# NAND KISHORE PRASAD v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1978] 3 S.C.R. 708
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-04-19
- **Bench:** R. S. Sarkaria, P. S. Kailasam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nand-kishore-prasad-v-state-of-bihar-and-ors-7419
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 226-Interference by lligh f7ourts, only
when an impugned order suffers fronl any error of law or of no Cf'idence.
The appellant a Bench Clerk and one Trilok Prasad Sinha, Fines Clerk
\Ve.re tried for various offences under sections 120B, 409, 466, 474 and 477 A
l.P.C. for embezzlement of a sum of Rs. 1068/M being fines recovered by the
Police and remitted to the Court through 1\ioney Orders. The Trial Magistrate
discharged them.
A departmental enquiry was, thereafter, instituted against
him and on the inquiry report submitted by the Sub Diviisonal Officer, Sasaram,
the District Magistrate who was the authority competent to appoint and remove
the appellant, held : "The conduct of Nand Kishore Prasad is higWy suspicious
but for insufficient evidence proceedings against him has to be dropped." Thereafter, the Commissioner of Patna Division called upon the appellant to show
cause why be should not be dismissed from service and after .perusing the reply
submitted by the appellant reversed the order of the District 1\.fagistrate and
directed removal of the appellant from service.
An appeal inade to the Board
of Revenue failed.
The Writ Petitions filed in the Patna High Court, against
the said orders were dismissed holding that since there was some evidence albeit
not sufficient for conviction in a crimi1,1al Court, it could not be quashed in
proceedings under the Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court
HELD : 1. Two princi,ples as crystallised by judicial decision~: are to be
borne in mind, while dealing with a case of the present type.
The first is that
disciplinary proceedings
before a
domestic
tribunal are of a
quasi-judicial
character. Therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is /
that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of son:e evidence,
i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the
guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspi:cion cannot
be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries.
The second
principle, which L<> a corollary from the first, is that if the disciplinary inquiry
has been conducted fairly without bias or predilection, in accordance with the
relevant disciplinary rules and the Constitutional provisions, the order passed
by such author_ity cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226
of the Constitution, merely on the ground that it was based on evidence which
would be insufficient for conviction of the delinquent on the same charge at a
criminal trial. [713 D-G]
Union of India v. H. C. Goel, A.LR. 1964 SC. 364 referred to.
2. (a) In the instant case :-It was not a case of no evidence, but of
evidence which was not adequate enough to carry conviction at a criminal trial.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the impugned orders did
not suffer from any error of law which may v.1arrant an interference in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. [715 G]
(b) A conjoint reading and analysis of the impugned orders of the Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue would show that they purport to
rest on these primary facts :
a. Fine amounting to Rs. 1.068/ -
\:Vas realised by the Police and sent
to the Court of the Magistrate, Sasaram, by money orders, where it
was received on September 4, 1950.
b. When this fine was imposed, and the aforesaid money orders were
received, the appellant (Nand Kishore Prasad) was the- Bench Clerk
<
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Iii. K. PRASAD v. BIHAR STATE (Sarkaria, /".)
709'
of the Magistrate. The fine records were with him and it was he who
used to issue distress warrants for realisation of outstanding fine.
But after 4-9-1950 he did, not ta.ke further action for recovery or
the fine in question, or for ensuring that the convicts suffered imprisonmt;;nt in default of payment of fine inflicted on them by the
Court.
c. A "receipt" (money order coupon) has been produced· "indicatin

## Text

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708
NAND KISHORE PRASAD
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.
April 19, 1978
[R. S. SARKARIA AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 226-Interference by lligh f7ourts, only
when an impugned order suffers fronl any error of law or of no Cf'idence.
The appellant a Bench Clerk and one Trilok Prasad Sinha, Fines Clerk
\Ve.re tried for various offences under sections 120B, 409, 466, 474 and 477 A
l.P.C. for embezzlement of a sum of Rs. 1068/M being fines recovered by the
Police and remitted to the Court through 1\ioney Orders. The Trial Magistrate
discharged them.
