# MUNSHI SINGH & OTHERS ETC. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 973
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-08-23
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals No. 2356 of 1968
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover, D. G. Palekar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/munshi-singh-others-etc-etc-v-union-of-india-etc-etc-5750
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

'
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-s. SA-No opportunity was available
to the apoellam to file objection u/s. 5·A in absence of definite scheme and
the pul>lic purpose for which the land was required was vague and inde~
finite-Whether the acquisition proceedings bad in law.
Ui•u•r
1ihe
U.P .. (Regulation
of
Blllildiing
Operations)
~ct,
1958 a notification was issued by the
U.P. Government,
declarmg
Gha~iabad a regulated area under S. 3 of the s~i~. Act.
On July 16,
1960 a notification under S. 4 of the La'·' AcquIS1IIon Act, was ISsued
by the State Government declaring its intention to acquire land measuring
about 34 000 acres for planned development of the area. On December
23 1961, a notification was issued under Sections 6 and 17 of the Acquisiti:X, Aci in respect of an area of 19.75 acres. This was follov.:ed .by
other notifications and on February 9, 1962,
by another notification
under S. 4 was issued by modifying the earlier notification dated July
16, 1960. By thls notification, the said 34000 acres was reduced to 6158
acres.
On July 4, 1962, the appellant made an application
to the
Land
Acquisition Officer, for supplying a copy of the scheme in order to file
objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act.
The Land Acquisition
Officer how eyer, ordered that no such scbemes of the planned development was available in his office. On September 4, 1962, the State Government sanctioned the Master Plan· of Ghaziabad under the Regulation
Act. Thereafter, the appellants filed a writ petition 1in the High Court
challenging the validity of the aforesaid notification.
A batch of 39
writ petitions, including the appellants were allowed by the High Court
and the notifications under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act were quasbed by
the High Court on the ground of invalidity of piecemeal notifications.
On February 9, 1966, this Court decided in State of Madhya Pradesh
and others v. Bishnu Prashad & Ors. [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557, that piecemeal and successive notifications was not p~rmissible.
On February 20, 1967, the President of India promulgated the Land
Acquisition (Amendment ·and Validation) Ordinance and this Ordinance
was challenged in the High Court by the appellant. Thereafter, an Act
was passed on the same lines as the Ordinance. The provision of the
Act were also challenged· before the High Court .by necessary
amendments in the writ petitions. This Court in Udairam Sharma & Ors, v.
Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41, upheld rb,e validity of the
Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1967.
Thereafter, the
High Court
dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants.
The counsel for the appellants confined his arguments mainly to one
question. namely that no proper, reasonable, or effective opportunity was
available to the appellant to file by objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act, inasmuch as the notification gave no indication that different
pieces of land
would
be acquired
for different
authorities
in
di!fere!lt circumstfoces and for d;.fferent purposes. Further, the a!)tiellant
die! not get a reasonahle opportunity of objecting under s.. 5-A
sin::e the purpose sho\vn \Vas extremely Vague and there was no definite
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973) 1 S.C.R.
scheme before the State Government at the material time
to
show
how the land would be developed and to what use it will be put. It was
pointed out that different notifications published under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act from time to time clearly indicated that the State Government
did not have any specific scheme of development at the time the notification under S. 4 was published.
It was pointed
out that
the whole
object of s. 5-A would be defeated if the public purpose
was
stated
vaguely and without any indication of the nature or the purpose for which
the land is being or is intended to be acquired.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( i) The Acquisition Act was enacted to amend the law for
the acquisition of land for public purpose and for Companies.· The expressior, "Public Purpose" was

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
i
973
MUNSHI SINGH & OTHERS ETC. ETC.
v.
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
August 23, 1972
[K. S. HEGDE, A. N. GROVER AND D. G. PALEKAR, JJ.]
'
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-s. SA-No opportunity was available
to the apoellam to file objection u/s. 5·A in absence of definite scheme and
the pul>lic purpose for which the land was required was vague and inde~
finite-Whether the acquisition proceedings bad in law.
Ui•u•r
1ihe
U.P .. (Regulation
of
Blllildiing
Operations)
~ct,
1958 a notification was issued by the
U.P. Government,
declarmg
Gha~iabad a regulated area under S. 3 of the s~i~. Act.
