# NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2008] 14 S.C.R. 419
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2008-10-14
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1921 of 2006
- **Bench:** Dr.Arijit Pasayat, P. Sathsivam, AFTAB -iALAM
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nagar-palika-nigam-v-krishi-upaj-mandi-samiti-and-ors-23631
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

-
Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972;
s. 9(3) and Proviso:
c
Property tax - Levy of, in terms of s. 9 (3) of the Act -
Challenge to in terms of Proviso to s.9(3) -Allowed by Single
Judge of the High Court holding that appellant-Corporation
had no jurisdiction to claim property tax from the petitioner for
the building constructed on market yard - Correctness of -
D
Held: Corporation did not challenge the proviso to s. 9(3) of
the Adhiniyam allowing exemption from levying of tax on such
property - Hence, no interference with the impugned order
called for.
Proviso to a Statute - Scope of - Discussed.
E
Interpretation of Statutes - Principles of construction -
Discussed.
'
The issue which arose for determination in this apF
peal was as to whether the Corporation had jurisdiction
---4.
and authority to assess and recover the property tax from
respondent No.1 for the buildings, superstructure constructed in the market yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation in terms of proviso to s.9(3) of the Madhya
Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972.
G
t--
Appellant contended that there was no challenge to
the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of
the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam; and
419
H
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
A
that the proviso casts out an exception to the provisions
}-
under s.9(3) of the Act.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The normal function of a proviso is to exB cept something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be
within the purview of the enactment. (Para - 8) [426-A]
+
Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 170; Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra
..
c Yograj Sinha AIR (1961) SC 1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co.
Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR (1965) SC 1728 - relied on.
1.2 When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part
D of the section would have included the subject matter of
the proviso. (Para - 8) [426-8]
1.3 As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enact-
+-
ment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment and o·rdinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as
E stating a general rule. (Para - 8) [426-D]
A. N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors.
AIR (1991) SC 1406; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v.
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. AIR (1991) SC 1538 and
1F
Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels
(P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994) 5 sec 672 - relied on.
)-
West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co.
(1897 AC 647) (HL) - referred to.
Coke upon Littleton 1 Sth Edition, 146 - referred to.
G
1.4 A proviso to a section cannot be used to import
into the enacting part something which is not there, but
·-4
where the enacting part is susceptible to several possible
meanings it may be controlled by the proviso. (Para - 13)
H [427-C-D]
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
421
SAMIT! & ORS.
--{
Ali M. K. & Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Ors. (2003) 4 SCALE
A
197 - referred to.
Re Barker, 25 Q.B.D. 285; Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C.
256; Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206 arid R. v. Taunton, St
James, 9 B. & C. 836 - referred to.
B
2.1 It is well settled principle in law that the Court
--+ ca.nnot read anything into a statutory provision which is
plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. (Para - 15) [427-E]
c
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis Price
Waterhouse and Anr. AIR (1998) SC 74 - relied on.
Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and
Ors. AIR (1962) SC 847 and The State of Gujarat and Ors. v.
D
Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. JT (1998) 2 SC 253 - re_J
ferred to.
Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1 - referred
to.
2.2 Statutes should not be construed as theorems E
of Euclid but words must be construed with some imaginat

## Text

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 419
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM
A
v.
KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1921 of 2006)
OCTOBER 14, 2008
B
[DR.ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHSIVAM AND AFTAB
-iALAM JJ.]
-
Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972;
s. 9(3) and Proviso:
c
Property tax - Levy of, in terms of s. 9 (3) of the Act -
Challenge to in terms of Proviso to s.9(3) -Allowed by Single
Judge of the High Court holding that appellant-Corporation
had no jurisdiction to claim property tax from the petitioner for
the building constructed on market yard - Correctness of -
D
Held: Corporation did not challenge the proviso to s. 9(3) of
the Adhiniyam allowing exemption from levying of tax on such
property - Hence, no interference with the impugned order
called for.
Proviso to a Statute - Scope of - Discussed.
E
Interpretation of Statutes - Principles of construction -
Discussed.
'
The issue which arose for determination in this apF
peal was as to whether the Corporation had jurisdiction
---4.
and authority to assess and recover the property tax from
respondent No.1 for the buildings, superstructure constructed in the market yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation in terms of proviso to s.9(3) of the Madhya
Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972.
