# Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 927
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-08-05
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 3343 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, R. Mahadevan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/narayan-yadav-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-39013
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgment
relying on the confessional FIR filed by the appellant-accused
himself and the medical evidence to uphold his conviction, however,
altering it from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.25 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302, 304
Part I - Confessional FIR, not admissible in evidence -
Appellant-accused himself lodged FIR confessing the murder
of the deceased in a drunken quarrel after the deceased
allegedly made an obscene remark about the appellant's
girlfriend - Convicted u/s.302, IPC - High Court relied on the
confessional FIR and medical evidence to uphold conviction,
however, it was altered from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I, giving
benefit of Exception 4 to s.300 - Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable - Confessional FIR is not admissible in
evidence - Contents of the FIR are hit by s.25, Evidence Act, being
a confession before a police officer - An FIR of a confessional nature
made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against
him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon
after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report,
which is admissible as evidence of his conduct u/s.8, Evidence Act -
High Court erred in reading the contents of the FIR lodged by the
appellant into evidence - There was no question at all for the High
Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record with
the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant - Further,
the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor is
not a witness of fact - Evidence of such an expert is of an advisory
character - An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder
solely on the basis of medical evidence on record - Furthermore, the
depositions of the panch witnesses do not inspire any confidence -
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
569
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
Most of them turned hostile - No discovery of fact at the instance
of the appellant, relevant and admissible u/s.27, Evidence Act, was
established - Also, the High Court erred in invoking Exception 4 to
s.300, IPC - Appellant acquitted. [Paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 52]
Penal Code, 1860 - Exception 4 to s.300 - When cannot be
invoked - Discussed. [Paras 40-43, 48-50]
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.27, 8 - Implication of - Conditions
necessary for the applicability of s.27 - Discussed. [Paras 33, 36]
Evidence - Of expert witness - Nature - Advisory:
Held: An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because
of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge
may not be fully equipped to assess - The evidence of such an
expert is of an advisory character - The credibility of the expert
witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his
conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis
of those conclusions. [Para 28]

## Text

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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 568 : 2025 INSC 927
Narayan Yadav
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 3343 of 2025)
05 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in passing the impugned judgment
relying on the confessional FIR filed by the appellant-accused
himself and the medical evidence to uphold his conviction, however,
altering it from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 - s.25 - Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302, 304
Part I - Confessional FIR, not admissible in evidence -
Appellant-accused himself lodged FIR confessing the murder
of the deceased in a drunken quarrel after the deceased
allegedly made an obscene remark about the appellant's
girlfriend - Convicted u/s.302, IPC - High Court relied on the
confessional FIR and medical evidence to uphold conviction,
however, it was altered from s.302, IPC to s.304 Part I, giving
benefit of Exception 4 to s.300 - Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable - Confessional FIR is not admissible in
evidence - Contents of the FIR are hit by s.25, Evidence Act, being
a confession before a police officer - An FIR of a confessional nature
made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against
him, except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon
after the offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report,
which is admissible as evidence of his conduct u/s.8, Evidence Act -
High Court erred in reading the contents of the FIR lodged by the
appellant into evidence - There was no question at all for the High
Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record with
the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant - Further,
the High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor is
not a witness of fact - Evidence of such an expert is of an advisory
character - An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of murder
solely on the basis of medical evidence on record - Furthermore, the
depositions of the panch witnesses do not inspire any confidence -
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
569
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
Most of them turned hostile - No discovery of fact at the instance
of the appellant, relevant and admissible u/s.27, Evidence Act, was
established - Also, the High Court erred in invoking Exception 4 to
s.300, IPC - Appellant acquitted. [Paras 24, 25, 28, 29, 52]
Penal Code, 1860 - Exception 4 to s.300 - When cannot be
invoked - Discussed. [Paras 40-43, 48-50]
Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.27, 8 - Implication of - Conditions
necessary for the applicability of s.27 - Discussed. [Paras 33, 36]
Evidence - Of expert witness - Nature - Advisory:
Held: An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because
of his specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge
may not be fully equipped to assess - The evidence of such an
expert is of an advisory character - The credibility of the expert
witness depends on the reasons provided in support of his
conclusions, as well as the data and material forming the basis
of those conclusions. [Para 28]
Case Law Cited
Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [1957] 1 SCR 657 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC
42; Faddi v. State of M.P. [1964] 6 SCR 312 : 1964 SCC OnLine
SC 123; Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 134 :
1965 SCC OnLine SC 109; Murli v. State of Rajasthan [2009] 13
SCR 378 : (2009) 9 SCC 417; A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State
of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; State of Andhra Pradesh v.
Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr. [1977] 1 SCR 601 : (1976) 4 SCC
382; Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh [2012] 11 SCR
848 : (2012) 13 SCC 663; Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1993]
3 SCR 696 : (1993) 4 SCC 238; Surain Singh v. State of Punjab
[2017] 2 SCR 824 : (2017) 5 SCC 796 - relied on.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Confessional FIR; Confessional FIR not admissible in evidence;
Conviction altered from Section 302, Penal Code, 1860 to Section
304 Part I; Confession before a police officer; FIR of confessional
nature made by accused; Confession made by accused before the
police; Contents of the FIR hit by Section 25, Evidence Act, 1872;
570
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Murder; Obscene remark about girlfriend; Section 27, Evidence
Act, 1872; Section 8, Evidence Act, 1872; Corroboration of medical
evidence with the confessional part of the FIR; Doctor not a witness
of fact; Expert Witness; Incorrect application of Exception 4 to
Section 300, Penal Code, 1860; Panch witnesses turned hostile;
Non-confessional FIR admissible against the accused.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3343 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2025 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 1538 of 2021
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Vishek Vats,
Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Ms. Kiran Bala Agarwal.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. Sugandha Jain, Prabodh Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................................
2
B.
ANAYLYSIS ...................................................................................
6
a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence ....................
7
b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature ....
20
c.
Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872 ............
22
d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC... 25
C.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 34
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
571
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated
16.01.2025 (hereinafter referred to as "Impugned Judgment")
by which the appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the
judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court came
to be partly allowed by altering the conviction of the appellant
herein from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short,
"the IPC") to Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
A.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3.
The appellant (original accused) himself lodged a First Information
Report (FIR) dated 27.09.2019 with Korba Kotwali Police Station,
District Korba, which came to be registered for the offence punishable
under Section 302 of the IPC. The FIR reads thus:
"On 27.09.2019 I came to the P.S. Kotwali on the orders
of Chowki Incharge for getting the Nalsi number in Crime
No. 0/19 for the offence under Sections 302 and 380 IPC
respectively. Nalsi number detailed that I am residing in
the house of my relative Rajnath Yadav situated near
the Pump House, Korba. I earn my livelihood as a milk
supplier. I started work with Ram Babu Sharma, Thekedar
past 15-20 days. Ram Babu Sharma used to call me for
having drink at his house. Ram Baby invited me at his
place on 24.09.2019. I went to his house at about 9.30
PM situated at Parshuram Nagar. We both sat and drank.
Meanwhile I showed my girlfriend's pic from my mobile.
Then he said that get your girlfriend at my place and leave
her with me for one night. Hearing this quarrel started
between us and we started to fight. Then I picked up a
knife kept in his house for cutting vegetables and inflicted
blows on his neck and stomach in anger and killed him by
hitting a log of wood on his head, legs and private part.
Thereafter I dragged his dead body near the bedside and
covered it with a cloth that I took out from an almirah. Then
I ransacked his room and took away his purse containing
Rs. 7000 and keys of the Bolero car. I locked the room
from outside and got the Bolero outside and locked the
main door and ran towards Bilaspur in Bolero. I met with
572
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
an accident at Raipur Road, ahead of Bilaspur. When
I regained consciousness in morning I found myself in
Saragaon Hospital where my mother and Yuvraj Yadu both
were present. Today morning I came to Korba after getting
discharged from the hospital. I informed about the incident
to my mausa Rajnath Yadav, Rahul Chaudhari and Anuj
Yadav and also informed the CSEB Chowki. Then I went
to Ram Babu's house with police people and pointed out
the dead body. My vehicle is at the place of accident. I
am filing the report. Investigation to be done."
4.
Upon registration of the FIR, lodged by the appellant himself, at
the concerned Police Station referred to above, the investigation
commenced. It appears that the investigating officer, after arresting
the appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking
open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in
a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of
offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. The knife
allegedly used by the appellant to inflict injuries on the deceased was
recovered from the place of occurrence, i.e., the deceased's house.
The clothes and other articles were also collected in presence of the
panch witnesses by preparing a panchnama, and were sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis. The clothes of
the appellant were discovered at his instance from the residence of
his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, by drawing a panchnama.
5.
