# Narayan Bhaskar Khare v. Tk Election Commission oj' India

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 1092
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-12-03
- **Case number:** Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 563 and 564 of 1957
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/narayan-bhaskar-khare-v-tk-election-commission-oj-india-1321
- **Pages:** 19

## Headnote

1957
Narayan Bhaskar
Khare
v.
Tk Election
Commission oj'
India
DasC.J.
1957
May6
1092
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
constituencies and different dates have to be fixed for
holding the actual elections in different constituencies
according to the various
exigencies
relating
to
the
particular lccalities in which
the constituencies
are
situate. No good
ground has been established for
holding that there has been anv discrimination such as
is prohibited by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In so far
as the alleged discrimination, if any, in breach of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution may be said
to be calculated to raise anv doubt in connection with
the election of the President it will, at best, be a noncompliance with the
prov1s10ns
of
the
Constitution
which may or may not, after the conclusion of the entire
election, be made a ground, under s. 18 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Election Act, 1952,
for
calling the election in question as to which we need
formulate no final opinion at this stage.
We express no opinion on the merits of any of the
controversies between the parties, but, for the foregoing
reasons,
we
hold
that
the
present
petitions
are
premature and cannot be entertained at this stage. We,
therefore, dismiss the petitions Nos. 63 and 64 of 1957.
Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 563 and 564 of 1957
will also stand dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
MR. 'C'
v.
THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS
(JAGANNADHADAS,
B.
P.
SINHA
and
GA JENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Professional misconduct-Advoratc borne on the rolls of a l--!igh
Court and Supre1ne Court-Debarred by l-!igh Court on Bar Cott:1cil's
ref;ort-Sumnions by Supreme
Cottrt-Procedure-Supremc Court
R;des, 0. IV, r. 30.
The appellant, an Advocate ,vhose nan1e was borne on the
rolls of the Madras I-Iigh Court and of the Supren1e Co11rt, \vas
found guilty of gross profes.sional misconduct by the 1vfadr:Js High
Court on the report of the Bar Council Tribunal and debarred from
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
practmng in that Court. The charge against him was that he did
not utilise a particular sum of
money
entrusted to him by his
client to clear a mortgage in order to secure a clear title for him
in completion
of a transaction of sale,
for
that purpose. nor
account for it.
The appellant
preferred
an appeal
by special
leave and this Court, being apprised of the order passed by the
Madras High Court, issued a Rule under r. 30, 0. IV of. the
Supreme Court Rules. It was found by this Court that the charge
against the appellant was fully supported by a large volume of:
evidence on record, both oral and documentary.
Held, that the appeal must be dismissed and the Rule made
absolute and the appellant's name removed from the roll of Advocates of this Court.
I
It is a great privilege to be an Advocate of this Court and
only such persons as can satisfy a very high standard of integrity
of character can be enrolled as such. An Advoi:ate who is found .
to have fallen from that standard and is debarred by the High
Court cannot be considered fit to practise in this Court.
Proceedings under r. 30, 0. IV of the Supreme Court Rules
should be treated as a natural sequel to proceedings in the High
Court under the Bar Councils Act and although an order made by
the High Court under that Act is not to be automatically followed
by this Court, it is not necessary that this Court should start a
fresh inquiry on evidence.
It would be enough for it to generally
examine the record prepared by the Bar Council Tribunal and
take into account the findings nf the High Court based on such
report.
Reasonable opportunity must, however,
be afforded to
the Advocate of being heard against the action proposed to be
taken against him and adducing such additional evidence as this
Court may think proper.
The Attorney General or any other
Advocate
representing
the Legal Profession
generally
or
the
complainant or the aggrieved party may also be heard before the
final decision is arrived at;
In the matter of an Ad

## Text

_Characters 0–39,801 of 42,076. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39801 for what follows._

1957
Narayan Bhaskar
Khare
v.
Tk Election
Commission oj'
India
DasC.J.
1957
May6
1092
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
constituencies and different dates have to be fixed for
holding the actual elections in different constituencies
according to the various
exigencies
relating
to
the
particular lccalities in which
the constituencies
are
situate. No good
ground has been established for
holding that there has been anv discrimination such as
is prohibited by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In so far
as the alleged discrimination, if any, in breach of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution may be said
to be calculated to raise anv doubt in connection with
the election of the President it will, at best, be a noncompliance with the
prov1s10ns
of
the
Constitution
which may or may not, after the conclusion of the entire
election, be made a ground, under s. 18 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Election Act, 1952,
for
calling the election in question as to which we need
formulate no final opinion at this stage.
We express no opinion on the merits of any of the
controversies between the parties, but, for the foregoing
reasons,
we
hold
that
the
present
petitions
are
premature and cannot be entertained at this stage. We,
therefore, dismiss the petitions Nos. 63 and 64 of 1957.
Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 563 and 564 of 1957
will also stand dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
MR. 'C'
v.
THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS
(JAGANNADHADAS,
B.
P.
SINHA
and
GA JENDRAGADKAR JJ.)
Professional misconduct-Advoratc borne on the rolls of a l--!igh
Court and Supre1ne Court-Debarred by l-!igh Court on Bar Cott:1cil's
ref;ort-Sumnions by Supreme
Cottrt-Procedure-Supremc Court
R;des, 0. IV, r. 30.
The appellant, an Advocate ,vhose nan1e was borne on the
rolls of the Madras I-Iigh Court and of the Supren1e Co11rt, \vas
found guilty of gross profes.sional misconduct by the 1vfadr:Js High
Court on the report of the Bar Council Tribunal and debarred from
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1093
practmng in that Court. The charge against him was that he did
not utilise a particular sum of
money
entrusted to him by his
client to clear a mortgage in order to secure a clear title for him
in completion
of a transaction of sale,
for
that purpose. nor
account for it.
The appellant
preferred
an appeal
by special
leave and this Court, being apprised of the order passed by the
Madras High Court, issued a Rule under r. 30, 0. IV of. the
Supreme Court Rules. It was found by this Court that the charge
against the appellant was fully supported by a large volume of:
evidence on record, both oral and documentary.
Held, that the appeal must be dismissed and the Rule made
absolute and the appellant's name removed from the roll of Advocates of this Court.
I
It is a great privilege to be an Advocate of this Court and
only such persons as can satisfy a very high standard of integrity
of character can be enrolled as such. An Advoi:ate who is found .
to have fallen from that standard and is debarred by the High
Court cannot be considered fit to practise in this Court.
Proceedings under r. 30, 0. IV of the Supreme Court Rules
should be treated as a natural sequel to proceedings in the High
Court under the Bar Councils Act and although an order made by
the High Court under that Act is not to be automatically followed
by this Court, it is not necessary that this Court should start a
fresh inquiry on evidence.
It would be enough for it to generally
examine the record prepared by the Bar Council Tribunal and
take into account the findings nf the High Court based on such
report.
Reasonable opportunity must, however,
be afforded to
the Advocate of being heard against the action proposed to be
taken against him and adducing such additional evidence as this
Court may think proper.
The Attorney General or any other
Advocate
representing
the Legal Profession
generally
or
the
complainant or the aggrieved party may also be heard before the
final decision is arrived at;
In the matter of an Advocate, Case No. XVI of 1942, decided
on March 23, 1943, In re: D. A. Slianmugasundaraswami, an Advocate, Misc. Case No. X of 1948, decided on January 24, 1949, In
the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, (1955)
1 S.C.R. 490 and In the matter of 'D', an Advocate of the Supreme
Court, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1006, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmcTmN: Civil Appeal No.
146 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 3, 1954, of the Madras High
Court in Referred Case No. 69 of 1954.
M. S. K. Aiyanger, for the appellant .
1957
Mr.'C'
v.
TJ.e AdvocateGeneral of Madrar
1957
Mr.•C•
v.
The AdvocaleCemral of MadraJ
Sinha:J.
1094
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
R. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for respondents
Nos. 1 and 2.
1957. May 6.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA J.-This appeal by special leave and the
summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1950, have been heard together and will
be disposed of by this Judgment.
The appellant was an advocate of the Madras High
Court of more than 25 ·years' standing, and was enrolled
as an advocate of the then F~deral Court in the year
1939. As will presently appear, he has had a chequered
career at the Bar. A Full Bench of the Madras High
Court, presided over by the Chief Justice of that Court,
by its judgment and order, dated December 3, 1954,
has directed that the appellant's name
be
removed
from the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court,
for
"grave
professional
misconduct".
This
Court,
having been apprised of the result of the proceedings
against the appellant in the High Court, issued notice
to him to show cause why he should not be suspended
from practice in view of the findings recorded by the
High Court.