On July 16,
1960 a notification under S. 4 of the La'·' AcquIS1IIon Act, was ISsued
by the State Government declaring its intention to acquire land measuring
about 34 000 acres for planned development of the area. On December
23 1961, a notification was issued under Sections 6 and 17 of the Acquisiti:X, Aci in respect of an area of 19.75 acres. This was follov.:ed .by
other notifications and on February 9, 1962,
by another notification
under S. 4 was issued by modifying the earlier notification dated July
16, 1960. By thls notification, the said 34000 acres was reduced to 6158
acres.
On July 4, 1962, the appellant made an application
to the
Land
Acquisition Officer, for supplying a copy of the scheme in order to file
objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act.
The Land Acquisition
Officer how eyer, ordered that no such scbemes of the planned development was available in his office. On September 4, 1962, the State Government sanctioned the Master Plan· of Ghaziabad under the Regulation
Act. Thereafter, the appellants filed a writ petition 1in the High Court
challenging the validity of the aforesaid notification.
A batch of 39
writ petitions, including the appellants were allowed by the High Court
and the notifications under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act were quasbed by
the High Court on the ground of invalidity of piecemeal notifications.
On February 9, 1966, this Court decided in State of Madhya Pradesh
and others v. Bishnu Prashad & Ors. [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557, that piecemeal and successive notifications was not p~rmissible.
On February 20, 1967, the President of India promulgated the Land
Acquisition (Amendment ·and Validation) Ordinance and this Ordinance
was challenged in the High Court by the appellant. Thereafter, an Act
was passed on the same lines as the Ordinance. The provision of the
Act were also challenged· before the High Court .by necessary
amendments in the writ petitions. This Court in Udairam Sharma & Ors, v.
Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41, upheld rb,e validity of the
Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1967.
Thereafter, the
High Court
dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants.
The counsel for the appellants confined his arguments mainly to one
question. namely that no proper, reasonable, or effective opportunity was
available to the appellant to file by objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act, inasmuch as the notification gave no indication that different
pieces of land
would
be acquired
for different
authorities
in
di!fere!lt circumstfoces and for d;.fferent purposes. Further, the a!)tiellant
die! not get a reasonahle opportunity of objecting under s.. 5-A
sin::e the purpose sho\vn \Vas extremely Vague and there was no definite
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973) 1 S.C.R.
scheme before the State Government at the material time
to
show
how the land would be developed and to what use it will be put. It was
pointed out that different notifications published under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act from time to time clearly indicated that the State Government
did not have any specific scheme of development at the time the notification under S. 4 was published.
It was pointed
out that
the whole
object of s. 5-A would be defeated if the public purpose
was
stated
vaguely and without any indication of the nature or the purpose for which
the land is being or is intended to be acquired.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( i) The Acquisition Act was enacted to amend the law for
the acquisition of land for public purpose and for Companies.· The expressior, "Public Purpose" was defined by S. 3-F. The expression ''Pub·
lie Purpose" includes provision for or in connection with the laying out
of village sites, townships or the extension of planned development or improvement of existing village sites or townships.
S. 5-A provides
that
any person interested in any land which has been notified under S. 4,
Sub-Section (1) as being needed for a public purpose, may object to the
acquisition within 30 days after the issue of the notification.
Every objection under Sub-Section ( 1) shall be made to the Collector in writing,
and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard.
The Collector after hearing all such objections, may make a report to
the appropriate Government. The decision of the appropriate government
on the objection shall be final. [981F]
It is apparent from Sub-Section (2) of S. 4 that the public purpose
which has to be stated in Sub-Section ( 1) of S. 4 bas to be particularised
because, un1ess that is done, the various matters which were mentioned
in Sub-Section (2) cannot be carried out. If the public purpose siated
in S. 4(1) is planned development, without anything more, it is extremely
difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in Sub-Section (2)
can be carried out by the officer concerned. [981C]
(ii) S. 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person who is deprived of his property, is given a reasonable oppotunity t\)
be heard.
The right to file objection under S. 5-A is a substantial right
when a person's property is being threatened with acquisition. and that
right cannot be taken away as if by siclewind. [981D]
Nandeshwar Prasad & Anr. v.
The State of U.P. & Ors.,
(1964]
3 S.C.R. 440.
In the present case, the notification
under S.