The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn
in the presence of the panch witnesses. The body of the deceased
was then sent for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem report
Exhibit-PW 34 recorded the following injuries found on the body of
the deceased:
"1. An incised wound was present on the right Side of
his forehead measuring 6 X 2 cm, deep to the bone, in
a vertical position.
2. An incised wound was present on the left side of his
forehead, the size of which was 3 X 1 cm, deep to the
bone, in a vertical position.
3. An incised wound was present on the skin of the right
parietal bone of the head, which was 4 X 2 cm, deep to
the bone, in a vertical position.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
573
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
4. An incised lesion was present on the skin of the left
parietal bone, which was 5 X 2 cm in size, deep to the
bone, in a vertical position, which was on the middle part
of parietal bone.
5. An incised wound was present on the anterior part of
the abdomen at the iliac fossa part which was 4 X 2 X 2
cm in size.
6. An incised wound was present on the upper right side
of the chest, below the clavicle bone, the size of which
was 4 X 2 deep to the upper part of the lung."
6.
The cause of death, as stated in the post-mortem report and duly
proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), was shock resulting from excessive
bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the upper lobe
of the right lung.
7.
Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet came to be filed by
the investigating officer, and the filing of chargesheet for the offence
enumerated above culminated in the Sessions Case No. 9 of 2020.
8.
The Sessions Judge, Korba, proceeded to frame charge against the
appellant for the offences mentioned above. The appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial,
the prosecution examined the following witnesses:
i.
PW-1, Rahul Kumar Chaudhari, panch witness (turned hostile);
ii.
PW-2 Kamlesh Kumar, son of the deceased;
iii.
PW-3 Ravishanker Sriniwas, panch witness;
iv.
PW-4 Rampradeep Sharma, panch witness;
v.
PW-5 Ramniwas Sharma, panch witness;
vi.
PW-6 Jalashwar Sakar, panch witness;
vii. PW-7 B.R. Chaudhary, Police witness
viii. PW-8 Sudama Prasad, Police witness
ix.
PW-9 Ashok Pandey, Police witness
x.
PW-10 Dr. R.K. Divya, Medical Officer who performed postmortem
xi.
PW-11 Hemant Patle, Police witness
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[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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9.
The prosecution also adduced a few documentary evidence.
10. Upon completion of the recording of the oral evidence, further
statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In his statement, the appellant
claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime and
asserted his complete innocence.
11. The Trial Court, upon overall appreciation of both oral as well as
the documentary evidence on record, reached the conclusion that
the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and
accordingly, it held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder and
sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
12. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before
the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and
altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 of the IPC
to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC
13. In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is before this
Court with the present appeal.
B.
ANAYLYSIS
14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any
error in passing the Impugned Judgment.
15. The entire judgment of the High Court could be termed as erroneous
on several grounds, there are errors apparent on the face of the
Impugned Judgment. The first misstep was that the High Court
examined the medical evidence on record in detail and then
proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the FIR
lodged by the appellant himself. In doing so, the High Court fully
convinced itself that the appellant's statements in the form of a
confession, as contained in the FIR, were entirely corroborated by
the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the
appellant had committed the alleged crime. In arriving at such a
conclusion, the High Court overlooked some fundamental principles
of criminal jurisprudence.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
575
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
a.
Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence
16. The FIR was exhibited in evidence (Exhibit P-14) through the oral
evidence of the investigating officer PW-9, Ashok Pandey. PW-9
proved his signature on the FIR and also identified the signature
of the first informant i.e., the appellant-herein. However, the other
contents of the FIR could not have been proved through the testimony
of the investigating officer. A plain reading of the FIR indicates that it
contains a confession by its maker i.e., the appellant-herein, regarding
the commission of the alleged offence.
17. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict
its maker as provided in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (for short, "the Act of 1872"), or to corroborate his evidence
as envisaged in Section 157 of the Act of 1872. In a criminal trial,
however, neither of these is possible as long as the maker of the
statement is an accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be
examined as a witness [See: Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 42]. J.L. Kapur, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench
in that decision has observed:
"A first information report is not a substantive piece
of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the
statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence
Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. It
cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial
if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or
contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is
not evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The High Court failed to take into consideration two landmark
decisions of this Court - one in Faddi v. State of M.P., 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 123, and the other in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of
Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109.
