# NARESH CHANDRA GANGULI v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 411
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-01-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1959
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/naresh-chandra-ganguli-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-and-others-1772
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Preventive Detention-Object and ground of such detentionDistinction·-Ground, Meaning of-Copy of order to be served on
detenu-Contents-Preventiw Detention Act, r950 (4 of r950),
SS. 3, 7.
The appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The copy of the grounds of the ~
order of detention served on him stated that he was detained as
he had been acting in a way prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order as evidenced by the particulars stated in its four
paragraphs. Paragraph 1 stated, inter alia, that the appellant
had, in a meeting of the refugees vilified the Prime Minister of
India for his unsympathetic attitude towards the sufferings of
the refugees and gave expression to violent feelings regarding his
person while referring to the recent Nehru-Noon Pact; paragraph 2 stated that he called upon the members of his party to
build up a strong movement against the implementation of the
pact and tried to rouse passion by alleging the Prime Minister
had no sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated that at
another meeting he denounced the pact and stressed the need of
forming a militia with the youths of the country for the safety
of the people living in border areas and paragraph 4, that he
intended to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned, and was
likely to instigate plans endangering the personal safety of the
Prime Minister. The High Court, on an application under ss. 491
and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a
writ of habeas corpus, while upholding the order of detention, held
that the said paragraphs were really ·not the grounds of detention but merely pieces of evidence on which the only ground of
detention, namely, acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, was based, that paragraph 4 was merely an
inference of fact having a bearing on the ground of detention. It
was contended, inter alia, on appeal that paragraph 4 was
extremely vague and devoid of particulars, and that the allegations made had no rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act and so he was deprived of his right to make
an effective representation. All this was, however, denied on
behalf of the State.
Held, that the High Court had overlooked the difference
between the objects of d()tention specified in els. (a) and (b) of
s. 3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts which constitute
the grounds envisaged by s. 7 of th~ Act.
z959
11fay zo
I959
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, read
together, contemplate that the copy of the order passed by the
Nare;h Chandm ·detaining authority under s. 3(2) of the Act to be served on the
Ganguli
v.
Tlie SloU of
West Bengal
an& Others
Sinha J.
detenu should contain, (1) a· preamble reciting in terms one or
more of the sub-clauses of els. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1) as its object or
objects, (2) the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which Jed to the passing of the order' of detention,
informing'the detenu as to why he was detained, and (3) particulars, if and where necessary, but not those referred to in subss. (3) and (4) of s. 3 of the Act.
In the instant case, however, the error of confusion made by
the High Court could not invalidate its order since the grounds
of detention, characterised by the High Court as recitals of fact,
read together, were in no.way ambiguous, indefinite or irrelevant
• to the object of the detention, namely, the maintenance of public
order and did not deprive the detenu of his right of representation.
·
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] S.C.R.
167, considered.
Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu Kashmir. [1956]
S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 59 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the
January 8, 1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 126 of 1958.
AND
PETITION No. 51 QF 1959.
Petition under Article

## Text

< ,
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
NARESH CHANDRA GANGULI
v.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS
(and connected petition)
(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Preventive Detention-Object and ground of such detentionDistinction·-Ground, Meaning of-Copy of order to be served on
detenu-Contents-Preventiw Detention Act, r950 (4 of r950),
SS. 3, 7.
The appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The copy of the grounds of the ~
order of detention served on him stated that he was detained as
he had been acting in a way prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order as evidenced by the particulars stated in its four
paragraphs. Paragraph 1 stated, inter alia, that the appellant
had, in a meeting of the refugees vilified the Prime Minister of
India for his unsympathetic attitude towards the sufferings of
the refugees and gave expression to violent feelings regarding his
person while referring to the recent Nehru-Noon Pact; paragraph 2 stated that he called upon the members of his party to
build up a strong movement against the implementation of the
pact and tried to rouse passion by alleging the Prime Minister
had no sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated that at
another meeting he denounced the pact and stressed the need of
forming a militia with the youths of the country for the safety
of the people living in border areas and paragraph 4, that he
intended to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned, and was
likely to instigate plans endangering the personal safety of the
Prime Minister. The High Court, on an application under ss. 491
and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the issue of a
writ of habeas corpus, while upholding the order of detention, held
that the said paragraphs were really ·not the grounds of detention but merely pieces of evidence on which the only ground of
detention, namely, acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, was based, that paragraph 4 was merely an
inference of fact having a bearing on the ground of detention. It
was contended, inter alia, on appeal that paragraph 4 was
extremely vague and devoid of particulars, and that the allegations made had no rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act and so he was deprived of his right to make
an effective representation. All this was, however, denied on
behalf of the State.
Held, that the High Court had overlooked the difference
between the objects of d()tention specified in els. (a) and (b) of
s. 3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts which constitute
the grounds envisaged by s. 7 of th~ Act.
z959
11fay zo
I959
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, read
together, contemplate that the copy of the order passed by the
Nare;h Chandm ·detaining authority under s. 3(2) of the Act to be served on the
Ganguli
v.
Tlie SloU of
West Bengal
an& Others
Sinha J.
detenu should contain, (1) a· preamble reciting in terms one or
more of the sub-clauses of els. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1) as its object or
objects, (2) the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which Jed to the passing of the order' of detention,
informing'the detenu as to why he was detained, and (3) particulars, if and where necessary, but not those referred to in subss. (3) and (4) of s. 3 of the Act.
In the instant case, however, the error of confusion made by
the High Court could not invalidate its order since the grounds
of detention, characterised by the High Court as recitals of fact,
read together, were in no.way ambiguous, indefinite or irrelevant
• to the object of the detention, namely, the maintenance of public
order and did not deprive the detenu of his right of representation.
·
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] S.C.R.
167, considered.
Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu Kashmir. [1956]
S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 59 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the
January 8, 1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No. 126 of 1958.
AND
PETITION No. 51 QF 1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the
appellant and petitioner.
B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for the respondents.
1959. May 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SINHA J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fitness
granted by the Calcutta High Court, is directed against
the order of that Court, dated January, 8, 1959, in
Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 126of1958, refusing
to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus in respect
')f one Ram Prasad Das (who will hereinafter be referred to as ' the petitioner '). This Court, by an order
' .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S.~
413
dated April 20, 1959, directed that the application of
the petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution, for a
similar writ in respect of the same person, be posted
for hearing immediately after the aforesaid criminal
appeal, and that it shall not be necessary that the petitioner be produced before this Court at the time of the
hearing of the writ petition. Hence, both the matters,
relating as they do, to the same subject-matter, have
been heard together and will be disposed of by this
judgment.
It appears that Naresh Chandra Ganguli, an advocate, practisiilg in the Calcutta High Court, made an
application under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, as a frien"d, on behalf on the petitioner, in detention in the Dum Dum Central Jail in
24 Parganas, under the orders of the Government of
West Bengal. The application was made to the Calcutta
High Court on the following allegations: The petitioner is the Secretary of the West Be,ngal Committee
of the Bharatiya Jana Sangha, one of the four big
political parties, as recognized by the Election Commission of India. On or about October 7, 1958, towards
evening, when the petitioner was coming out of the
Basanta Cabin, a tea stall, at the crossing of the
College Street and Surya Sen Street, after having
addressed a meeting at the College Square, he was
stopped on the street by the police and was taken to
the office of the Special Branch (Police) on Lord Sinha
Road. From there, he was sent to the Dum Dum
Central Jail, where he was served with an order, being
Order No. 83 dated October 7, 1958, purporting to have
been made by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta,
under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act
(No. IV, of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as' the Act').
The order is in these terms :-
"ORDER Dated 7-10-58.
No.83.
Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person
known as Sri Ram Prasad Das, son of late Bepin
Behari Das of Village P-S-P Dist.
and of 6,
Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta that with a view to
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
West Bengal
antl Others
Sin/la J.