4
all
that was
stated was that the land was required
for
planned
development
of
the area.
There was no indication whatsoever, whether the development
. was to be of residential and building sites, or commercial and industrial
class, nor was it possible for any one to find out that kind of planned
development was under contemplation. If the Master Plan which came
to ~ sanctioned in SepteJl!ber 4, 1962, was available for inspection, the
poS!tlon may have been ddferent.
The words that were found
in the
notification, "planned development of the area'' were wholly insufficient
and conveyed no idea as to the specific ~urpose for which the lands were
to be utilised. [982BJ
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
(iii) The Acquisition Act did net originally
provide for filing
or
hearinll of objections to the proposed acquisition.. It was only by the
H
Amending Act of 1923 that S. 5-A was inserted in the Acquisition Act.
Upto that time, the view was that the wishes of° the owners of the land
were wholly irrelevant. But after the insertion of S. 5-A the position bas
completely changed, and it cannot be said that the owner's wishes are
A
B
c
D
MUNSHI SINGH v. 'JNION (Grover, !.)
975
not relevant and be does not need an opportunity to file his objections.
A person whose land is likely to be acquired must have an opportunity
to submit his objections and that he can do only if the notification under
S. 4( I), while mentiunipg the public purpose, gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons
concerned to object effectively, if so desired.
In the absence of such
specific or particular purpose, the objector cannot
file any proper
or
cogent objections under S. 5-A which he has a right to do under that
provision,
In t'1e present case, owing to the vaguness and indefiniteness
of the public purpose stated in the notifications under S. 4(1) and in
the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were
shown this scheme or Master Plan in respect of the planned development
of the area in question, the appellants were wholly • unable to object
effectively and exercise their right under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act.
[983E]
Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Ars, [1961] I S.C.R.
128, referred to.
·
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 2356
of 1968.
Appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constituti0n of
India from tlte judgment and ordrr dated March 26, 1968 of _the
Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ No. 662 of 1971 and Civil
Appeals Nos. 1139, 1475 and 1476 of 1971.
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated
April 2, 1968 of the High Court at Allahabad in Civil Misc.
E
Writ, No. 3671, 3670 and 3669 of 1967 respectively and Civil
Appeals Nos. 1140 and 1785 of 1971
F
H
/
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated
April 2, 1968 of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc.
Writ Nos. 3667 and 3668 of 1967 r:spectively and Civil Appeal
No. 1888 of 1970
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated
March 26, 1968 of the. Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 465 of 1967.
K. R. Chowdhry, for tl:e appellant (in C.A. No.
2356 of
1968).
G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A.
No. 2356/68) and G. N. Dikshit, M. V.
Goswami and O. P.
Rana, for the State of U.P., Collector of Meerut & Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Meerut (in all the appeals).
0. P. Rana, for the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad (in all
the appeals).
U. P. Singh and Shiv Pujan Singh, for the appelfo.nt in C.A.
Nos. 1139, 1140 and 1785 of 1971).
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 1 S.C){.
L. M. Singhvi, P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants (in C. A.
A
Nos. 1475 and 1476 of 1971).
L. M. Singhvi, U. P. Singh and S. C. Dingra, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1888 of 1970).
A. K. Sen, G. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for respondent
No. 4 (in C.A. No. 1888/70).
.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. These appeals from the decision of the Allahabad High Court involve a common point and shall stand disposed
of by this judgment.
It is necessary to •tare the facts only in C.A.1888 of 1970.
The U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act 1958 received the assent of the Prelident on October 8, 1958.
On December 10, 1958 a notification was issUl'.,d by the U.P. Government
declarii:ig Ghaziabad a regulated area under s. 3 of the aforesaid
Act. In February 1959 the Controlling Authority under s. 4 of
the Regulation Act was constituted.
On July 16, 1960 a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the
State Government declaring its intention ito acquire land measuring about 34,000 acres in fifty villages of Ghaziabad for planned
development of the area.
On December 23, 1961 a notification
was issued under ss. 6 and 17 of the Acquisition Act in respect
of an area of 19. 7 5 acres. This was folfowed by successive piecemeal notifications on various d<rtes in 1962 and 1. 963.
