# NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

- **Citation:** [2023] 6 S.C.R. 1055
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2023-03-27
- **Case number:** Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 157334 of 2018
- **Bench:** K. M. Joseph, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/narayan-chetanram-chaudhary-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-37152
- **Pages:** 60

## Headnote

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- ss. 9, 94 - Juvenility - Determination of - The applicant, along
with two other accomplices had committed murder of five women,
and two children - They were tried for commission of offences u/ss.
302, 342, 397, 449 r/w 120B and 34 of IPC - Trial Court sentenced
the appellant to death - Both the judgment of conviction and order
of sentence were confirmed by the High Court - The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal preferred by appellant against the said judgment
- The review petition filed by appellant was also dismissed - The
appellant (in detention for more than 28 years) filed present
application under s. 9(2) of the Act of 2015, requesting Supreme
Court to hold that the applicant was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence - In 2019 by order, the Supreme Court
referred the matter to the Principle District and Sessions
Judge(Inquiring Judge) to decide the issue of juvenility of the
applicant - The Inquiring Judge gave his report sustaining the
applicant's claim for juvenility - Held: On examination of various
documents, it was found that the applicant's original name was
'Niranaram' and the applicant discharged his part of onus to
establish that it is he who has been tried and convicted as 'Narayan'
- Now, considering the course adopted by the Inquiring Judge, s.
9(2) of the 2015 Act does not prescribe following the trial procedure,
as stipulated in the 1973 Code and Evidence Act, 1872 - The
legislature has not mandated any specific procedure to be followed
[2023] 6 S.C.R. 1055
1055
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
by the Court for conducting inquiry to determine juvenility of the
claimant under the 2015 Act - Therefore, Court can formulate its
own procedure for conducting inquiry on this count - No flaw in
the procedure which has been adopted by the Inquiring Judge in
the instant case - As far as certificate of date of birth is concerned,
the applicant has relied on the certificate issued by the School for
determination of his age - Said certificate was issued by the office
of the headmaster of the School - The principal of the school has
in writing disclosed that the content of the admission register is
maintained in ordinary course of business - In normal course the
said register would satisfy the test specified in S.35 of the 1872 Act,
of being a relevant fact - Hence, the date of birth of the applicant
as reflected in the certificate issued by the School is to be accepted
for determining his age at the time of commission of the offence of
which he has been convicted - Going by that certificate, his age at
the time of commission of offence was 12 years and 6 months -
Thus, he was a child/juvenile on the date of commission of offence
- Order sentencing him to death passed by the Trial Court and
subsequently confirmed by the High Court and by the Supreme Court
invalidated by operation of law.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- s. 9 (2) - Stage of raising juvenility plea - A petition u/s. 9 (2) of
the 2015 Act contemplates statutory remedy, plea for which can be
raised at any stage - On juvenility plea, if a writ petition is dismissed
in limine, such order would not foreclose the option of an accused
(or a convict) to make plea for juvenility under sub-section (2) of
s.9 of the 2015 Act.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- ss. 9(2), 103 - 'Inquiry' - As far as the procedure for making an
inquiry by the Court, s. 9(2) does not prescribe scrupulously
following trial procedure, as stipulated in the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The Court
can formulate its own procedure for conducting inquiry.
Allowing the application, the Court
HELD:1. The State has taken a plea that at the time of
inquiry, sufficient time was not available to them to verify this
fact. There are several documents where Niranaram has been
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1057
shown to be

## Text

_Characters 0–39,932 of 139,345. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39932 for what follows._

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1055
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 157334 of 2018
In
Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 1139-1140 of 2000
In
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 25-26 of 2000)
MARCH 27, 2023
[K. M. JOSEPH, ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND
HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- ss. 9, 94 - Juvenility - Determination of - The applicant, along
with two other accomplices had committed murder of five women,
and two children - They were tried for commission of offences u/ss.
302, 342, 397, 449 r/w 120B and 34 of IPC - Trial Court sentenced
the appellant to death - Both the judgment of conviction and order
of sentence were confirmed by the High Court - The Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal preferred by appellant against the said judgment
- The review petition filed by appellant was also dismissed - The
appellant (in detention for more than 28 years) filed present
application under s. 9(2) of the Act of 2015, requesting Supreme
Court to hold that the applicant was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence - In 2019 by order, the Supreme Court
referred the matter to the Principle District and Sessions
Judge(Inquiring Judge) to decide the issue of juvenility of the
applicant - The Inquiring Judge gave his report sustaining the
applicant's claim for juvenility - Held: On examination of various
documents, it was found that the applicant's original name was
'Niranaram' and the applicant discharged his part of onus to
establish that it is he who has been tried and convicted as 'Narayan'
- Now, considering the course adopted by the Inquiring Judge, s.
