# NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL v. mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1972] 3 S.C.R. 75
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-01-13
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. ·308 of 1971
- **Bench:** 1. M. SHl!LAT, H. R. Khanna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nagendra-nam-mondal-v-me-state-of-west-bengal-5612
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

75
West Beng4l Prevention of Violent A.ct/vlll.,
A.ct, 1910--Sectlon
3(2)(b)-A.cts prejudicial to the maintenonce of public. order-Tests for
determining.
Practice and procedure-Habeas Corpus-Grounds not urged In
th•
petition, if can be urged.
The petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of
Violent Activities Act, 1970. The grounds for detention staled that he,
along with others, on two occasions, entered the premises of eduealiotial
institutions, set fire to books, registers, furniture etc., placed bombs in the
building and threatened the staff with death and thereby committed "milchief" disturbin~ "public order" within the meaning of S. 3(2)(b) of the
Act. The petitioner's representation was received by the State Government
on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971 the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board. The State Govel'nment considered the representation and rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971
the Board reported that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the
P'~titioner's detention.
The petitioner sent his habeas corpus petition from jail in which he
denied the allegations made ag<linst him. At the hearing of the petition,
the counsel for the petitioner raised two additional grounds (i) that the
grounds furnished to thll detenu did not constitute breach of public order,
and therefore, the detention was illegal; and (li) that the delay in consld-M'ing the petitioner's representation was inordinate, iand ther.efore, was in
violation of Artic!!e 22(5) of Con,titution.
Dismissing the petition,
HELD : (i) According to th;: Report of the Advisory Board, there
was sufficient material justifying the order and in the absence of any
definite material, it is not possible to. accept the vague allegations by the
petitioner. [78 El
(ii) Ordinarily grounds which do not find any place in the petition
would not be permitted to be raised before this Court. But since this was
a habeas corpus petition and, furtherm~re, made by the petitioner from
jail such grounds could be allowed to be raised. [78 Fl
(iii) The true distinction between the area of Jaw and order and public
order is ode of degree of extent of the breach of the act in question upon
society.
Any 'contravention of law always affects order, but before it
could be said to affect 'public order' it must affect the community at large.
Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and clrcum·
stances might affect the problem of Jaw and order and in another, the
breach of public order. Thll anaolgy of crimes against individuals and
crimes against the public, though usdful to a limited extent, would not
always be apt. [79 li-80 Bl .
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
Lohia v. State [1966] I S.C.R, 709, Pushkar Mukhtrl., v. West Bengal
f,19691 2 S.C.R. 635: Arun Gho.h v. West Bengal [!9701 3 S.Gl.R. 288
and S. K. Sah• v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [19701 3 S.C.R. '360
r~erred to.
A
(iv) The distinction drawn by Clause (b) of S. 3(2) is between caus·
ing fire to building of an educational institution simp/iciler arid CQ!Illllitting
mischief of the same nature but such that it disturbs or is likely to
B
disturb the even tempo of the community in that particular locality. The
object of the acts complained of. as vandalism, to disturb .pie working
of the institution by burning its records and to create a scare so that
neitl:\er the teaching staff, nor the pupils would ,dare attend it for prosecution of studies. In these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely
constitute mischief under S. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such
mischief which disturbed or was likely to disturb public order and, therefore, fell within the definition in Sectio~ 3(2)(b). [81 G, HJ
C
(v) In the circumstances of the present case, it oannot be held that
the delay w .. so inordinate as to affect the validity of the detention. No
doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was 34 days, but most of
it was due to the fact

## Text

B
c
D
E
F
NAGENDRA NAm MONDAL
v.
mE STATE OF WEST BENGAL
January 13, 1972
[1. M. SHl!LAT AND H. R. KHANNA, JJ.]
75
West Beng4l Prevention of Violent A.ct/vlll.,
A.ct, 1910--Sectlon
3(2)(b)-A.cts prejudicial to the maintenonce of public. order-Tests for
determining.
Practice and procedure-Habeas Corpus-Grounds not urged In
th•
petition, if can be urged.
