay High Court to act in accordance with Article
I 41 of the Constitution and to apply it by giving proper reasons to justify whatever
be its view.
The judgment of the Bombay High Court was set aside and it was
directed that the case should be treated as admitted for regular hearing in the
Bombay High Court .and should be disposed of in accordance with law. [688-C,
E, F, G, H 689-AB]
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 191
of 1971.
·
(Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the
Bombay High Court dated 25-2-1972 in criminal appeal No. 683 of
1971.)
MI s. M. K. Ramamurthi & Co. for the appellant.
M. N. Shroff and Vineet Kumar, for the respondents.
The Judgni.ent of the Court was delivered by
G
BEG, J. The allegations, on questions of fact raised in the appeal now
before us, were quite unusual. The judgment of a Division Bench of
H
the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 683 of 1971, in respect of coaccused Syed Ali Naki Hade Hasan, who was acquitted on
25-2-1972, shows the nature of the allegations made by the prosecutor
B.
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 197 6] 2 S.C~R.
in this case. On those allegations, it became necessary to consider
whether the ~ccused, w130 had been put on trial together with six others,
was actually m possession of a Hotel. The appellant claimed to be the
owner of a hotel of which Jagannath, complainant, was said to be the
11?anager.
The case of the Manager was that he had been forcefully
dispossessed by the accused and that certain properties ·belonging to
him and others, including some money, were. mis-appropriated by the
accused. Therefore, the appellant and five others were charged under
Section 395 Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 452 read with
Section 34 LP.C. According to the accused, Shri Jagannath and his
brother, the complainant, were only licensees. However, these are questions relating to the merits of a case in which the Trial Court had acquitted accusrd numbers 3 to 8 and the High Court acquitted accused
No. 2. The appeal of the only remaining accused, accused No. 1, who
is the appellant before us by special leave was, however, rejected in
limine by the High Court without giving any reasons for the rejection.
There is a whole ca.tena of cases which have come up here from the
Bombay High Court in which this Court has consistently disapproved
of the practice followed by the Bombay High Court of not giving
reasons when exercising its power of summary dismissal of criminal
O
appeals which lie both on questions of fact and law. In other High
Courts, such appeals are automatically admitted. In any case, it is not
possible for this Court to exercise its powers satisfactorily without giving an appellant, who may have an arguable case, an opportunity of
first presenting his case to the High Court and getting a decision from
~
. '
F
G
The power of a summary rejection of a criminal 1st appeal, even
though it is exercisable under the provisions of Section 421 Criminal
Procedure Code, should, in our opinion, be only exercised when the
Court is satisfied, from a perusal of the judgment as well as the record,
that there is absolutely no reasonable possibility of its success for the
reasons mentioned in the order. In a case such as the one now before
us, it cannot be said that there are no such arguable points that, after
the High Court had an opportunity of fully considering both sides of
the case, it must necessarily dismiss the appeal. At least, in such cases,
where there arc arguable points, the High Court should give its grounds
and reasons in support of its decision to reject summarily on some
absolutely clinching ground. This Court has laid down the duty upon
the High Court to record reasons.
(See : Mushtak Hussein v. The
State of Bombay ('); Krishna Vithu S11rosha v. State of Maharashtra (2); Mustaq Ahmed Mohmed Hussain & Anr. v. The State of
Gujarat( 3); Kapurchand Kesrimal
Jain v. The
State
of Maharashtra(4) .
It is difficult to believe that judgments of this Court have neither
come to the knowledge of the Bombay High Court nor were cited on
behalf of the appellant. In any case, the law having been declared by
H
this Court, it is the duty of the Bombay High Court to act in accord-
(]) [1955] SCR 809.
(3) [19731 (1) s.c.c. 702.
(2) [1974] (3) s.c.c. 404.
(4) [1973] (3) s.c.c. 299.
,
)_
)
•
•
MUNIR SAYED V. MAHARASHTRA (Beg, ].) .
689
ancc with Article 141 of the Constitution and to apply it by giving prok
per reasons to justify whatever be its view.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the
High Court rejecting the appeal summarily and order that the case
will be treated as admitted for regular hearing of both sides by the
Bombay High Court, and disposed of in accordance with the law.
P.H.P.
Appeal allowed ..