9(2) of the 2015 Act does not prescribe following the trial procedure,
as stipulated in the 1973 Code and Evidence Act, 1872 - The
legislature has not mandated any specific procedure to be followed
[2023] 6 S.C.R. 1055
1055
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
by the Court for conducting inquiry to determine juvenility of the
claimant under the 2015 Act - Therefore, Court can formulate its
own procedure for conducting inquiry on this count - No flaw in
the procedure which has been adopted by the Inquiring Judge in
the instant case - As far as certificate of date of birth is concerned,
the applicant has relied on the certificate issued by the School for
determination of his age - Said certificate was issued by the office
of the headmaster of the School - The principal of the school has
in writing disclosed that the content of the admission register is
maintained in ordinary course of business - In normal course the
said register would satisfy the test specified in S.35 of the 1872 Act,
of being a relevant fact - Hence, the date of birth of the applicant
as reflected in the certificate issued by the School is to be accepted
for determining his age at the time of commission of the offence of
which he has been convicted - Going by that certificate, his age at
the time of commission of offence was 12 years and 6 months -
Thus, he was a child/juvenile on the date of commission of offence
- Order sentencing him to death passed by the Trial Court and
subsequently confirmed by the High Court and by the Supreme Court
invalidated by operation of law.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- s. 9 (2) - Stage of raising juvenility plea - A petition u/s. 9 (2) of
the 2015 Act contemplates statutory remedy, plea for which can be
raised at any stage - On juvenility plea, if a writ petition is dismissed
in limine, such order would not foreclose the option of an accused
(or a convict) to make plea for juvenility under sub-section (2) of
s.9 of the 2015 Act.
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
- ss. 9(2), 103 - 'Inquiry' - As far as the procedure for making an
inquiry by the Court, s. 9(2) does not prescribe scrupulously
following trial procedure, as stipulated in the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The Court
can formulate its own procedure for conducting inquiry.
Allowing the application, the Court
HELD:1. The State has taken a plea that at the time of
inquiry, sufficient time was not available to them to verify this
fact. There are several documents where Niranaram has been
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1057
shown to be the son of 'C'. After the Inquiry Report was made in
2019, substantial time has lapsed since this Court heard the
matter. No material was produced by the State to demonstrate
that there was any other Niranaram in Jalabsar or another 'C'. It
is a fact that the claimant for juvenility has to establish his case.
But it has also to be appreciated that a death row convict in prison
for over 28 years would be under severe limitations in retracing
his school records and other forms of age-proof. In such
circumstances, in absence of any contrary evidence this Court
accept the finding in the Inquiry Report given by the Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Pune that Niranaram has to be said
to be another name of "Narayan". This Court's opinion on this
point would not vary even if this Court reject the certificate of
the Sarpanch. That certificate plays a supportive role in
determination of the name of the applicant. Moreover, in all these
documents, Jalabsar has been shown as the village of which 'C'
and his family were residents, and this was the place from where
he was arrested. In this Court's opinion, the applicant's original
name was Niranaram and the applicant has discharged his part of
onus to establish that it is he who has been tried and convicted
as Narayan. This Court accepted the finding of the Inquiring Judge
on this point. [Para 19][1088-G-H; 1089-A-C]
2. As regards maintainability of the present application
under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. In the applicant's case,
juvenility plea has been raised for the first time before this Court,
albeit after dismissal of his review petition against his conviction
and sentence having been upheld by this Court. It is a fact that
the juvenility plea was raised in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 126
of 2013 and this writ petition was dismissed in limine. But this
dismissal would not operate as res judicata so far as the present
application is concerned. Relief under Article 32 of the
Constitution is discretionary in nature and the order of this Court
dismissing that petition is not supported by reason. A petition
under Section 9 (2) of the 2015 Act contemplates statutory remedy,
plea for which can be raised at any stage. In this Courts' opinion,
on juvenility plea, if a writ petition is dismissed in limine, such
order would not foreclose the option of an accused (or a convict)
to make plea for juvenility under sub-section (2) of Section 9 of
the 2015 Act. [Paras 20, 21][1089-D-F; 1090-D]
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
3. Next comes the question as to whether the course
adopted by the Inquiring Judge was in terms of the provisions of
the 2015 Act or not. It is apparent that the Inquiring Judge has
conducted the inquiry typically as a fact-finding inquiry is
conducted and has not followed the procedure of summons trial.
