# NARAYAN GOYIND GAVATE ETC v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA - **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 763 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1976-10-11 - **Bench:** A. N. Ray, M. H. Beg, JASWANT S!NGlf - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/narayan-goyind-gavate-etc-v-state-of-maharashtra-6966 - **Pages:** 22 ## Headnote Land Acquisition· Act, 1894, ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of establishing urgency-On whom lies. Certain lands were sought to be acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the public purpose stated being the develbpment and utilisation oti the lands as a residenJial and industrial area. Identical notifications under s. 4 were issued in all the cases. In one group of A B lands, declarations that the provisions of s. 5A shall not apply in respect of the C lands Vier~ issued under s. 17 ( 4). With respect to a second group, declarations under s. 17 ( 4) were issued but were not followed up with the s. 6-notification. With respect to a third group no notification under s. 17 ( 4) was issued but after the petitioners filed objections, the s. 6-notification was issued accompanied by the declaration of urgency under s. 17 ( 4). The owners of the land sought to have the proceedings quashed on the grounds that, (1) there was no public purpose, and that (2) there was no urgency justifying the notification under s. 17 ( 4) and dispensing with the enquiry under D s. SA. . The High Court held that, ( l) the notifications under s. 4 (l) were valid, and that (2) the State had not discharged its burden of showing facts con•tituting the urgency which impelled it to issue the declarations under s. 17 ( 4) di~ pensing with the enquiry under s. 5A, and, therefore, those declaration.s were invalid, and that the parties were relegated to the position they could take up iu the absence of declarations under s. 17 ( 4). Both sides appealed to this Court. In the appeals by the State, it was contended by the appellant-State that E the burden of proving that there was no urgency was on the owners of tho lands. Dismissing all the appeals, HELD: (!) Th~ notifications under s. 4(1) of the Act were valid i• all the cases. [769 G] (2) (a) The rules regarding burden of proof are set ont in the Indian EviF dence Act, 1872. Section 101 of the Evidence Act Jays down that whoever desires any Conrt to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependrni on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist, and s. 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Sectioa 103 provirles that the burden of proof as to anv narticular fact lies on that person who wishe11 the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided lly any la·w that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Section 106 lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any G person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 114 of the Evidence Act covers a wide range of presumptions of fact which can be used by the Courts.,jp the course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the chain of direct evidence before it. (774· C-E; 775 C-E] • (b) The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts, circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trinl or proceeding which cannot, II for pu rprn;es of this final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnected parts. What is weighed at the end is one totality against another and not 17-1234SCI/76 A B c D E F G H 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [I 977] 1 S.C.R. selected bits or scraps of evide~ce against each other. Such total cff~ct. of evidence is determined at the entl of a proceeding not merely by _..:onstdenn.g the "eneral duties imposed by ss. 101 and 102 but also by the spec1al or parll- <:ula~ ones imposed by other provisions suCh as ss. 103 and 106. In judging whether a general or' particular or special onus has been iischargcd the _Court v.·ill not only consider the direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also v.·hat may be indirec ## Text _Characters 0–39,996 of 70,347. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39996 for what follows._ r 763 NARAYAN GOYIND GAVATE ETC. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA October 11, 1976 [A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT S!NGlf, JJ.] Land Acquisition· Act, 1894, ss. 5A, 6 and 17(4)-Burden of establishing urgency-On whom lies. Certain lands were sought to be acquired by the State Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the public purpose stated being the develbpment and utilisation oti the lands as a residenJial and industrial area. Identical notifications under s. 4 were issued in all the cases. In one group of A B lands, declarations that the provisions of s. 5A shall not apply in respect of the C lands Vier~ issued under s. 17 ( 4). With respect to a second group, declarations under s. 17 ( 4) were issued but were not followed up with the s. 6-notification. With respect to a third group no notification under s. 17 ( 4) was issued but after the petitioners filed objections, the s. 6-notification was issued accompanied by the declaration of urgency under s. 17 ( 4). The owners of the land sought to have the proceedings quashed on the grounds that, (1) there was no public purpose, and that (2) there was no urgency justifying the notification under s. 17 ( 4) and dispensing with the enquiry under D s. SA. . The High Court