# N. VIMALA DEVI v. K. MADHUSUDHANA REDDY

- **Citation:** [1975] 3 S.C.R. 128
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-12-20
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1973
- **Bench:** A. Alagiriswami, \l. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. Sarkaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/n-vimala-devi-v-k-madhusudhana-reddy-6387
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Repre.icntation of the People Act, 1951-S. 'l16A-A/lega1io11s of corrupt
B
practice-Duty of High Court to scrutinise with care.
Jn the ejection to the State Legislative Assembly, the respondent was declared elected.
The appellant who was the defeated candidate in :he election,
in !>er elect.ion petition alleged that the respondent had committed a number
of corrupt practices, the most important of whi~h related to the distribution
of a pamphlet def'amatory of h·~r, falling under s. 123(4) of the R1ipresentatio11 of the People Act, 1951.
The High Court dismissed her petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court applied one
s!andard in appreciating the
evidenc·~ of the appellant's· witnesses and an altogether different standard in appreciating the
evidence of the
respondent's
witnesses.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) On an examination of the evidence it is satisfactorily established that the impugned pamphlet was printed and distributed at lhe mstance
of the respondent. [135H]
(2) Where a corrupt practice is alleged against a returned candidahi it must
be scrutinised with considerable care because a finding to that effect has very
serious consi~uences. It not merely sets aside th·~ popular verdict but also
subjects the successful candidate to the penalty of being disqualified for election and even criminal prosecution. [135 El
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(3) This Court does not normally reappraise the evidence and come to a
contrary conclusion from that of the trial judge if it is generally acceptable.
E
But it must not be forgotten that an appeal under s. 116A of the Representation of the People Act is a first app~al a·nd not one under the provisions of ArL
136 of the Constitution and that an appeal is a rehearing. [135 Fl
In the instant case the evidence has been reassessed because the High Court
had rejected the evidence of the appellant's witnesses wholesale mainly on tjie
ground of their being partisan witnesses while no such standard has been :i~- '
plied to evid-ence of witnesses on behalf of the respondent except in two cases.
Even in those cases it was done because the documentary evidence was too
F
strong. The , rejection of the evidence by the High Court in one important
in~tance has led to a wrong approach in the appreciation of the oral evidence.
CrviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1973.
From the judgment and order dated the 22nd December, 1972 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 7 of 1972.
S. V. Gupte, P. P. Rao and G. Narayana Rao, for the appellant.
P. Ram Reddy. B. Parthasarthi and B. Balamukunda Reddy, for
the respondent.

## Text

128
N. VIMALA DEVI
v.
K. MADHUSUDHANA REDDY
December 20, 1974
A
[A. ALAGIRISWAMI, \l. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA JJ.]
Repre.icntation of the People Act, 1951-S. 'l16A-A/lega1io11s of corrupt
B
practice-Duty of High Court to scrutinise with care.
Jn the ejection to the State Legislative Assembly, the respondent was declared elected.
The appellant who was the defeated candidate in :he election,
in !>er elect.ion petition alleged that the respondent had committed a number
of corrupt practices, the most important of whi~h related to the distribution
of a pamphlet def'amatory of h·~r, falling under s. 123(4) of the R1ipresentatio11 of the People Act, 1951.
The High Court dismissed her petition.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court applied one
s!andard in appreciating the
evidenc·~ of the appellant's· witnesses and an altogether different standard in appreciating the
evidence of the
respondent's
witnesses.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : ( 1) On an examination of the evidence it is satisfactorily established that the impugned pamphlet was printed and distributed at lhe mstance
of the respondent. [135H]
(2) Where a corrupt practice is alleged against a returned candidahi it must
be scrutinised with considerable care because a finding to that effect has very
serious consi~uences. It not merely sets aside th·~ popular verdict but also
subjects the successful candidate to the penalty of being disqualified for election and even criminal prosecution. [135 El
c
D
(3) This Court does not normally reappraise the evidence and come to a
contrary conclusion from that of the trial judge if it is generally acceptable.