A departmental enquiry was, thereafter, instituted against
him and on the inquiry report submitted by the Sub Diviisonal Officer, Sasaram,
the District Magistrate who was the authority competent to appoint and remove
the appellant, held : "The conduct of Nand Kishore Prasad is higWy suspicious
but for insufficient evidence proceedings against him has to be dropped." Thereafter, the Commissioner of Patna Division called upon the appellant to show
cause why be should not be dismissed from service and after .perusing the reply
submitted by the appellant reversed the order of the District 1\.fagistrate and
directed removal of the appellant from service.
An appeal inade to the Board
of Revenue failed.
The Writ Petitions filed in the Patna High Court, against
the said orders were dismissed holding that since there was some evidence albeit
not sufficient for conviction in a crimi1,1al Court, it could not be quashed in
proceedings under the Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court
HELD : 1. Two princi,ples as crystallised by judicial decision~: are to be
borne in mind, while dealing with a case of the present type.
The first is that
disciplinary proceedings
before a
domestic
tribunal are of a
quasi-judicial
character. Therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is /
that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of son:e evidence,
i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the
guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspi:cion cannot
be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries.
The second
principle, which L<> a corollary from the first, is that if the disciplinary inquiry
has been conducted fairly without bias or predilection, in accordance with the
relevant disciplinary rules and the Constitutional provisions, the order passed
by such author_ity cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226
of the Constitution, merely on the ground that it was based on evidence which
would be insufficient for conviction of the delinquent on the same charge at a
criminal trial. [713 D-G]
Union of India v. H. C. Goel, A.LR. 1964 SC. 364 referred to.
2. (a) In the instant case :-It was not a case of no evidence, but of
evidence which was not adequate enough to carry conviction at a criminal trial.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the impugned orders did
not suffer from any error of law which may v.1arrant an interference in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. [715 G]
(b) A conjoint reading and analysis of the impugned orders of the Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue would show that they purport to
rest on these primary facts :
a. Fine amounting to Rs. 1.068/ -
\:Vas realised by the Police and sent
to the Court of the Magistrate, Sasaram, by money orders, where it
was received on September 4, 1950.
b. When this fine was imposed, and the aforesaid money orders were
received, the appellant (Nand Kishore Prasad) was the- Bench Clerk
<
•
•
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•
Iii. K. PRASAD v. BIHAR STATE (Sarkaria, /".)
709'
of the Magistrate. The fine records were with him and it was he who
used to issue distress warrants for realisation of outstanding fine.
But after 4-9-1950 he did, not ta.ke further action for recovery or
the fine in question, or for ensuring that the convicts suffered imprisonmt;;nt in default of payment of fine inflicted on them by the
Court.
c. A "receipt" (money order coupon) has been produced· "indicating
that the Petitioner (Nand Kishore Prasad) had received this amount".
d. "It is clear from the circumstances of the case that the money realised
was not deposited .... I see no reason to interfere with the order of
discharge" (passed by the Commissioner holding that the amount
of Rs. 1,068/- had been embezzled between Nand Kishore Prasad,_
Bench Clerk, and Triloki :Prasad Sinha, Fines Clerk). [714 A-DJ
(c) While it is true that the impugned orders are unjustifiably brief it is
not correct that they are totally bereft of reference to or discussion of evidence.
There is in the impugned orders a specific reference to the money order coupon
which the Member of the Board of Revenue has termed as 'receipt'. Indeed
the main-stay of the impugned orders is the circumstantial evidence furnished
by the conduct of the appellant in not taking further action for the realisation
of the fine. [714H, 715A]
A
(d) It is true that the impugned orders do not fully measure up to the
devoutly desired standard viz. desirability of writing a self-contained speaking
order in disciplinary proceedings.
Nevertheless, they do contain a bald and
D1
general allusion to the primary facts and a cryptic inference therefrom.
As
there was no specific reference to or discussion of the evidence, the High Court
examined the record of the disciplinary tribunal not with a view to make out
or reconstruct a new case, but only to see whether there was some evidence
of the primary fact relied upon bv the domestic tribun2.J. in support of its
conclusion. There is no impropriety in the course adopted by the High Court.