held that, ( l) the notifications under s. 4 (l) were valid, and that (2) the State had not discharged its burden of showing facts con•tituting the urgency which impelled it to issue the declarations under s. 17 ( 4) di~ pensing with the enquiry under s. 5A, and, therefore, those declaration.s were invalid, and that the parties were relegated to the position they could take up iu the absence of declarations under s. 17 ( 4). Both sides appealed to this Court. In the appeals by the State, it was contended by the appellant-State that E the burden of proving that there was no urgency was on the owners of tho lands. Dismissing all the appeals, HELD: (!) Th~ notifications under s. 4(1) of the Act were valid i• all the cases. [769 G] (2) (a) The rules regarding burden of proof are set ont in the Indian EviF dence Act, 1872. Section 101 of the Evidence Act Jays down that whoever desires any Conrt to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependrni on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist, and s. 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Sectioa 103 provirles that the burden of proof as to anv narticular fact lies on that person who wishe11 the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided lly any la·w that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Section 106 lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any G person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 114 of the Evidence Act covers a wide range of presumptions of fact which can be used by the Courts.,jp the course of administration of justice to remove lacunae in the chain of direct evidence before it. (774· C-E; 775 C-E] • (b) The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts, circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trinl or proceeding which cannot, II for pu rprn;es of this final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnected parts. What is weighed at the end is one totality against another and not 17-1234SCI/76 A B c D E F G H 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [I 977] 1 S.C.R. selected bits or scraps of evide~ce against each other. Such total cff~ct. of evidence is determined at the entl of a proceeding not merely by _..:onstdenn.g the "eneral duties imposed by ss. 101 and 102 but also by the spec1al or parll- <:ula~ ones imposed by other provisions suCh as ss. 103 and 106. In judging whether a general or' particular or special onus has been iischargcd the _Court v.·ill not only consider the direct effect of the oral and documentary evidence led but also v.·hat may be indirectly inferred because certain facts have been proved or not proved though easily capable of proof if they existed at all and such proof of other facts may raise either a presumption of Ia:w or fac~. The party_ against \Vhich a presumption may operate can and must lead the ev1de1~ce to show why the presumption should not be given effect to. If the pa~ty ,., h1~h initia~s the- proceeding or comes with a case to Court offers no e\1dcnce 1n support of it~ the presumption is that su::h evidence does not exist and if some evidence is shown to exist on a question in issue but the party v1bich has it within ilS power to produce it does not, despite notice to do so. produce it, the natural presum}'.ltion is that it would, if produced, have gone against it. Similarly, a presur.1ptiOn arises from failure to discharge a special or particular ci;ius. The doctrine of onus of proof becomes unimportant when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to reach a particular conclu'iion in favour of or against a party. The principle of onus of proof beco1nes important in cases of either paucity of evidence or Vihere evidence given by t\YO sides is so equivalenced that the Court is unable to bold where the tn1th lay. The question whether an onus. probandi has been discharged is one of fact. Sufficiency otj evidence to discharge the onus probandi is not examined by this Court as a rule in appeals by special leave granted under Art. 136 of the Constitution,. but placing an onus \\rhere it did not lie may be so examined in appropriate cases. [775 H; D-G; 778 C--D; 774 GJ Swadeshi Cot!on A-fills Co. Ltd. v. The State of U.P. & Ors. [1962] 1 S.C.R. 422. 434 and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. & Ors. [19671 1 S.C.R. 373 at 381 referred to. I. G. Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat & anr. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 267 held inapplicable. (c) Section 17(4) of the.Land Acquisition Act has to be read \Yith ss. 4(1) and 5A of the Act. The immediate purpose of a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act is to enable those wbQ may have ·any objections to lodge them for purposes of an enquiry under s. SA. Considering thet nature of the objections \vhich are capable of being successfully taken under s. SA, the enquiry shc:.;ld be concluded quite expeditiously. The purpose of s. 17(4) is obviously not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an enquiry under s. SA will serve no useful purpose, or, for som! overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgencv of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under s. SA of the Act Should be eliminated. _ It is not just the existence of an urgency· but the need to dispense with an inquiry under s. SA which:has to b~ considered. [781 G-1-I; 782 D-C] (d) Even a technically correct recital in an order or notification stating that the ·conditions precedent to