# MUNSHI LAL BENI RAM GLASS WORKS v. S. R. SINGH, ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 27
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-10-27
- **Bench:** V. R.Amaswami, I. D. Dua
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/munshi-lal-beni-ram-glass-works-v-s-r-singh-assistant-labour-commissioner-and-4912
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Utiar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
(Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act XXIII of 1957, s. 16-If s. 16 refers to s. 6A as it stood
prior to amendment of s. 6A by U.P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (1 of 1957)-Generc'l Clauses
Act, 1860 s. 6---Award--State Government's power to enforce.
The State Government, purporting to act under ss. 3, 4 and 8 of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1944 referred a dispute in the appellant's
factory to an adjudicator who gave his award on December 31, 1957.
On January 28, 1958, the Government passed an order enforcing the
Award, under ss. 3 and 6(12) of the Act. The Award was challenged
by means of a writ petition in the High Court. A single Judge of the
High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the State Government
bad no power to enforce the Award in question. According to the single
Judge the old s. 6 having been replaced by a new s. 6 by U.P. Act 1 of
1957 it was not a case of repeal simpliciter and therefore old s. 6 could
not be resorted to by relying on s. 6( e) of the General Clauses Act. A
Divis~on Bench, in appeal, reversed the order of the single Judge and
djsmig.sed the writ petition. On the question whether s. 6A as mentioned
in s. 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1956 (U.P. 1 of 19571 as amended by U.P. Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act XXIII of 1957
refers to s. 6A as it stood in U.P. Act XXVIII of 1947 prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 1 of 1957 or as it emerged after the said amendment,
HELD : (i) By U.P. Act 1 of 1957 s. 6A was replaced by new s. 6A
which came into force from April 16, 1957. Prima facie the amendment
in s. 16 made in November 1957 by U.P. Act XXIII of 1957 should be
referable to s. 6A in the form in which it existed on the date of the enforcement of Act XXIII of 1957. But looking at the position as it stood
on April 16, 1957 it would be seen that s. 16 was designed to save the
pending proceedings from the operation of U.P. Act 1 of 1957 itself. If
this Act was held to be inapplicable then s. 6A as amended thereby would
be excluded and that section as it stood prior to the amendment by U.P.
Act 1 of 1957 would automatically be attracted. To uphold the view of
the learned single Judge would render awards like the one in the present
case unenforceable which intention is difficult to attribute to the legislature.
On the adjudication of the dispute the provision of s." 6A would
be attracted and thereunder the State Government could enforce the
Award. [32 C-FJ
(ii) Tho broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act
is ruled out whenever there is a repeal of any enactment followed by a
fresh legislation, cannot be accepted.
Section 6 would be applicable in
such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompa·
tible with or contrary to the proposition of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of ~ the relevant provisions of ,the new law and the. mere .absence of a saVIng dause
is by itself not material. [33 G-34 BJ
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
St<lte of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893 referred to.
A
(iii) The contention that the decision of the adjudicator is not an
"award" as defined in s. 2(c) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, as
amended by Act 1 of 1957 has no force. If U.P. Act 1 of 1957 is ex·
eluded from its application to pending proceeding unde'r s. 16, then the
word "award" has to be libe'rally construed and so construed it would be
covered by s. 6A. The power conferred by s. 16 and 6A has to be ~n&-
tn1ed as real_ and not illusory and it has to be interpreted so as to achieve
B
the purpose for which it was conferred. [33 D-E]
CIVIL- APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1706
and 1707 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1964 of
the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 77 and , 118
C
of

## Text

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MUNSHI LAL BENI RAM GLASS WORKS
v.
S. R. SINGH, ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER AND
OTHERS
October 27, 1969
(V. R.AMASWAMI AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]
Utiar Pradesh Industrial Disputes
(Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act XXIII of 1957, s. 16-If s. 16 refers to s. 6A as it stood
prior to amendment of s. 6A by U.P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (1 of 1957)-Generc'l Clauses
Act, 1860 s. 6---Award--State Government's power to enforce.
The State Government, purporting to act under ss. 3, 4 and 8 of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1944 referred a dispute in the appellant's
factory to an adjudicator who gave his award on December 31, 1957.