On February 9, 1962 another notification was issued under s. 4 of the
Acquisition Act modifying the earlier notification dated July 16,
1960. By this notification the proposed area from 34,000 acres
was reduced to 6158 acres.
On July 4, 1962 the appellants made
an application to the Special Land Acquisition Officer Ghaziabad
for supplying a copy of the scheme of the planned development
for which notification under s. 4 had been issued to enable them
to make representations at the hearing of 1the objections filed under
S. SA of the Acquisition Act. It was mentioned inter alia in that
application that the Government had not published the scheme of
the planned development and without a copy of the scheme for
which the notification had been published "no forceful
arg11ments could be submitted·'.
The Special Land Acquisition Officer
made the follgwing order on th~t application :
"The scheme of the planned development is
not
necessary for a notification under s. 4 of the Act, as
such, no such scheme of the planned development is
available in this office."
On September 4, 1962 the Stat.e
Government sancitioned the
Master Plan of Ghaziabad under the Regulatio'n Act.
On September 27, 1962 a writ petition was filed by the appellants in the
c
D
E
G
H
.·\
ll
D
E
F
G
H
MUNSHI SINGH v. UNION (Gro1·er, J.)
!J7 i'
High .Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid notifications.
Several oiher writ petitions were also filed by other petitioner!.
On December 10, 1965 a batch of 39 writ petitions including the.
appellants' petition were allowed by the High Court and the notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisitions Act were· quashed on the
jl,found of invalidity of piecemeal notifications.
Another batch of
writ petitions was similarly allowed quashing the
notifications
under s. 6 of the Acquisition Act on the same ground. On February 9, 1966 this court decided in State of Madhya Prade1h &
Others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Others(') that 'piecemeal and
'uccessive notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisition Act was not
permissible.
On February 20, 1967 the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) O:-di1mace No. 1 of 1967. The validity of this Ordinance apart from
the legality of the notifications issued was challenged in the High
Court by the appellants in February 1967.
In April 1967 an
Act was passed on the same lines as the Ordinance.
The provisions of the Act were also challenged before the High Court by
necessary amendment in the writ petitions filed. by the appe!l1mts.
This Court in Udai Ram Sharma & Othrs etc. v. Unin,n of India
& Others(') upheld the validity of the Acquisition Amending
Act of 1967.
On March 26, 1968 the High Court dismissed the
writ petition of the appellants.
In view of the judgment of this
Court the High Court repelled the contentions of th» appellants
impugning the validity of the Acquisition Amendment Act 1967.
Another point which was agitated before the High Court was that
the notification under s. 4 was too vague and afforded no adequate
basis for the lodging of objection under s. 5A of the Acquisition
Act Certain other points were also raised' which need not be
mentioned.
The High Court observed thf<t all these points had
been urged in the writ petition No. SS of 1963 which had been
heard along with any other writ petitions by the Division Bench
which, by i•ts judgment dated December 24, 1965, had negatived
them.
For the reasons mentioned in that .iudgment these contenti011s were also repelled.
Dr. L. M. Singhvi sou!!ht to raise a number of points before
us but ultimately he confined his arll.'Uments mainly to one queslion.
Reference has been made to the notification dated Julv 1"
1960 issued under s. 4 as also to subsequeoit notification dated
February 9, 1962 amending the earlier notification.
The earlier
notification to the extent it is material h ai follows :-·
"In pursuance of the provisions of under (?) sub-s.
( l) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(Act No. J of 1894), the Governor of U.P. is pleased
--
(IJ lt966] 3 S.C.R. 557.
(2) [1968] J s.c.R. 41.
B-Ll72Sup Cl/73
978
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l s.c.R.
to notify for general information that the land mentioned
in the schedule is likely to oo needed for a public purpose.
2. Under Section 5-A of the said Act, ~ny person
interested in the land may, within thirty days after the
issue of this notification, make an objection to the acquisition of the land for any land in the locality in writing
to the Collector, Meerut.
For what purpcse : For ]Jlanned development of
the
area.
Note :-A plan of the land may b.~ inspected in the
office of Collector, Meerut."