E
But it must not be forgotten that an appeal under s. 116A of the Representation of the People Act is a first app~al a·nd not one under the provisions of ArL
136 of the Constitution and that an appeal is a rehearing. [135 Fl
In the instant case the evidence has been reassessed because the High Court
had rejected the evidence of the appellant's witnesses wholesale mainly on tjie
ground of their being partisan witnesses while no such standard has been :i~- '
plied to evid-ence of witnesses on behalf of the respondent except in two cases.
Even in those cases it was done because the documentary evidence was too
F
strong. The , rejection of the evidence by the High Court in one important
in~tance has led to a wrong approach in the appreciation of the oral evidence.
CrviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1973.
From the judgment and order dated the 22nd December, 1972 of
the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 7 of 1972.
S. V. Gupte, P. P. Rao and G. Narayana Rao, for the appellant.
P. Ram Reddy. B. Parthasarthi and B. Balamukunda Reddy, for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-In the election to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Chennur constituenoy held on 5th March,
1972, :he appeilant was the official Congress candidate and the respondent an independent candidate though
both belonged
to
the
Congress PartY. The respondent obtained 25,654 votes as against 23,940
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VIMALA DBYl v. JC, M. REDDY (Alagiriswami, !.)
129
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votes obtained by the appelfant and was declared elected. Thereupan
the appellant filed an election petition which was dismissed by the,
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Andhra Pradesh Hi~ Court. This appeal is against that decision.
Though a number of corrupt practices were alleged in the election
petition the only one pressed before this Court was that relating to
the distribution of a pamphlet defamatory of the appellant falling
under section 123( 4). That leaflet marked Ex.A-1 purports to have
been issued by the Yuvajana Congress, Thorrur. It does not bear .the
name of the printer or the publisher. But the allegation in the election
petition was that it was published by the respondent and his agents
throughout the' constituency. In Schedule I. to the election petition
were given the ·uamcs of villages where the distribution was made, the
penons who distributed, the date of distribution as well as the names
of persons who received the pamphlet. Certain other. details were
also given.
It was further alleged that the appellant received letters
in this regard from some of her supporters in the constituency. These
were marked as Exs. A-2, A-3 and A-4. It was stated that the Prellident of the Yuvajana Congress, Thorrur was a man named Uppal
Reddy who became a paid clerk of the respondent. The respondent
denied knowledge of the pamphlet and contended that Bies. A-2 to A-4
are self serving statement:; got prepared by the appellant and the· persons who are supposed to have written those letters for the purpose of
the election petition. He claimed that he was not aware whether
Uppal Reddy was President of the Yuvajana Congress. Thorrur but
that he was a strong sug;~rter of the appellant. The distribution of
the pamphlet either by ·
or his election agent or his workers with
his consent was denied.
The names of workers mentioned in the schedule to the election petition were stated to be those of the supporters
of the appellant with a view to let in false evidence.
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The learned Judge of the High Court after an elaborate examination of the evidence found that there cannot be any doubt that the
allegations contained in leaflet Ex.A-1 go deeply against the persona.I
character and conduct of the appellant and can be taken as being
reasonab]/y calculated to prejudice her prospects in the election. This
does not see01 to have been disputed before the High Court.
It was
only contended that neither the respondent nor his election agent was
aware of the existence of those leaflets n~r were they distributed during
the election period and even if they were distributed they were not
responsible for it.
The learned Judge further held that it has to be
taken that the allegations made against the appellant in Ex.A-1 were
false and the respondent did not believe them to be true and he would
be guilty of the corrupt practice if the publication was made by the
respondent or his election agent or by others with th6 consent of the
respondent or his election. agent.
He then took up the question whether the respondent or his election agent or with the consent of either .
any other person distributed leaflets like Ex.A-1 durin! the election
period.
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The case for the respondent as suggested in the cross-examination of the appellant was that she expected her defeat even when the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] .3 S.C.R.
election was one week ahead and therefore she started manufacturing
all the documents filed by her for the purpose of the election petition,
which even then she decided to file in case of her defeat.