The documents on which he relied on were not formally proved
as is the normal procedure in a trial and there was no examination
or cross-examination on oath. But as it would be evident from
sub-section (1) of Section 103 of the 2015 Act, the prescription
for following the procedure in summons cases is for the Juvenile
Justice Board ("Board") or the Child Welfare Committee
("Committee") while holding any inquiry under the 2015 Act.
Under Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act the Court also has been
empowered to make an inquiry if the Court itself is of opinion
that the person was the child on the date of the commission of
offence. The mandate of following summons procedure has not
been prescribed so far as inquiry which ought to be conducted by
the Court. The manner in which evidence could be taken has not
been mandated. The manner in which the Court shall conduct
such inquiry has also not been specifically prescribed. The
procedure which has been followed by this Court in the present
case has been to direct a Principal District and Sessions Judge, a
Senior Judicial Officer at the State Level, to conduct inquiry within
a given timeframe. As this Court find from the Inquiry Report,
the Inquiring Judge had directed a police officer to make
authentication of the documents relied upon by the applicant and
after the police officer gave his views on the authenticity of the
documents, finding discrepancy in some of them. Thereafter,
hearing was conducted before the Inquiring Judge, in which
prosecution was represented by an officer holding the rank of
Director General of Police ("DGP"). Both the prosecution and
police had filed report and statement before the Inquiring Judge.
The Inquiring Judge himself applied his mind considering the
submissions of the prosecution as also the learned advocate of
the applicant and the applicant himself was produced before the
Inquiring Judge. The Inquiring Judge had marked the documents
filed before him as exhibits. The Inquiring Judge examined each
of the documents upon ascertaining the stand of the DGP and
also the advocate representing the applicant. In application filed
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1059
before us, extract from the school register was annexed which
showed applicant's date of birth as 1st February 1982. Before the
Inquiring Judge, this Court found that in addition to the documents
annexed to the application, a certificate of date of birth issued by
the school authority was also furnished by the applicant. The latter
was issued on the basis of school register but this certificate was
dated 30th January 2019. [Paras 25, 27][1092-A; 1093-F-H; 1094A-E]
4. This Court found no flaw in the procedure which has been
adopted by the Inquiring Judge. So far as the procedure for
making an inquiry by the Court, in this Court's opinion Section
9(2) of the 2015 Act does not prescribe scrupulously following
trial procedure, as stipulated in the 1973 Code and the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. The requirement to follow the Code is "as
far as practicable," as per Section 103 (2) of the 2015 Act. The
legislature, thus, while prescribing the summons trial procedure
for inquiry by Board or Committee on age determination of a
juvenile claimant has not mandated any specific procedure for
inquiry by the Court. It follows, by implication, that the Court can
formulate its own procedure for conducting inquiry on this count.
So far as the present case is concerned, this Court had directed
inquiry to be conducted by the Inquiring Judge at the first level,
before whom the applicant and the prosecution had sufficient
opportunity to present their version. The report of the Inquiring
Judge was subsequently examined by us, again giving adequate
opportunity to both sides. This Court has ourselves called for
the original admission register from the school. The
principal-incharge of the school, had given a statement in writing
at the inquiry stage, and the translated version of which appears
at page 311 of the Inquiry Report. [Para 28][1094-F; 1095-F-H;
1096-A]
5. The school in question is a government school. The "date
of birth certificate" of Niranaram has been issued by the office of
the headmaster of the said school. This certificate has been issued
on the letterhead of the State Government carrying the national
emblem. The principal of the school has in writing disclosed that
the content of the admission register is maintained in ordinary
course of business. Hence, in normal course the said register
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1060
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
would satisfy the test specified in Section 35 of the 1872 Act, of
being a relevant fact. [Para 33][1105-A-B]
6. As regards authenticity or genuineness of the admission
register, which forms the basis of certificate of the applicant's
date of birth, an argument is made that the whole register was
fabricated. His submission is that at the time the extract therefrom
was produced before the Inquiring Judge, the same was not
paginated. He also argues that the register was not stitched.
Further, he has submitted that serial entry no. 566 of the register
shows the date of entry of the student to be 2nd February 1980,
which is not in order in relation to the other entries. He has also
referred certain other entries in the register prior in order to
serial no. 568, in which dates of admission of the respective
students are earlier than that of the applicant. But these entries,
at best, would show some defect in maintaining the records and
cannot lead to the conclusion that the entire admission register
is fabricated. Reference has also been made to an entry of one
Lekhram, that stood against serial no. 423, which reappeared in
entry 562. The endorsement of the school in serial no. 423 is
that "his name was deleted" whereas against entry no. 562,
recordal is "as per previous records". This clearly appears to be
the case of re-admission or re-entry in the school. His further
stand is that there was interpolation of pages. He has again pointed
out that one of the pages (page no. 33) of the register has been
stitched in reverse. But these are nitpicking submissions and
cannot lead to the conclusion that admission register itself is fake.
