# NARAYANIBAI v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS

- **Citation:** [1970] 3 S.C.R. 172
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-10-29
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 256 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, J. M. Shelat, C. A. Vaidialingam, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/narayanibai-v-state-of-maharashtra-ors-4896
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act (i1 of
1961)-Act included in Ninth Schedule to
Constitution by the Seventeenth Amendment-Action taken under Act after the date of judgment
in Golaknath:s case-If vq./idity of action can be questioned.
The petitioner was called upon to show cause why land held by her in
excess of the ceiling area shall not be deemed surplus land and shall not
vest in the State under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on
Holdings) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon challenged the validity of
the Act on the ground that it violated the fundamental rig!lts under Arts.
14, 19(1) (f) and 31 df the Constitution. It was contended that though
A
B
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the Act was, by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, incorporated in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and p·rotected from . D
challenge by Art. 3 !B, action sought to be taken in pursuance of such an
Act infringing the fundamental rights was :iable to be declared void, if
that action was taken subsequent to February 27, 1967, the date on which
judgment of this Court in Go/aknath's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 was
.delivered.
HELD : The petition must fail.
(I) In Golaknath's case five of the Judges upheld the Seventeenth
Amendment· on the basis of the 'doctrine of prospective overruling : five
relied upon the power of Parliament to exclude, from the pale of challenge,
the Acts and Regulations in the J-linth Schedule, and one Judge was of the
view that the Acts impugned in that case were protected by Arts. 31 (I),
(2) (2A) and 31A(l). J'hercfore, the majority of ten Judgesof the Court
expressly held that by virtue of Art. 3 !B the Acts incorporate<! in
the
Ninth Schedule were not exposed to challenge on the ground that they infringed the fundamental rights. [175 D-E, G-H]
(2) Those judges who relied upon the 'doctrine of prospective of overruling', did not accept the doctrine in all its implications as understood by·
the U.S. Courts:
They merely denied to Parliament power, after February 27, 1967, to amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge
any of the fundamental rights of the people, but amendments made prior
to that
date and action taken pursuant to the amendme'nts, both before
and after that date were not to be deemed
invalid
on the ground that
fundamental rights v.·ere infrir..ged. [176 C-E]
( 3) This Court had upheld the validity of the Act as .amended
by
Act 13 of 1962, in State 'of Maharashtra v.
Madhavrao Damodar Pati/-
chand, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712. [176 F-G]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 256 of 1968.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indra for enforcement of the fundamental rights.
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NARAYANIBAI V, MAHARASHTRA (Shah, J,)
173
M. C. Setalvad, S. L, Khanna and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the
petitioner,
B. Sen, M. S. K. Sastri and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.
K. Jayaram, for the intervener.

## Text

172
NARAYANIBAI
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
October 29, 1969
[J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, K. S. HEGDE
AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act (i1 of
1961)-Act included in Ninth Schedule to
Constitution by the Seventeenth Amendment-Action taken under Act after the date of judgment
in Golaknath:s case-If vq./idity of action can be questioned.
The petitioner was called upon to show cause why land held by her in
excess of the ceiling area shall not be deemed surplus land and shall not
vest in the State under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on
Holdings) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon challenged the validity of
the Act on the ground that it violated the fundamental rig!lts under Arts.
14, 19(1) (f) and 31 df the Constitution. It was contended that though
A
B
c
the Act was, by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, incorporated in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and p·rotected from . D
challenge by Art. 3 !B, action sought to be taken in pursuance of such an
Act infringing the fundamental rights was :iable to be declared void, if
that action was taken subsequent to February 27, 1967, the date on which
judgment of this Court in Go/aknath's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762 was
.delivered.
HELD : The petition must fail.
(I) In Golaknath's case five of the Judges upheld the Seventeenth
Amendment· on the basis of the 'doctrine of prospective overruling : five
relied upon the power of Parliament to exclude, from the pale of challenge,
the Acts and Regulations in the J-linth Schedule, and one Judge was of the
view that the Acts impugned in that case were protected by Arts. 31 (I),
(2) (2A) and 31A(l). J'hercfore, the majority of ten Judgesof the Court
expressly held that by virtue of Art. 3 !B the Acts incorporate<! in
the
Ninth Schedule were not exposed to challenge on the ground that they infringed the fundamental rights. [175 D-E, G-H]
(2) Those judges who relied upon the 'doctrine of prospective of overruling', did not accept the doctrine in all its implications as understood by·
the U.S. Courts:
They merely denied to Parliament power, after February 27, 1967, to amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge
any of the fundamental rights of the people, but amendments made prior
to that
date and action taken pursuant to the amendme'nts, both before
and after that date were not to be deemed
invalid
on the ground that
fundamental rights v.·ere infrir..ged. [176 C-E]
( 3) This Court had upheld the validity of the Act as .amended
by
Act 13 of 1962, in State 'of Maharashtra v.