On January 28, 1958, the Government passed an order enforcing the
Award, under ss. 3 and 6(12) of the Act. The Award was challenged
by means of a writ petition in the High Court. A single Judge of the
High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the State Government
bad no power to enforce the Award in question. According to the single
Judge the old s. 6 having been replaced by a new s. 6 by U.P. Act 1 of
1957 it was not a case of repeal simpliciter and therefore old s. 6 could
not be resorted to by relying on s. 6( e) of the General Clauses Act. A
Divis~on Bench, in appeal, reversed the order of the single Judge and
djsmig.sed the writ petition. On the question whether s. 6A as mentioned
in s. 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1956 (U.P. 1 of 19571 as amended by U.P. Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act XXIII of 1957
refers to s. 6A as it stood in U.P. Act XXVIII of 1947 prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 1 of 1957 or as it emerged after the said amendment,
HELD : (i) By U.P. Act 1 of 1957 s. 6A was replaced by new s. 6A
which came into force from April 16, 1957. Prima facie the amendment
in s. 16 made in November 1957 by U.P. Act XXIII of 1957 should be
referable to s. 6A in the form in which it existed on the date of the enforcement of Act XXIII of 1957. But looking at the position as it stood
on April 16, 1957 it would be seen that s. 16 was designed to save the
pending proceedings from the operation of U.P. Act 1 of 1957 itself. If
this Act was held to be inapplicable then s. 6A as amended thereby would
be excluded and that section as it stood prior to the amendment by U.P.
Act 1 of 1957 would automatically be attracted. To uphold the view of
the learned single Judge would render awards like the one in the present
case unenforceable which intention is difficult to attribute to the legislature.
On the adjudication of the dispute the provision of s." 6A would
be attracted and thereunder the State Government could enforce the
Award. [32 C-FJ
(ii) Tho broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act
is ruled out whenever there is a repeal of any enactment followed by a
fresh legislation, cannot be accepted.
Section 6 would be applicable in
such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompa·
tible with or contrary to the proposition of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of ~ the relevant provisions of ,the new law and the. mere .absence of a saVIng dause
is by itself not material. [33 G-34 BJ
28
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
St<lte of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 893 referred to.
A
(iii) The contention that the decision of the adjudicator is not an
"award" as defined in s. 2(c) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, as
amended by Act 1 of 1957 has no force. If U.P. Act 1 of 1957 is ex·
eluded from its application to pending proceeding unde'r s. 16, then the
word "award" has to be libe'rally construed and so construed it would be
covered by s. 6A. The power conferred by s. 16 and 6A has to be ~n&-
tn1ed as real_ and not illusory and it has to be interpreted so as to achieve
B
the purpose for which it was conferred. [33 D-E]
CIVIL- APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1706
and 1707 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated May 7, 1964 of
the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 77 and , 118
C
of 1960.
G. N. Dikshit, for the appellant (in both the appeals).
J. P. Goyal and S. N. Singh, for respondent No. 3 (in C.A.
No. 1706 of 1968) and respondent No. 1 (£n C.A. No. 1707 of
1968).
0
41
C. B. Agarwala and O. P. Rana, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A.
No. 1706 of 1968) and respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 1707 of
.j.)
1968).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J.
In these two appeals on certificate of fitness, challenge is directed against the view taken by a Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court on appeal in disagreement with that of
a learned Single Judge of that Court on the interpretation of
s. 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act of 1957 and s. 6A of
U.P. Industrial Dispute§ Act of 1947.
The relevaint facts may first be briefly stated.
In June 1956
there was a strike in the glass factory of the appellant, M/ s.
Munshi Lal Beni Ram Glass Works, at Ferozabad.
As a result
the factory was closed down for some time.
In August 1956 a.
settlement was reached with the workers and it became po5sible to
reassume operations from August 31, 1956.
The workers were
asked to report personally, latest by August 26, 1956, to show
their willingness to work. According to the appel!ant, Lal Khan,
one of the workers, failed to register his willingness to work before
the appointed day, and indeed he did not care to report in spite of
a messenger having been sent to him requiring his attea:idance. In
his place one Jang Jit was thereupon employed and intimation of
this fact duly sent to Lal Khan. This gave rise. to a controversy
between Lal Khan and the employers with the result that the State
Government purporting to act under ss. 3, 4 and 8 of U.P .. JndusE
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MUNSHI LAL v. s. R. SINGH (Dua, J.)
29
trial Disputes Act referred the following dispute to the Adjudicator:
"Whether the employers have wrongly and/ or unjustifiably refused employed to Shri Lal Khan with
effect from 28/29th August, 1957? If so, to what
relief is he entitled ?
Soon after the reference the appellant presented a writ petition in
the Allahabad High Court (C.W. No. 899 of 1957) challenging
its validity principally on the ground ·that there was no industrial
dispute within the contemplation of the Industrial Disputes Act.
As interim stay of the proceedings was declined, the proceedings
before the adjudicator continued and on December 31, 1957 the
adjudicator gave his award.
This was followed by an order of
the State Government dated January 28, 1958 enforcing the
award under ss. 3 and 6 ( 2) of the U .P. Industrial Disputes Act,
194 7. The award and the order of the State Government were
also challenged by the appellant by means of a writ petition in the
High Court (C.W. No. 1025 of 1958). Though principally in
this writ petition the power of the State Government to enforce the
award was questioned, challenge to the order of reference was also
reiterated.