So far as Niranaram's name is concerned, in the admission
register there is no discrepancy. His serial number is 568 which
falls in order in which the register is maintained and is in sequence
with the admission entries of other students barring few minor
discrepancies as regards names in other entries. Even if the
register has been freshly stitched and paginated to be sent to
this Court, that would not lead to a conclusion that the whole
thing has been fabricated. Moreover, there is no clear evidence
to demonstrate that at the time of initial inquiry, the register was
unstitched or without pagination. This Court have itself seen the
register and it is of sufficient vintage. Thus, this Court agree
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1061
with the Inquiring Judge that the date of birth recorded therein
was not a fabricated entry. [Para 34][1105-D-H; 1106-A-C]
7. So far as the applicant is concerned, his claim of juvenility
basedon his date of birth in the school certificate would not vary
based on definitions of juvenile, "juvenile in conflict with law" or
"child in conflict with law" under the 1986 Act, 2000 Act or the
2015 Act. For applying the procedure for determining his claim,
of juvenility or of being a child, in this Court's opinion, the law
applicable at the time of undertaking that exercise by the
concerned statutory body would prevail. Hence, in his case, this
Court has tested his claim on the basis of the provisions of Section
9 read with Section 94 of the 2015 Act. [Para 40][1111-E-F]
8. Under the 2015 Act the date of birth certificate ought to
be the main factor for determination of juvenility. In the case of
Rishipal Singh Solanki, the two-Judge Bench of this Court has
laid down the principle that an inquiry initiated under Section 9
(2) of 2015 Act would be similar to that contained in Section 94 of
thereof. This Court accepted this view. This Court has called for
the source of the date of birth certificate, which recorded the
applicant's birth date at the time of his entry into the school which
was in the year 1986. So far as the inconsistent dates of birth
mentioned in the other documents, none of them is specified to
be taken into consideration for undertaking the process of age
determination as laid down in Section 94 (2) of the said statute.
Once the applicant has discharged his onus, in support of his
claim of juvenility by producing the date of birth certificate from
the school, the State had to come up with any compelling
contradictory evidence to show that the recordal of his date of
birth in the admission register was false. The State, in this case,
has not come up with any such compelling evidence which would
render such certificate to be unreliable or false. The State and
the complainant have sought to disprove the applicant's case on
the basis of materials disclosed by him only, apart from the
electoral roll. Here, this Court cannot indulge in any guesswork
to doubt the entry in the school register. No evidence has been
led to contradict the basis of the age of the applicant reflected in
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
the aforesaid document. The certificate of date of birth as evidence
of age having been provided in the statute itself, this Court shall
go by that. The other factor which has crossed this Courts's mind
is as to whether a boy of 12 years could commit such a gruesome
crime. But though this factor shocks this Court, this Court cannot
apply speculation of this nature to cloud this Court's adjudication
process. This Court possess no knowledge of child psychology
or criminology to take into account this factor while examining
the report of the Inquiring Judge. Moreover, the age of the
applicant revealed in the ossification test keeps the age of the
applicant as claimed by him, within the range specified in the
report. The said test was conducted in the year 2005, and his age
was determined in the range of 22 to 40 years. If this Court take
22 years as his age in 2005, then his year of birth would haven
been 1983. That would broadly correspond to the date of birth
contained in the admission register. [Para 41][1111-G-H; 1112A-E]
9. In the light of this Court's findings and the reasons this
Court have disclosed above for arriving at such finding, this Court
accept the report of the Inquiring Judge. This Court declare that
the date of birth of the applicant as reflected in the certificate
issued by the Rajkiya Adarsh Uccha Madhaymik Vidyalaya,
Jalabsar, tehsil Shri Dungargarh, district - Bikaner, dated 30th
January 2019, a copy of which has been annexed in the Inquiry
Report as "I-2", is to be accepted for determining his age at the
time of commission of the offence of which he has been convicted.