I959
Naresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
West Bengal
and Others
Sinha].
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
to the maintenance of Public Order it is necessary .so
to do.
Now therefore in exercise of the Powers conferred
by Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950
(IV qf 1950) I made this order directing that the said
Sri Ram Prasp,d Das be detained.
Given under my hand and seal of office.
Sd/- Illegible,
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta."
On or about October 8, 1958, the petitioner was served,
in the Dum Dum Central Jail, with a further order,
being Order No. 85 dated October 8, 1958, which is as
follows:
" Government of West Bengal.
Office of the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta.
Dated 8-10-58.
No. 85.
Grounds for detention under clause (ii) of clause
(a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950).
To
Sri Ram Prasad Das S/o Bepin Behari Das, of
6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.
You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made in exercise of power conferred by
Section 3(2) (c) of the P.D. Act 1950 (Act IV of 1950)
on the ground that you are acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, as
evidenced by the particular8 given below:-
1. That on 13-9-58 you attended a meeting of
Eastern Indian Refugee Council held at the Refugee
office at 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane and vilified Prime
Minister of India for his allegedly turning a deaf ear
to the untold miseries of the refugees and while
referring to the recent agreement between the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan you vented feelings
of violence against the Prime Minister of India by
emphasising that in order to save the refugees and
the territories of the Indian Union, Sri Nehru should
be murdered, if necessary and so the need of another
Nathuram Godse was felt now.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
2. That in course of discussion with members of
your party on 17-9-58 at 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, you
stated that the Indian Prime Minister had made a
Present of certain Indian enclaves to Pakistan in
pursuance of the policy of appeasement which has
been initiated by the Late Mahatma Gandhi and
called upon the members to build up strong movement against the implementation of Nehru-Noon
Pact. You also tried to rouse passions by alleging
that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy
for West Bengal.
3. That on 26-9-58 you attended another meeting
of the South Durtolla Branch of the Jana Sangha at
Jatin Mitter Park, where you denounced the aforesaid agreement between the two Prime Ministers-and
stressed the need of forming a militia with the
youths of the count.ry for the safety of the people
living in border areas and urged all to enrol themselves for the said purpose.
4. That you intend to proceed to Delhi on 9-10-58
and that you are likely to instigate plans which may
adversely affect the personal security of the Prime
Minister of India.
Your action above is bound to result in the main.
tenance of public order being prejudicially affected.
You are hereby informed that you may make a
representation to the State Government against the
detention order and that such representation should
be addressed to the Assistant Secy. Home (Special)
Department, Government of West Bengal, and forwarded through the Supt. of the Jail in which you
are detained as early as possible.
You are also informed that u/s 10 of the P.D. Act
1950 (IV of 1950) the Advisory Board shall, if you
desire to be heard hear you in person and that if
you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you
should intimate such desire in your representation to
the State Government.
Sd/- Illegible,
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta."
r959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
West Bengal
and Others
Sinha].
z959
N11resh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
Th• SlaJ• of
West Bengal
ond Others
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
On or about October 11, 1958, the petitioner was
served with another order which is in these terms :
"Government of West Bengal.
Home Department, Special Section.
Order
Calcutta, 11-10-58.
No. 1882 H. S.
In exercise of the power conferred by Section 3(2)
of the· Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950),
the Governor is pleased to approve order No. 83
dated the 7-10-58 made under Section 3(2) of the
said Act by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta
directing that Sri Ram Prasad Das son of Late
Bepin.Behari Das of6, lVIurlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta
be detained.
By order of the Governor.
Sd/- Illegible
Dy. Secty. to the Govt. of West Bengal."
The petitioner made a representation in writing
against the order of detention aforesaid, denying and
refuting the grounds of his detention, set out above.