The petitioner was detained under the West Bengal Prevention of
Violent Activities Act, 1970. The grounds for detention staled that he,
along with others, on two occasions, entered the premises of eduealiotial
institutions, set fire to books, registers, furniture etc., placed bombs in the
building and threatened the staff with death and thereby committed "milchief" disturbin~ "public order" within the meaning of S. 3(2)(b) of the
Act. The petitioner's representation was received by the State Government
on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971 the petitioner's case was placed before the Advisory Board. The State Govel'nment considered the representation and rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971
the Board reported that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the
P'~titioner's detention.
The petitioner sent his habeas corpus petition from jail in which he
denied the allegations made ag<linst him. At the hearing of the petition,
the counsel for the petitioner raised two additional grounds (i) that the
grounds furnished to thll detenu did not constitute breach of public order,
and therefore, the detention was illegal; and (li) that the delay in consld-M'ing the petitioner's representation was inordinate, iand ther.efore, was in
violation of Artic!!e 22(5) of Con,titution.
Dismissing the petition,
HELD : (i) According to th;: Report of the Advisory Board, there
was sufficient material justifying the order and in the absence of any
definite material, it is not possible to. accept the vague allegations by the
petitioner. [78 El
(ii) Ordinarily grounds which do not find any place in the petition
would not be permitted to be raised before this Court. But since this was
a habeas corpus petition and, furtherm~re, made by the petitioner from
jail such grounds could be allowed to be raised. [78 Fl
(iii) The true distinction between the area of Jaw and order and public
order is ode of degree of extent of the breach of the act in question upon
society.
Any 'contravention of law always affects order, but before it
could be said to affect 'public order' it must affect the community at large.
Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and clrcum·
stances might affect the problem of Jaw and order and in another, the
breach of public order. Thll anaolgy of crimes against individuals and
crimes against the public, though usdful to a limited extent, would not
always be apt. [79 li-80 Bl .
76
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972) 3 S.C.R.
Lohia v. State [1966] I S.C.R, 709, Pushkar Mukhtrl., v. West Bengal
f,19691 2 S.C.R. 635: Arun Gho.h v. West Bengal [!9701 3 S.Gl.R. 288
and S. K. Sah• v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [19701 3 S.C.R. '360
r~erred to.
A
(iv) The distinction drawn by Clause (b) of S. 3(2) is between caus·
ing fire to building of an educational institution simp/iciler arid CQ!Illllitting
mischief of the same nature but such that it disturbs or is likely to
B
disturb the even tempo of the community in that particular locality. The
object of the acts complained of. as vandalism, to disturb .pie working
of the institution by burning its records and to create a scare so that
neitl:\er the teaching staff, nor the pupils would ,dare attend it for prosecution of studies. In these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely
constitute mischief under S. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such
mischief which disturbed or was likely to disturb public order and, therefore, fell within the definition in Sectio~ 3(2)(b). [81 G, HJ
C
(v) In the circumstances of the present case, it oannot be held that
the delay w .. so inordinate as to affect the validity of the detention. No
doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was 34 days, but most of
it was due to the fact that the representation and the record remained
w;th the Board. In a given case, Government may not be able to reach
a proper conclusion within a sho'rt time especially, where another authority
has passed ·the questioned order. {83 Pl !ayanarayan Sukul v.
West
D.
Ben!!al fl9701 3 S.C.R. and Khalrul Haque v. West Bengal, writ petition
aecided on September 10, 1969, referred to.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. ·308 of 1971.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus.
E
S. K. Dhingra for the petitioner.
P. K. Chatterjee, G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shelat, J.
On May 7, 1971, the District Magistrate, Jalpai· F
guri, in exetcise of power conferred upon him by s. 3 ( 3) of the
West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (Pre-
'sident's Act 19 of 1970) passed an order under sub-sec. 1 of that
section directing the detenti0n of the petitioner.
The order
recited that the District Magistrate was satisfied that it ha<! be·
come necessary to detain the petitioner ''with a view to prevent· G
ing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order".