G
t--
Appellant contended that there was no challenge to
the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of
the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam; and
419
H
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
A
that the proviso casts out an exception to the provisions
}-
under s.9(3) of the Act.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The normal function of a proviso is to exB cept something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be
within the purview of the enactment. (Para - 8) [426-A]
+
Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 170; Shah
Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra
..
c Yograj Sinha AIR (1961) SC 1596 and Calcutta Tramways Co.
Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR (1965) SC 1728 - relied on.
1.2 When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part
D of the section would have included the subject matter of
the proviso. (Para - 8) [426-8]
1.3 As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enact-
+-
ment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment and o·rdinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as
E stating a general rule. (Para - 8) [426-D]
A. N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors.
AIR (1991) SC 1406; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v.
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. AIR (1991) SC 1538 and
1F
Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels
(P) Ltd. and Ors. (1994) 5 sec 672 - relied on.
)-
West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co.
(1897 AC 647) (HL) - referred to.
Coke upon Littleton 1 Sth Edition, 146 - referred to.
G
1.4 A proviso to a section cannot be used to import
into the enacting part something which is not there, but
·-4
where the enacting part is susceptible to several possible
meanings it may be controlled by the proviso. (Para - 13)
H [427-C-D]
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
421
SAMIT! & ORS.
--{
Ali M. K. & Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Ors. (2003) 4 SCALE
A
197 - referred to.
Re Barker, 25 Q.B.D. 285; Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C.
256; Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206 arid R. v. Taunton, St
James, 9 B. & C. 836 - referred to.
B
2.1 It is well settled principle in law that the Court
--+ ca.nnot read anything into a statutory provision which is
plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. (Para - 15) [427-E]
c
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Mis Price
Waterhouse and Anr. AIR (1998) SC 74 - relied on.
Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and
Ors. AIR (1962) SC 847 and The State of Gujarat and Ors. v.
D
Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. JT (1998) 2 SC 253 - re_J
ferred to.
Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1 - referred
to.
2.2 Statutes should not be construed as theorems E
of Euclid but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. (Para - 17)
[428-D]
Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547 - reF
~ ferred to.
'
2.3 Two principles of construction - one relating to
casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first
principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the G
..
Court except in the case of clear necessity and when rea-
~ son for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself
but at the same time a casus omissus should not be
readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every H
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
A clause of a section should be construed with reference }--
to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes it a
consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads
B to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could
not have been intended by the Legislature. (Para - 20)
(429 B-D]
+
c
Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966) 1 QB 878 and Luke v. /RC
(1966) AC 557 - referred to.
2.4 The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest
of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and orD di nary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid
that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. (Para -
22) (430 C-D]
E
Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat
(2004) 6 sec 672 - referred to.
Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas. 61 and Abley v. Dale 11,
C.B. 378 - referred to.
3. Since there was no challenge at any point of time
by the appellant to the proviso to sub-section (3) of SecF tion 9 on the alleged ground of lack of legislative competence, obviously the High Court could not have dealt with )-
that issue. Till now also, no such challenge has been made
by the appellant. That being so, this Court found no scope
for interference with the order passed by the High Court.
G (Para - 24) (431 A-B]
CASE LAW REFERENCE
1880 (5) QBD 170
Relied on
Para - 8
"-..+
AIR (1961) SC 1596
Relied on
Para - 8
H
AIR (1965) SC 1728
Relied on
Para - 8
..
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
423
SAMITI & ORS.
----!
(1897 AC 647) (HL)
Referred to
Para - 8
A
AIR (1991) SC 1406
Relied on
Para - 8
AIR (1991) SC 1538
Relied on
Para - 8
(1994) 5 sec 672
Relied on
Para - 8
(2003) 4 SCALE 197
Referred to
Para - 14
B
~
25 Q.B.D. 285
Referred to
Para - 12
[1922] 1 A.C. 256
Referred to
Para - 10
[1940] A.C. 206
Referred to
Para - 13
9 8. & c. 836
Referred to
Para - 11
c
AIR (1998) SC 74
Relied on
Para - 16
AIR (1962) SC 847
Referred to
Para - 16
JT (1998) 2 SC 253
Referred to
Para - 16
D
(1846 (6) Moore PC 1
Referred to
Para - 16
218 FR 547
Referred to
Para - 17
(1966) 1 QB 878
Referred to
Para - 20
(1966) AC 557
Referred to
Para - 20
E
(2004) 6 sec 672
Referred to
Para - 23
6 H.L. Cas. 61
Referred to
Para - 22
11, C.B. 378
Referred to
Para - 22
"
_,,.