A learned Single Judge allowed this later writ petition
on January 28, 1958, holding that the State Government had no
power to enforce the award in question. According to the learned Single Judge the old s.6 having been replaced by a new section
6 by U.P. Act I of 1957, it was not a case of repeal simpliciter
and therefore old s. 6 could not be resorted to by relying on
s.6 ( e) of the General Clauses Act.
On the matter having been taken on special appeal a Division
Bench of the High Court followin;; its earlier decision reported as
Central Distillery and Chemical Works Ltd. Meerut v. State of
U.P.(1) reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
The short question, the determination of which is decisive of
these appeals, is whether s.64 as mentioned in s.16 of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes (Amendnient and Miscellaneous Provisions)
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Act, 1956 (U.P. Act I of 1957) as amended by U.P. Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act XXIII
of 1957, refers to s.6A as it stood in U.P. Act XXVIII of 1947
prior to its amendment by U.P. Act I of 1957 or as it emerged
after the said amendment.
The learned Single Judge construed it
to mean as it stood before the amendment of U.P. Act I of 1957
whereas according to the .two Bench decisions Section 16 refers to
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s. 6A as amended by U.P. Act I of 1957. We are required to
determine which of these two views is correct.
(I) A.l.R. 1964 All. 156.
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R.
Section 16 of U.P. Act I of 1957 as it stood prior to its
amendment by U.P. Act XXIII of 1957 ran as follows:
"Saving.
16. If immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is pending any proceeding in
relation to an industrial dispute before any authority
constituted under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
194 7, as in force before such commencement, the dispute may be adjudicated and the proceeding disposed
of by that authority after such commencement, as if this
Act had not been passed."
After amendment by U.P. Act XXIII of 1957, this section
read thus:
"Saving.
16. If immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is pending any proceeding in relation to an industrial dispute before any authority constituted under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as
in force before such commencement, the disp11te may be
adjudicated and the proceeding disposed of by that
authority after such commencement, as if this Act had
not been passed,
and the provisions of section 6-A of the Principal
Act shall remain enforceable with reference to such a
proceeding."
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The words added as a result of the amendment by U.P. Act
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XXIII of 1957 had been deleted by this very amending Act from
sub-section 2 of s.17 of U.P. Act I of 1957.
We may now turn to the history of s. 6-A. This section was
inserted in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 by
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act XXIII of 1953 in the following
form:
"6-A. Where any period is specified or is required
to be specified in any order made under or in pursuance
of this Act referring any industrial dispute for adjudication with in which the award shall be made,_ declared or
submitted it shall be competent for the State Government from time to time, to enlarge such period even
though the period originally fixed or enlarged may have
expired or the award made."
This amendment had retrospective effect because it was to be
deemed to have always been added in the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act I of 194 7 which was described as the "Principal Act".
In
1957 by means of U.P. Act I of 1957 which extensively amended
the Act I of 1947, s.6-A was replaced by the following new
section 6-A.
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MUNSHI LAL v. s. R. SINGH (Dua, J.)
"6-A. Commencement of the Award-(1) An
award (including an arbitration award) shall become
enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date
of its publication under Section 6 :
Provided that if the
State Government is of the
opinion that it will be inexpedient, on grounds of social
justice, to give effect to the whole or any part of the
award, the State Government may, by notification in the
official Gazette, declare that the award shall not become
enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty
days:
Provided further that an arbitration award shall
not become enforceable where the State Government
after such enquiry as it considers necessary, is satisfied
that the same has been given or obtained through collusion; fraud or misrepresentation.
(2) Where any declaration has been made in relatioll' to an award under the first proviso to sub-section
( 1) the State Government may within ninety days from
the date of publication of the award under Section 6,
make an order rejecting or modifying the award, and
shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with a copy of the order before the Legislature of
the State.
( 3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an
order made under sub-section (2) is laid before the
Legislature of the State, such award shall become
enforceable on the expiry of fifteen days from the date
on which it is so laid and where no order under subsection ( 2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under
the first proviso to sub-section ( 1), the award shall
become enforceable on ilie expiry of the period of
ninety days referred to in sub-section (2).
( 4) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections ( 1 )
and ( 3) regarding the enforceability of an awara, the
award shall come into operation with effect from such
date as may be specified therein, but where no date is
specified it shall come into operation on the date when
the award Qecomes enforceable under sub-section ( 1) of
sub-section (3) as the case may be."
31
This enactment was enforced with effect from April 16, 1957.
The U.P. Act XXIII of 1957 which was published in the Government Gazette on November 3, 1957, as noticed earlier, amended
s.16.