It appears that the appellant was engaged by one
K. T. Appannah, ordinarily residing in Bangalore city,
who will hereinafter be referred to as the complainant,
to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city
of Madras, whom we shall call, in the course of this
judgment, as the vendor, after scrutinizing the title
deeds in respect of the property which was the subiectmatter of the transaction of sale. Before the appellant
was engaged by the complainant, the bargain had been
srruck and the sale price of the property had been
fixed at Rs. 15,000 out of which Rs. 1,300 had been
paid to the vendor by way of earnest money. A retired
Government servant named
Sundararajayya who was
a relation of the complainant, and used to live
near
about the appellant's residence, had also helped the
complainant in acquiring the property, and in
that
connection, used to give instructions to the appellant
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1095
on behalf of the complainant. On May 11, 1951, the
complainant sent, by way of a demand draft, the' sum
of Rs. 1,400, to the appellant, to meet the costs of
stamp for the sale deed, and registration, and a fee of
Rs. 150 to the appellant for his work in connection with
the transaction. In the course of the enquiry into the
title to the property, it was discovered that there was a
mortgage on the property, of Rs. 5,500, on the basis of a
registered mortgage-deed which had been filed in Court
in connection with a litigation in respect of that very
property, pending on the original side of the Madras
High
Court. By negotiation,
it
was
settled
that
Rs. 5,500, out of the sale price, shall be reserved for the
.discharge of the mortgage debt, and that the remaining
amount of the consideration, will be paid to the vendor
on completion of the sale -transaction and delivery of
vacant possession of the property. The appellant wrote
to the complainant that the latter should send him a
demand draft for Rs. 5,600, in his name, for payment
to the mortgagee, aforesaid, when the mortgage bond,
properly discharged, would be handed over to the
appellant, acting for the complainant. In due course, on
or about June 26, 1951, a demand draft in the name of
the appellant, for Rs. 5,600, was sent by the complainant for the express
purpose of discharging the
mortgage
debt,
aforesaid.
On August
21, 1951,
a
cheque for Rs. 1,200, on September 26, 1951, a cheque
for Rs. 500, and on October 19, 1951, a demand draft
for Rs. 5,500, all in the narri.e of the appellant, were
sent by the complainant, in order to put him in funds
for completing the. transaction of sale and for payment
of the consideration money to the vendor. On July 9,
1951, the
sale~deed was executed
by some of the
executants, and on September 6, 1951, it was executed
by the remaining executant, and registered.
Hence,
it would appear that between May 11, 1951, and Octoher 24, 1951, the complainant had paid to the appellant, the sum of Rs. 15,200, which was sufficient to pay
the outstanding amount of the consideration for sale
.
'
namely,
Rs. 13,700, including the mortgage amount,
afnresaid, of R.s. 5,500, besides the costs of stamp and
registration and the appellant's fees.
But it appears
1957
Mr.'C'
v.
The AdvocateGeneral of Madras
Sinha].
1957
Mr.•C'
v.
The AdvocateGencral of Madras
Sinha].
1096
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957)
that the vendor's portion of the consideration money,
was paid by the appellant on November 23, 1951, after
some avoidable delay due to him, and vacant delivery
of possession given
to the
appellant
as
stipulated
between the parties. It appears further that the complainant was in need of raising money on the security
of the newly-acquired property, and,
therefore,
was
anxious t'> receive all the documents of title including
the mortgage bond duly discharged. But the appellant,
for reasons of his own, went on postponing the payment of the mortgage money on some pretext or the
other. On being pressed for the mortgage-deed, duly
discharged, being handed over to the complainant, and
as a result of a protracted correspondence, the appellant sent, to the complainant, on
June 26, 1952, a
number
of
documents including "cancelled mortgage
documents."
It should be added here that the mortgage transaction of Rs. 5,500, ha• l been entered into
by the owner of the property in order to discharge
previous mortgages on the same property.
All these
documents had to be withdrawn from the High Court
where they had been in the custody of the Court as
already
indicated.
Unfortunately,
Sundararajayya
died on June 28, 1952. As a result of further correspondence, the complainant came to realise, to his cost,
that the mortgage debt of Rs. 5,500 had not been paid
to the mortgagee, as arranged between the appellant and
the complainant who had put him in funds with the
express purpose of obtaining a clear title to the property which he had agreed
to purchase. Thus, the
complainant was reduced to the necessity of filing a
regular petition of complaint in the High Court on
November 14, 1952. In that petition of complaint, the
complainant made copious quotations from the letters
addressed by the appellant to him and made reference
to the fact that the mortgagee had already instituted
a suit in court for recoverv of the mortgage mane.,', and
had impleaded the compbinant as party defenchnt to
the rnit. The gravamen of the charge against the
appelbnt was that he had not discharged the outstanding mortgage on the property purchased, for which he
had been supplied with ample funds by the complainant
"-
.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1097
and that he had not disclosed
how and . in what
manner, the complainant's
money,
meant
for
the
purpose, had been utilized by the appellant.
In answer to the notice issued to him on February 16,
1953, the appellant submitted a
long statement by
way of an explanation which runs into about 43 pages
in print, which is more in the nature of an argument
in justification of his conduct than
a
statement of
facts.
The High Court
referred
the
complaint,
for
inquiry and report, to the Bar Council. Three members of the Council constituted the Tribunal which held
a very elaborate inquiry. After recording both oral
and documentary evidence, the Bar Council made its
report on May 5, 1954, holding that :
'· ...... both the charges have been fully
established
and that the respondent
has
not only not used
the
moneys of the complainant for the purpose for which
the, money was sent, but that the respondent has not
accounted at all for the sum of rupees, 5,000; which was
ndmittedly cashed by him and brought into his
bank
account though not in his professional account."