He particularly denied the allegation contained in
ground .No. 1 aforesaid, as totally false, and stated
that there was no meeting, as alleged, on September 13,
1958, and that he had not made any speech attributed to him in the said ground. He also denied that
he had advocated in any meeting for the formation of a
militia, as alleged. But he claimed that he had a right
to express his views about the policy of the Government or the Prime Minister, relating to Pakistan and/
or about Nehru-Noon Pact or similar other Agreements.
He denied that he indulged in any violent speeches, or
that he tried to rouse passions. His further contention
was that the ground No. 4 was extremely vague in the
absence of any particulars about how, where and when
and in what manner, he was likely to instigate any
plan which was to adversely affect the personal
security of the Prime Minister of India, and the nature
or particulars of any such contemplated plan.
In his application to the High Court, the petitioner
also submitted that the grounds supplied to him, had
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
no rational connection with the objects mentioned in
s. 3 of the Act, and that, therefore, he was deprived
of his right to make an effective representation. He
also alleged that he was a member of a political party
opposed to the party in power, and held definitely
pronounced views about the failure of the Government
to tackle the problem of refugees, as also about the
relationship between the Government aIJ.d the State of
Pakistan.
He also claimed to be a leader of the
refugees, and as such, had been relentlessly criticising
the policies of the present Government. He further
asserted that the order of detention passed against
him, was a clear case of political victimisation. He
alleged further that the order of detention, on the face
of it, was mala fide, and was a clear infringement of
his fundamental right to freedom of speech and association, guaranteed by the Constitution.
On November 28, 1958, the petitioner was brought
to the Writers' Buildings in Calcutta, and placed before
the Advisory Board as constituted under the Act. The
petitioner was heard in person by the Advisory Board
on that date, and on the next day, that is, November
29, 1958, after the hearing by the Advisory Board,
another order, being order No. 1967 H. S., dated
November 29, 1958, made by the Governor of West
Bengal, was issued, confirming the aforesaid order of
detention No. 83 dated October 7, 1958, set out above,
and continuing the petitioner's detention till the expiration of 12 months from the date of detention. On
those allegations, the petitioner submitted to the High
Court that the orders aforesaid, relating to his detention
in the Dum Dum Central Jail, were "illegal, invalid,
ultra Vires, void and inoperative."
An affidavit in opposition, on behalf of the State
of West Bengal and other opposite parties, was sworn
to by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta-opposite
party No. 3 in the case. In the aforesaid affidavit,
the deponent averrred that he was satisfied on the
records and materials placed before him that the
petitioner was a person likely to act in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and
that with a view to preventing him from doing so, it
s~
I959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
West Bengal
and Others
Sinha].
'959
N aresh Chandra
GanguH
v.
The State of
West Bengal
and Olhers
Sinha].
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
was necessary to make the order of detention on the
grounds mentioned in the Order No. 85 dated October
8, 19.58 (set out above). He also averred that the orders
of detention aforesaid, together with the grounds and
all other relevant particulars, were reported by him to
the Government of West Bengal, which, after duly
considering the same, duly approved of the orders of
detention. It was also stated in the affidavit that the
petitioner personally .appeared before the Advisory
Board on November 28, 1958, and the Advisory Board,
upon a consideration of the records and materials
placed before it, and the representation made by the
petitioner, and after hearing the petitioner in person,
reported to the Government of West Bengal that in
the opinion of the Advisory Board, there was sufficient
cause for the detention of the petitioner. The Commissioner of Police further stated in the affidavit that
he had duly passed and signed the orders of detention
after considering the records and materials in respect
of the petitioner, in exercise of the powers conferred
under the Act, bona.fide and without any malice whatsoever, on being satisfied about the necessity of the
said orders of detention. He also stated that he denied
all statements of facts to the contrary, contained in
the affidavit in support of the petition, and he undertook to produce the original records in the Court at
the hearing. Allegations of victimisation on political
grounds, and that the. order of detention was mala fide
a:ti.d in infringement of the fundamental rights of the
petitioner, were specifically denied.