Going by that certificate, his age at the time of commission of
offence was 12 years and 6 months. Thus, he was a child/juvenile
on the date of commission of offence for which he has been
convicted, in terms of the provisions of the 2015 Act. This shall
be deemed to be the true age of Niranaram, who was tried and
convicted as Narayan. He has already served more than 3 years
of incarceration and under the law as it prevailed at the time of
commission of offence as also under the 2015 Act, he cannot be
subjected to capital punishment. In view of this finding, the order
sentencing him to death passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Pune in Sessions Case No. 462 of 1994 and subsequently
confirmed by the High Court and by this Court would stand
invalidated by operation of law. He shall be set free forthwith
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1063
from the correctional home in which he remains imprisoned, as
he has suffered imprisonment for more than 28 years, having
regard to the provisions of Section 18 of the 2015 Act. Section 21
of the 1986 Act also carried substantially the same provision on
the question of maximum punishment that can be awarded to a
delinquent juvenile by the Juvenile Court. The restriction on
term of detention that can be awarded by the Board under the
2015 Act to a child below 16 years would also apply to the Court
before which the juvenility question is being determined. [Para
43][1113-E-H; 1114-A-C]
Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2012) 9 SCC 750 : [2012] 10 SCR 540 - relied on.
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988) Supp SCC
604 : [1988] Suppl. SCR 1; Surajdeo Mahto & Another
v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Mohd. Anwar v.
State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 7 SCC 391; Ramdeo
Chauhan alias Raj Nath v. State of Assam (2001) 5 SCC
714 : [2001] 3 SCR 669; Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2019) 12 SCC 370 :
[2019] 9 SCR 735; Parag Bhati (Juvenile) through
Legal Guardian- Mother-Rajni Bhati v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another (2016) 12 SCC 744 : [2016] 2
SCR 1089; Manoj alias Monu alias Vishal Chaudhary
v. State of Haryana and Another (2022) 6 SCC 187;
Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and Another (2008)
13 SCC 133 : [2008] 14 SCR 161 - distinguished.
Murari Thakur & Another v. State of Bihar (2009) 16
SCC 256 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988 - held not good
law.
Ram Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 142; Abuzar Hossain alias Golam Hossain
v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 : [2012] 9
SCR 244; Pawan Kumar Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2020) 2 SCC 803 : [2020] 1 SCR 69; Pawan v. State
of Uttaranchal (2009) 15 SCC 259 : [2009] 3 SCR
468; Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5
SCC 584 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 615; Hari Ram v. State
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
of Rajasthan and Another (2009) 13 SCC 211 : [2009]
7 SCR 623; Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2015) 15 SCC 637; Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1204; Ram Narain v.
State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 17 SCC 699 : [2015] 9
SCR 200; Upendra Pradhan v. Stae of Orissa (2015)
11 SCC 124 : [2015] 5 SCR 214; Ajay Kumar v. State
of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 15 SCC 83; Sheo Mangal
Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1989) SCC OnLine
All 605; Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others (2022) 8 SCC 602; Pratap Singh v. State of
Jharkhand and Another (2005) 3 SCC 551 : [2005] 1
SCR 1019; Jitendra Singh Alias Babboo Singh and
Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11 SCC 193 :
[2013] 13 SCR 764; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)
and Another (2010) 5 SCC 344 : [2010] 5 SCR 137;
Mahesh Jogi v. State of Rajashthan (2014) 15 SCC
184 : [2014] 11 SCR 293; Satya Deo alias Bhoorey v.
State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 555; State of
Jammu & Kashmir (Now U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir)
and Others v. Shubham Sangra 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1592; Rajinder Chandra v. State of Chhattisgarh and
Another (2002) 2 SCC 287 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2012] 10 SCR 540
relied on
Para 12
[2012] 9 SCR 244
referred to
Para 12
[2020] 1 SCR 69
referred to
Para 12
[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988
held not good law
Para 13
[2009] 3 SCR 468
referred to
Para 13
[2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 615
referred to
Para 14
[2001] 3 SCR 669
distinguished
Para 14
[1988] Suppl. SCR 1
distinguished
Para 14
[2009] 7 SCR 623
referred to
Para 20
[2015] 9 SCR 200
referred to
Para 20
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1065
[2015] 5 SCR 214
referred to
Para 20
[2016] 2 SCR 1089
distinguished
Para 32
[2019] 9 SCR 735
distinguished
Para 37
[2008] 14 SCR 161
distinguished
Para 37
[2005] 1 SCR 1019
referred to
Para 38
[2013] 13 SCR 764
referred to
Para 39
[2010] 5 SCR 137
referred to
Para 39
[2014] 11 SCR 293
referred to
Para 39
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No. 157334 of 2018 in Review Petition (Criminal)
Nos. 1139-1140 of 2000 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 25-26 of 2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2000 in Crl.A.Nos. 26
and 25 of 2000 of the Supreme Court of India.
