# NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1973] 1 S.C.R. 40
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1972-03-29
- **Bench:** C. A. Vaidialingam, I. D. Dua, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/national-buildings-construction-corporation-v-pritam-singh-gill-and-others-5804
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

B
industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Scope af-'Work-
.111an', if includes une }Vhose services have been terminated.
The respondent, an employee of the appellant was suspended and
the suspension remained in force till the date of his dismissal.
He applied to the Labour Court under s. 33C{2) of the Jndrutrial Disputes
Act, 1947, for computation of the benefits and amounts he was entitled
C
to receive during the period of suspemion, and the Labour Court decided
• f
.in his favour.
On the question whether the section can be invoked by a dismissed
workman in respect of benefits and salary due to him for the perioC
prior tc the date of dismissal,
HELD: The suo-section provides that where any workman is entitled
to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money and if any question· arises as to
the amount due, then the question may be decided by the appropriate
'Labour Court.
The definition of 'workman' in s. 2(s) of the Act includes within its fold, only, for the purpose of a proceeding ur.der the
Act in <elation to an industrial dispute. persons who have been dismissed,
.discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that
dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that
dispute.
The definitivn specifically excludes from its
purvie•v
fourcatcgo'ries of perrnns •omployed in an industry, who would have otherwise
been wit'1in the periphery of the definition.
But, because the definition
'includes only specified types of
dismissed,
discharged or retrenched
·workmen
for
limited
purposes
and
expressly
excludes
certain
·categories of persons, it cannot, on that account, be contended that the
definition is precise and exact and cannot be extendod to other dismissed,
discharged or retr.enched workmen, whose claim I'equiring computation
'is in respect of an existing right arising out of his relationship as an in-
.dustrial workman of his employer.
[501!-E, 5JA.(:J
The definition section begins with the clause, 'unless there is anything
repugnant in thr.;!. subject or context.' The context and the subject matter
are accordingly important factors. because, all parts of the Act have to
be in harmony with the statutory intent. The object of enacting the
section \vas to enable individual \vorkmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without bein~
compelled to have· :r.ecourse to s. 10 by raisin~ disputes and securing a
reference which is obviously a lengthy process. It clothes the Labour
Court with powers ·similar to those of an exeduting court so that the cono!rncd workman eets speedv relief. It therefore calls fclr a broad and
'beneficial construction, consistent with the other provisions of the Act,
which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mi•chief.
The mischief which the section was designed to suppress was the difficulty
·faced by individual workmen in getting reliet in ·respect of their existirig
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N.B.C.C. v. P. s. GILL. (Dua, J.)
41
rights without ha•ing resort to s. 10 of the Act.
Therefore, the term
'workman' as used in the
sub-section must include all persons whose
claim, requiring compuation under the sub-section, is in respect of Qll
existing right arising from his relationshiP' as an industrial workman with
his empley.ir. Otherwise, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by the section
and .compel hiril to have reso'rt to th,e lengthy procedure by way of referenc-~ •under s. 10, the{J:by defeating the very purpose and object of
enacting the
provi~ion. [51E-A, 52CA-El
Chief Mining Engineer, Eost In:dia Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar &
Ors. [196&] 1 S.C.R. 140, UP. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla,
Al.R. 1970 S.C. 237, R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v.
lhe Labour Court, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1972 S.C.

## Text

40
NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
v.
PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS
March 29, 1972
A
[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]
B
industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Scope af-'Work-
.111an', if includes une }Vhose services have been terminated.
The respondent, an employee of the appellant was suspended and
the suspension remained in force till the date of his dismissal.
He applied to the Labour Court under s. 33C{2) of the Jndrutrial Disputes
Act, 1947, for computation of the benefits and amounts he was entitled
C
to receive during the period of suspemion, and the Labour Court decided
• f
.in his favour.
On the question whether the section can be invoked by a dismissed
workman in respect of benefits and salary due to him for the perioC
prior tc the date of dismissal,
HELD: The suo-section provides that where any workman is entitled
to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money and if any question· arises as to
the amount due, then the question may be decided by the appropriate
'Labour Court.
The definition of 'workman' in s. 2(s) of the Act includes within its fold, only, for the purpose of a proceeding ur.der the
Act in <elation to an industrial dispute. persons who have been dismissed,
.discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that
dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that
dispute.
The definitivn specifically excludes from its
purvie•v
fourcatcgo'ries of perrnns •omployed in an industry, who would have otherwise
been wit'1in the periphery of the definition.
But, because the definition
'includes only specified types of
dismissed,
discharged or retrenched
·workmen
for
limited
purposes
and
expressly
excludes
certain
·categories of persons, it cannot, on that account, be contended that the
definition is precise and exact and cannot be extendod to other dismissed,
discharged or retr.enched workmen, whose claim I'equiring computation
'is in respect of an existing right arising out of his relationship as an in-
.dustrial workman of his employer.