In course of its report, the Tribunal found that the
appellant had received all
the amounts sent by the
complainant, as
set out above. It also pointed
out
that
an unfortunate
feature of the case was that
the
mortgage bound in question which was one of the
"cancelled
mortgage
documents'',
had
not
been
produced before it.
The non-production of the crucial
document was explained to the Tribunal by counsel for
the complainant. It was. stated
that the mortgagedccd in question, along with other document>, had been
left by the complainant with his counsel ancl
that
thewhole bundle of papers inclucling tho>e documents had
"disappeared from his office".
One
can
onlv
surmise
as
to who may
have
been
responsible
fo~ secreting
those documents, or for who>e benefit. thev h:id been
stolen away, as alleged by counsel for the complainant.
Another ugly aspect of the proceedings was that a
number of letters, admittedly written
by the appelbnt
to the complainant in connection with the tramaction
of sale. had been found bv the High Court to have been
4-81 !;. C. Ind1a'59.
1957
Mr.'C'
v.
Tht Advocat ..
General of Madras
Sinha].
1957
Mr.'C'
....
Tire A.duocate--
G,:vra/ of Madrdl
9inhaJ.
1098
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r 1957J
tampered with or bodily
substituted.
The
Tribunal
observed
with
particular
reference
to
exhibit C-12,
which was alleged to have been substiruted for the
original, that the learned counsel for the complainant
had not persisted in the charge that it had been substituted; and that he did not press the charge that
there had been certain alterations in some other letters
which formed part of the voluminous correspondence
that passed between the appellant and the complainant.
It may be observed here that no specific
"charge" had
been drawn up against the appellant in respect of those
letters.
Hence, when the Tribunal stated that the
'charge' had been withdrawn, it only meant to s2y that
the learned counsel for the complainant did not persist
in his allegations about those alterations or the wholesale substirution of exhibit C-12 about which we
will
have to say something more in the course of this
judgment.
The Tribunal examined, in some detail, the particular defence of the appellant with reference
to the
sp<":rific charges mac.le Jgainst
hin1
in
respect
of the
sum. of Rs. 5,600, admittedly sent by
the complainant
for the specific purpose of
discharging
the
mortgage
encumbrance on
the
purchased
property. It appears
to have been the appellant's case
that the demand
draft for Rs. 5,500, dated Octo'ier 24, 1951, had been
sent to him through Sundararajayya, and
that
the
appellant, after getting the amount of the draft credited
to his personal
account.
kept only
Rs. 500 for
pa::-
ment to the vendor and made over to Sundararajayya
the rem'aining 5,000 rupees in cash. It was not his
case
that the complainant had instructed him to pay
to Sundararajavya the 5,000 rupees, alleged by him to
have been r»id to Sundararajayya. It was not c-.·en
his case that he had taken anv receipt for the s.id sum
from Sundararaiayya, though he alleged that he had
given
a
receipt
to
Sundararajayya
for
the
much
smaller sum of Rs. 500 which he admitterl to have kept
in his hands on account of the complainant for pavment to the ven<iee. After reviewing the entire cvirlencc
and
particularly
the
correspondence
that
passed
between the appdlant and
the complainant,
the
\
"·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1099
Tribunal came to the
conclusion
that the
appellant
"dishonestly and fraudulently represented to the complainant that the mortgage had been cancelled and he
picked out 3 out of the 36 documents received by him
from the vendor, including the mortgage document
herein involved, and sent the same to the complainant
describing them as 'cancelled documents'.
The only
inference that one can draw is that the respondent
having utilized
<:he
monies intended for the discharge
of the mortgage for his own purpose put on the mortgage document the marks of cancellation and sent the
same to the complainant at the pressure of the complainant's demand for
the discharged mortgage document".
The Tribunal
also examined all the relevant
evidence bearing on the payment back of Rs. 5,000, to
Sundararajayy:i, out of the demand draft for Rs. 5,500,
admittedly sent by the complainant and credited to the
persona! account of the appellant. As already indicated,
Sundararajayya
ha•l
died
before the
commencement
of the inquiry, and, therefore, his
evidence could not
be a'·aibble to the Tribunal. But in spite of the complete absence of the mortgage bound in question from
the record, and of the, possible· explanation of
Sundararaiayya, the Tribunal had no difficulty in coming to the
cm1clusion
that the appellant "is clearly guilty not
only of professional misconduct but also a clear breach
of trust."
Ti!:s report of the Tribunal was closely examined bv
a Full Bench of the Madras High Court: The learne~l
Chief Justice who presided over the Bench, after carefully considering all that could have been said
on
behalf of the appellant, and the relevant evidence both
01:11 and documentary, confirmed the findings of the
Tribunal. It went a little further and held that exhibit
C-12 was
not genuine and
th;1t
the letters-exhibits
CIO and C-11-coptained interpolations at the
imtance
of the appellant who was the respondent before
the
Court. In this connection, the High Court made the
following observations :
·
"The
learned
Advocate-General
attacked
the
l';c:nuincness of this letter. Whether there was another
genuine letter of the same date or not, it
i~ not
1957
Mr.'C'
...