On that very day,
the District Magistrate
reported to the State Government the fact of his having passed
the said order.
In pursuance of that order, the petitioner was
arrested on May 9, 1971 and was detained in jail.
The petitioner was furnished, as required by the Act, with the grounds ff
for his detention at the time when his arrest was effected.
On
May 17. 1971, the State Government approved the said order.
On the same day the State Government reported the fa9t of the
I
N. N. MONDAL V. WEST BENGAL (She/at,/.)
77
A
passing of the said order and its approval to the Central Government.
The petitioner made his representation which he was
entitled to make by v~e of s. S(i). That was received by the
State Government on May 27, 1971. On June 7, 1971, that is
within 30 days from the date of detention, the petitioner's case
was placed before the Advisory Board constitnted under s. 9 of
B
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the Act.
The State Government considered that representation,
but rejected it by its order dated July 1, 1971. On July 9, 1971,
the Board reported that there was, in its opinion, sufficient cause
for the petitioner's detention.
Thereupon, the State Government,
by its order dated July 29, 1971, confirmed the detention order
under s. 12.
The grounds for detention served on the petitioner stated that
the. order was passed in view of his acting "in a manner prejudi·
cial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars given below".
These particulars were :
"1. On 1-12-70 after midnight you
along
with
other entered into the Headmaster's room of Moynaguri
Higher Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri,
after breaking open the doors and set fire to books,
registers, a typewriter, furnitnre etc. causing heavy loss
to the school.
After completing the operation you
placed a bomb in the school premises endangering the
life of the teaching staff and the stndents.
2. On 5-4-1971 at about 10.30 hours you along
with others forcibly entered into
Moynaguri
Higher
Secondary School, Police Station Moynaguri and set fire
to the office room and the Headmaster's room of the
school with the help of kerosene oil causing damage to
books, almirahs and other articles.
While committing
the arson in the above school you also threatened the
teaching staff and the -duftry of the school with death if
they would dare to give you any resistasnce or divulge
your name to any authority holding you responsible for
the arson:·
G
The grounds also informed the petitioner that he could make
a representation to the State Government, that his case would be
put up before the· Board and that the Board would grant him a
personal hearing, if he so desired.
The case of the detenu, as stated in the petition, was that he
was at first arrested on suspicion Oil April 23, 1971 in connectioo
H
with G. R. Case No. 812 of 1971, but was released on bail as
there was no evidence against him.
There was another case
also being G.R. 2639 of 1970 in connectioo with the incident
78
SUPllBME COUll T llllPOll TS
(1972] 3 S.C.R.
referred to in ground No. 1 sot out above.
The detenu, however,
A
was not arrested in that connection.
The two G.R. Cases were
started long before he was arrested on May 9, 1971 under the
detention order dated May 7, 197 L He denied that he was
connected or associated with the incidents mentioned Jn the said
grounds, anJ said that the allegations made against him therein
were false, baseless, motivated and vague, and that there was
B
absolutely no material upon the basis of which the order of detention could be made.
He also alleged that some rival parties,
who were in league with the police had falsely involved him in
the incidents referred to in the grounds and got the District
Magistrate to issue the said detention order.
These allegations
were denied in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State
Government, the assertion therein being that there was reliable C
material before the District Magistrate relating to the illegal and
anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of
public
order, and that it was after careful examination of that material
that the impugned order was passed.
The allegations made by the petitioner were, in our view,
D
vague and indefinite and not backed by any material or particulars, and therefore cannot be accepted.
Besides, the detenu's
case was placed before the Advisory Board together with his representation and other relevant materials, and according to the
report of the Board, there was sufficient ma,terial justifying the
order. In the absence of any definite material before us, it is not
E
possible to accept the extremely vague allegations made by the
petitioner.
But Mr. Dinghra, who appeared amicus curiae for the petitioner, raised two additional grounds.
Neither of
them was,
however, raised in the petition but since this was a habeas
corpus petition, and fuvthermore, made by the petitioner from
F
jail, he was allowed to take them though ordinarily he would
not have been permitted to do so as they did not find any place
in the petition.