Based on
the evidence of P.W. 70, the Secn:tary of the Zila Parishad, Warungal
who was then the Returning Officer, and P.W.76, the Sub-Collector,
Warangal, the learned Judge found that leaflets like Ex.A-1 were in
circulation a few days prior to the date of the election. He, however, came to the conclusion that it was not possible to say that even
before the date of the election the appellant and her supporters must
have thought that her defeat in the election was a certainty and thought
of distributing leaflets like Ex.A-1 to prepare for thc~ion petition
instead of working vigorously for her success in llieefcction and, there:
fore, whoever might be responsible for the distribution· of th~ leaflets
it could not have been the appellant or her supporters but her enemies
only. He finally came to the conclusion that there is no cogent and
reliable evidence to show that the distribution of the leaflets was made
by the respondent or his election agent or with the consent of either
by some others and it is not possible to hold the respondent responsible: for th1~ distribution.
With regard to Uppal Reddy he held that
th1:re was no satisfactory evidence to show either that Uppal R1:ddy was
.a paid clerk of the respondent or that he worked for the respondent
in the ele1;tion and not for the appellant as alleged by the respondent.
As we are in substantial agreement with the learned Judg1~ regarding the nature of the leaflet Ex.A-1 its possible effect and the impossibility of the appellant or anybody on her behalf having distributed
those pamphlets we do not think it necessary to discuss those questions
or even to set out the pamphlet itself. These were not seriously disputed by the respondent.
We wili therefore confine eursclvcs to the
question as to who was rcsponsibc for their distributi011.
The learned Judge seems to lJave thought that R.Ws. 32 and 33,
the brothers of the appellant's husband, might perhaps have done it
as they were bitterly inimical towards the appellant and her :husband.
R.W.32 was the respondent's polling agent and R.W.33 was an active
worker on his behalf. There is no evidence as to who had the leaftet
printed or where it was printed. Neither R.W.32 nor R.W._33 accepted either that they pri!!_tcd the leaflet or that they distributed it.
Some time before the election and even before the Congress candi-
<late was s1~lected for this constituency a representation, E'X A-48, was
sent to the Congress authorities signed among others by the respondent as well as R.W.33.
The main purport of that representation was
that neither the appellant nor her husband should be set up as the
Congress candidate. It suggested certain other persons as fit to be
set up as Congress candidates, but there is no doubt that it was intended to prevent either the appellant or her husband being selected
as the CO'agress candidate. R.W. 33 claimed that it was he 1hat prepared Ex. A-48 and got the signatures of the persons containc:d therein. The first of the signatories is respondent himself. Forty out of
its fortythree signatories are his supporters. Though he p:retended
not to have known its contents he~ as well as R.W. 33 had to admit
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131 -
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that it was prepared after some discussion.
The respondent had ~.lso
to admit that he it was who wrote in his own hand about a copy of the
representation having to go to the Congress observer for Warangal
district. We have nti doubt at all that the main mover behind Ex. A48 is the respondent himself and R.W. 33 is merely his instrument
This is also evident from the fact that he decided to stand for
t-hc
election himself because only if he stood he could defeat the appcln - !ant.
Thus his main motive being to defeat the appellant is clear
beyond doubt.
It is not merely the normal effort of a contesting
candidate to defeat his opponent but something special, >omething out
of the ordinary.
This exhibit has not been discussed at all by the
learned Judge. The importa•ace of Ex. A-48 is because it is a forerunner of Ex. A-1 and some of the statements found in Ex. A-1 as well.
as its main purpose •are the same as of Ex. A-48.
We arc not imC
pressed by the argument on behalf of the respondent that Ex. A-57.
which shows that even in 1970 a representation of a similar kind was
made, shows that there were many others out to besmirch the name
of the appellant. Ex. A-57 contains many instances which have
_ nothing to do with the election in 1972 or the setting up of a Cortgress
candidate in that election. That is the affinity between Ex. A-48 am!
Ex. A-L Nor are we impressed by the argunient on bch•alf of the rcsD
pondent that NGOs towards whom the appellant is said to have behaved rudely might have been responsible for the p1'i11ting and _distri·
bution of the pamphlets.
The NGOs as a class may not be so much
interested and no suggestion h:.is been put and we have not been told _
that any particular NGO had such a strong grievance against the appel~·
!ant that he could go to the extent of printing clandestinely a paii1phlet like Ex. A-1, meeting the expenditure therefore and for distributE
ing it. The search ultimately must be confined to R.Ws. 32 and
33
on the one hand and thi; respondent on the other.