the exerciset of a power have been fulfilled may' not debar the Court in a given case from considering the question \vhether, in fact, those conditions have been fulfilled. And, a fortiori the Court n1ay consider and decide· whether the authority concerned has applied its mind to really relevant fac!S of a case with al view to determining that a condition precedent to the exercise of a power has been fulfilled. If it appears upon an examination of the totality of facts in the case, that the power conferred has been exercised for an extraneous or irrelevant purpose or that the mind has not been applied at all -to the real object or purpose of a· power, so that the result is that the eXercise of power could only serve some other or -collateral object the Court will interfere. [779 E-F] ' (e) TI:e. High Court was 'Wrong in the present case in laying do"-'ll a general propos1tton that the presumption Of regularity attaching to an order containing a technically correct recital did not operate in cases in \vhich s. 106 Evidence Act, was applicable. An order or notificat!on containing a recital t'echnically correct on the face of it raises a presumption of fact under s. 114, illustration t ' • > I • • NARAYAN GOVJND GAVATE V. MAHARASHTRA 76S (el. That presumption is based on, the, maxim amain praeswnuntur rite esse · A .acta, that, is, all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. This presumption, however, is one of fact. It is an optional presumption which. can be displaced by circumstances indicating that the power lodged in an autho· ritv or official has not been exercised in :tccordance with the law. The totality ,pf circumstances has to be examined including the recitals to determine whether and to what extent each side had discharged its general or particular onus. [777 E-F] (fl The High Court had, however, correctly stated the limited grounds on B which even a, subjective opinion as to the existence of the need to take action under s. 17(4) of the' Act can be challenged, namely, mala fides, no application of mind and total want of material on which the opinion is formed. There· fore, it is for the petitioner to substantiate the grounds of his challenge under ss. 101 ~d 102. That is, the, petitioner has td either lead evidence or show that some evidence has come from the other side to indicate that his challenge to a notification 01" order is made good. If he does not succeed in discharg· ing that duly his petition will fail. f776 B-Cl C In the present case, in addition to the bare assertions of the owners of the land that the particular urgency contemplated by s. 17 ( 4) did not exist there were other facts and circumstances including non-disclosure of any facts and circumstances which could easily justify the use of s. 17 ( 4) and which could have been disclosed if they existed; and, therefore, the petitioners should be held to have discharged their general onus under s. 101 of the Evidence Act. Thus the High Court was right in quashing the notifications under s. 17 ( 4). [778 El D (g) In the present case, the public purpose was sufficiently specified to be prima facie a legally valid purpose. The High Court thought it vague; but, that ·did not really affect the judgment of the High Court so much as the total absence -of facts and circumstances which could possibly indicate' that this purpose had necessarily tq be carried out in such a way as to exclude the application of s. SA of the Act. Therefore, a triable issue did arise in these cases and was decided by the High Court. This issue was whether the conditions precedent E to exercise of power under s. 17 ( 4) had been fulfilled or not. Such a question can only be decided rightly after determining what was the nature of compliance with the conditions of s. l7 ( 4) required by the Act. [776 D-E] (i) The public purpose indicated is the development o~ an area for industrial. and res.idential purposes. This, in itself, did not make the taking of immediate possession imperative without holding even a summary enquiry under s. SA. On the other hand, the execution of such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under s. SA of the Act to be completed without any impediment to the execution of the scheme. F (ii) All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must 'be urgent in the context of the country's need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature, of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries under s. SA. (iii) There is no indication whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf ofi the State that the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the question whether it was a case, necessitating the elimination of the enquiry under s. SA. The recitals in the notification on the contrary G indicate that elimination of the enquiry under s. SA was treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under s. SA. [782 G; 783 C--D] The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, in recitals by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances existed which necessitated the elimination ,of an <:,nquiry under s. SA and that the mind -0f the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. [783 El H (h) The High Courn has thus correctly applied the provisions of s. 106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances, although the High Court was not quite correct in stating that i66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1977] 1 S.C.R. A some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under ss. 101 :rnd 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State to discharge its duty under s. 