R. Basant, Sr.Adv., Vishnu P., Ms. Trisha Chandran, Ms. Shreya
Rastogi, Shadan Farasat, Advs. for the Applicant.
Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Durgesh
Gupta, Hrishikesh Chitaley, Vijay Kari Singh, Rajat Joseph, Advs. for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
This is an application under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 ("2015 Act") requesting
this Court to hold that the applicant, who is a convict for committing
offences under Sections 302, 342, 397, 449 read with 120B and 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("1860 Code") was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence. Simultaneous prayer of the applicant is for
his release from custody on the ground of having served more than the
maximum punishment permissible under the Act. The applicant has been
sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune by a judgment
and order dated 19th February 1998 and 23rd February 1998 respectively.
This application has been taken out in connection with a petition for
review of the order by which his conviction and sentence was sustained
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
by this Court after confirmation by the High Court. The review petition
of the applicant was also dismissed on 24th November 2000. The applicant,
along with two other offenders (Jitu and Raju) were tried for commission
of offences under the aforesaid provisions of the 1860 Code. The
applicant had not raised the plea of juvenility at the trial or the appellate
stage. In the Trial Court, said Raju had turned approver and was tendered
pardon. Both the judgment of conviction and order of sentence were
confirmed by the High Court on 22nd July 1999 in the appeal of the
applicant as also in the confirmation proceeding. The appeal against the
judgment of conviction and order of death sentence made by the applicant
was dismissed by this Court on 5th September 2000. The offence of the
applicant is no doubt, gruesome in nature. On 26th August 1994, as per
the prosecution case sustained by all the judicial fora including this Court,
the applicant alongwith the two other accomplices had committed murder
of five women, (one of whom was pregnant) and two children. The
offence took place at Pune in the State of Maharashtra. The applicant
was arrested on 5th September 1994 from his home village and is in
detention for more than 28 years.
2. Though the offence was committed at Pune, the applicant claims
to hail from Jalabsar, in Shri Dungargarh tehsil, at present in Bikaner
district, Rajasthan. It is from there he was arrested. He was tried as
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary. His plea before us is that his actual
name is Niranaram. In the Inquiry Report, which we shall deal with later
in this judgment, there is observation to the effect that people in Pune,
Maharashtra might find it difficult to pronounce Niranaram and there is
possibility of pronunciation mistake to call "Niranaram" as "Narayan" in
Pune. The said tehsil was earlier in the district of Churu but in the year
2001, it came within the Bikaner district. Date of occurrence of the
offence is 26th August 1994 and the chargesheet submitted against the
applicant showed his age to be about 20 years at the time of commission
of the offence. The applicant's claim of juvenility is primarily based on a
"certificate" of date of birth issued on 30th January 2019, in the name of
Niranaram, son of Chetanram. The said certificate has been issued by
the Pradhanacharya (Headmaster), Rajakiya Adarsh Uccha Madhyamik
Vidyalaya, Jalabsar, Shri Dungargarh. In the said document, it is recorded
that Niranaram was born on 1st February 1982. In a "transfer certificate"
by the same authority issued on 15th August 2001, it is reflected that he
had joined the school in Class First on 1st April 1986 vide admission
number 568 and left from Class Third (Passed) on 15th May 1989.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1067
By the date of birth reflected in these certificates, the age of the
applicant on the date of commission of offence would have been 12
years and 6 months. The applicant, as we have already indicated, was
tried as Narayan, not Niranaram. Moreover, in certain other documents
Niranaram's age is shown to be different from that reflected in the said
certificates. The variations or discrepancies as regards the name of
applicant and his age are the factors we shall be dealing with in this
judgment and we shall dwell into these aspects in subsequent paragraphs
of this judgment.
3. In the chargesheet, the accused Narayan's age was shown to
be 20 years. We find from the judgment of the High Court that the said
age (20-22 years) was given on behalf of the applicant only at the time
of hearing. The High Court had tangentially referred to the question of
age of the applicant in its judgment in the appeal and death reference. At
that time, however, the plea of juvenility was not there. It was observed
in the High Court's judgment that the age of the accused at the time of
occurrence ought to be borne in mind while considering the question of
awarding the sentence.
