# MUSTAQ AHMED MOHED HUSSAIN MUKHTAR HUSSAIN ALI HUSSAIN v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT

- **Citation:** [1973] 3 S.C.R. 670
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1973-03-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 1973
- **Bench:** A. Alagiriswami, 1. D. Dua, C. A. Vaidial!Ngam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/mustaq-ahmed-mohed-hussain-mukhtar-hussain-ali-hussain-v-the-state-of-gujarat-5918
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure s. 421-Power of l(igh Court to 'dismiss
appeal in limine-When may be exercisted-Higl] Court
must
record
reasons and it is not sufficient to sa,v 'dis1nissed'.
Jn this appeal by special leave the short question requiring determination was whether the High Court of Gujarat
was
justified
in
dismissing in limine with one word 'dismissed' the appellants' · appeal
against their conviction by the Sessions Judge, Jam~gar for offences
under s. 420 read with ss. 511 and 34, I.P.C. and under s. 474 read
with s. 34, JJ!dian Penal Code,
Allowing the appcal,
HELD: Section 421 Cr.P.C. no doubt empowers
the
appellate
court to dismiss the appeal summarily but before doing so it is bound
to peruse with care and attention the. petition of appeal and the copy
of the judgment or order appealed against. The order . of SUlllIOOry
dismissal can be passed only if the court considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interference. This conclusion has to be arrived ·
at judicially after a proper scrutiny of the
petition of appeal
and
the impugned judgirumt or order.
[673G]
The power of dismissing appeals in limine should be exe'rdsed sparingly and with judicious caution so that no case raising arguable points,
\Vhether of law or of fact requiring re-appraisal of evidence, goes without requisite scrutiny. The
requireme;at
of
recording
reasons
for
summary dismissal. however concise, serves to ensure proper functioning of the judicial process.
Reasons are, therefore. advisedly required
by the decisions of this Court to be given for rejecting
an
appeal
summarily under s. 421 Cr. P. C.
[6740]
The contention that when the trial court records a well
reasoned
judgment, then, even though arguable points on the
question
of the
credibility of witnesses are raised, it is unnecessary for the court of
appeal to deal with all these points and record Its own
reasons
for
agreeing with the conclusions of the trial
oourt,
was
unacceptable.
Unless the challC!llge can be held to be prima facie unimpressive and
unarguable the High Coun would be well-advised to go into the points
canvassed a'1C) record· 'its reasons. Such a Course would be in accord
with the st itutorv intendment, and also of assistance to this Court in
more satisf: ctorilv dealing with appeals under Art. 136 of the Cqnstitution.
[6770]
In the present case the trial court's judgment mentioned
several
di.scTepancies in the prosecution evidence.
The
appetlant.s
were
not
unjustified in claiming to have the evidence on the record re-examined
by the Hi~h Court for coming to its own
conclusions.
The
points
raised in the petition of appeal could' by no means
be
said to be
unarguable.
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MUSTAQ AHMED v. GUJARAT (Dua, J.)
671
Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case the Court
sent the case back to the High Court for a fresh \l<cision in the fight
of this Court's obe,ei'vation.
U. /, S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 94,
Queen
Empress v. Ram Narain & anr., l.L.R. 8 All. 514, Mohamad Ayub
Abbas Raut v. The State of Maharashtra, Crl. A. No. 145
of
1961
decided on March 2.5, 1963, Mushtak HusMlin v. The Stale of Bomba,y,
[1953) S.C.R. 809, Bhagat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Cr!. A. No. 38
of 1969 decided on September 17, 1969, Shankar Beldar v. The State
of MahGrashtra, Or:!. A. No. 95 of 1969 decided on September 18,
1969, K. K. lain v. State of Maharashtra A.LR. 1973
S.C. 243,
/iwan Prakash v. State of Milharashtra, A.LR.
1973
S.C.
278,
Shaikh Mohd. Ali v. State of Maharashtra, [1972] 2 S.C.C. 184 end
Rajertdrapaul Ran=aran Dass Sharma v. The State
of
Maharashtra,
Cr!. Appeal No. 264 of 1972 decided on Febh!ary
23,
1973,
referred to.