Thi A.dvocaleGeneral of M adru
Sinha].
1957
Mr. •c•
v.
The AdvocattGentral of Madras
Sinha].
1100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
necessary to decide.
No doubt, this letter is in the
handwriting of the respondent. After deep consideration
of all the circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that
this letter must have been introduced into the bundle
of documents with
the
complainant's advocate at or
about the same time, when the respondent made the
interpolations
in
the
letters
dated
6-9-1951
and
6-10-1951, (exhibits C-10 and C-11 )."
In the result, the High Court directed that the appellant's name be removed from the roll
of advocates of
that Court.
Against this order, the appellant prayed for and
obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.
It is
convenient at
this
stage, to deal with the arguments
advanced by the learned counsel for
the appellant.
It
has been suggested that the inquiry by the Bar Council
Tribtmal was ''rambling and
roving".
This
objection
is not altogether unfounded. It appears from the ordt;r
slm·t
maintained by
the
Tribunal
that charges were
framed on July 22, 1953.
and
the
inquirl'
continued
from date to date until the report was made on May
5, 1954. The Tribunal handhl the case on as many
as 45 dates and the printed record of the inquirv runs
into 296 pages in print.
This must have entailed a
good deal of expenditure of time and money to the
parties and one mav particularlv sympathize with
the
complainant who had to go through all this after having
been deprived of at least Rs. 5.000,
if
not more. as
found by the High Court and the Tribunal. But if it
is necessary to apportion blame, much of it mav
be
bid at the door of the appellant himself, who appeus
to have :"pent
a lot
ingenuity o\·er tryingto explain
his dealings with his unfortunate client. lri answer to
the charge framed by the Bar Council T rihunal. the
appellant submitted a long "written answer"
on
September 27,
1953.
But
before
that, he
had
already
submitted
a 'written
explanation'
on
Fchruarv
16,
1953,
rnnning into 43 pages in print, as
alreacly
indicated.
There is no doubt that the appellant left no
stone unturned to cloud the issues anrl to throw a veil
over his mis-deeds, as found bv the Tribunal and the
Marlra' High Court.
It is clear, therefore, that it is
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1101
not the appellant who should have made any grievance
out of the so-called rambling anq roving inquiry.
It was next pointed out· that the inquiry by the
Tribunal into the alleged mis-conduct of the appellant
was in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and
as necessary corollaries to this proposition,
it was
contended
( 1) that the charge should have been more precise,
and that
(2) it should have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
We have examined these contentions with reference to
the record as prepared by
the Tribunal and in our
opinion, it has not been made out that the charge was
so defective as to mislead the appellant or to cause any
substantial prejudice to him or that there is any room
for reasonable doubt as to the truth of the charges
framed
against
the
appellant.
The charges
framed
against the appellant were in these terms :
"That you Mr. 'C', in acting for the petitioner as
his advocate in the matter of scrutinising the title deeds
of No .. 104-A. Lloyds Road, Gopalapuram, Madras, and
putting through the sale of the said premises in petitioner's favour, received from the petitioner Rs. 5,600
for the purpose of discharging a mortgage encumbrance
on the property and that you have not applied the
monies so entrusted to you then and there for the
purpo~es of entrustmel'lt.
That you Mr. 'C' have further not disclosed to
the petitioner how and in what manner you have
utilised
the said monies and that
you have
not
accounted for the same when demanded.
That you have for these reasons committed acts
of professional misconduct liable to be dealt with under
the R:ir Councils Act."
With referenet: to the charge in the first paragraph,
it was contended
that the charge, as
it appears,
has
been
completely
an<wered
bv the
appellant.
The
argument runs as follows :
The reference to the sum
of R~. 5.600, apparentlv is to the demand draft for the
11aid amount elated
Tanuarv
26,
1951. This amount,
the appellant claimed, had been paid over to the vendee
1957
Mr. •C'
v.
Tiu~ocatt·
Genera/ of Madras
Sinha].
1957
Mr. •C'
...
TM A.dvotat..,.
~rural of Madru
Sinh• ].
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
himself on November 23,
1951,
when
vacant possession of
the premises purchased was delivered to the
appellant .