In the writ petition a specific plea was taken in paras 35 (b) an<l
36 'that no proper, reasonable or effective opportunity was available to the appellants to file any objections under s. SA of the
Acquisition Act inasmuch as the notification gave no indication
that different pieces of land wo1,1ld be acauired for different authorities in different circumstances and for different purposes. Accordinlo( to para 36 the appellants did not get any effective or reasonable opportunity of objecting under s. 5 A of the Acquisition Act
inasmuch as the purpose shown was extremely vague and there
was no definite scheme before the State Government at the material time to show how the land would be developed and to what
use it would be put.
Para 33 of the petition may also be noticed.
It is stated therein that different notifications published under s. 6
of the Acauisition Act from time to time clearly indicated that
the State Government did not have any specific scheme of development at the time the notification under s. 4 was published, nor
had it any idea as to whether the land would be utilized by it or
would be utilized for the purposes of U.P. State Industrial Corporation or the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. In the return which
wM file<l para 9 contained the reply to para 33 and this is what
Wll.5 stated :
"That the allegations made in paragraph 33 of the
petition are denied.
The scheme for the planned develooment of the area was there when the
notification
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued
although the scheme at that stage had not been finalised in the details".
No r.ep!y is to be found in the return to paragraphs 35 lb) and
36 of the writ petition.
We mav also refer to paragraoh 14 of
the petition in which the order of' the Special Land Acauisition
Officer was reproduced in respect of the applications filed by the
A
B
c
D
E
F
Jl
.
,
A
B
c
D
E
F
MUNSHI SINGH \', UNION (Grover, !.)
979
appellaI1ts for supplying the copy of the scheme of the planned
development. It is noteworthy that in the return nothing was
said about this order.
Dr. Singhvi has based his argument on the above significani
facts. , According to him 1the words in the notification, namdy,
'for planned development of the area" gave no indicatioa whatsoever as to the precise purpose for which the land was required.
Planned development could be of various kim,J.
It could be for
residential, industrial or some similar purpose.
Moreover for
devdopment' of a particular area ihe Governmerit mav acquire
the land itself and develop it or it may control the development
of that area by making a scheme or a Mgster Plan. It is\ urged
that the scheme of the Acquis~tion Act shows that public purpo"~
for which the land is needed or is likely to be needed shou)d be
stated with sufficient particularity and in such a manner that a
land owner should be able to file an objection under s. SA. The
whole object of s. SA would be defeated if the public· purpose is
stated vaguely and without any indication of the nature of the
purpose for which the land is being or is intended to be acqui~ed.
It is necessary to examine the scheme of the Acquisition Act.
This Act was enacted to amend the law for the acquisition of land
for public purpose and for companies.
The expression "public
purpose" is defined by s. 3 (f). By the Land Acquisition
(U.P.
Amendment) Act 1954 s. 3 was amended and for clause (f) in
the Central Act the following clause was substi1tuted :
'
"(f) the expression "public purpose'; includes provision for or in connection with.,..--
(i) ......................... ', ... .
(ii) the laying out of village sites, townships or the
extension, planned development' or improvement
of existing village sites or itown~hips;
(iii)
\
I
n
..............................
'
Section 4(1) provides for a notification to
1be issued and public
notice of the same to be given whenever it appears to the approG
priate Govermnent 'that land in any locality 1is needed or is likely
to be needed for any pubiic purpose.
Sub's. (2) is
in these
H
terms:
'
"4(2) "Thereupon it shall be lawful for any
officer,
either generally or specially authorised by such
Gov.~rmnent in this behalf. and 'for his servants
and workmen,-
.
'
to enter 1_:non 1nd survev and' take levels of
~!nv l~~qd in such Jncalirv:
980
SUPREME' COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R,
to dig or bore into the sub-soil;
'lo do all other acts necessary - to ascertain
whether the land is adopted for such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed
10 be taken and the intended line of the work:
(if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark: such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cul'ting trenches;
and, where othern'ise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries
and line marked, to cut down and clear away
any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle :
Provided that. .... , ... , ......... , ...... "
Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 5A being material for purposes of
the present appeal may be set out in extenso :
( 1 ) 'rny person intere~ted in any land which has ~n
notified under section 4, sub-s. (1), as being
needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty
days
after th.e issue of the notification,
object
to
the acquisition of the land or of any land in t.he
locality, as the case may be,
( 2) Every objection under sub-section ( 1) shall be
made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give 1the objector an opportunity of
being heard either
in person or by pleader
and shall, after hearing all such objections and
after making such further enquiry, if any, as he
thinks necessary either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under
section 4, sub-section ( l) or make different
reports in respect of different parcels of such
land ito the appropriate Government, containing
his recommendations on the objections. together
with the record of the proceedings held by him.
for the decision of that Goverrunent. The decision of the appropriate Gov•;rnrnent on the objection shall be final".