·

## Text

670
MUSTAQ AHMED MOHED HUSSAIN
MUKHTAR HUSSAIN ALI HUSSAIN
v.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT
March 13, 1973
(A. ALAGIRISWAMI, 1. D. DUA AND C. A. VAIDIAL!NGAM, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure s. 421-Power of l(igh Court to 'dismiss
appeal in limine-When may be exercisted-Higl] Court
must
record
reasons and it is not sufficient to sa,v 'dis1nissed'.
Jn this appeal by special leave the short question requiring determination was whether the High Court of Gujarat
was
justified
in
dismissing in limine with one word 'dismissed' the appellants' · appeal
against their conviction by the Sessions Judge, Jam~gar for offences
under s. 420 read with ss. 511 and 34, I.P.C. and under s. 474 read
with s. 34, JJ!dian Penal Code,
Allowing the appcal,
HELD: Section 421 Cr.P.C. no doubt empowers
the
appellate
court to dismiss the appeal summarily but before doing so it is bound
to peruse with care and attention the. petition of appeal and the copy
of the judgment or order appealed against. The order . of SUlllIOOry
dismissal can be passed only if the court considers that there is no
sufficient ground for interference. This conclusion has to be arrived ·
at judicially after a proper scrutiny of the
petition of appeal
and
the impugned judgirumt or order.
[673G]
The power of dismissing appeals in limine should be exe'rdsed sparingly and with judicious caution so that no case raising arguable points,
\Vhether of law or of fact requiring re-appraisal of evidence, goes without requisite scrutiny. The
requireme;at
of
recording
reasons
for
summary dismissal. however concise, serves to ensure proper functioning of the judicial process.
Reasons are, therefore. advisedly required
by the decisions of this Court to be given for rejecting
an
appeal
summarily under s. 421 Cr. P. C.
[6740]
The contention that when the trial court records a well
reasoned
judgment, then, even though arguable points on the
question
of the
credibility of witnesses are raised, it is unnecessary for the court of
appeal to deal with all these points and record Its own
reasons
for
agreeing with the conclusions of the trial
oourt,
was
unacceptable.
Unless the challC!llge can be held to be prima facie unimpressive and
unarguable the High Coun would be well-advised to go into the points
canvassed a'1C) record· 'its reasons. Such a Course would be in accord
with the st itutorv intendment, and also of assistance to this Court in
more satisf: ctorilv dealing with appeals under Art. 136 of the Cqnstitution.
[6770]
In the present case the trial court's judgment mentioned
several
di.scTepancies in the prosecution evidence.
The
appetlant.s
were
not
unjustified in claiming to have the evidence on the record re-examined
by the Hi~h Court for coming to its own
conclusions.
The
points
raised in the petition of appeal could' by no means
be
said to be
unarguable.
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F
G
H
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B
c
D
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F
G
H
MUSTAQ AHMED v. GUJARAT (Dua, J.)
671
Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case the Court
sent the case back to the High Court for a fresh \l<cision in the fight
of this Court's obe,ei'vation.
U. /, S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 94,
Queen
Empress v. Ram Narain & anr., l.L.R. 8 All. 514, Mohamad Ayub
Abbas Raut v. The State of Maharashtra, Crl. A. No. 145
of
1961
decided on March 2.5, 1963, Mushtak HusMlin v. The Stale of Bomba,y,
[1953) S.C.R. 809, Bhagat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Cr!. A. No. 38
of 1969 decided on September 17, 1969, Shankar Beldar v. The State
of MahGrashtra, Or:!. A. No. 95 of 1969 decided on September 18,
1969, K. K. lain v. State of Maharashtra A.LR. 1973
S.C. 243,
/iwan Prakash v. State of Milharashtra, A.LR.
1973
S.C.
278,
Shaikh Mohd. Ali v. State of Maharashtra, [1972] 2 S.C.C. 184 end
Rajertdrapaul Ran=aran Dass Sharma v. The State
of
Maharashtra,
Cr!. Appeal No. 264 of 1972 decided on Febh!ary
23,
1973,
referred to.
·
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
9 of 1973.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
July 31, 1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Cr. Appeal No."596
of 1972.