[715 A-Cl
Crvn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2313
(N)
of 1968.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28th day of July 1966 of
the Patna High Court in Misc. Judi. Case No. 1273 of 1974.
E.
A. B. N. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and K. K. Sinha for the Appellant.
F'
R. C. Prasad for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate under Article 133
(1 )(a) and (b) of the Constitution from a Judgment dated July 28,
1.966 of the P~tna High Court, dis~ss!ng the ~ppella~t's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, for 1mpugnmg an Order
of his removal from Government service.
The facts are as follows :-
G ..
Tile appellant, Nand Kishore Prasad, was Qppointed as a mmisterial servant by the District Magistrate, Shahabad, in his office at
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Arrah on June 16, 1930. He was confirmed in service in the year
1933.
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710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) 3 S.C.R.
In 1950, the appellant was transferred to Sasaram as a Bench
Clerk in the Court of Shri R. Singh, Judicial Magistrate. His normal
duty was to aid and assist the Court by putting up cases for hearing
and disposal.
In April J 952, he was transferred from Sasaram to Buxer as an
Election Clerk. On September 16, 1954, the Sub·Divisional Officer,
Sasaram, summoned the appellant and asked him to explain the outstanding fine of Case No. 886-Cl\04 T.R. of
1950
(The State v.
Sarju Chauhe)' & Ors.), decided by Shri R. Singh, Magistrate, Sasiram, on April 26, 1950.
Three Money Order coupons, two for Rs· 5001- each and one for
Rs. 681-, were sent by the Police Sub-Inspector 0! Kargahar to the
Magistrate, Shri R. Singh.
These amounts represented the fine recovered from the persons who were convicted in the aforesaid case.
The appellant was confronted with those Money Order con1pons which
purported to bear the initials of the appellant, and ms asked to trace
if the money bad been credited to the Government. The appellant
inspected the records and found an entry in the Fine Register of the
Court relating to the year 1951 which was to the effect, tha• an appeal
arising out of the case, in question, had been allow,d and the fine
remitted.
The appellant brought that entry to the notice of the then
Magistrate, Sbri M. P. Singh, and submitted a written report to the
Sub-Divisional Officer, stating that the initials on the Money Order
coupons were not his and he had never received the amounts. The
appellant furtl;er mentioned that he had discovered the aforesaid entry
in the Fine Register.
At the relevant time, one Triloki Prasad Sinha wa!> the Fines
Clerk in the Court at Sasaram and the entry, in question, in the Fine
Register was in his hand-writing. Triloki Prasad Sir,ha admitted that
this entry of remission was in his hand-writing, but alle:ged that he
had made it on the basis of an extract of the order of the Appellate
Court, transmitted to him by the appellant.
The appellant denied
that he had sent any such extract or information to the Fines Clerk
and alleged that, according to the practice of the office, appellate
judgments were transmitted to the Fines Clerk, in original, by all the
Courts, regular1y.
On January 26, 1955, the appellant was suspended from service.
On February 1, 1955, the Magistrate - in-charge of Fines, Sasaram,
lodged a First Information Report in the local Police Station for
prosecution of Triloki Prasad Sinha and the appellant in respect of
offences under Sections 120-B, 409, 466, 468, 474 and 477(A) of
the Indian Penal Code.
After investigation, the Police submitte-d a
charge-sheet in the Court of the Snb-Divisional Magistrate, Sasaram,
against both Triloki Prasad Sinha and the appellant.
The Trial Magistrate, after making an inquiry under Chapter
XVII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, discharged both the
accused persons, holding-(i) that there was nothing direct against
Nand Kishore Prasad (appellant herein) to show trat he had sent a
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N. K. PRASAD v. BIHAR STATE (Sarkaria, l.)
711
false or wrong extract to the Fines Clerk, "except ~he statements of a
co-accused e;;culpating himself which is of little worth", and (ii) that
''this accused cannot be connected with the receipt of the money",
i.e. the Money Orders in question.