The matter was heard by a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court (Guha Roy and H.K. Sen, JJ.),
which, by its order dated January 8, 1958, discharged
the Rule. In the course of its judgment, the High
Court made the following observations :-
"On a reading of the order however, it is quite
clear to us that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 do not
state the grounds of the order. There is only one
ground of the order and that is that the petitioner
was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the remaining paragraphs
of the order make it quite clear that what are stated
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
419
in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute different pieces
of evidence by which the authority making the
order came to the conclusion that the petitioner was
acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order and therefore should be detained
under the Act."
Hence, the High Court, on a construction of s. 3 of the
Act, came to the conclusion that the grounds of detention in respect of the petitioner, were not vague, and
that the statement in para. 4 of the detention order
No. 85 dated October 8, 1958, quoted above, was not
a ground but only a piece of evidence out of several
such pieces of evidence on which the ground of detention was based.
It was further pointed out that
para. 4 aforesaid, was not by itself a ground of the
order, but merely an inference of fact which had some
bearing on the ground of the order. The High Court
also pointed out that there was no ambiguity in the
recitals, including these in para. 4 aforesaid. In that
view of the matter, the order of detention of the peti-
'tioner was upheld, and the Court further held that the
question whether the whole order was bad on the
ground that one of th~ grounds was too vague, did not
a.rise in the case.
The petitioner moved the Calcutta High Court for a
certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this
Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court, delivering
the order of the Division Bench of that Court, granting
the necessary certificate, observed that the view of the
High Court that para. 4 aforesaid, was not a ground
of detention but only one of the items of evidence in
support of the ground, raised a serious question to be
determined by this Court, particularly because a view
contrary to the one taken by the High Court in the
instant case, appeared to have been taken by this Court
and by the Calcutta High Court itself in a number of
decisions. That is how this appeal has come to this
Court. Besides preferring the aforesaid appeal, the
petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, praying for a writ in the nature of habeas
corpus, and a Constitution Bench, by its order dated
April 20, 1959, directed that this appeal be posted for
I959
Nares Ii Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The Stale of
West Bengal
and Othe..1
Sinha].
z959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
Wesl Bengal
and Ot!ie,.s
Sinha.].
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
hearing by a Constitution Bench, on May 11, 1959, on
a cyclostyled paper book, and that the filing of the
petition of appeal and the statements of cases be dispensed with. The Court further ordered that the
application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, be
posted for hearing immediately after the criminal
appeal. That is how both the matters have been
placed one after the other for hearing before us.
The order under appeal takes the view that the
various grounds of detention, are stated in s. 3 (l)(a)
(i) (ii) (iii) and (b) of the Act, and that there can be no
grounds apart from those. The High Court then, on
a reading of the Order No. 85, set out above, has held
that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not the grounds of
detention, as contemplated by s. 3 of the Act, but that
they only constitute different pieces of evidence by
which the authority making the order came to the
conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which
was the only ground on which the order of detention
in question was founded. The High Court was right
in its literal construction of the order impugned in
this case, which proceeds to recite the four numbered
paragraphs, preceded by the introductory clause "as
evidenced by the particulars given below." But the
case of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar
Vaidya('), has laid it down that cl. (5) of Art. 22 of
the Constitution, confers two distinct though interrelated rights on the petitioner, namely, (I) the right
to be informed of the grounds on which the order of
detention has been made, and (2) the right to be enabled, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against the order. This Court further pointed
out in that case, that the grounds which have a rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3,
have to be supplied. As soon as that is done, the first
condition of a valid detention is complied with. The
second condition of such a detention is fulfilled only
after the detenu has been supplied with such information as will enable him to make a representation.
If the information supplied in order to enable a detenu
(1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
to make a represention, rloes not contain sufficient
particulars, the detenu is entitled to ask for further
particulars which will enable him to make a representation. Therefore, if there is an infringement of either
of the two rights, and any one of the two conditions
precedent to a valid detention, as aforesaid, has not
been fulfilled, the detenu has a right to approach this
Court for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. In
other words, the grounds for making an order of
detention, which have to be communicated to the
detenu as soon as practicable, are conclusions of facts,
and are not a complete recital of all the relevant facts.