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1921
F
of 2006
From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.10.1998 and
14.10.2004 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at
Indore in Writ Petition No. 251 of 1995 and LPA No. 327 of G
1999 respectively
H.K. Puri for the Appellant.
S.K. Dubey, Nandita Dubey, Vikas Upadhyay, Yogesh
Tiwari and B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.
H
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
}-
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. A Bench of two learned
Judges being of the view that one of the questions which is
interlinked with the interpretation of Section 9(3) of Madhya
B
Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 (in short the
'Adhiniyam') would be whether having regard to the provisions
contained in Part IXA of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
+
the 'Constitution') the Legislature of the State of M.P. had the
requisite legislative competence therefor. Respondent No.1 filed
a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court under
c Article 226 of the Constitution with basically two prayers. They
are as under:
"(1) The respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation, Ratlam
has no jurisdiction or right to claim the property tax from
D
the petitioner for the building and the superstructure
constructed in the Market Yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation, Ratlam.
(2) That the amount of Rs.70,000/- which has been
deposited by the petitioner with respondent No.1 pursuant
E
to the notice and auction proceedings initiated against
the petitioner should be directed to be refunded to the
petitioner. Interest on the said amount is also being
claimed."
F
2. With reference to Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam it was
submitted that exemption had been provided on the property
)_.
/
on which no property tax could be levied even if the same falls
within the area of Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council,
Notified Area, Gram Panchayat or a Special Area Development
Authority. Learned Single Judge accepted the first prayer, but
G permitted the respondent-writ petitioner to avail such remedy
as is available by filing a civil suit in respect of second prayer.
"-+
3. Review petition was filed by the present appellant which
was dismissed. A Letters Patent Appeal was also filed, which
H was dismissed on the ground that the same was not maintain-
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
425
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
·---{
able against an order passed in the review petition. The appeal A
was also without merit.
4. The basic stand in the appeal was whether the Corporation had jurisdiction and authority to assess and recover the
property tax from respondent No.1 for the buildings, superstruc8
tu re constructed in the market yard within the area of Municipal
Corporation, Ratlam.
·--t;-
5. During the course of hearing of the appeal, learned coun-
-
sel for the appellant fairly accepted that there was no challenge
to the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the c
Adhiniyam. It is also fairly accepted that the proviso casts out
an exception.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
submitted that in the absence of a challenge to the legality of
the proviso, there is no question of adjudicating the issue which
D
the reference Bench has considered to be of importance.
-+
7. Section 9(3) of the Adhiniyam so far as relevant reads
as under:
"(3) Nothing contained in the Madhya Pradesh Land
E
Revenue Code, 1959 (No.20 of 1959), and rules made
thereunder in so far as they relate to diversion of land,
revision of land revenue consequent on the change in the
use of land from agriculture to any other purpose and other
matters incidental thereto shall apply to land acquired by
F
~\
the market committee under sub-section (1) or acquired
by transfer, purchase gift or otherwise and use for the
purpose of establishment of a market yard or a sub-market
yard:
Provided that the premises used for market yard, subG
market yard or for the purpose of the Board shall not be
-~
deemed to be included in the limits of the Municipal
Corporation, Municipal Council, Notified Area, Gram
Panchayat or a Special Area Development Authority, as
the case may be."
H
_.
426
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008) 14 S.C.R.
A
8. The normal function of a proviso is to exceptsomething
)._--
out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein
which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey [1880
(5) QBD 170], (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills
B and Ginning Factory v. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha (AIR
1961 SC 1596) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1965 SC 1728); when one finds a proviso
+-
to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso,
the enacting part of the section would have included the subject
~
c matter of the proviso. The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within
the general language of the main enactment and its effect is
confined to that case. It is a qualification of the preceding enI
actment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite
T
D accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment
to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and
ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
"If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not con-
-t--
tain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot deE
rive these provisions by implication from a proviso." Said Lord
Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life. Assurance
Co. (1897 AC 647)(HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel
beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an
exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as
a proviso and to no other. (See A.N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje
F Ram Sheoram and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1406), Tribhovandas
Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. (AIR
/-
1991 SC 1538) and Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v.
Ramapriya Hotels (P)Ltd. and Ors. (1994 (5) SCC 672).