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On February 29, 1956, after his discharge by the Criminal Court,
the appellam submitted his joining report to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Buxcr, and prayed for permission to join Juty. No orders were
passed on that application of the appellant, for a couple of months.
His suspension was continued and on July 31, 1956, a Departmental
foquiry was instituted against him on these charges :--
"(!)
(2)
Dishonestly receiving Rs. 1,0681being
the fine
money collected and sent by three M.Os. by the S.I.
of Police, Kargahar, in
respect of
Criminal Case
No. GR 886/TR 104 on 4-9-50 to the Court of
Shri R. Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Sasaram, of whom
he was the Bench Clerk.
Issuing an incorrect extract of order of the Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 1950 to
Sliri Triloki Prasad, the then Fine Clerk, and conspiring with Shri Triloki Prasad and misappropriating Rs. 1,0681- sent by the S.I. of Police, Kargahar
on 4-9-50".
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The inquiry was held by the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Sasaram, who,
after concluding it, submitted his report to the District Magistrate,
Sasaram, who was the authority competent to appoint and remove iiie
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appellant from service.
The District Magistrate, ultimately, by his order, dated March 19,
1950, held: "The conduct of Shri Nand Kishore Prasad is highly suspicious but for insufficient evidence proceeding against him has to
be dropped". This order of the District Magistrate was communicated to the appellant as per Memo. No. 278, dated April 19, 1960 .
F
More than two months thereafter, a Jetter, dated June 29, 1960,
was sent by the P.A. to the Commissioner of Patna Division, calling
-._ . upon the appellant to show cause as to why he should not be
dismissed from service. To this "show-cause" letter, the appellant sub-
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mitted a detailed reply, representing inter alia, that since the Magi.Strate had found him not guilty, in the absence of fresh or further evidence showing that he had received the Money Orders, it would be
violative of the elementary principles of natural justice, to punish him
in the departmental proceedings by using a portion only of the judgment of the Court of law. He extracted copiously from the judgment
of the Magistrate to show that the charges against him were baseless.
He reiterated that he had not received the amount of the Money
Orders, and the initials on the Money Order coupons were not his.
The Commissioner reversed the order of the District Magistrate
and directed removal of the appellant from
service. Since a good
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
deal of argument before us centres around the legality of the Commissioner's order, dated October 8, 1960, it will be worthwhile to quote
its material portion in extenso :
"Although from the evidence recorded against this Clerk
it appears that there was no direct independent proof of
embenlement by him, yet, in my opinion, there is strong
suspicion against this clerk which has also been indicated
sufficiently clearly by the then trying Court, Shri A. K.
Sinha, Magistrate, 1st Class, Sasaram, while passing an order
of discharge against him under Section 207 A of Cr. P.C.
in the Criminal case against him.
The Court observed as
follows:-
"One may suspect him about it, if at all, a Benca
Clerk as he was, as the M.O. coupons purport to bear
the like of his initials, but that is not enough for justifying a criminal action against him.
The case is not
raised beyond a stage of suspicion, if at all, as against
this accused."
"It i,: evident that the amount of the fine was realised
and sent to the Magistrate and it was received by
Shri Nand Kishore Prasad. The fine records were with
Shri Nand Kishore Prasad and Shri
Triloki Pra-sad
Sinha. and between them the amount of Rs. 1,0681was embezzled.
Shri Nand Kishorc Prasad appears
to be throughly unreliable and the punishment in respect
of his conduct should be deterrent in nature.
"Accordingly ........ I hereby order that Sbri Naild
Kishore Prasad be discharged from service."
The appellant went in Revision to the Board of Revenue against
the Commissioner's Order.
The Board on August 31.. 1963, by a
short order, dismissed the Revision and affirmed the order passed by
the Commissioner.
This order of the Board of Revenue was communicated to him on February 14, 1964.
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On September 23, 1964, the appellant moved the High Courv---~
at Patna by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
•
challenging bis removal from service.