This could have been a complete answer to the
charge, if it had been found as a fact that out of the
demand draft dated October 24, 1951, of Rs. 5,500, the
appelbnt had paid back to Sundararajayya the
sum
of Rs. 5,000, as alleged by him. But as found by the
Court below confirming the conclusions of the Bar
Council Tribunal, the appellant had failed to establish
by reliable evidence that the sum of Rs. 5,000 had, as
a matter of fact, been paid back to Sundararajayya,
aforesaid. Hence, on the findings, it is clear that the
appellant had in his hands, more than ample funds to
pav
the
entire consideration money
including the
mortgage encumbrance of Rs. 5,500, after
deducting
Rs. 1,300, which had already been paid to the vendor
by way of earnest money, before the appellant came
on the scene. But it is sought to be pointed out on
behalf of the appellant that the charge against him
was not that
he
had
not accounted for,
or had
embezzled any portion of the sum of Rs. 5,500, sent to
him last on October 24, 1951. This argument assumes
that
the
mortgage-debt
outstanding
against
the
purchased property had to be discharged in specie, out
of any particular item out of several instal mcnts in
which the complainant had entrusted the total sum of
Rs. 15,200, to the appellant, in connection with the
transaction in question. The appellant had to account
for the due application of the said amount of Rs. 15.200,
being the total sum placed in his hands by his client
for the purpose of seeing through the transaction. The
appellant himself does not claim
that he
rendered
account of the total sum thus entrusted to him by his
client. The appellant cannot be said
to have duly
accounted for all this sum unless it were held that he
had paid Rs. 5.000 in cash to Sundararajayya. On his
own showing, if it is held, as it has been found by the
High Court, in agreement with the Tribunal, that the
sum of Rs. 5,000, had not been paid to Sundararaiayya,
the appellant has not accounted for the entire amount
entrusted to him by his client. This then is a clear
•
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1103
case, shorn of all verbiage introduced by the appellant
himself to cloud the issues, that the appellant was
entrusted by his client with the sum of Rs. 15,200, out
of which, he had to discharge the mortgage-debt of
Rs. 5,500, as settled with the JllOrtgagee by the appellant himself, acting on behalf of the complainant. The
appellant has never pretended that he has paid this
sum to the mortgagee. This is made absolutely clear
by the appellant's statement in paragraph 58 of his
'written explanation', to the following effect :
"There is no question of 'my having discharged
the mortgage.' I did not discharge the mortgage. I
never paid any money to the mortgagee or to anyone
on his behalf. I never told or wrote and I could not
have ·told or written to any, at any time, that I had
paid the mortgage claim. The allegation or suggestion
to that effect is
untrue. As already stated, I was
not placed with the requisite funds
on and after
21-11-1951."
There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the
appellant had not applied the sum of Rs. 5,500, in
discharging the mortgage debt, aforesaid, out of the
sum of Rs. 15,200, placed in his hands by the complainant for the specific purpose of acquiring a clear title to
the property. It would have been better if the Bar
Council Tribunal had called upon the appellant
to
account for the entire amount of Rs. 15;200, which he
admitted he had received from his client, instead of
mentioning only the one item of Rs. 5,600. That
would have been a straight case to state against the
appellant. But there is no reason to hold that the
appellant was in any way prejudiced 'in his defence by
the omission in the charge to mention the entire sum
of money entrusted to him. It was repeatedly mentioned
before us that the appellant might have been a fool in
his dealings with the money placed at his disposal by
his client-the complainant. There are clear indications
in the record that the appellant, far from being a fool,
is a knave, and that he knew fully what charge he had
to meet. . There is no ambiguity in the charge and there
is no doubt . that the High Court was fully justified in
whole-Heartedly
confirming
the conclusions
of
the
1957
Mr. •C'
••
T ht Ad110cat1Gennal of Madr111. e
Sinha J.
1957
Mr. 'G'
Y.
The Advocate9
Genera! of Madras
Sinha J,
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Tribunal. 1t is equally clear to us that there is
no
room for any doubt whatsoever that the appellant had
misappropriated his client's money and that the High
Court was fully justified in striking off his name from
the roll of advocates of that Court.
It remains to consider the further points sought to
be. made on behalf of the appellant that the High
Court was not justified in recording its findings
in
. respect of exhibits C-10, C-ll and C-12, quoted above,
specially when the learned counsel for the complainant
had .not pressed those alkgations of interpolation and
forgery, before the Tribunal. This contention is wellfounded.
We have, therefore, left completely out of
account,
those
allegations of material
alterations in
exhibits C-10 and C-ll and the
alleged
wholesale
substitution of the original of exhibit C-12.
In considering the question whether the
charges
framed
against the appellant have been substantiated, we have
proceeded on the assumption that these letters, as they
appear
at present, are
genuine. They
contain
the
statements of the appellant himself and constitute an
attempt to explain away his acts
of
omission and
commission in relation
to the transaction
of
sale for
which he had been engaged by the complainant. Those
statements are wholly out of tune with the rest of the
record and particularly inconsistent with the rest of
the
correspondence
which
had
admittedly
passed
between the appellant and the complainant. We have
not dealt, in detail, with the voluminous correspondence
between the parties because this being an appeal
by
special leave, we have not found it necessary to examine
very closely, ~he findings of fact recorded by the High
Court in concurrence with the Tribunal. The case
against the appellant, as made out by the complainant,
is fully supported by a large body of reliable oral and
documentary evidence which is consistent only with
the guilt of the appellant, and wholly inconsistent with
his innocence, notwithstanding the fact that he made
a belated but vain attempt to white-wash his misconduct.