The two additional grounds were ( 1) that the grounds furnished to the detenu did not constitute breach of public order,
and therefore, the detention did not fall under sub-ss.
( 1) and
G
(3) of s. 3; and (2) that although the representation made by
the detenu was received by the Gov~rnment on May 27, . 1971,
it was not considered and disposed of till July 1, 1971, that the
delay in doing so was inordinate and was in violation of Art.
22(5) of the Constitution, rendering the impugned order invalid.
H
In regard to the .first contention, counsel urged that assuming
that the allegations made in the grounds for detention were true,
setting fire to an educational institution and destroying thereby its
N, N. MONDAL v. WEST BENGAL (She/at, J.)
79
A
records might constitute an offence under the Penal Code, but
did not constitute disturbance or breach of public order, which
alone could warrant a detention order under the Act.
In support
of this proposition, counsel referred to some of the decisions of
this Court.
The detention order, no doubt, mentioned that it was issued
B with a view to prevent the detenu acting prejudicially to the
maintenance of public order.
The contention raised by counsel,
however, involves the question whether the acts alleged against
the detenu constituted breach of public order or were such as
would be prejudicial to its maintenance. As to what is meant
by the expression, 'public order', Hidayatullah, J., (as he then
C was) in Lohia v. State('), said that any contravention of law
always affected order, but before it could be said to affect 'public
order', it must affect the community or the public at large.
He
considered three concepts, viz., "law and order'', "public order"
and "the security of the state" generally used in preventive detention measures and suggested that to appreciate the scope and
extent of each of them, one should imagine three concentric cirD cles, the largest of them representing "law and order", the next
representing "public order" and the smallest representing "the
security of the state". An act might affect "law and order'', but
not "public order", just as an aot might affect public order but
not "the security of the state".
Therefore, if the detention order
E
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G
H
were to use the expression "maintenance of Jaw and order", that
would be widening the scope of the detaining authority, if the
statute concerned confined that power in relation to acts prejudicial to "the maintenance of public order".
A similar distinction
was also drawn in Pushkar Mukherjee v. West Benga/( 2 ), where
Ramaswami, J., observed that ,the expression "public order" in
s. 3 ( 1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 did not take in
every kind of infraction of law.
An assault by one on another in
a house or even in a public street might create disorder but not
public disorder, for the latter was one which affected the community or the public at large.
Therefore, a line of demarcation
must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder
which affect the community or injure the public interest and the
relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance
which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest.
A mere disturbance of law and order
leading to disorder was, thus, not necessarily sufficient for action '
under tho Preve.ntive Detention Act but a disturbance which
would affect public order fell within the. scope of the Act.
But in Arun Ghosh v. West Bengal('), it was pointed out
that the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and
(I) [1966) I S.C.R. 709.
(2) (19691
2 S.C.R.
635.
(3) [1970]
3 S.C.R.
288.
so
SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS
(1972] 3 S.C.R.
"public order" was one of degree and extent of the reach of the
A
act in question upon society.
Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions; in one case it might affect the problem of the
breach of law and order, and in another the breach of public
order.
The analogy resorted to by Ramaswami, J., of crimes
agai~t !ndividuals and crimes against the· public, though useful
8
to a !Im1ted extent, would not always be apt.
An assault by one
individual upon another would affeot Jaw and order only and
cause its breach.
A similar assault by a member of one community upon a leading individual of another community, though
similar in quality, would differ in potentiality in the sense that it
might cause reverberations which might affect the even tempo of
the life of the community.
As the Court pointed out, "the act C
by itself is not determinant of its own gravity.
In its quality it
may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different". At
the same time, the power of detention having been permitted to
the State under the Constitution as an exceptional power,
its
exercise had to be scrutinized with extreme care and could not
be used as a convenient substitute for the normal processes of the
D
criminal law of the country.
(cf. S. K. Saha v. Commissioner
of Police, Calcutta(').]