K. K. Sinha and S; K. Sinha, for the appellants.
Urmila Kapoor, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DuA, J.-In this appeal by special leave the short question
requiring determination is whether the High Court of Gujarat was
justified in dismissing in limine with one word "dismissed" the
appellants' appeal against their conviction by the Sessions Judge,
Jamnagar for offences under s. 420 read with ss. 511 and 34,
1.P.C. and under s. 474· read withs. 34, Indian Penal Code.
Both the appellants were charged on five counts in the court
of the Sessions Judge relating to offences, inter alia of forging
railway receipts purporting to be valuable security, being in pos•
session of forged receipts knowing them to be forged and of dishonestly or fraudulently using the forged receipts as genuine
knowing them to be forged, in furtherance of 1 he common intention
of cheating the Indian Railways or attempting to cheat them.
The points which arose lor determination in the trial court as
statlld in its judgment were :
" ( l ) Whether the prosecution has proved that on or
about 7-8-71 at Jam.nagar accused no. l Mustaq Ahmed
Mohmed Hussein and accused no. 2 Mukhtar Hussein
Ali Hussein Sayed in furtherance of c0mmon intention
of both to cheat the Indian Railway by using forged
672
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 3 S.C.R,
railway receipts actually forged three railway receipts
mark 6/ A, 6/B and 6/C purporting to be valuable
security and thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 467 read with section 34, I.P. Code?
(2) Whether the prosecu1ion has proved that on or
before 7-8-71 said accused nos. 1 and 2 in furtherance .
of the common. intention of both to cheat Indian Railway forged railway receipts mark 6/ A, 6/B and · 6/C
intending that they shall be used for the purpose of
cheating they thereby committed the off~nce punishable
under section 468 read with section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code ?
( 3) Whether the prosecution has proved that said
accused nos. 1 and 2 on or about 7-8-71 in furtherance
of common intention of both to cheat Indian Railway
fraudulently or dishonestly used as
genuine •he three
railway receipts marked 6/ A, 6/B and 6/C which they
knew or had reason to believe at the time they used them
to be the forged documents and thereby committed the . · ·
. offence· under section 471 read with section 34, J.P.
Code?
· ·
( 4) Whether 1he prosecution has proved that on or
about 7-8-71 bath the said accused nos. 1 and 2 were in
possession of the forged railway receipts purporting to be ·
valuable security knowing . the same to be forged and
intending that the same shall be fraudulently used as
genuine documents and thereby committed an offence
punishable under
s. 474 read with section 34, J.P.
Code ?
( 5) Whether the prosecution has proved that on or
about 7-8-71 accu,ed nos. 1 and 2 were at J"mnagar
and in furtherance of common intentfon of both "f them
to cheat Indian Railway attempted to cheat Western.
Railway by dishonestly inducing the railway employees,
i.e ... the goods clerk at Jamnagar railway station to deliver them Coal Wagons in question and thereby commit-
. 1ed the offence punishable under section 420 read with
section 34 and s. 511 of the Indian Penal Code?"
On ooints nos. 1 to 3 ·the decision· of the. trial court went in
·favour of the appellants and against the prosecution but on paints
nos. 4 and 5 the anpellant~ were held guilty ·and convicted. They
were sentenced under s. 420 read with ss. 511 and 34, I.P.C. to ·
rigorous imori~onment for three years and a fine of Rs . .1,000/-
with further rigorous imorisonment for nine
month~ in ·case of
default in payment of fine.
A similar sentence was imposed on
each one of them for the offence under ss. 474/34, l.P.C. - Both,
.
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MUSTAQ AHMED V. GUJARA~ (D1ia, },)
673
the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. It appears from
· the judgment of the trial court which covers about forty pages of
exhaustive discussion on the poin1s raised .hat a large number of
witnesses were examined at the trial and the court entertained
considerable doubt with respect to the prosecution story ·on several
aspects of the various charges framed against the appellants.
On appeal in the High Conn the appellants challenged all the
adverse findings of the trial court, as they were entitled to do under
s: 410 read withs. 418, Cr. P.C., and assailed the appraisal and
evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses by that
court.
More than 20 grounds were taken in the memorandum
of appeal in which· the testimony of the various eye-witnesses wa:;
C ·criticised and ilie approach of the · learned Sessions Judge
in
this respect assailed.