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been to say that the failure of the State to producei the evidence of facts especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under s. 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with other evidence and the attendant facts and circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled the petitioners to discharge their burdens under ss. 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act in these B particular cases. [783 F-G] c D E F G H ARGUMENTS For the Appellant : It was urged on beha·lf of the appellant State that the High Com' was i11 error in placing the burden of proof on the State. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in [1962] 1 S.C.R. 422 (pages 432, 433 and 434). In particular it was urged that where a statute prescribes •something as a condition precedent for the exercise of statuory power, and there is a recital of existence of that condition in the notification then it is presumed that the statutory condition exists and it is for the other side to bring material before the Court to show that recital is not supported on any evidence or is made ma/afide. Simila.rly, in [1967] 1 S.C.R. 373 Raja Anand's case the very scope of section 17 ( 4) was discussed and the State relied on the observations at page 381 indicating the scope of judicial review. The original petitioners have not brought their case within the grounds mentioned in thfa case. The Barium Chemicals case and other cases cited can be easily distinguished on the ground that the statutory requirements for the exercise of particular power, for example under section 237 of the Companies Act are differently worded where certa.in circumstances are required to· be present. The Land Acquisition Act does not require the existence of any such circumstances. Besides, a decision of the Supreme Court has clearly indicated the scope of judicial review in [967] 1 S.C.R. 373 and the respondents have not shown why any different view should not be taken. Cases like ILR 67 Gujarat 620, AIR 1964 Punjab 477 and ILR 19711 Cuttack 21 can be easily distinguished. There specific allegations were made by the petitioners giving reasons as to why they challenged the notifications. ln reply thereto the State was bound to bring the material to negative those charges. In the present case if such allega·tions were made by the writ petitioners the State would have certainly placed all the necessary materials 10 negative those allegations. In the absence of any such allega.tion the correct rule to apply was the one stated in [1962] 1 SCR 422 & 433. Apart from this it may be noticed that by amending paragraph XVI (ARP) was introduced which made some effort to make concrete allegations regardlBJ: the invalidity of the notification under section 17 ( 4). The substance of these allegations is that out of the whole area which is to be acquired urgency clause has been applied only to some areas and, therefore, petitioners prayed that a-n inference of exercise of powers in a casual and lighthearted manner should be drawn. To this averment, and since such concrete allegation was made a concrete reply has been given by the State m para 6 at Record Pa.ge 55 explaining why some lands were selected for urgency clause and why some notifications were issued earlier and why other. came to be issued later. It is not open to the respondents to enlarge their attack on grounds otber than those which are stated in para. 16A. Lastly it was urged that the satisfaction under section 17 ( 4) is not subjective satisfaction but must be an objective test because section 17 ( 4) should be deemed to be controlled by section 17 sub-sections 1 ancl 2. In the first place such a, contention was never raised in the High Court. Secondly, there are number of decisions of the Supreme Court where the opinion whicl! i~ to be formed on s. 17(4) is held to be subjective satisfaction. Thin;lly_ NARAYAN GOVIND GAVATE V. MAHARASHTRA 767 the contention does not interpret complete provisions of section 17(1), 17(2) A .and 17(4). It is submitted under section 17(1) and 17(2) on on.e hand .and the power under 17 ( 4) are two separate and independent powers which can be exercised at different stages of the Land Acquisition proceedings. Vide AIR 1970 Allaha·bad 151-Hakim Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh, .under 17 (1) possession can ·be taken without there being an award under section 11 but there has to be a publication of a notice under section 9(1) and also a• notification under section 6 preceded by an iaquiry under section 5 (a). In such cases and the cases covered by 17 (2) B the urgency may be determined on an objective basis but the whole purpose of s. 17(4) is to dispense with an enquiry under section S(a) which is to be followed again by a notification under section 6 and for such a purpose all that is required is that in the case of any land in the opinion .of the" appropriate Government the provision of sub-section 1 or sub-section 2 are &pplicable. In other words the lands must be either waste or arable lands (which is, of course to be determined objectively) but so far as the questior.