G
9. "This word (proviso) hath divers operations. Sometime
it worketh a qualification or limitation; sometime a condition;
and sometime a covenant" (Coke upon Littleton 18th Edition,
146)
·-110. "If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later
H clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
427
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant,
A
and the earlier clause prevails .... But if the later clause does not
destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be read
together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties
as disclosed by the deed as a whole" (per Lord Wrenbury in
Forbes v. Git [1922] 1 A.C. 256).
B
11. A statutory proviso "is something engrafted on a pre-
.-+ ceding enactment" (R. v. Taunton, St James, 9 B. & C. 836).
12. "The ordinary and proper function of a proviso coming
after a general enactment is to limit that general enactment in c
certain instances" (per Lord Esher in Re Barker, 25 Q.B.D. 285).
13. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into
the enacting part something which is not there, but where the
enacting part is susceptible to several possible meanings it may
be controlled by the proviso (See Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C.
D
206).
14. The above position was noted in Ali M.K. & Ors. v.
State of Kera/a and Ors~ (2003 (4) SCALE 197).
15. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot E
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.
__ J
16. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental
F
, references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of/ndia v. Mis Price Waterhouse
and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74)) The intention of the Legislature is
primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means G
that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to
J..; what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which
requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which
results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1 ),
H
428
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
A
Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an )..-
Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up de-
~
ficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and
Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr (JT 1998 (2) SC
253)). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into
B an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v.
Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of
interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provi- +-
~
sion as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts
are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless
'
~,
c clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the
Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim
Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid,
.....
Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Devi ah and Ors. (Al R 1962 SC
847).
D
17. The question is not what may be supposed and has
been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge· Learned Hand said,
t--
"but words must be construed with some imagination of the
purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co.
E
v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union
of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De
Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).
18. In Dr R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy Transport
I
\
Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was obF
served that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determinal._
tion of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-con-
/
ceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which
the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not
entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interG pretation.
19. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets
....... ~
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused
and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legisH
lature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See
_
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
429
SAMITI & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--.....(
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P v. Popular Trading ComA
pany, U1/ain (2000 (5) sec 515). The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.
20. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole
B
- appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus
omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of
--f'
clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus
.....
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts
of a statute or section must be construed together and every c
clause of a section should be construed with reference to the
context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be
put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of
the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction
of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous D
results which could not have been intended by the Legislature.
-Jor
"An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said
_,
Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878),
"is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construetion available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the E
obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and
so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. !RC (1966 AC 557) where
,,
at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though F
_)
our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".
21 . It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not
to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which
often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further
than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law G
intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other hand,
j_,
"it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to
an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it
happens but seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C.
H
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 14 S.C.R.
L
A 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpreta-
).._.-.
tion, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a
casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis
existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case,
B
thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the
law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni
datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus,"
,..,..,..
observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no
case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make
\..
c laws."
22. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in
fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The gramr-
matical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to
•
unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance
I
D or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case
~
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be moditied, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no fur_,...
ther" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of
this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution.
E "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain
and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe
them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of
the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be
modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure.
F
But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from
-
the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely be-
/,;l
cause w.e see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v.
Dale 11, C.B. 378).
G
23. At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of a
maxim "Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur'' (The
,,.
\
laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently occur).
i ....
·.•
The above position was highlighted in Maulavi Hussein
H
Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004 (6) SCC 672).
NAGAR PALIKA NIGAM v. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI
431
SAMITI & ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
24. Since there was no challenge at any point of time by
A
the appellant to the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 9 on
the alleged ground of lack of legislative competence, obviously
the High Court could not have dealt with that issue. Till now also,
no such challenge has been made by the appellant. That being
so, we find no scope for interference with the order passed by
B
the High Court. In the circumstances indicated above, there is
no need to answer the reference made. If and when challenge
is made to the legislative competence to enact proviso to subsection (3) of Section 9, it goes without saying, the same shall
be considered in its proper perspective and in accordance with c
law.
25. The appeal is disposed of without any order as to
costs.
S.K.S.
Appeal disposed of.
0