Madhavrao Damodar Pati/-
chand, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712. [176 F-G]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 256 of 1968.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indra for enforcement of the fundamental rights.
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F
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H
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B
c
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F
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NARAYANIBAI V, MAHARASHTRA (Shah, J,)
173
M. C. Setalvad, S. L, Khanna and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the
petitioner,
B. Sen, M. S. K. Sastri and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.
K. Jayaram, for the intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J.-Narayanibai is the holder of 142 acres and 8
gunthas of "dry crop" land in village Teosa, District Amravati
in the State of Maharashtra.
By notice dated March 12, 1968,
under s. 17 (1) of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling
on Holdings) Act 27 of 1961, the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Chanduri, called upon Narayanibai to show cause why land held
by her in excess of the "ceiling area" shall not be deemed surplus
land and shall not vest in the State. Narayanibai filed a petition
in this Court claiming a declaration that Maharashtra Act 27
of 1961 is ultra vires the State Legislature in that it violated the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) & (g)
and 31 in Part III of the Constitution, and for an order restrain·
ing the State of Maharashtra and the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Chanduri, from dispossessing the petitioner from the land in
question or any part thereof.
Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 is by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, incorporated m the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. Article 3 IB of the Constitution enacts
that the Acts and Regulations in the Ninth Schedule and the
provisions thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have
become void on the ground that the Act, Regulation or any provision thereof is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any
of the right~ co_nferred by Part III of the Constitution. Articles
14, 19(1) (f) & (g) and 31 fall in Part III of the Constitution
and guarantee certain fundamental rights, but by virtue of incorporation of the Act in the Ninth Schedule protection in respect
of infringement of any of the fundamental rights by the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 or any provision thereof is not claimable.
Mr. Setalvad for the petitioner contends that in view of the
judgment of this Court in 1. C. Golaknath & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & A nr. (') action sought to be taken in pursuance of an
Act in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution infringing any
fundamental rights is liable to be declared void, if that action is
taken subsequent to the date on which the judgment of this Court
in that case was delivered. Counsel submitted that in I. C. Golak
H
Nath's case(') it was held that all Acts in the Ninth Schedule and
action taken pursuant thereto were to be regarded as \'alid on1y
(I) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1910] 3 S.C.R.
till February 27, 1967, by the declaration made by this Court,
and that actions· taken after February 27, 1967 pursuant to any
of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule, must, to the extent they infringe
any of the fundamental rights, be deemed void. Counsel said that
the effect of the "doctrine of prospective over-ruling" as understood by the American Courts and adopted by this Court in /, C.
Golak Nath's case(') is to regard as valid acts done prior to the
date on which the Court delivered the judgment in I. C. Golak
Nath's case('), btit acts done after that date which are inconsistent with the law declared by this Court are invalid.
In .our judgment, that is not the effect of ./. C. Golcik Nath's
case('). In that case Wanchoo, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ., held
that the word 'law' in Art. 13 ( 1) does not include any law in the
nature of a constitutional provision, and Art. 13(2) when it
speaks of the State making any law, refers to the law made under
the provi~ions contained in Ch. I of Part XI of the Constitution :
it has no reference to the constituent power of amendment under
Art. J68.
Bachawat and Ramaswami, JJ., substantially agreed
with that view. They therefore regarded all the Acts in the Ninth
Schedule as beyond challenge on the plea that the Acts or provisions infringed any of tlie fundamental rights under Part III
of the Constitution.
Subba Rao, C.J., who spoke for himself and four of his colleagues observed that Art. 13 ( 3) gives an inclusiv.: definition of
"law" which does not, prima fade, exclude "constitutional law",
and proceeded to enunciate certain propositions, of which the
following are, for the purposes of the present case, relevant :
" ( 2) Amendment is 'law' within the meaning of
Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if it takes
away or abridges the rights conferred by Part Ill thereof, it is void.
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1.3) The Constitution (First Amendment)
Act
1951, Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955'
and the C::onstitution, (Seventeenth Amendment) Act:
1964, abn.dge the ~cope ~f. the fundamental rights. But,
on the basis of earlier decmons of this Court, they were
G
valid.
.
( 4) On .the, application of the .d?ctrine of 'prospective ove~-ruling, : . .
our dec1S1on . will· have only
prospective operation ancl, therefore the said amendments will continue to be valid.