4. The applicant for the first time wanted a medical examination
for determination of his age on 14th August 2005, when the Prison
Inspector General, Western Division, Pune went to meet the applicant
at Yerawada Central Prison. A request was made thereafter by the prison
authorities to the Chief Medical Officer and the applicant was taken to
Department of Forensic Science, BJ Medical College and Sassoon
General Hospital, Pune. The age determination report by the Department
of Forensic Medicine, of the said institution states that on 24th August
2005, age of the patient was more than 22 years but less than 40 years
including margin of error. The said report reads: -
"MD/ AGE/ 198/ 2005
Department of Forensic Science
B J Medical College and Sassoon
General Hospital, Pune
Proforma for age examination
24/8/2005
Mr. Narayan Chetram Chaudhary
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1068
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
Brought by Yerawada Central Prison, Pune
Date: 24/8/2005, time: 3:45 pm, MLC No 25802, date:23/8/
2005
Consent: The doctors have given me an idea of the tests
involved in determination of age. I am ready for the
examination of my own free will.
(unclear 3 line)
Physical Development: Medium
Teeth: Upper 15
Lower 15
Ht 5'9"
Wt 68 kg
Secondary Sex Characters
Male:
Moustache: Present
Beard: Shaved
Pubic Hair: Present
Voice: normal
Genitals: normal
Medicolegal exam: X Ray plate no R180( 4) date: 23/8/05
(unclear medical description)
Conclusion: From clinical & radiological examination the age
of the patient on date 24/8/05 'more than twenty two years
but less than forty years (40 years)' including margin of error.
Signed in the presence of:
Sd/-
B G More
Sd/-
Dr. M.S. Vable
Prof. & Head / Assec. Prof. / Asstt. Lect.
Department of Forensic Medicine,
B. J. Medical College, Pune - 411001"
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1069
5. It was in the early part of 2006, we are apprised by Mr. Basant,
learned senior counsel representing the applicant, that his cause was
taken up by certain human rights groups. Some public spirited individuals
espousing the applicant's cause on the point of juvenility had written to
the President of India on 24th January 2006 requesting cancellation of
award of death penalty on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time
of commission of the offence. A copy of the said communication, captioned
"Mercy Petition", has been annexed as A-7 to the application. The text
of this petition is reproduced below: -
"President's Secretariat
CA II Section
Date- 24/1/2006
Dy. No. 03-/06 M.P.
Mercy Petition on behalf of a juvenile to the President
Hon. Excellency
The Hon. President of India,
Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi
To his Excellency, the President of the Republic of India
We are an organization Human Rights and Law Defenders
(HRLD) working on different issues on Human Rights
violations. We also work in the Yerawada Central Prison, Pune
and provide free legal aid to the prisoners in peril.
It is due to the extremity of the matter before us that we·take
the liberty of corresponding with your Hon. Self to make you
aware that one person names Niranaram Chetanram
Chaudhary, born on 1/2/1982, who has been awarded the
death penalty in a murder case in languishing in the Yerawada
Central Prison, Pune. Therefore, this applicant was around
13 years of age at the time of committing this offence. Your
Excellency, your office has received a mercy petition from his
co-accused Jitendra Nainsingh Gehlot DY no 7/27 on 8/11/
2004. You are indeed suitably in receipt of all the relevant
case material which has been earlier sent to you office.
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
The prison authorities have also requested us that we should
attract your attention to the fact that Niranaram Chetanram
Chaudhary was a juvenile at the time of offence so that death
penalty awarded is a mistake of the law. It should also be
well noted that there are various judgement given by the High
Court and the Apex Court and numerous and substantive laws
to confirm that if any person had been a juvenile at the time
of committing the offence, it can be a strong ground for
consideration at any stage of the case. He has already spent
more than 11 years languishing inside the four walls of the
prison. We would like to bring to light the miscarriage of
justice in this case where in a 13 year old juvenile who
committed an offence has become a grown up man inside the
prison meant for major and hardened criminals. So we want
to request you to consider this sensitive matter of a juvenile
in conflict with law and ask your august office and
Honourable self to cancel the punishment of death penalty
awarded to the juvenile in this case.
Yours truly
Adv. Asim Sarode Adv. Smita Lokhande Jagriti Sanjay
 Jadhav
Mohat
Human Rights Activist Legal Aid Lawyer Student Intern Social
Worker
Enclosures: Transfer certificate of Niranaram Chetanram
Chaudhari and other papers with respect to his proof of age.