Therefore, the grounds, that is to say, those conclusions of facts, must be in existence when the order of
detention is made, and those conclusions of facts have
to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be.
This Court, and naturally, the High. Courts, have
treated the recitals in the orders of detention, with
particular reference to the several clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act, as stating the
object to be achieved in making the order of detention.
The order of detention may also contain recitals of
facts upon which it is based. If the order of detention also contains the recitals of facts upon which it is
founded, no further question arises, but if it does not
contain the recitals of facts which form the basis of
the conclusions of fact, justifying the order of detention, then, as soon as may be (now, under s. 7, within
a maximum period of five days from the date of
detention), the person detained has to be informed of
those facts which are the basic facts or the reasons on
which the order of detention has been made. Section
3 of the Act requires the authority making ~n order
of detention, to state the fact of its satisfaction that it
is necessary to make the order of detention of a particular person, with a view to preventing him from
acting in a manner prejudicial to one or more of the
objects contained in clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1)
(a) and (b) of the Act. Section 7 requires that the
person detained should be communicated the grbunds
on which the order of detention has been made, so as
to afford him the earliest opportunity to make a
z959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The Stale of
West Bengal
and Others
Sinha].
z959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The State of
West Bengal
and Others
-,
Sinha].
422
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(U)
representation against the order, to the appropriate
Government. The statement of facts contemplated
by s. 7, would, thus, constitute the grounds, and not
the matters contained in one or more of the clauses
and sub-clauses under s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act.
Section 3 also requires that when an order of detention
has been made, the State Government concerned has
to be apprised of the order of detention as also of the
grounds on which the order of detention has been
made, together with such other particulars as have a
bearing on the order and the grounds. And finally,
after the order has been approved by the State
Government, that Government, in its turn, has to
report to the Central Government the fact of the
detention, together with the grounds on which the
order of detention had been made ; and such other
particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order.
Thus, on a consideration of the provisioi:is of ss. 3 and
7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenu
has to be served with a copy of the order passed by the
authority contemplated by sub-s. (2) of s. 3, containing,
firstly, recitals in terms of one or more of the subclauses of cl. (a) and (b) of s. 3(1), which we may call
the 'preamble', and secondly, the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact which
have led to the passing of the order of detention,
informing the detenu as to why he was being
detained. If the grounds do not contain all the
particulars necessary for enabling the detenu to make
his representation against the order of his detention,
he may ask for further particulars of the facts, an<;i
the authority which passed the order of detention is
expected to furnish all that information, subject, of
course, to the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 ; that is to
say, the person detained shall not be entitled to the
disclosure of such facts as the authority making the
order, considers against public interest to disclose.
Thus, the order of detention to be served upon the
persol'I. detained would usually consist of the first two
parts, namely, the preamble and the grounds, but it
may also consist of the third part, namely, the
---
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
particulars, if and when they are required or found to be
necessary. But it has to be noted that the particulars
referred to in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3, would not be
identical with the particulars which we have called the
third part of the order. The State Government, as also
the Central Government, would, naturally, be placed
in possession of all the relevant facts and particulars
on which the order of detention has been passed. But
those particulars may ·contain such details of facts as
may not be communicated, in public interest, to the
person detained.
From what has been said above, it is clear that the
High Court was in error in so far as it treated what we
have called 'the preamble' as the grounds of detention
contemplated by s. 7 of the Act. But this error, as
will presently appear, has not affected the legality,
propriety or correctness of the order passed by the
High Court in the habeas corpus proceedings before it.
The High Court, as already indicated, after making
those observations which we have held to be erroneous,
proceeded further to say that there was no ambiguity
in the recitals of facts, as the High Court characterised
them and which we have called the grounds.