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It is here that the relevance of the reference to Uppal Reddy and
the Yuvajana Congress, Thorrur becomes
important.
The :Yuvajana Congress, Thorrur was inaugurated on the 26th January,'· 1972.
Before that Uppal Reddy had met P.W.66, Vasautha Nageswara Rao.
the President of the State Youth Congress and a member of the Legislative Assembly from the Nandigama constituency of Krishna district.
He wrote a letter Ex.A-25 on 6-2-1972 congratulating Uppal Reddy
on his having organised the Yuvajana Congress.
Later finding that
Uppal Reddy was working against the Congress candidate on behalf
of the respondent he was removed from the office and P.W.68. Vasudeva Reddy was elected President of the Yuvajana Congress, Thorrur.
The removal of Uppai Reddy and the election of P.W.68 ,was intimated to P.W.66 by Ex.A-26.
The second letter is Ex--.A-28 written
by P.W.68 to P.W.66 about distribution of leaflets by the respondent's
associates.
That letter also refers to __ th_c pamphlet as havin~ been
printed by the respondent and asks that he be suspended immediateLy;
Another letter Ex.A-32 written bv P.W.66 to P.W.68 also shows that
P.W.66 was invited to tour the Chennur constituency and he was unable to do so.
Exhibits A-31, A-31{a) and A-31(b) show that letters
were written to P.W.66 as well as to the President of the· Andhra -
Pradesh Congress _Committee.
Exhibit_ A-29 is a letter b~ P.W.68
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 S.C.R.
to P.W.66 inviting him to tour the constituency. Exhibit A-29(a)
is a resolution of the Youth Congress Committee dated 29-2-1972
about Uppal Reddy having been won over by the respomknt and
the pamphlet against the appellant being published and requesting
P. W .66 and the .President of the A11dhra Pradesh Congress Committee
to institute proceedings against the respondent.
Exhibit A-27 is .a
letter addressed by P.W.66 to Uppal Reddy apparently on the basis
of Ex.A-26 about the complaints that he was. working for the respon··
dent and asking him to show cause why disciplinary acdon should not
be taken against him. It also refers to the resolution of the Youth
Congress.
We arc unabfo to share the h~a.rncd Judge's concluoion that all th~1sc
could have been got up in order to supporc the election/etitioA.
The
learned Judge himself recognises that the appellant woul not have had
any apprehension th::ir ~be would be defeated in the election because
stre was standing from Chennur constituency which was the (Jnly one
among the many constituencies comprising the Parliamentary seat that
was won by a Congress candidate with a majority of 5000 votes in
the previous election though all the other Assembly seats as well as
the Parliament seat went to the non-Congress candidate. That is why
the learned Judge took the view that the distribution of the pamphlet could not have been made by the appellant before the date of the
election. It is, therefore, obvious that these documents could not
have been. got up before the election nor are we able to accept the
learned Judge's facile conclusion that these could have been got up
by antedat,ing some postal stamps. One cannot take it that it is so
easy to antedate postal stamps.
In fact no such suggestion was put
to the appellant or any of her witnesses. This theory of antedating
the postal stamps has also been relied upon by the learned Judge in
connection with Exs.A-2 to A-4, with which we shall deal a little later.
The only slight reference to anybody connected with the appellant
having anything to do with the Post Office was in relation to one of the
Post Offices alone.
It is not that if no such suggestion was inade on
behalf of the respondent about the postal sramps being aatedated it is
not permissib~e to the learned Judge to draw such a conclusion if the
facts justify it but we feel there are no facts justieying such an inferenc1~.
We are satisfied that these various documents are genuine and
not got up for the purpose of the election petition.
The whole case of the respondent was that these documents
as
well as Exs.A-2 to A-4 had been created before the election though
the question put to the appellant's witnesses was in a fonn which
would enable him to put forward two alternative pleas ( 1) of their
being prepared before the election, and (2) of their being prepared
after the election but before the election petition was filed.
We nrc
of the opinion that the respondent should not be allowed to draft his
pleadings in a dubious way and try to shape either his evidence or
his arguments to suit either theory.
We are unable to accept
the
argument on behalf of the respondent that these documents do not
establish that either the respondent or his election a.irent distributed
too pamphlets. Theso letters and resolutions sometimes refer to the
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VIMALA DEVI v. K. M. Rl\DDY (Alagiriswami, J.)