Prima facie this amendment in s. 16 made in November,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 S.C.R
1957 should be referable to section 6-A in the form in which it
existed on the date of the enforcement of the amending Act in
question (U.P. Act XXIU. of 1957). It was contended on
behalf of the appellant that the very fact that the amendm1<11t of
s.16 was retrospective so as to date back to April 16, 1957 when
s. 16 itself was originally enacted, indicates that s, 6-A as it
existed prior to April 16, 1957 was intended to be kept alive.
Now looking at the position as it stood on April 16, 1957, it
would be seen that s.16 was designed to save the pe11ding proceedings from the operation of U.P. Act No. I of 1957 itself.
If this Act was held to be inapplicable, then s. 6-A as amended
thereby would be excluded and that section as it stood prior to the
amendment by U.P. Act No. I of 1957 would automatically be
attracted.
The question arises : where was then 'the occasion to
provide specifically for applying to the pending proceedings s.6-A
as it stood before U.P. Act No. I of 1957? It may, of course,
be contended that it was so done by way of abundant "1Ution. To
us, however, it seems that to specifically incorporate s.6-A in s.16
in this situation is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature to
extend the amended s.6-A to the proceedings contemplated by
s.16. The enactment under consideration is not an example of
i,deal draftmanship and the provisions under consideration may
admit of two constructions.
Assuming the two constructions to
be possible we are not satisfied that the construction placed on this
provision by the two Benches of the Allahabad High Court is
clearly erroneous justifying reversal of the view taken therein and
thereby unsettling the legal position.
On the other hand to uphold the view of the learned Single Judge would also render the
awards like the present unenforceable, which intention is difficult
to impute to the Legislature.
And then this point is not likely to
arise very frequently in future, the matter being confined only to
the cases which were pending when U,P. Act No. I of 1957 was
enforced.
The enactment is also confined in its operation to the
State of U.P. alone.
The appellant's counsel next contended that the proceeding in
question pending with the adjudicator could not be considered to
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be pending with the State Government and the State Government
could not give effect to the decision of the adjudicator under s.16.
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It was argued that it was only the Authority before which the proceeding was actually pending immediately after the commencement of U.P. Act No. I of 1957 which was empowered to dispose
it of and the proceeding in the present case being pending before
an adjudicator, the State Government could not claim any power
under this section. It was added that the State Government
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could also not be treated _as.the authority constituted under the
said Act.
In our opinion the proceeding in questiQtt was clearly
pending before the adjudicator as contemplated by s.16.
The
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MUNSHI LAL v. s. R. SINGH (Dua, J.)
33
adjudicator, therefore, could plainly proceed to adjudicate upon
the dispute. On his adjudication the provisions of s.6-A would be
attracted and thereunder the State Government could enforce ii.
This submission of the appellant is, therefore, repelled.
On the
view that we have taken it is not necessary to decide whether the
State Government is an authority constituted under the Act as
envisaged by s.16 and also whether the proceeding in question
could be considered to be pending before the State Government.
The appellant's counsel also submitted that without resort to
s.17 of U.P. Act No. I of 1957 the award could not be enforced.
This argument too nee~ not detain us as it does not arise on the
view we have taken.
We may, however, point out that s. 17
only provides for delegated legislation in certain circumstances
and resort to s. 17 is not essential or a condition precedent for enforcing the awards, as suggested on behalf of the appellant.
The appellant's learned Advocate as a last resort submitted
that the decision of the adjudicator is not an 'award' as defined in
s.2(c) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act as amended by U.P.
Act No. I of 1957. ·Now if U.P. Act No. I of 1957 is excluded
from its application to pending proceeding under s.16 then the
word 'award' has to be liberally construed and ·so construed it
would be covered by s. 6-A. The power conferred by ss. 16 and
6A has to be construed as real and not illusory and it. has to be
interpreted so as to achieve the purpose for which it was conferred.
We must not be understood to accord our approval to the view
of the learned Single Judge that s.6 of the Principal Act having
not been repealed simpliciter, but having been replaced by a new
section 6 by U.P. Act I of 1957, the principle underlying s.6(e)
of the General Clauses Act cannot be attracted. In our opinion,
this approach is not quite correct.
Section 6 would seem to us to
apply to a case of repeal even i·f there is a simultaneous enactment
unless a contrary intention appears from the new enactment. As
observed by this Court in the State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh(')
whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid
down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless,
as the section itself says, a different intention appears.
In the
case of a simple repeal there is sc_arcely any room for expression
of a contrary opinion.
But when the repeal is followed by fresh
legislation on the same subject we would _undoubtedly have to
look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of
determining whether they indicate a different intention.
The line
of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps
alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention
(1) [19SSI I S.C.R. 893.
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 3 s.c.R.
to destroy them.
We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad
proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out
whenever there is a repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh
legislation.
Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also
unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible
with or contrary to the proposition of the section.
Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all
the relevant provisions of the new Jaw and the mere absence of a
saving clause is by itself not material.
The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with
costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeals dismissed.
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