The learned Judges of the High Court while observing that the
Commissioner's Order was somewhat cryptic and
did not make a
specific and pointed reference to the evidence against the writ petitioner, noted that the Commissioner had drawn his conclusion about
the guilt of the petitioner "from the fact that the petitioner was in
actual charge of the fine record and it was his duty to take necessary
action for realization of the fine until due payment thereof".
The
High Court further observed that "the mere fact that the Commissioner has not discussed in detail the circumstantial evidence againSt
the petitioner, was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the im-
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N. K. PRASAD v. BIHAR SfATE (Sarkaria, J.)
713
-pugned order, beeause this aspeet has been more elaborately referred
to in the impugned order of the Board of Rewnuc. The High Court
<Concluded that sinee there was some evidence-albeit not sufficient for
conviction in a criminal court-in support of the impugned order, it
could not be quashed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the result, the writ petition was dismissed.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends
that
the impugned
orders are. based merely on suspicions and conjectures, and not on
any evidence whatever, and as such, are bad in law. It is ·,ubmitted
that the High Court had over-stepped its writ jurisdiction inasmuch as
it reappraised the evidence, and reconstructed the case as if it were
itself a domestic tribunal, reviewing in appeal the orders of the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue.
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As againot I.his, counsel for the Respondent submits that the High
Court had examined the evidence on the record of the domestic tri ·
bunal, not to make out ;i new case, but to satisfy itself that the impugned orders were based on circumstantial evidence which had been
cryptically alluded to by the Commissioner and more elaborately mentioned by the Member of the Board of Revenue
in the impugried
D
<Jrder.
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Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we
n~ay remind
ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallised by judicial decisions.
The first of these principles is that disciplin.ary proceedings before a
,domestic tribunal are of a
quasi-judicial
character;
therefore, !Tie
minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribuE
nal shculd arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e.
evidential material which with some degree cif difiniteness points to
the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him.
Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic
inquiries.
As pointed out by this Court in Union of lndia v.
H. C.
Guel('), "the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care
must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as
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much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under
the statutory rules."
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The second principle, which is a corollary from the first, is that
if the disciplinary inquiry has been conducted fairly without bias or
predilection, in accordance with the relevant disciplinary rules arid
the Constitutional provisions, the order passed by such authority cannot be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Con-
~titution, merely on the ground that it was based on evidence which
would be imu/jicient for conviction of the delinquent on the same
charge at a criminal trial.
G
The contentions in the instant case
resolve
into
the narrow
issue : Whether the impugned orders do not rest
on any evidence
H
whatever, but merely on suspicions, conjectures and surmises.
(l
.l.R. 1964 S.C. 364.
ll-315SCI/78
714
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 3 s.c.R.
A
A conjoint reading and analysis of the impugned orders of the
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Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue would show that
they purport to rest on these primary facts :-
(a) ThJt line amounting to Rs.
1,0681was
realised by the
Police and sent to the Court of the Magistrate, Sasaram, by money
orders, where it was received on S<;ptember 4, 19 50.
(b) When this fine was imposed, and the aforesaid money orders
were received, the appellant (Nand Kishore Praml) was the Bench
Clerk of the Magistrate.
The fine records were with Nand Kishore
Prasad and it was he who nsed to issue distress warrants for realisation of outstanding fine. But after 4-9-1950, fie did not take further
action for recovery of the fine in question, or for ensuring that the
convicts suftered
imprisonment in default of payment of fine inflicted on them by the Court.
(c) A "receipt" (money order coupon) has been produced "indicating that the petitioner (Nand Kishore Prasad) has 1received thi&
amount".
( d) "It is clear from the circumstances of the case that the money
realistd was not deposited.
I see no reason to interfere \\ith the
order of discharge" (passed by the Commissioner holding that the
amount of Rs. 1068/- had been embezzled between Narid Kishore
Prasad, Bench Clerk, and Triloki Prasad Sinha, Fines Clerk).
It will be noticed that the recovery of the tine and its remittance
to the Court as per money order (as set out in
(a)
above) wa&
never disputed by the appellant.
He only disputed that the initial~
on the money order coupons purporting to be his, were not executed
by him.