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respondent and sometimes to his associates.
One of them refers to
the respondent having printed the pamphlet.
We do not think that in
assessing the evidentiary value of these documents rhe statements contained in them should be scrutinised as though they were either pleadings before the Court or a statute to be interpreted.
When pamphlets
are said to be .distributed by the respondent it does not necessarily
mean that he was physically han~ling over those pamphlets to various
persons. It includes the pamphlets being distributed in his presence
or in the presence of his election agent or at his instance or on his
behalf.
Even if persons working for the respondent were distribut·
ing, in common parlance it would be said that the respondent was
distributing the pamphlets.
Interpreted in the proper perspective the
various statements merely mean that the pamphlets were being distributed at the instance of the .respondent.
Some criticism was made of these documents on the basis of the
constitution of the All India Youth Congress and that it does not provide for village Youth Congresses and that people cannot become
members of the Youth Congress unless they become primary members
of the All India Youth Congress. But it is obvious from the documents themselves as well as the evidence of P.W. 66, it was found
necessary and advantageous to have Youth Congress in Thorrur as it
would help the Congress candidate as it was election time.
This question cannot be decided as though we are concerned with the legality
of the establishment of the Youth Congress in "Iborrur.
All that it
shows is that certain youngmen of the village decided to start a Youth
Congress in the village, that it had the sanction and the blessings of
P.W.66 and that they hoped to regularise the establishment of :Y-outh
Congress in due course.
The criticism that the receipt 'Of these. letters
is. nqt entered \n the receipt and despatch book of the_ State Youth
Congress office· is no.t of much substance. Non-officllil ·political Organisations. are -n,ot run and do not function as though they were. oH\ciaJ
aaministrati~e offices.,
.
.
.
.
.
We .do ~not ~!so agree wit4 tlie'view cif the learned)udge who ·re~
jepted the_;evigerice of P.W.66 on the ground that he was merdy- a
Congress memb~r: He is a .member of the Legislative Assembly fro111
another dlsfiicf and he is the chief of the State Youth Congress-.
The
fact that he is a Congressman could not be the sole grourid ·for re•
jccting his evidence.
We are, therefore, satisfied that these docuinents
produce Cbntemporaneous evidence of the fact that the pamphlets like
Ex. A" 1 were brought into existence and distributed at the instance of
the respondent.·. They cover the period from 6-2-1972 to the day before the poll.
Their evidentiary value is, therefore; very high.
The distribution of the pamphlets by the respondent· is <ilso probabilised by Ex. A-16 written by the appella.'ilt to the Geneml Secretary
of the Congress in Warangal District and Ex. A-44 to the Returning
Officer.
H
We shall now refer to Exs. A-2 to A-4. These are three :etters
written by three supporters of the appellant about the distribution of
the pamphlets by either the respondent or his election ;:gent as well as
R.W. 33. The learned Judge has rejected them among other reasons
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
on the ground that postal stamps on them c.ould have b~cn 51ntedated.
The criticism we have made earlier with reference to this vtcw nf the
learned Judge when we were discussing the documents relating to the
Yuvajana Congress of Thorrur applies here· also.
Four PClst Of:fiees
are involved with reference to these three documi:nts, the thrc'~ different Post Offices in which they were posted and the one Post Office
in which they were received.
OnJ,y with rcb~ncc to one of the Post
Ollices it was said that the Postmaster was a relative of the appellant.
We think it impossible that postal stamps from four different Post
Offices could have been antedated so easily. On the other h~ncl these
three clocumcnts give us the feeling that they have been prepared with
an eye on an election petition. People who have been wor1,ing for
the appellant would not suddenly stop working merely because they
saw a pamphlet like Ex. A-1 and i[ they dod so they would just stop
wcrking and not bother further about writing to her.
Jt was also
unnatural in such letters for these persons to say that people were
being convinced and that they themselves were convinced by
the
pamphlets. If that is so, these letters must !lave come into existence
before the date of the poll.
If the postal stamps could not have been
antedated, how and why were these letters brought into ex:istence?