As already pointed out, the High Court
dismissed the appeal in limine with one word "diomisscd" without
indicating whether it also edorsed the· line of reasoning and
approach of the trial court in evaluating the testimony of the
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various witnesses and its manner of dealing with the arguments
advanced by the prosecli1ion and the defence. .
In this Court it was seriously contended on behali of the appellants that the High Court h~d gravely erred in summarily dismis- ·
sing the appeal in limine without disclosing even broadly i1s reasons
for rejecting the various grounds of attack against the appraisal
of the prosecution evidence by the trial court. This, according 1o
the appellants learned counsel, is against the consistent and uni-·
form view expressed by this Court that in arguable cases the High
Court,· while dismissing the appeal, broadly indicate its reasons
in support of its conclusions. The judgment of the High Court
has, in this case, resulted in failure of jus1ice to the appellants'
prejudice, said the counsel.
In our view, the appellants' grievance is well-founded.
The
right of appeal conferred by s. 410 read with s. 418, ·Cr. P .C.
entitled the appellants to question the conclusions of the trial court
both on matters of fact and of law. They had a right to ask for
a review of the entire evidence and to challenge the appraisal of
the evidence by the trial court and its conclusions based on such
appraisal. Section 421, Cr. P.C. no doubt empowers the appellate
court to dismiss the appeal summarily but before doing so it is
bound to peruse with care and attention the petition of appeal
and the copy of the judgment or order appealed against The
order of suminarjr dismissal can be pas•ed only if the court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interference.
This
conclusion has to be arrived at judicially after a proper scrutiny,
of the petition of the appeal and the impugned judgment or order.
ln U. f. S. Chopra v. State.of Bombay( 1) Bhagwati J., speaking
(11 (10551 2 S.C.R. 94.
674
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R,
for the majority expressed the view that the hearing under s. 421
is intended for the purpose of detem1ining whether a prima facie
case for 1he appellate court's interference is made out. The whole
purpose of the hearing accorded to the appellant or his counsel,
even after calling for the record of the case, under this section, is
to determine whether there is a prima facie case for !he appellate
court's interference and it is not within that court's province at
that stage to fully consider the evidence on the record and hear
arguments with a view to deteffiline whether the conviction could
be sustained or the sentence passed could be reduced. No doubt
the question directly arising in that case was somewhat difierenbut the observations with respeet to <the purpose of the hearing
under s. 421, Cr. P.C. would be equally applicable to the consideration of the present contr0versy. If such be the real purpose
of hearing contemplated biy s. 421, then, the power of dismissing
appeals in limine should, in our view, be exercised sparingly and
with judicious caution so that no case raising arguable points,
whether of law or of fact requiring re-appraisal of evidence, goes
withoU't requisite scrutiny. The requirement of recording reasons
for summary dismissal, however concise, serves to ensure proper
functioning of the judicial process.
Reasons are, therefore. advisedly required by the decisions of this Court to be given for
rejecting an appeal summarily under s. 421, Cr. P.C.
Sinlilar
view was taken by the Allallabad High Court as far back as 1886
in Queen Empress v. Ram Narain & Anr.('). Although that
was a case in which the appeal had been dismissed by the Sessions
Jud~e. the considerations prevailing in such a case may equally
well apply to cases where the High Court dismisses an appeal in
limine for the reason, inter alia, that this Court may, when approach by the aggrieved party to exercise its power under Art.
136 of the Constitution, have <the benefit of the views of the High
Court. With speakinJ!: orders justice is also seen to be done.
Turning now to the decisions directly dealing with the point
raised by the appellants, this Court has consistently and uniformly
held that in cases raising arguable points the High Courts would
be well-advised to make speaking orders indicating their reasons,
however concise, inducinJ!: them to dismiss the appeals in limine.
The learned counsel Oil behalf of the State, Mrs. Uffilila Kanur.
without disputing that where arguable and substantial questions
of faot or law are raised on appeal the High Court is, according
to the decisions of this Court, expected to write a speaking order
however brief, dealing with and disnosine of the points canvassed
before it submitted that in the present case there were no arguable
or •ubstantial points involved and, therefore, the High Court was
justified in dismissing the appeal In limine without indicating its
Tl T.L.R. 8 All. 514.
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MUSTAQ AHMED v. GUJARAT (Dua, J.)