Section 6(1) says, inter alia, that when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report made under s. 5A(2)
that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for
company a- declaration shall be made to that effect bv th~ authority mentioned therein. According to sub-s, (3) such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needeif for a
public purpose or for a company as the case may be.
After the
A
B
c
E,
F
G
n
A
8
c
D
E
F
G
H
MUNSHI SINGH v. UNION (Grover, J.)
981
declaration under s. 6 the Collector has to \ake orders for acquisition tmder s. 7 Section 8 provides for land to be marked out,
measured and planned and s. 9 for notices to persons interested.
Section 11 d.J:Oals with inquiry into measurements, value and claims
and the award by the Collector. It is not necessary to refer to
any otber provision.
It is apparent from sub-s. ( 2) that the public purpose which
has to be stated in sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4 has to be particularised because unless that is done the various matters which are mentioned
in sub-s:(2) carmot be carried out; for insta.,ce, the officer concerned or his servants and workmen cannot de any act necessary to
a:.certain whether it is suitable for the purpose for which it is
being acquired. If the public purpose stated in s. 4 (1) is planned
development of the area without anything more it is extremely
difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in sub-s. (2)
can be carried out by th'e officer specially authorised ;il this behalf and by his servants and workmen.
Section SA embodies a very just and who~~some principle that
a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired
ahould have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading
the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. ·We may refer to the
observation of this Court in Nandeshwar Prasad & Anr. v.
Tire
State of U.P. & Others(') that the right to file objections under
s. 5A is a substantial right when a person's property
IS being
threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away
as if by a side wind. Sub-section (2) of s. SA makes it obligatory on the Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being
heard.
After hearing all objections and making further inquiry
Ile is to make a report to the appropriate Government containing
his recommendation on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections is then final.
The declaration under s. 6 has to be made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by
the Collector under s. 5A(2). The legislature has, therefore.
mac!e comp~ete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of
their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special
powers have been confen-ed on the appropriate Government to
dispense with the provisions of s. SA: (Sees. 17 ( 4) of the Acquisition Act).
As already noticed in the notifications under s. 4 all that wa~
stated was . that the land was required for "planned development
at the area".
There was no indication whatsoever whether the
(l) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 440.
982
SUPREME· COURT REPORTS
[l 973] 1 S.C.I!..
development was to be· of residential and building sites or of commercial and industrial plots nor was it possible for any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out what kind of
planned development was under contemplation i.e. whether the
land would be acquired and the development made by the Govcrmnent or whether the owners of properties would be required·
to develop· a particular area in a specified way. If the Master
Plan which came to be sanctioned on September 4, 1962 had
been available for inspection by the persons interested in filing
objections or even if tM knowledge of its existence on ·the part of
the appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position may
have been different. In that situation the appellants could not
claim that they were unable to file objections owing to the lack
of any indication in the notification under s. 4 of the nature of
development for which the area was being
requisitioned.
On
behalf of the State it has been pointed out that the appellants had
themselves filed a copy of the Master Plan which was sanctioned
on September 4, 1962 and that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Master Plan was umlcr rrcparation. The details
n;lating to the Master Plan and the Plan itself' had been published
in the local newspapers and the appellants could have easily discovered what the proposed scheme was with regard to the development of the area in which they were int!rcc.~cd ._ In view of
the peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an opportunity
to the State 10 apply for amendment of its return since nothing
had been said about these matters therein
and
to
produce
additional evidence in support of its allegations. Such a petition
was filed and certain documents were sought to be placed on the
record.
After a careful consideration of the petition for amendment and the evidence sought to be adduced we dismissed the
prayer for amendment as well as for production of additional evidence as we were not satisfied that the documents sought to be
produced were either relevant or were required to enable this
Court to pronounce judgment.
Learned counsel for the State next contended that the proposed
acquisition was in pursuance of the activity under the Regulation
Act. Moreover planned development is one of the public purposes
as defined ins. 3(f) as amended by the U.P. Amending Act 1954.