Turning to the summons issued by this Court to
the appellant, the first question
that arises
is
the
r
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1105
procedure according to which this summons is to be
disposed of.
Should this Court initiate
independent
proceedings in the sense of making fresh inquiry after
recording evidence pro and con, and then come
to
its conclusions, or, should this Court proceed upon the
inquiry already made by the High Court through the
Bar Council Tribunal, and
record
its
orders after
gmng the Advocate concerned an opportunity of being
heard against
similar orders
being
passed
by
this
Court, in view of the consideration that an advocate
of this Court may be entitled to practise in any of the
subonlinate courts , in India even though he may not
be borne on the roll of advocates of any
particular
High Court? In this connection, we have precedents
of the time of the Federal Court and of this Court
which are analogous to the case in hand.
In those cases, the Federal Court and, subsequenth•,
this Court acted upon the report of the H:gh Court
containing its orders in respect of an advocate on
its
rolls and passed orders after giving an opportunity
to the advocate concerned to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him in view
of the findings of the High Court. In those ca<es, it
was not considered necessary to have a fresh inquirv
made and the Court being satisfied that the orders of
the High Court were well-founded in fact and law,
passed
similar orders.
Curiously
enough,
the
first
precedent of the Federal Court, In the matter of an
Advocate(
1), relates to the case of the appellant himself, at an earlier stage of his career as an advocate.
The Court
consisting of Sir Maurice Gw,·er, Chief
Justice, Sir S. Varadachariar and Sir Torick
Ameer
Ali lJ. dealt with his case. The appellant had been
charged in respect of events which had happened in
1934-35, and was convicted in 1941, at the Madras
Sessions, of only one out of 5 counts, of an attempt to
cheat. He served a sentence of 18 . months' rigorous
imprisonment. Then, the matter was dealt with
by
the High Court on a report made by the Tribunal of
the Madras
Bar Council,
to
the
effect
that
the
(1) Ca.;el\'o. X\'1 of i942, decided on March 23, 1<4:l.
, ,I 'l
1957
Mr. •C'
v.
Tiu AdvocateGtneral qf Madras
Sinha J.
1957
Mr. •C'
"·
The AdvocattGmeral of Madras
Sinha].
1106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957J
appellant's conviction involved moral turpitude, and in
1942, the Madras High Court ordered him to be struck
off the roll of advocates of that Court. In the course
of their short order, the Federal Court made the
following observations :
"Having regard to the decision of the High Court
of Madras in a matter which may be regarded as
analogous (In re an Advocate I. L. R. 46 Mad. p. 903)
we have not dealt with that before us as if an order
made against the responqent must follow automatically
from the result of the proceedings in Madras, and we
have heard the respondent at length in support of the
written memorandum submitted.
As a result of such hearing however we are not
satisfied
that circumstances
exist· so exceptional or
extraordinary as to make it either possible or proper
for us to disregard the verdict or the subsequent order
of the High Court against the respondent ............... .
In the~e circumstances we have to hold that grounds
have not been adduced sufficient to prevent an order
removing the respondent from the rolls of this Court
following upon the order made by the High Court of
Madras, and such an order must now be made."
The appellant ceased to be on the roll of advocates
of the Madras High Court and of the Federal Court as
a result of the Federal Court order passed, as quoted
above, some time in 1943. In 1948,
the appellant
moved the Federal
Court for
re-instatement as
an
advocate of that Court in view of the fact that he had
been
re-instated by the Madras High Court bv its
order dated March 22, 1948.
That Court has passed
its orders on affidavits and certificates of good character during the period the advocate stood struck off
the. roll of advocates. A Judge of the Federal Court,
during the long. vacation, passed orders re-instating
the appellant as an advocate of that Court, following
the orders passed by the Madras High Court. That is
how the appellant was re-introduced to the profession
and within about two years of his re-instatement. the
complainant fell a victim to. the appellant's dishonest
and fraudulent conduct, as found above.
r
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1107
In another case, In re : D. A. Shanmugasundaraswami ( 1 ), an Advocate, coming again from the Madras
High Court, a similar proceeding followed. One D. A.
Shanmughasundaraswami, . an advocate
of the Madras
High Court, had been dealt with by that Court for
professional misconduct on several counts. After the
necessary inquiry and report by the Tribunal of the
Bar Council, the High Court directed his name to be
struck off the roll of advocates of that Court. As that
advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of
the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29,
of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal
Court consisting of Kania,
Chief Justice, Fazl Ali,
Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and
B. K. Mukherjee
JT.
by their order dated Jam,1ary 24, ordered that his
name should be similarly removed from the roll of
advocates
of
the
Federal
Court.