This question has given us considerable anxiety and we think that the
most acceptable explanation is that having come to )rnow of the
distribution of the pamphlets like Ex.A-1 the appellant got her supporters to write these letters and they have done it only too well. The
tell-t•aie statements contained i"1 them give us no option but to reject Exs.-A-2 to A-4.
We do not think it necessary to refer at length to the oral 1evidence
in this ca&~ about the distribution. A large volume of evidence has
been let in. on behalf of the appellant regarding the distribution. As
already mentioned the villages in which the distribution was made, the
dates on which the distribution was made, the persons who made the
distribution as well as the persons to whom the distribution was made
are set out in the schedule to the election petition. The atta1:k made
on these in the written statement filed by the respondent is that the
names of the supporters of the appellant were given therein in order
to enable them to give false evidence. The learned Judge has in discussing tht~ evidence of these witnesses extracted their evidence at
length and rejected them mostly on the ground that they were the.
appellant's supporters. · But he has not hesitated to accept the! den•als
bv the respondent and that of his witnesses and their evidence even
though the.y are as much partisan as the appellant's witnesses. 11rnt
is why in matters of this kind in assessing the oral evidence we have
got to have some reliable test for assessing the reliability of one version or the other. Much of the criticism made by the learned .Judge of
the evidenc:e on behalf of the appellant is that of very tenuous lk:ind and
they can be applied as well to the evidence on behalf of the respondent
and we can see no justification for the facile way he accepted the denial
by the respondent and his witnesses.
The documents regarding the
Youth Congress of Thorrur, which we have discussed, furnish strong
support wf1ich one has got to look for before one can acc:ept oraT
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VIMALA DEVI \'. K. J\I. REDDY (Alagiriswii/ni, J.)
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~vidence in matte:s of this. kintl. It is easy enough to accept or re1ect oral evidence by mentioning one or two minor conlradicticns.
One should be satisfied that the broad outline of the evidence given
is true and worthy of acceptance.
We are not impressed with the view of the learned Judge that
either R. W. 32 or R. W. 33 might have been responsible for bri,.gmg
into existence the pamphlet Ex.A-1. After all the person that was
standing for election was the respondent and his attitude of trying to
see that neither the appellant nor her husband was set up as a Congress candidate and being prepared to stand merely for th~ purpose
of defeating her shows .that it was he that was interested in publishing
this pamphlet. His earlier effort, Ex. A-48 also shows thi.s.
We find
it imoossible to accept the evidence of R. W. 32 and R. W. 33 that
the appellant and her husband were responsible for sending a petition ·
against them in regard to a contract work that they had undertaken or
that the appellant wanted a bribe of Rs. 3000 from them. All this is
falsified by the admission that it was Nookala Ramachandra Reddy, a
former Minister, that was responsible for the representation against
R.Ws. 32 and 33 in regard to the contract about which the AntiCorruption Department made an enquiry.
We are conscious that where a corrupt practice is alleged against a
returned candidate it must be scrutinised with considerable care because a finding to that effect has very serious consequences. It not
merely sets aside the popular verdict but also subjects the successful
. · candidate to the penalty of being disqualified for election and even
criminal prosecution. We are also conscious that this Court does not
normally reappraise the evidence and come to a contrary conclusion
from that of the trial Judge if it is generally acceptable. But we must
not forget that an appeal under S. 116A of the Representation of the
People Act is a first appeal and not one under the provisions of Art.
136 of the Constitution and that an appeal is a rehearing. In this case
we have undertaken a reassessment of evidence because the learned
Judge has rejected the evidence of the appellant's witnesses wholesale
mainly on the ground of their being partisan witnesses while no
such standard has been applied to evidence of witnesses on behalf of
the respondent, except R. w. 3 and R. w. 21. Even there it was
because the documentary evidence was too strong. He has also not
discussed Ex. A-48 and appreciated the evidence in the background
of that document. His rejection of the evidence regarding the Thorrur
Yuvajana Congress has led to a wrong approach in the appreciation
of the oral evidence.
We have come to the conclusion tbat it is satisfactorily established
that these pamphlets were orinted and distributed at the instance of
the respondent. The appeal is allowed and the election of the respondent set a~ide. The respondent will pay the appellant's costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal al/01.>ed