[501!-E, 5JA.(:J
The definition section begins with the clause, 'unless there is anything
repugnant in thr.;!. subject or context.' The context and the subject matter
are accordingly important factors. because, all parts of the Act have to
be in harmony with the statutory intent. The object of enacting the
section \vas to enable individual \vorkmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without bein~
compelled to have· :r.ecourse to s. 10 by raisin~ disputes and securing a
reference which is obviously a lengthy process. It clothes the Labour
Court with powers ·similar to those of an exeduting court so that the cono!rncd workman eets speedv relief. It therefore calls fclr a broad and
'beneficial construction, consistent with the other provisions of the Act,
which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mi•chief.
The mischief which the section was designed to suppress was the difficulty
·faced by individual workmen in getting reliet in ·respect of their existirig
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N.B.C.C. v. P. s. GILL. (Dua, J.)
41
rights without ha•ing resort to s. 10 of the Act.
Therefore, the term
'workman' as used in the
sub-section must include all persons whose
claim, requiring compuation under the sub-section, is in respect of Qll
existing right arising from his relationshiP' as an industrial workman with
his empley.ir. Otherwise, it would always be open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by the section
and .compel hiril to have reso'rt to th,e lengthy procedure by way of referenc-~ •under s. 10, the{J:by defeating the very purpose and object of
enacting the
provi~ion. [51E-A, 52CA-El
Chief Mining Engineer, Eost In:dia Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar &
Ors. [196&] 1 S.C.R. 140, UP. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla,
Al.R. 1970 S.C. 237, R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v.
lhe Labour Court, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451 and Bennl!t Coltman
& Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta,
[1970]
1 S.C.R.
131,
referred to.
Central
Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopa/an, f1964] 3 S.C.R.
140
and Ke.1>oram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809, distin-
~uished.
Tiruchi-Srirangan1 J'ra11sport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai,
11961] I L.L.J. 729, Manicka Mudaliai· (M) v. Labour CourD, Madras.
ii961) 1 L.L.J. 592, Bachittar Singh v. Central Labour Court, Jul/under,
A.I .R. 1969 Punjab 187, Managemeht of Government Soap Factor,r,
BanJ?(llore v.. The Presiding Officer, Labour CQurt, BanKalore, A .1.R.
J 9i0 Mys. 225 and U.P. Electric Supply Co, Lid. ,v. Assi>tant Labour
Co1111nfa·sioner, Allahabad, approved.
This judgment should not be considered as an expression- of opinion
on the int·Jrpretation of .s. 20 read with '· 2 ( 1) of the Minimum Wages
Act. 1948.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal N6. 1171 of
1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
February 18, 1970 of the Labour Court, Delhi in L.C.A. No. 709
of 1968.
· 0. P. Malhotra, N. S. Das Bahl, P. S. Mahindru and Sat Pa/,
for the appellant.
:,, D. Adlakha, Promod Swarup and S. S. Khandu;a, for respondent No. I.
·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dua, J.
Facts necessary for understanding the short but important point arising for decision in this appeal by special leave are
these :
H
The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956 with its registered office in New Delhi. Its entire share
I
capital has been subscribed by the Central Government. Pritam
Singh Gill, respondent no. 1, in this appeal was cmμloyed by the
4-Ll208Sup Cl/72
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
appellant as Junior Engineer at its Bhopal office with effect from
the 9th November, .1962 at Rs. 280/- p.m. as basic salary with
other allowances. On October 5, 1964 he was suspended and this
order of suspension remained in force till September 18, 1967. He
was dismissed from service on September 19, 1967. During the
period of suspension, on October 7, 1965, the respondent was transferred to Delhi. On June 15, 1968 the respondent applied to the
Labour Court at Delhi under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act) for computing the benefits
and amount he was entitled to receive alleging that the appellant
had not paid to him such amounti and benefits.
The appellant
contested the respondent's claim on various grounds. The Labour
Court framed the following four issues :
"L Whether the application is not legally maintainable?
2. Whether this court has no .iurisdiction to entertain
this petition ?
3. Whei!her the petitioner has been dismissed with
effect from 19-9-1967, if so its effect?
4. Whether ·the applicant is entitled to any of the
benefits claimed ?"
and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was held
entitled to Rs. 5,195/- as balance of salary at the rate of Rs. 150/-
p.ni. for the period of suspension and also other allowances, the
total amount computed being Rs. 10,259.98 ..
Before us the appellant only questioned the jurisci1ction of the
Labo'.lr Court to entertain the respondent's application under s.
33C(2) of the Act because, according to the submission, the resoondent, having already been dismissed, had ceased to be a workman on the date of the application.
After his dismfrsal, argued
Shri Malhotra learned counsd for the appellant, the respondent
ceased to be a workman and had, therefore, po locus standi . to
approach the Labour Court under s. 3 3C(2) and the Labour Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's application, The
date of the application under s. 33C (2) of the Act, contended the
counsel, is the crucial ooint of time, when it is to be seen whether
or not the applicant is a workman. 'The respondent on the other
hand emphasised that if the period, in respect of which the benefits
and amount are claimed under s. 3 3C(2) of the Act, was during
the course of his employment prior to his dismissal, then. the mere
fact, that he was dismissed by his employer before he could apply
to the Labour Court under s. 33C(2), would not deprive him of
his right to claim relief under that section. The sole question we
are thus called upon to decide is, whether s. 33C(2) can be invoked
by a dismissed workman in respect of benefits and salary due to
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43
·'
him for the period prior to the date of his dismissal. It may be
stated that the appellant did not contend that a workman under
suspension is disentitled to seek relief under s. 33C(2) and indeed,
it was specifically conceded that a suspended workman could invoke
this section for relief because by suspension he does not ce;i,, ~
to be a workman as defi.ned in the Act. Tht! question posed is a
n
pure qucstion of law deprnding on the construction of the relevant
statutory provisions.