'
( 5) . . . that the Parliament will have no power
H
from the date of this decision to amend any of the pro-
(1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
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NAllAYANIWAI V, MAHARASHTRA (Shah, /.)
175
visions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away
or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein."
Applying those propositions he held that since the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act could not be declared void,
validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act X of 1953,
and the Mysore Land Reforms Act X of 1962, as amended by
Act XIV of 1965, callenged in that case could not be questioned
on th" ground that those Acts offended Arts. 13, 14 or 31 of the
Constitution.
Hidayatullah, I., also held that the expression "law" in Art.
13(2) did include within itself constitutional law.
But he held
that though the Seventeenth Amendment which extended the definition of 'estate' to include ryorwari and agricultural iands was
an inroad upon the fundamental rights, the Acts were protected
from challenge under Art. 31A (l)(a) of the Constitution.
It is clear from this analysis that the Court ( excPpc Hidayatul!ah, J.,) opined, though for different reasons, that the Acts
incorporated in Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution were
not liable to be challenged as infringing the fundamental rights.
Hidayatullah, J., was of the view that the challenge to the two
Act>" which were impugned in that case was unsuccessful, because
of the provisions ol Arts. 31(1), (2), (2A), 31A(l) of the
Constitution.
·
Mr. Setalvad contended that this interpretation of the judgment of the Court in /. C. Golak Nath's case(') is in consistent
with the basic concept of the "doctrine of prospective over-ruling"
as enunciated in the Courts of its origin, and it must on that '
accou.nt be held that the Court intended to give effect to the traditional concept of the doctrine in alt its implications. But Subba
Rao, C.J., used the expression "doctrine of prospective overruling"
as a convenient 111ode oil describing the power which the Court
exercised in/. C. Golak Nath's case('). He has not expressly
or by implication sought to incorporate in the stream of our jurisprudence, "the doctrine: of prospective overruling" in all its manifold implications as understood by the American Courts. Again,
the ten Judges who agreed in upholding the Seventeenth Amendment were equally divided : five relied upon the "doctrine of
prospective overruling" : five upon the power of the Parliament
to exclude ftom the pale of challenge the Acts and Regulations
in the Ninth Schedule, notwithstanding that they infringe any
of the fundamental righti; in Part III of the Constitution.
Mr. Setalvad conten<jed that to uphold the validity of the Acts
in the Ninth Schedule,. and action taken thereon after February 27,
(1) [1%71 2 S.C.R. 762.
176
SUPREMII COURT ·REPORTS
[1970] 3 s.c.R,
1967 involves a basic inconsistency. Counsel submitted that an
Act ~annot be both valid and invalid at the same time.
He
submitted that with a view to avoid chaos in the body politic the
wheel of time was not reversed till the date of the Constitution
First Amendment, but the majority of the Court still denied to
the Parliament power to incorporate in the Ninth Sc;hedule Acts
and Regulations removed from the pale of judicial scrutiny on
the plea that the fundamental rights of the people were infringed
thereby.
If that be the true effect of the judgment, said Mr.
Setalwad, it must logicaily follow from the judgment in 1 .. C.
Golak Nath's case(') that the Seventeenth Amendment has no
validity after February 27, 1967.
We are unable to agree with
that interpretation for more reasons than one. The first and the
most obvious is that the majority of the Court expressly held that
by virtue of Art. 31 (B) the Acts
incorporated in
the Ninth
Schedule were not exposed to challenge on the ground that they
infringed the fundamental rights of the people.
The second is
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that even the Judges for whom Subba Rao, C.J. spoke did not
accept the "doctrine of prospective overruling" in all its implica'
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lions as understood by the American Courts.
They merely
denied to the Parliament power after February 27, 1967 to amend
the Constitution so as to take away any of the fundamental rights
of the people, but amendments made prior to that date and action
taken pursuant to the amendments, both be.fore and after Fooruary 27, 1967, were not to be deemed invalid, on the ground that
they infringed the guarantee of fundamental rights.
That being
the true effect of the judgment in I. C. Golak Nath's case('), the
petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of the
action taken llllder the provisions of the Maharashtra Act of 1961
on the ground that the action had been taken after February 27,
1967.
.
.
In a later judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra etc.
v. Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand & Ors. etc.( 2 )" the validity of
the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 as amended by Act 13 of 1962
was challenged and this Court upheld the validity of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 as originally enacted and also the amendE
ment made by Act 13 of 1962.
·
a
The petition fails and is dismissed.
There will be no order
as to costs.
V.P.S.
I 1) 11967] 2 S.C.R. 762.
(2; [1968J 3 S.C.R. 71c.
Petition dismissed.