- of urgency is concerned it is the opinion that the Government has to form and that is not to be established by any objective test but its subjective C satisfaction . . For the Respondents : The Appellant (the State of Maharashtra) tried to a,rgue that lack af bonafides were not argued in the Court below. In the pleadings of the Respondents (the writ petitioners) it was urged at pages 10 and 11 of the record that in fact it is significant that in some cases the Ja.nds which are sought to be acquired for the same purpose vis-a-vis for development and utilisation of the land as industrial and residential area the urgency clause ha5 not been applied. It was further stated at page 11 that the power under Section 17 ( 4) has been exercised in casual and light-hearted manner without there being any proper application of mind to the condition requisite for the exercise of that _power. The said point was argued before the High Court and the High Court dealt with the same at pages 61 to 70 of the ·record. It woo argued before this Hon'ble Court that the circumstances under 'Section 17 ( 4) is not subjective satisfaction but . an objective test since Section 17 ( 4) is controlled by Section 17 ( 1) and (2). It was further argued that the Government never applied its mind nor did it place before the High Court any material to show that there was any -urgency with respect to some of the lands and no Llrgency in respect to the others. It is admitted tha,t the lands in all these cases were acquired for the same purpose inter alia for the development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area. It Nas further argued that the burden of proof on the fads of these cases would be on the State since the reasons for urgency are only in the knowledge of the authority issuing the Notification. The cases cited by the Couusel for the State have no application since in those cases the petitioners could establish that the impugned notific&tion was not bo11a fide. D E F In this case the respondent, land owners, bad . in their Writ Petitions G specific,.ny raised the quest!Qn that the authority had not applied its mind and treated it light-heartedly and the Notification was not bona fide.. The State however did not place !lny material before the Court to show that the autharity had applied its mind or there was any clue to the urgency. The respondents have been deprived of their right to prefer objections under Section SA of the Act and those objpections are to be filed within 30 days. The notifications in this case have been made· at the interval of months and even more than a yenr. The notification under Section 17 ( 4) was made with respect to some lands and it was not made with respect to other. The St&te has not satisfactorily explained the reasons for this. From all these •facts and circumstances the respondents argue that the notification under H 768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 S.C.R. A Section 17 ( 4) was not bonafide and the authority haJ not applied its mind and the High Court was right in setting aside the said notification. B c D E F G H CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1616-1621 / ~ ' Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated 16th/19th of June 1967 of the Bombay High Court in S. C. A. Nos. 1971/64, 115, 216; 343, 345 and 579/65 and CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1411-1413/69 • Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated 16-6-67 of the Bombay High Court in S. C. A. Nos. 1971/64, 115 and 345/65 . • M. Natesan, A. K. Sen (In CA 1412/69), Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli In CAs. 1616-1621/69 and Respondents in CAs. 1411-1413/ 69. M. H. Phadke, M. N. Shroff for Respondents In CAs. 16161621/69 and for Appellants in CAs. Nos. 1411-1413/69. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. There arc nine appeals before us, aftec ·certification of fitness of the cases for appeals/ to this Court, directed against orders governed by the same judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Maharashtra disposing of Writ Petitions relating to four groups of lands, which were sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). A notification dated 11th October, 1963, under Section 4 of the Act, was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette with regard to the first group. The public purpose recited in the notification was "development and utilisation of said land as a residential and industrial area". The notification goes on to state : "AND WHEREAS the Commissioner, Bombay Division. is of the opinion that the said lands were waste or arable lands and their acquisition is urgently necessary, he is further pleased to direct under. sub-section ( 4) of Section l 7 of the said Act, that the provisions o~ Section 5-A of the said Act shall not apply in respect of the said land". Thereafter, a notification was issued under section 6 of the Act on 19th December, 1963, followed by notices under Section 9(3) and (4) of the Act. With regard to the second group of lands, identically similar notifications under Section 4 together with identically worded. declarationcum-direction, under section 17 ( 4) of the Act, were issued on 13th June, 1965. As proceedings with regard to land comprised in thi' group_ were not followed up by notification under section ti of the Act. it was conceded by Counsel, in the course of arguments on behalf of the State in the High Court, that the proceedings had become invalid. NARAYAN GOVIND GAVATE V. MAHARASHTRA (Beg, .f.) 769 We are, therefore, not concerned with lands in ti# group in the appeals now before us. Nevertheless, it is not devoid of significance that the terms of the notification under section 4(1) and