(All attested copies)"
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)
6. That letter, as pleaded in this application, was forwarded to the
Government of Maharashtra eliciting the State Government's comments
on such claim of juvenility. There were subsequent exchange of
communications among the officials on the question of his age
determination. In a letter originating from the Superintendent, Yerawada
Central Jail, Pune addressed to Additional Secretary, Home Department,
Maharashtra (which is Annexure A-13 to the present application), the
Jail authorities recorded that the Medical Superintendent, Sassoon hospital,
Pune was intimated by the applicant that he had studied in a Government
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1071
School at Jalabsar and his name in the school was Niranaram. It was in
this communication dated 19th January 2007 a reference was made to
his name being Niranaram. It does not appear, however, that any further
age determination test was carried out. The said communication reads:-
"With reference to the above subject, orders were given to
present a medical report regarding the current age of the
condemned prisoner C1871 Narayan Chetanram Chaudhari.
Accordingly, the said prisoner was sent to the Hon Medical
Superintendent, Sassoon Hospital, Pune and the he was
requested through letter NV1/ AVT/ 64/ 2007 date 8/1/2000
to give a medical report about the age of the prisoner.
In his letter no SSR/ Prisoner/ 26/ 06 date 8/1/2007 about the
age of the prisoner, the Hon. Medical Superintendent noted
that, "after speaking to the prisoner, it appears that his actual
age can be found out through his school records. His name
in school was Niranaram Chetanram Chaudhari and he has
studied in the Government School in Julabsar until grade 3.
The village is in Dungargadh Taluka, earlier Churu District,
now Bikaner District. If you obtain a certificate from that
school it could be useful." We have attached a photocopy of
the said letter. Similarly, photocopies of the prisoner's earlier
mercy petition submitted by his lawyer Mr. Aseem Sarode along
with his school certificate are also attached. Photocopy of
the school certificate submitted by the prisoner is being
attached.
Presented for information and further action."
(quoted verbatim from paperbook)
7. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed in this Court under Article
32 of the Constitution of India by the applicant representing himself as
'Narayan @ Niranaram' seeking quashing of the order of punishment
imposed upon him on the ground of him being a juvenile on the date of
commission of offence. In this petition, apart from the aforesaid
certificates, the applicant had relied on a "Family Card" of the Rajasthan
Government issued in 1989, recording the age of Nirana to be of 12
years as also the aforesaid Transfer Certificate issued on 15th August
2001 recording Niranaram's date of birth as 1st February 1982. In both
these documents, Chetanram's name appears as father of Niranaram.
NARAYAN CHETANRAM CHAUDHARY v. THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2023] 6 S.C.R.
This writ petition, registered as W.P. (Criminal) No. 126 of 2013, was
dismissed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court on 12th August 2013 with
the following order:-
"UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
"We are not inclined to entertain this Writ Petition under Article
32 of the Constitution of India and the same is dismissed."
 8. This application was instituted on 30th October 2018. When it
was taken up for hearing, a Coordinate Bench by an order passed on
29th January 2019 had referred the matter to the Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Pune to decide the juvenility of the applicant keeping in
view the provisions of Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This order reads:-
"UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The applicant - Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary has filed an
application (Crl.M.P.No.5242 of 2016 in R.P.(Crl.)Nos.11391140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25-26/2000) seeking review of the
final judgment of this Court dated 05.09.2000 in Criminal
Appeal Nos.25-26 of 2000, upholding his conviction under
Sections 342, 397, 449 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
(hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC') and the sentence of death
awarded to him under Section 302 IPC by reopening the
Review Petition(Crl.)Nos.1139-1140 of 2000, which were
dismissed by this Court on 24.11.2000. The applicant has also
filed an application (Crl.M.P.No.157334 of 2018 in R.P.
(Crl.)Nos.1139-1140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25-26/2000) under
Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
seeking a declaration that he was a juvenile at the time of
commission of offence. The applicant has placed certain
additional documents to prove his juvenility at the time of
commission of offence.
On 31.10.2018, when the matter came up before this
Court for hearing, the counsel for the State was directed to
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1073
take instructions on the additional documents on the question
of juvenility of the applicant. However today, the learned
counsel for the respondent-State submits that he has not got
any instructions in that regard so far. The instant case reflects
gross lethargic and negligent attitude of the State. In view of
the pendency of the matter, we are restrained from observing
anything further.
Keeping in view Section 9(2) of the Act, we have no
other option but to refer the matter to the Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Pune, to decide the juvenility of the
applicant. Accordingly, we direct the Registry of this Court to
send the application (Crl.M.P.No.157334/2018 in R.P.(Crl.)
Nos.1139-1140/2000 in Crl.A.Nos.25-26/2000) along with
xerox copy of the documents, relied upon by the applicant, to
the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune to decide the
juvenility of the applicant. If notice is given to the applicant,
he is directed to produce all the original documents before
the concerned Court in support of his claim of juvenility at
the time of commission of offence. The Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Pune is directed to send a report to this Court,
preferably within a period of six weeks.