These are all cases under the Preventive Detention Act, IV
of 1950, which by s. 3 of it confers power of detention on specified grounds which include acts prejudicial to the maintenance E
of public order.
The present Act likewise confers such power
with a view to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public
order under its s. 3 (1).
Though the Act does not define the
expression "public order", it does define the expression "acting
in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order".
That expression under the definition
inter alia means "committing mischief within the meaning of
s. 425 of the Indian Penal Code, by fire or any explosive substance on any property of Government or any local authority or
any corporation owned or contr\)lled by Government or any University or other educational institution, or on any public building
where the commission of such mischief disturbs or is likely to
disturb public order .... " The definition itself thus draws a distinction between mischief by fire or explosive substance upon
property of one of the specified categories and such mischief upon
any such properties which disturbs or is likely to disturb public
order.
The former, however reprehensible, would be taken care
F
G
of by the Penal Code, and it is only in respect of the latter that
the drastic power of detention without trial conferred by the first
H
sub-section can be validly exercised.
But to the extent that the
(I) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 360.
I';. I'!. MOl'!DAL v. WEST BEl'!GAL (She/at, J.)
81
A
expression "public order" is not defined
here
also,
decisions
under Aot IV of 1950 delineating the sphere of "public order"
from those of "maintenance of law and order" and "the security
of the State'.' would still be of utility.
The acts alleged against the petitioner in the grounds for
detention are acts which fall under s. 3(2)(b), in that, they consB titute mischief by fire and by explosive substance on property of
an educational institution.
But the question is
whether these
acts disturbed or were likely to disturb public order; in the words
Of Hidayatullah, C.1., in Arun <Jhosh v. West Bengal('), disturb
the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality.
The distinction drawn by cl. (b) of s. 3 (2) then is between
c causing fire, for instance, to a building of an educational institution simpliciter, and committing mischief of the same nature but
such that it disturbs or is likely to disturb the even tempo of the
community in that particular locality.
The grounds set out two acts alleged against the petitioner.
The first, of December 1, 1970, was that the petitioner and some
D others trespassed after midnight into the Headmaster's room in
the Moynaguri Higher Secondary School and set fire
to
books.
registers, furniture etc., and then placed a bomb in the school
building thereby endangering the life of the teaching staff and the
students attending the school.
The second, of April 5, 1970, was
that the petitioner along with some others again trespassed into
the same school and set fire to parts of it and then threatened the
E
members of its stall' with death if they offered resistance or disclosed his name to any authority.
The target of arson, (assuming the allegations to
be
true
which we have to assume) was an educational institution and
particularly the registers and other papers maintained by it. The
object obviously was vandalism, to disrupt its working by burning
1
its records and to create a scare so that neither the teaching staff
nor the pupils would dare attend it for prosecution of studies.
The parents dare not henceforth send their wards for · fear that
the school might be set on fire while they are in it.
The bomb
was manifestly placed in the premises for creating that scare. It
could not have been intended for any other purpose after the
G records and furniture had been set on fire.
In these circumstances, the alleged acts did not merely constitute mischief under
s. 425 of the Penal Code, but constituted such mischief
which
disturbed or was likely to disturb public order.
The acts in
question, no doubt, would be acts similar to those committed by a
perlOD. who resorts to arson, but in the circumstances were acts
different in potentiality, and therefore, fell within the definition
H
in s. 3(2)(b). The first argument urged on behalf of the peti·
tionei' must, consequently, fail.
(I) [1970)3 S.C.R. 288.
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
The second argument related to the time taken by the State
A
Government in deciding the reprerentation sent by the petitioner
from jail.
As aforesaid, it was received by Government on May
27, 1971, but was considered and rejected on July 1, 1971, that
is to say. after a lapse of 34 days.
Like s. 7(i) of the Preventive
Detention Act, IV of 1950, the present Act also provides by s.
8(1) that the detaining authority .shall provide to the detenu not
B
later than five days from the date of detention the grounds on which
tile detention order has been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order· to the
State Government.