the declaration-cum-directions, under section 17 ( 4) of the Act, in this group are also identical with those in the first two groups. This certainly suggests that directions under section 17 ( 4) could have been. mechanically issued in all the groups in identical terms without due application of mind to the factual requirements prescribed by law. The third group of land was also the- subject matter of identically similar notifications under section 4 of the Act datec\ 13th June, 1964, togcthel with identically worded declarations cum directions under section 17 ( 4) of the Act. This land was notified under section 6 of the Act in 28th September, 1964, followed by the notice under section 9, sub-ss. ( 3) and ( 4) of the Act on 28th October, 1964. With regard to the land in the fourth group, a notification under Section 4 of the Act took place on 13th November, 1963, in substan .. ti~lly the same terms as those in the other three groups; but, there was no di rec lion under section 17 ( 4) of the Act. Consequently, the appellant filed his objection pn 9th January, 1964. Later, a notification under section 6 of the Act on 13th July, 1964, was accompanied by identically worded vague declaration of urgency under section 17 ( 4) of the Act. This strange course of action suggests that notification under section 17 ( 4) was probably made only to save the botheration of the inquiry begun under section SA of the Act which should and could have been concluded quite easily before 13th July, 1964. In . Writ Petitions before the High Court, the submission that no public purpose existed was not pressed in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Somavanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & 'Ors.(1) In Shri Rmntanu Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(') acquisition of land for development of industrial areas and residential tenements for persons to live on industrial estates was held to be legally valid for a genuinely public purpose. This ground, therefore, need not detain us, although the appellants, who are owners of the properties acquired, have formally raised it also by means of the six appeals filed by them (Civil Appeals Nos. 1616-1621 of 1969). In agreement with the High Court, we hold that notification under section 4( 1) of the Act were valid in all these cases. The real question which:;has been argued before us is raised by the State of Maharashtra in its three appeals Nos. 1411 to 1413 of 1969, against the .view taken by ai Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in its judgment dated 16th June, 1967. It had held that, although notifications under section 4 ( l) of the Act were valid, yet, the Government of Maharashtra had not d;scharged its burden of showing facts constituting the urgency which impelled it to give declarationscum-directions under section 17 ( 4) of the Act dispensing with the (I) [1963] 2 SCR 774 (2) [1971] I SCR 719 at 723 A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H 770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 S.C.R. enquiries under scuion SA of the Act. Therefore, ac.:tions taken pursuant to those declarations under section l 7 ( 4) of the Act were held to be invalid. and quashed. The result was that parties were relegated to the position they' could take up in the absence of declarations under section 17 ( 4) of the Act in the cases decided by the High Court. The correctness of this view is assailed before us. The case oE the State of Maharashtra is stated as follows in the affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition officer: "I deny, the allegation that the urgency clause has been applied without any valid reason. I respectfully sufnnit that whether an urgency exists or not for exercising the powers under section 17 (1) of the Act is a matter sol~y for the determination of the State Government or the Commissioner. Without prejudice to this, respectfully submit that as mentioned in the impugned Notifications, the 3rd Respondent formed the opinion that the ~aid lands were urgently acquired for the public purposes mentioned therein, and, accordingly, he was pleased to so direct under the provisions of Section 17 ( 4) of the Act." The respondent No. 3 referred to in the affidavit is the Commissioner of Bombay Division. It is significant that, in the affidavit filed in reply to t\le assertions of petitioners, denying the existence of such urgency as to attract the provisions of section 1 7 ( 4) of the Act, the position primarily taken up, on behalf of the State of Maharashtra, was that the existence on the urgency is not a justiciable matter at all left for determination by Courts. After that, there is a bare submission stating the alternative case that the 3rd respondent had formeq the opinion that the said lands were urgently required for the public purpose mentioned therein. But, no facts or particulars are stated to which the mind of the Commissioner could have been applied in forming the opinion that the situation called for declarations-cum-directions, under section 17 ( 4) of the Act, to dispense with inquiries under section SA of the Act in these cases. It is important to remember that the mind of the officer or authority concerned has really to be directed towards formation of an opinion on the need to dispense with the inquiry under Section SA of the Act. It is true that, in such cases, the formation of an opinion is a subjective matter, as held by this Court repeatedly with regard to situations in which admiuistrativ