His implied defence was that somebody who !rad received
the amount of the money orders, had forged his (appellant's) initials
on the Money Order Coupon. On this point, at the criminal trial of
the appellant, a handwriting expert was examined, who stated that no
definite c.pinion could be given as to whether these
initials were
executed by Nand Kishore Prasad.
The Magistrnte, therefore, gave
the appellant benefit of doubt on this point. But the disciplinary
Tribunals (i.e. the Commissioner and the Member, Board of Reve-
~J
nue) have, presumably on examining the disputed
i'1i.tial5 on the . _,-
Money Order Coupon (called "receipt" in the impugned order of the ·
Board) coupled with the circumstance
(b), mentioned :1bove, unanimously reached the finding that the amount of the aforesaid Money
Order was received by Nand Kishore Prasad.
From the appellant's
conduct in not taking any action thereafter for realisation of the fine
in question, they concluded that he did not do so because the fine had
been realised and the amount had been embezzled by h'.m.
It was urged before us that since the impugned orders do not specifically refe.r to any evidence or discuss it, they should be taken to be
based on no ~vid.ence, wh~tev~r.. While it is true that the impugned
orders are unjustifiably bnef, 1t 1s not correct that they are totfilly
bereft of all reference to or discussion of evidence.
There is in the
•
N. K. PRASAD v. BIHAR STATE (Sarkaria, J.)
715
impugned orders a specific reference to the Money Order coupon which
A
the Member of the Board of Revenue ha's termed as a "recipt".
Indeed,
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the main-slay of the impugned orders is the circumstantial evidence
furnished by the conduct of the appellant, in not taking any further
action for the realisation of the fine.
The desirability of writing a self-contained speaking order in disciplinary proceeding cnlminating in an order of removal of the delinquent from service, cannot be over-emphasised. It is true that the
impngned orders do not fully measure npto this devontly desired standard.
Nevertheless, they do c.ontain a bald and general allusion to the
primary facts, and a cryptic inference therefrom.
There is no
specific reference to or discussion of the evidence.
The High
Court, therefore, examined the record of the disciplinary tribunal,
not with a view to make out or reconstruct a new case, but only
to see whether there was some evidence of the primary facts relied
upon by the domestic tribunal in support of its conclusion.
We do
not see any impropriety in the course adopted by the High Court.
On examination of the Tribunal's record, the High Court found
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that there was oral and documentary evidence before the disciplinary
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tribunal; that at all times material to the imposition, realisation and
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receipt of the fine amounts in question, all the fine records in the
Court of the Magistrate, Sasaram, used to remain with the
Bench
Clerk, i.e., the rrppellant. The Inquiry Officer had examined three
witnesses, namely : Triloki Prasad Sinha, RanK Bahaclur Singh and
)
Kalka Prasad.
The evidence of Triloki Prasad Sinha was certainly
of an accomplice character, but the evidence of Rang Bahadur Singh,
who was the Fines Clerk befote Triloki Prasa<l Sinha, and of the
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Mea<l Clerk Kalka Prasad, did not suffer from such a ilaw.
From
their evidence, it was clear that in actual practice all the fine records
~
were being maintained by the Bench Clerk, and it wa' he who used
to take all necessary steps, including the preparation and issue of
distress warrants for realisation of outstanding fine.
The Fines clerk
made entries in the Fines Register in accordance with the intimation
sent by the Bench Clerk.
This practice continued till March 1951,
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•
when Mr. Gorden, the then District Magistrale clirecteJ that all fine
~
records must be made over to the Fines Clerk by !\Jay 14, 1951. The
fine amounts in question, were evidently recovered in cxeculion of a
,
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distress-warrant, issued by the Magistrate.
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In view of what has been said above, it is dear that this was not
a case of no evidence, but of evidence which was not adequate enough
G
to carry co11v:ction at a criminal trial. The High Court was, therefore,
right in holdint! that the impugned orders did not suffer from any
error of law which may warrant an interference in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
In the 1esu1t, the appeal meets with failure and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
H
S.R.
A ppeol dismissed.