19. In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:
"If the FIR given by the accused contains any admission
as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act there is no
bar in using such an admission against the maker thereof
as permitted under Section 21 of the Act, provided such
576
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
admission is not inculpatory in character. In the judgment
their Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC
366] in the following lines:
"But it appears to us that in the context in which the
observation is made and in the circumstances, which
we have verified from the record of that case, that the
Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information
report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted
to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High
Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this
observation really refers to a first information report
which is in the nature of a confession by the maker
thereof. Of course, a confessional first information
report cannot be used against the maker when he be
an accused and necessarily cannot be used against
a co-accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. In Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), this Court sounded a note of caution
that when the statement in the FIR given by an accused contains
incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory portion
therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
21. In Faddi (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the FIR
lodged by the accused himself therein was admissible in evidence.
In the facts of the said case, this Court held that the objection to the
admissibility of the FIR lodged by the appellant was not sound, as the
FIR only contained a few admissions, and those admissions did not
amount to a confession so as to render the entire FIR inadmissible
in evidence. We quote the relevant observations made by this Court
in Faddi (supra) as under:
"14. It is contended for the appellant that the first information
report was inadmissible in evidence and should not have
been therefore taken on the record. In support, reliance
is placed on the case reported as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P
[AIR 1957 SC 366]. We have considered this contention
and do not see any force in it.
15. The report is not a confession of the appellant. It
is not a statement made to a police officer during the
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
577
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act
and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by
the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on
the question to be determined by the Court viz. how
and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or
whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the
correctness of certain statements' of the prosecution
witnesses is correct or not. Admissions are admissible in
evidence under Section 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines
an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary,
which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or
relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons,
and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in
the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant
and may be proved as against a person who makes
them. Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to Section 21 are of
the circumstances in which an accused could prove his
own admissions which go in his favour in view of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 21 to the provision
that admissions could not be proved by the person who
makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions of an
accused can be proved against him.
16. The Privy Council, in very similar circumstances, held
long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor [LR 44 IA 137] such
first information reports to be admissible in evidence. It
was said in that case at p. 142:
"It is important to compare the story told by Dal
Singh when making his statement at the trial with
that what he said in the report he made to the police
in the document which he signed, a document which
is sufficiently authenticated. The report is clearly
admissible. It was in no sense a confession. As
appears from its terms, it was rather in the nature
of an information or charge laid against Mohan and
Jhunni in respect of the assault alleged to have
been made on Dal Singh on his way from Hardua to
Jubbulpur. As such the statement is proper evidence
against him....
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[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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It will be observed that this statement is at several
points at complete variance with what Dal Singh
afterwards stated in Court. The Sessions Judge
regarded the document as discrediting his defence.
He had to decide between the story for the prosecution
and that told for Dal Singh."
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the facts
of that case were distinguishable in some respects from
the facts of this case. Such a distinction, if any, has no
bearing on the question of the admissibility of the report.
The report was held admissible because it was not a
confession and it was helpful in determining the matter
before the Court.
17. In Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] Kapur, J. who
spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts:
"An objection has been taken to the admissibility
of this report as it was made by a person who was
a co-accused. A first information report is not a
substantive piece of evidence and can only be used
to corroborate the statement of the maker under
Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under
Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence
against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes
an accused, not to corroborate or contradict other
witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence."
It is on these observations that it has been contended for
the appellant that his report was inadmissible in evidence.
Ostensibly, the expression 'it cannot be used as evidence
against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an
accused' supports the appellant's contention. But it appears
to us that in the context in which the observation is made
and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the
record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely
held the first information report lodged by the co-accused
who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and
that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment,
this observation really refers to a first information report
which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof.
[2025] 8 S.C.R.
579
Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
Of course a confessional first information report cannot
be used against the maker when he be an accused and
necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. Further,
the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is
significant and indicates what the Court meant was that
the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the coaccused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court
did not mean - as it had not to determine in that case -
that a first information report which is not a confession
cannot be used as an admission under Section 21 of the
Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other
provisions of that Act. We find also that this observation
has been understood in this way by the Rajasthan High
Court in State v. Balchand [AIR 1960 Raj 101] and in State
of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh [AIR 1962 Raj 3] and by the
Allahabad High Court in Allahdia v. State [1959 All LJ 340] .
18. We therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility
of the first information report lodged by the appellant is not
sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it
in evidence and have made proper use of it."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Aghnoo
Nagesia (supra). The following observations of this Court at
paragraphs 9 to 18 are relevant and are quoted below:-
"9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions
of law dealing with confessions made by an accused.