The contention raised before the High Court has
been repeated before us, that the grounds contained in
para. 4, are vague and indefinite, not enabling the
person detained to make his representation. It will
appear from the paragraph aforesaid that the petitioner intended to proceed to Delhi on October 9, 1958,
with a view to instigating plans against the personal
security of the Prime Minister. It is clear that the
place, date and purpose of the planned nefarious
activity, have all been stated as clearly as could be
expected. But it was argued that it was also necessary
to state the details of the plan to be hatched in Delhi.
There are several answers to this contention. Paragraph 4 has reference to something which was apprehended but lay in the womb of the future. From the
nature of the fact that it was not an event which had
already.happened but what was apprehended to be in
the contemplation of the detenu and his associates, if
any, no .further details of the plan could possibly be
I959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The Slate of
West Bengal
and Others
Sinha].
I959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The Slate of
West Bengal
and Othets
Sinha].
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
disclosed. As was observed in the decision of this
Coul'.t in The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar
Vaidya(') (at pp. 184 and 185), vagueness is a.
relative term. Its meaning must vary with the facts and
circumstances of each case. What may be said to be
vague in one case, may not be so in another, and it
could not be asserted as a general rule that a ground is
necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained
person can be to deny it. If the statement of facts is
capable of being clearly understood and is sufficiently
definite to enable the detained person to make his
representation, it cannot be said that it is vague.
Further, it cannot be denied that particulars of what
has taken place, can be more definitely stated than
those of events which are yet in the offing. In the very
nature of things, the main object of the Act is to
prevent persons from doing something which comes
within the purview of any one of the sub-clauses of
cl. (a) of s. 3(1) of.the Act.
It was next contended that some of the grounds at
least are irrelevant. This was not said of the first
paragraph of the grounds, set out above. It was said of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 that they are irrelevant to the
main object of the order of detention, namely, the
"maintenance of public order"
In our opinion, there
is no substance in this contention either. All the
statements in the four paragraphs of the grounds,
which have to be read together as being parts of a
connected whole, calling upon persons to "build up
strong movement against the implementation of
Nehru-Noon Pact", and to "rouse passions by alleging
that the Indian Prime Minister had no sympathy for
West Bengal", cannot be said to be wholly unconnected
with the maintenance of public order. Similarly,
denouncing the agreement between the two Prime
Ministers and stressing the need of forming a militia
with the youths of the country, cannot be said to have
no repercussions on the maintenance 'of public order.
And lastly, any instigation against the personal
safety of the Prime Minister of India cannot but have
a deleterious effect on the maintenance of public ordt>r.
(r) (r95r) S.C.R. r67.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
It was sought to be argued that any weak link in
the chain of facts and circumstances, said to have been
the basis of the order of detention, would affect the
legality of the whole order. This argument postulates
that there are many grounds which are either vague or
irrelevant. In this connection, particular reliance was
placed on the observations of this Court in Dwarka
Dass Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir (1),
to the effect that if some of the reasons on which the
order of detention had been based, are found to be
non-existent or irrelevant, the Court ought to quash
the order, because it is not in a position to know which
of the reasons or the grounds, had operated on the
mind of the authorities 'Concerned, when they decided
the pass the impugned order. As already pointed out,
no such situation arises in this case, because, in our
opinion, none of the grounds is either vague or irrelevant. It may also be pointed out that the ground of
irrelevance was not urged before the High Ofrurt, but
even so, we allowed the petitioner's counsel to urge
that ground before us, and having heard him on that
aspect of the matter, we have no doubt that there is
no justification for the contention that any of the
matters taken into consideration by the authorities
concerned in the matter of the detention of the petitioner, was irrelevant.
For the :ceasons given above, it must be held that
there is no merit in this appeal or in the application
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. They a.re, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal and applicatian dismissed.
(1) (1956) S.C.R. 948.
54
I959
N aresh Chandra
Ganguli
v.
The Stall of
West Ben1al
and Others
Sinha].