Mere_mention of such a public purpose was sufficiwt to .satisfy
the requirement of law. Reliance has been placed on a decision
of this Court in Arnold Rodricks & Another v. State of Maha·
rashtra( 1 ) in which in the notification under s. 4 it was stated
that the land was needed "for a public purpose, viz, for development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area". It was said that the purpose specified was a public
purpose within the Acquisition Act.
The points which arose for
(I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885.
c
D
F.
..
F
G
I!
•
-·
A
ll
c
0
E
F
G
H
MUNSHI SINGH 1'. UNION ( Gro1-er, J.)
9S3
ueterminati.:m in that case were entirely different.
At any rate,
the public purpose was stated with sufficient particularity, namely,
for development and utilisation of the land as an industrial and
residential area. Once it was stated that the land will be utilised
for the aforesaid purpose the persons interested could certainly
object effectively. But the mere words, as are to be found in the
notifications here "planned development of the area" were wholly
insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the speciiic purpose for
which the lands were to be utilised. It must be remembered that
the Acquisition Act is silent ·as to the nature of objections that
could be raised.
In some of the States executing instructions
have been issued or rules have been framed which indicate the
classes of objections which are contemplated.
In Madras the
classes of objections that the Collector's inquiry should specifically
deal with are the following .
(a) that the purpose for which the land is acquired is
not a public purpose;
( b) that the land notified is not the best adapted to the
purpose intended or that its area is greater than is
actually required for the purpose, and
( c) that the acquisition of the land or any land in the
locality is not desirable or expedient.
In Babil Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Others( 1)
it was stated in the notification under s. 4 (I) that the land was
likely to be needed for purposes of a company which was named.
A challenge was made against the validity of that ·notification
on the ground that it was not stated that the land was required for
a public purpo>e.
It was laid down that where the land was
required for a company
the requirement of t1•.e law would be
sufficiently met if the appropriate Government was satisfied on a
report under s. 5A(2) or by ari inquiry under s. 40 that the
purpose of the acquisition was the same as contemplated by s. 40
of the Act. This Court said that the purpose of the notification
under s., 4 'was t•J carry out a preliminary investigation with a
view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of levels
and, if necessary, digging or boring into sub-soil whether the land
was adapted for the purposes for which it was sought to be acquired.
It '.''"' nnJ~, nnder s. 6 that a firm declaration had to be
made by the l'overnment that land with proper description and
area was needed for a public purpose or a company. Hence it
was not correct to say that any defect in the notification under
s. 4 was fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when
the acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to
the suggestion on behalf o! the State that the observations made
(I) •t%1] 1 S.C.R. 128.
98~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1973 J l S.C.lt.
in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present cases. The
question which we are called upon to decide is of an entirely
<lifferent nature. It relates to the notification under s. 4 in the
light of s. 5A with a view to giving full effect to that section and
not simply wiping it out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which. came into force on January 1, 1924
that s. SA was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time
the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly
irrelevant but after the insertion of s. SA the position has completely change and it cannot be said that the owner's wishes arc
not relevant and that he does not need -an opportunity to file his
objections. To take such a view would render s. SA otios. If
!t has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an
opportunity to SU bmit his Objections and that he can do Only if
the notification under s. 4( l) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said pur,
pose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired.
Jn the absence of such specific or particular
purpqse being stated the objector cannot file any proper or coger.t
objections under s. SA which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness
and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications
under s. 4 (I) and in the absence of any proof that the appellan!8
were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master
Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question
the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exerci5e their righ( under s. SA of the Acquisition Act.
For the reasons given above these appeals must succeed and are
hereby allowed. The entire acquisition proceedings in respect
ot the lands of the appellants in all the appeals are hereby
quashed.
In matters of this nature we would have taken· due
notice of !aches on the part of the appellants while granting the
above relief but we are satisfied that so far as the present appellants are concerned they have not been guilty of lacl\,es, delay
or acquiescence at any stage.
The appellants shall be entitled
to costs in this Court.
C.M. Petition No. 68S2 of 1971 is disposed of by observing that it will be open to the partly to file a
suit foe damages, if any, .if so desired.
s.c.
Appeals allawed.
B
c
D
E
F
G
...,., __