The law relating to confessions is to be found generally
in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to
31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading
"Admissions". Confession is a species of admission,
and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an
admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its
admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section
24 excludes confession caused by certain inducements,
threats and promises. Section 25 provides: "No confession
made to a police officer shall be proved as against a
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[2025] 8 S.C.R.
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person accused of an offence". The terms of S. 25 are
imperative. A confession made to a police officer under
any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against
the accused. It covers a confession made when he was
free and not in police custody, as also a confession made
before any investigation has begun. The expression
"accused of any offence" covers a person accused of
an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of
the offence when he made the confession. Section 26
prohibits proof against any person of a confession made
by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made
in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial
ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to
a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not
qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession
made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a
proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24,
25 and 26.It provides that when any fact is deposed to
as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of
a police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any
statement made by any person to a police officer in the
course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry
or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save
as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under
sub-s. (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it
shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the
Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to
include a confession made to a police officer in the course
of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the
course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate
under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject
to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except
as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession
by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected
under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the
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course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to
any other person made by him while in the custody of a
police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in
the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions
seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by
an accused to a police officer or made by him while he
is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted,
and should not be used in evidence against him. They are
based upon grounds of public policy and the fullest effect
should be given to them.
10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
for the recording of the first information. The information
report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used
to corroborate the informant under S. 157 of the Evidence
Act or to contradict him under S. 145 of the Act, if the
informant is called as a witness. If the first information is
given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the
information is admissible against him as evidence of his
conduct under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information
is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the
accused as an admission under S. 21 of the Evidence Act
and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cri.
Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated 24-1-1964: (AIR 1964 SC
1850), explaining Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957
SC 366 and Dal Singh v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137:
(AIR 1917 PC 25). But a confessional first information report
to a police Officer cannot be used against the accused in
view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define "confession".
For a long time, the Courts in India adopted the definition
of "confession" given in Art. 22 of Stephen's Digest of the
Law of Evidence. According to that definition a confession
is an admission made at any time by a person charged
with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he
committed that crime. This definition was discarded by the
Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor,
66 Ind App 66 at p. 81: (AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord
Atkin observed:
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".......no statement that contains self exculpatory
matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which if true would negative
the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a
confession must either admit in terms the offence, or
at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute
the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating
fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not
of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the
accused is the owner of and was in recent possession
of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no
explanation of any other man's possession." These
observations received the approval of this Court in
Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94
at p. 104; (AIR 1952 SC 354 at p. 357). In State of
U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p.
21: (AIR 1960 SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J.,
referred to a confession as a statement made by a
person stating or suggesting the inference that he
has committed a crime.
12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an
admission of the offence by a person charged with the
offence. A statement which contains self-exculpatory
matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative
the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an
accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should
be tendered in evidence and if part of the admission is
exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not
at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only.
See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952 SCR 1091
at p. 1111: (AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350) and 1953 SCR
94 : (AIR 1952 SC 354). The accused is entitled to insist
that the entire admission including the exculpatory part
must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no
assistance to the accused where no part of his statement
is self-exculpatory; and the prosecution intends to use the
whole of the statement against the accused.
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Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts and
may reveal not only the actual commission of the crime
but also the motive, the preparation, the opportunity,
the provocation, the weapons used, the intention, the
concealment of the weapon and the subsequent conduct of
the accused. If the confession is tainted the taint attaches
to each part of it. It is not permissible in law to separate
one part and to admit it in evidence as a non-confessional
statement. Each part discloses some incriminating fact,
i.e., some fact which by itself or along with other admitted
or proved facts suggests the inference that the accused
committed the crime, and though each part taken singly
may not amount to a confession, each of them being part
of a confessional statement partakes of the character
of a confession. If a statement contains an admission
of an offence, not only that admission but also every
other admission of an incriminating fact contained in the
statement is part of the confession.
14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any provision
of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the Evidence Act,
the entire confessional statement in all its parts including
the admissions of minor incriminating facts must also be
excluded, unless proof of it is permitted by some other
section under as S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance
and content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of
admission of incriminating facts in a confessional statement
is permitted.
15. Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may not
amount to a confession at all. Take a case of a person
charged under S. 301-A of the Indian Penal Code and
a statement made by him to a police officer that "I was
drunk: I was driving a car at a speed of 80 miles per
hour. I could see A on the road at a distance of 80 yards;
I did not blow the horn: I made no attempt to stop the
car; the car knocked down A". No single sentence in this
statement amounts to a confession; but the statement
read as a whole amounts to a confession of an offence
under S. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would
not be permissible to admit in evidence each sentence
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separately as a nonconfessional statement. Again, take a
case where a single sentence in a statement amounts to
an admission of an offence. 'A' states "I struck 'B' with a
tangi and hurt him". In consequence of the injury 'B' died.
'A' committed an offence and is chargeable under various
sections of the Indian Penal Code. Unless he brings his
case within one of the recognised exceptions, his statement
amounts to an admission of an offence, but the other parts
of the statement such as the motive, the preparation, the
absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon and
the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the gravity of
the offence and the intention and knowledge of the accused,
and negatives the right of private defence, accident and
other possible defences. Each and every admission of an
incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement
is part of the confession.
16. If the confession is caused by an inducement, threat
or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the Evidence
Act, the whole of the confession is excluded by S. 24.
Proof of not only the admission of the offence but also
the admission of every other incriminating fact such as
the motive, the preparation and the subsequent conduct is
excluded by S. 24. To hold that the proof of the admission
of other incriminating facts is not barred by S. 24 is to rob
the section of its practical utility and content. It may be
suggested that the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other
admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they are of
no weight, as they were caused by inducement, threat or
promise. According to this suggestion, the other admissions
are relevant but are of no value. But we think that on a
plain construction of S. 24, proof of all the admissions of
incriminating facts contained in a confessional statement
is excluded by the section. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar not
only proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a
police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police
officer but also admissions contained in the confessional
statement of all incriminating facts related to the offence.
17. A little reflection will show that the expression
"confession" in Ss. 24 to 30 refers to the confessional
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Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
statement as a whole including not only the admissions of
the offence but also all other admissions of incriminating
facts related to the offence. Section 27 partially lifts the
ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much
of the information whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in
consequence of the information, if the other conditions of
the section are satisfied. Section 27 distinctly contemplates
that an information leading to a discovery may be a part
of the confession of the accused and thus fall within the
purview of Ss. 24, 25 and 26. Section 27 thus shows that
a confessional statement admitting the offence may contain
additional information as part of the confession. Again, S.
30 permits the Court to take into consideration against a
co-accused a confession of another accused affecting not
only himself but the other co-accused. Section 30 thus
shows that matters affecting other persons may form part
of the confession.
18. If the first information report is given by the accused to
a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement,
proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The
confession includes not only the admission of the offence
but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the
offence contained in the confessional statement. No part
of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence
except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S. 27."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. The legal position, therefore, is this - a statement contained in the FIR
furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any manner,
be used against another accused. Even as against the accused who
made it, the statement cannot be used if it is inculpatory in nature
nor can it be used for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction
unless its maker offers himself as a witness in the trial. The very
limited use of it is, as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of
1872, against its maker alone, and only if the admission does not
amount to a confession.
24. To put the aforesaid in simpler terms, an FIR of a confessional nature
made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence against him,
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except to the extent that it shows he made a statement soon after the
offence, thereby identifying him as the maker of the report, which is
admissible as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Act of
1872. Additionally, any information furnished by him that leads to the
discovery of a fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872.
However, a non-confessional FIR is admissible against the accused
as an admission under Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant.
25. Thus, the first error that the High Court committed was to read the
contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant into evidence. As observed
earlier, the FIR lodged by the appellant amounts to a confession,
and any confession made by an accused before the police is hit by
Section 25 of the Act of 1872. There was no question at all for the
High Court to seek corroboration of the medical evidence on record
with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by the appellant.
26. Once we say that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of
the Act of 1872, being a confession before a police officer, the only
remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral
evidence of the panch witnesses.
b.
Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature
27. At this stage, we may look into some curious findings recorded by
the High Court in its Impugned Judgement. We quote the relevant
paragraphs as under:
"16. Now, the next question for consideration would be
whether the accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator
of the crime in question, which the learned trial Court has
recorded in affirmative by relying upon the testimony of
Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), who conducted post-mortem had
opined that the cause of death is shock due to right side
of haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right lung
secondary to incised wound over upper part of right side
of front of chest. The Doctor ultimately opined through his
report the nature of death to be homicidal. Thus, on the
basis of testimony of Dr R.K.