675
reasons therefor. She, however, .referred us specifically to an unreported decision of this Court in Mohammad Ayub Abbas Raut
v. The State of Maharashtra(').
According to the learned
counsel, this decision has not been noticed 1:fy this Court in its
later decisions disapproving the dismissal i11 /imi11e by the High
Courts of appeals from judgments of learned Sessions Judges.
This argument,. on first impression, appeared to suggest that the
learned counsel wanted us to re-examine the numerous decisions
of this Court uniformly disapproving the practice, prevailing in
some High Courts, of too readily dismissing in limi11e, with one
word "dismissed", appeals from the Sessions Courts even where
arguable points of fact or law are apparent on the face of the impugned judgment or order.
Mrs. Kapur, however, soon clarified
her position by submitting that ~he only wanted to contend that
in the present case this Court should not interfere with the High
Court's judgment as there were no arguable or substantial points
involved in the appeal and Mohd. Ayub (supra) was only cited
as a precedent to support this contention. According to her the
judgment of the trial court is detailed and well-considered, sound
reasons having been given in support of its conclusions : it was
accordingly unnecessary for the High Court to specifically <lea!
with the various points raised in the petition of appeal and to
record its reasons for rejecting various grounds of challenge can-
' vassed before it.
In our view, Mohd. Ayub Abbas Raut (supra) does not in
any way cast a doubt on the soundness of the various reasons
which have consi!!lently prevailed with this Court firmly disapproving dismissal in /imine with one word "dismissed" of appeals before
the High Courts from the judgments of Sessions Courts which
raised arguable . points of fact or law. The view expressed in
earlier decisions was not dissented from. Indeed no reference was
F
made to them. On the contrary it was observed that on the findings of the trial coUrt not considered erroneous by the High Court
the latter was justfied in dismissing the appeal in limine as it bad
full power to do so in exercise of its discretion under s. 421, Cr.
P.C. That the High Court has power to dismiss in limine bas
always hleen accepted by this Court. What this Court has consistently and uniformly laid down is that where arguable points ol
fact or law are raised then the High Court Would be well-advised
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to indicate its reasons for dismissing the appeal in limine. This
view is now firmly established and there has never been any
dissent.
No doubt, even now we come across stray cases from
some Hi!!h Courts in which, either in ignorance of the legal position firmly settled by this Court in a string of authorities, or
erroneously thinking that there is no arguable point of fact or
(I) Crl. A. No. 145of1961 decided on March 25. 1963.
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] 3 S.C.R,
law involved in an appeal under s. 410, Cr. P.C. from the judgment of Sessions Court, actually and prima facie raising arguable
pomts on the question ot appreciation of evidence, appeals are
dismissed in limine with one word "d,missed" without indicating
its reasons. It is because of such cases that we consider it necess;uy once again to refer to some of the decisions of this Court in
which the legal position has been declared and ~e-stated.
ln Mushtak Hussein v. The State of Bombay( 1) Mahajan J~
(as he then was) observed :
"With great respect we are however CO!litrained to
observe that it was not right for the High Court -to have
dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant to that
court summarily, as it certainly raised some arguable
points which required considera'lion th0ugh we have not
thought it fit to deal with all of them. In cases which
prima facie raise no arguable issue that course is, of
course, justified, but this Court would appreciate it if in
arguable cases the summary rejection order gives some
indication ol the views of the High Court on the points
raised. Without the opinion of the High Court on such
points in special leave petitions under article 136 of the
Constitution this Court sometimes feels embarrassed if
it has to deal with those matters without the benefit of
that opinion."
In Bhagat Singh v. 'State Of Rajasthan(') Bhargava and
Hegde JJ ., sent the case back for re-decision as the appeal had
~n dismissed
summarily.
The same Bench in
Vishwanath
Shankar Beldar v. The State of Maharashtra(')
adooted a
·similar course. The view expressed in Mush•ak Hussein (supra)
was reiterated in K. K. lain v. State of Maharashtra(').
In
Jiwan Prakash v. State of Maharashtra(•) this Court had drawn
the attention of the High Courts to as many as 13 cases in which
this Court had consistently sent the matters ba~k for re-hearing.