In Ja,vanarayan Sukul v. West Bengal(')
where also a point as to undue delay in the light of Art. 22(5) of
the Constitution and s. 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, lV
of 1950 was raised, Ray, J., speaking for the Court, laid down
C
four principles . These were :
1. that the appropriate authority is bound to give an
opportunity to the detenu lei make a represen~tion and
to consider the representation as early as possible;
2. that such a consideration of the representation is
entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board
including consideration by it of the detenu's represen·
tation;
3. that there should not be any delay in the matter
of consideration, though no hard and fast rule can be
laid down as regards the ttlne which can be taken in
considering such a representation;
4 •. that the appropirate government has to exercise
its opinion and judgment on the representation independent of that of the Advisory Board.
D
E
r
(cf. Khair11l Haque v. West Bengal('), which was applied in this
case and where the distinctive features of the functions of the Government and the Board and their objects were discussed.)
No
doubt, Ray, J., at p. 232 of the report, said that the Government
had to come to its decision on the representation before it seiit the
~
detenu's case to the Bo!lfd. But, in that observation, he was not
emphasising so much the point of time when the Government has
to send the detenu's case including his representation to.the Board,
but of the necessity of the Government considering and deciding
the representation independently of and before the Boani'a decision, a point made in Khairul Haque's case(1). The delay in
J.ayClrtllrayan' s case ( 1) was ol the month and twenty days, and was
H
(I) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 225.
(2) Writ Petkion No. 246 of 1969, deed. on September 10, 19611.
N, N. MONDAL v. WEST BENGAL (She/at,/.)
83
A in the circumstances of that case held to be inordinate vitiating
the detention .
The time gap between the receipt by Government of the ~
tioner's representation aiid .the date of its decision was o~ 34 ~ys.
B The question is whether that gap can be treated as inordinate
delay going to the root of the validity of the detention or its continuation thereafter. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the
Government, no doubt, did not contain any explanation. But that
was because it answered only the allegations in the petition filed
by the petitioner from jail, which had in it only general allegations.
c such as the vagueness of the grounds of detention, mala {ides etc,.
and did not raise specifically any point on this aspect at all. The
point as to delay was for the first time taken in the course of argu·
ments when the peition first came up for hearing before anothet
Bench of this Court. At that time, counsel· for the State produced
the records of the case and notings from the records were actually
read out before the Court in the hearing of the petitioner's counsel.
D That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those
ICcords showed that on June 7. 1971 Government had sent tho
files in connection with the petitioner's case and his representation
to the Advisory Board. As soon as the representation was returned
to it, Government considered it and rejected it but that was before
the Board made its report and sent it to Government. But counsel
E urged that this face may ex1>lain the lapse of time from the dato
that the records were sent and the date when they were returned,
but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971 during
which Government could have arrived at its decision. That argu·
ment has not m.uch force, because in a given case Government
may not be able to reach a proper conclusion within a short time,
F
especially, in a case where another authority, in this c'ase the
District Magistrate, has passed the questioned order.
It might
have to make inquiries as to the situation in the locality, the nature
of and the circumstances ia which detention was found necessarV.
the previous history of the person detained etc. Therefore, it is
difficult.to agree with counsel that Government should have reached·
it.s ~onclusion during .the said j,eriod. No doubt, the delay in deG c1dmg the representation was of 34 days, but part of it was due to
. the fact that the representation and the record remained with the
Board. In .these circumstances, it is difficult to say that there is a
iust and proper analoinr between this case and that of Khairur
Haque('), or Jayanarayan(1 ) or'lhat upon such analogy we should
reach, the same conclusion which was reached in those cases. As
H held m Jayanarayan's caH(1) there can be no liard and fast rut~
with regard to the time which Government can or should take,.
(I) W.P. No. 246 or 1969 deed. on Sept. 10, 1969.
(2) 1197013 s.c.R. 22s.
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1972] 3 S.C.R.
.and that each case must be decided on i\is own facts. In the cirA
cumstances of the present case we are unable to hold that the delay
was so inordinate as to affect the validity of the petitioner's detention.
The petition fails and is dismissed.
S.N.
Petition dismissed .
•