Their Lordships,
relying upon the precedent referred to in the last
paragraph, passed their order in these terms:
"Having regard to a precedent of this Court, we did
not consider that on the footing of the order made by
the Madras High Court an order of removal of his
name from the Rolls of this Court should automatically
follow. He accordingly argued his case before us in
detail.
After hearing the respondent . at great length, we
see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the
Madras High Court. We are not satisfied that circumstances exist which make either possible or proper for
us to disregard the verdict or the subsequent order of
the Madras High Court against the respondent. Under
the circumstances we hold that no sufficient grounds
have been adduced to prevent an order removing the
respondent from the Rolls of this Court, following
upon the order made by the Madras High Court, and
such an order is therefore made.".
This Court dealt with the case of an advocate of the
Bombay High Court, who was also enrolled as a senior
advocate of this Court That case is Jn the matter of
Mr. 'G'. a Senior Advocate of the St1preme Court('). After
(1) Mi:c. Ca,e No. X of 1948, decided on January 24' 1949.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 490.
1957
Mr. 1C'
v.
The AdvocattGeneral of Madras
Sinha].
1957
Mr. •c•
v.
The AdvocateGeneral of Madras
Sinha J .
1108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
the appellant claimed, had been paid over to the vendee
Bombay High Court for six months, and that order
was brought to the notice of this Court, this Court
dealt with the matter under Order IV, rule 30, and
passed orders similar. to that passed by the
Bombay
High Court.
Another case from the Bombay High Court, dealt
with by this Court is In the matter of 'D', an Advocate
of the Suprement Court( 1 ). When the matter was dealt
with by this Court, under Order IV, rule 30 of the
Rules, the advocate, after having been suspended from
practice for a period of one year, by
the
Bombay
High Court, prayed that a fresh inquiry might be held
into the matter. This Court rejected that prayer of
the advocate, and proceeded upon the record as made
by the High Court through the
Bar Council.
This
Court agreed with the view taken
by
the
Bombay
High Court about his mis-conduct in connection with
a criminal trial, and suspended
the
advocate
from
practice for a period co-terminous with the period of
suspension fixed by the High Court.
On a review of the aforesaid precedents, it may be
taken that the following principles
have
been
laid
down by the Federal Court and by this Court when
dealing with a summons under rule 30 of Order IV of
Supreme Court Rules, or, uts equivalent rule of the
Federal Court :-
( l) Any
order by
a High Court, by
way of
discipl.inary action against an advocate borne on
the
roll of advocates both of a High Court and of this
Court. is not automatically followed by a similar order
by this Court;
(2) this Court need not start a fresh inquiry by
way of recording
evidence
over
again
against the
advocate concerned, for professional mis-conduct;
(3) it is enough that this Court should
generally
examine the record prepared bv the Bar Council of a
High Court. un<ler the direct.ions of that Omrt, on the
basis of which the High Court has passed its orders ;
and take into account the findings of the High Court;
(•) [•9s5] 2 S.C.R. 1006.
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1109
( 4) of course, this Court has to grant a reasonable
opportunity to the advocate concerned of
being heard
against the action proposed to be taken against him
under its disciplinary jurisdiction;
(5) it is open to this Court, in an appropriate
case to permit the advocate to adduce such additional
evidence as it thinks fit;
(6) this Court, after hearing the advocate or his
legal adviser and, if necessary, the Attorney-General,
or such other advocate as may be appointed to place
the vi.ew-point of the
legal
profession generally, or
of the complainant or the aggrieved party if he desires
to be heard in the matter, may pass such order as it'
may deem fit and proper, in its judicial discretion.
It may be noted that in the instant case, at the final
hearing, we did not fin<l it necessary to adjourn the
hearing to issue notice to the Attorney-General, nor
was any request made in that behalf.
In view of these precedents, as also in view of the
fact that ordinarily it is necessary that a person, in
order to be entitled to be enrolled as an advocate of
the Supreme Court, should be borne on the roll of
advocates of a High Court, proceedings in this Court,
under
rule 30 of Order IV,
of
the Rules,
should
normally be treated as a natural sequal to the proceedings in the High Court under the Bar Councils Act.
lf one is not a fit an<l proper person to continue on
the roll of advocates of a High Court, a fortiori he
cannot be
permitted to continue on the roll of
advocates of this Court. It is a great privilege to be
borne on the roll of advocates of the Supreme Court,
and only such
persons
as
show a high degree
of
integrity of character
should
be
so
enrolled.
Any
person, who has been found by the High Court to
have fallen from that high standard of integrity of
character required
of an advocate of a court,
must
suffer the consequences of his name being removed
from the roll of advocates of this Court.