In Shaikh Mohd. Ali v. State of Maharashtra(') Shelat J.; soeaking for the Court a~ain emnhasised that a High Court would not
be justified in dismissing summarily and with<'lut a speakinl? order
an appeal raising arguable questions either factual or legal. Rofe•ence in this decision was made to Murhtak Hunein <•upra)
and · Jiwan Praka•h (supra).
Si".ce then O" .several
f'CC&<ions
again this Court ha~ re•ffirm~ this view. The moll! recent dee!-·
&ion in which this Court felt con•trai"e<l to rem•"d th~ ca•e to
the Hi ~h Court for a fresh decision is Rajendrapaul Ramasaran
(11 [1953) S.C.R. 809 ..
121 Crl. A. No. 3R or 1969 decided on September 17. 1969.
m Crl. A. No 9S or 1969 decided on September 18. 1%9.
141 A.l.R. 1973 S:C. 243.
(S) A.l.R. 1973 S.C 2'8.
(6) (1972) 2 s.c.c. 784.
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MUSTAO AHMED v. GUJARAT (Dua, /.)
677
Dass Sharma v. The State of Maharashtra(''). In that decision
various aspects have again been considered to impress upon the
High Court the inexpediency and impropriety of disposing of with
one word "dismissed" the appeals before it which raise arguable
points.
The contention that, when the trial court records a well-reasoned judgment, then, even though arguable points on the question
ol. credibility of witnesses arel raised, i1: is unnecessary for the Court
of appeal to deal with all these points and record its own reasons
for agreeing with the conclusions of the trial cou~. is unacceptable. The right of appeal conferred on a convicted person gives
him a right to challenge the reasoning and finding on the appraisal
of evidence both or!!_l and documentary by the trial court and
unless the challenge can be held to be prima facie unimpressive
and unarguabfo the High Court would be well-advised to go into
the points canvassed and record its reasons. Such a course would
be in accord with the statutory intendment, and also of assistance
to this Court in more satisfactorily dealing with appeals under Art.
136 of the Constitution.
The judgment of the trial court in the present case clearly
shows that in order to arrive at a safe conclusion the entire evidence en the record has to be closely scrutinised. The trial court
devoted several pages for the purpose of proper appraisal of the
evidence, discarding some of the contentions of the prosecuting
counsel, as unsupportable on the material on the record.
That
court also noticed some discrepancies in the evidence of some of
the witnesses for the prosecution, considered them to the minor and,
therefore. immaterial. Further found defects in the wor]>ing of the
Railways as regards the movement of goods wagons and, according
to the trial court, had !here been a proper system of checking
and tallying at the relevant railway stations, what has unfortunately
happened in the present case would perhaps have been avoided.
On appraisal of the evidence, the offences under ss. 467 and 468,
I.P.C. )Vere held not proved, th~re being no reliable evidence on
those points. Again, on the actual fraudulent or dishonest use of
forged documents also the trial court felt that the prosecution
evidence fell short of the main ingredients and only an attempt
had been made by the accused persons to use the forged documents with the result that they were acquitted of the charge under
s. 471 _ I.P.C.
The trial court also seems to have taken into
account the suspicious conduct of the appellants in coming to the
conclusion about their guilt under s. 420, I.P.C. read with ss. 415
and 34. I.P.C. and under ss. 474/34, I.P.C.
This discussion
clearly shows that the appellants were not unjustified in claiming
to have the evidence on the record re-examined by the High Court
(!) Crl. Appeal No. 264of1972 decided on February 23. 1973.
ll-761 Sup.C. I. /74
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973) 3 S.C.R.
for coming to iis own conclusions, of course, after considering the
views of the trial court and giving due weight to that court's reasoning and conclusion. Recording ol reasons by the High Court
for its conclusion on all the relevant aspee'ts was thus necessary
because even the trial court had not completely and unr<:servedly
accepted the evidence led by the prosecution and the charges pressed against the appellants. The points raised as disclosed in the petition of appeal could by no means be said to be unarguable. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we are constrained to allow this appeal and send the case back to the High
Coul'I for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made
above.
Had the High Court recorded its reasons in support of
the order dismissing the appeal perhaps this remand could have
been avoided and the appellants saved the further delay in the
:final disposal of their appeal by the High Court. The appeal is
accordingly allowed and the case sent back for a ;fresh decision.
<tC.
Appeal allowed.
A
B
c