The Act was brought on the statute book for making provi;ion
for the investigation and settlement of.industrial disputes and for
certain other purposes. Section 2(s) defin~s "workman" to mean
"any person (including an apprentice) employed in any indust1y
C · to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or
cleiical work for hire.or reward, whether the terms of employment
be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under
this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, include> any such person Who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection
with, or as a conseque!}ce of, that dispute, or whose dismissal.
D
discharge 9r retrenchment has led to that dispute,
but does not
include any such person-
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, J 950, or the Air
Force Act, 1950 or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an
E
officer or other employee of a prison; or
F
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(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity,
draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem
or exercises, either by the nature of the duties <tltr1ched to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in him,
functions mainly of a managerial nature."
It is norewor.thy that s. 2 by its opening words expressly includes
the operation of this section in case of repugnancy in the subject
or context. Section 33C provides for recovery of money due from
an employer and sub·s. (2) of this section reads as under :-·
"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from
the e1.nployer any ~oney or any benefit w~ich is capable
of bemg computed m terms of money and 1f any question
arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount
at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under
thfa Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be
specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government."
44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
According to the appellant's submission, under s. 33C(2) the applicant cannot claim that his dismissal is unlawful arid that he
should, therefore, be deemed to be in service and on that basis
entitled to receive salary or wages under the pre-existing contract.
Now, if challenge to his dismissal is not open under this provision
of law then the respondent must be considered to be a dismissed
workman. and, therefore, outside the purview of "workman" as
defined ins. 2(s). A dismissed workman, the argument proceeded,
A
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is to be considered as a workman under this provision only for the
purposes of that proceeding under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, which has either arisen out of, or resulted in or is
connected with, his dismissal. In support of this submission he
relied on the Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan('). At
p. 156 of the report it was observed there that:
c
"If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his
case that the dismissal or demot.ion is wrongful, it would
not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of
his salary or wages under s. 33C(2). His dw1otion or
dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which.may
be appropriately triJ:d, but once it Is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim. that the
tlismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues D be the workman of the employer and
is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing
contract, cannot be made under s. 33C(2)."
Reference was also made on behalf of the appellants to Messrs
Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & ors. (2 ) where it is ob.
served at p. 823 :
·
"Ordinarily, tile law is tha~ a workman may be suspended pending enquiry and disciplinary action. If after
the enquiry the mis_i;conduct is proved the workman is dismissed and is not entitled to any wages for the suspension
· period; but if the inquiry results in the reinstatement of
the workman he is entitled to full wages for the suspension period also along witll reinstatement unless the employer instead of dismissing the employee can give hini
a lesser P.Unishment by way of ~ithholding of part of the
wages for the suspension, period."
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These observations were made in an entirely different context and
have notlling to do with the narrow point on which alcne the appellant based his challenge to the judgment impugned in this appeal.
H
The case cited has not the remotest connection with s. 33C of the
Act.
The decision iii the Central Bank of India .v. Ra;agopa/an
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140.
(!) [1694] ! S.C.R. 809.
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45
(supra) also in our opinion, does not assist us in deciding the q~es
tion requiring determination because the respondent before us clanns
· relief with respect to the period of suspension prior to his dismissal
and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not questioned by the
appellant on the ground that the only relief available to the respondent is to raise an industrial dispute with regard to his dismissal.
The respondent in the present case is not seeking relief against his
dismissal as indeed consistentay with the order of dismissal his
claim is confined to the benefits and amount which he was entitled
to receive for the peri_od prior to his dismissal. However, the de
cision irr Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (supra) does trace
the legislative history of Chapter VA and s. 33C of the Act 3ad
after doing so, the Court observed :
"In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to
receive the benefit is dispute, that may have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to ~om
pute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court in.
evitably has to deal with the question as to whether the
workman has a right to receive that benefit. If the said
right is not disputed, nothing mote needs to be done
and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value
of the benefit in terms of ivoney; but if the said right is
disputed, the Labour Court must deal wilh that question
and decide whether the workman has the right to' receive
the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour
Court answers this point in favour of the workman that
the next question of making necessary computation can
arise."
And again,
"Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it
would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s.(2)
because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground
that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to
oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the
workman's application. The claim under s. 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about
computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some
cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence
of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main detennination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-s. (2)."
Section 33C of the Act has been the subject matter of several
judicial pronouncements. This Court has also dealt with this sec1ion in several decisions. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India
46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1973] l S.C.R.
Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar & ors.( 1) this Court deduced from
three of its earlier decisions the following propositions·:-
"( 1) The legisl.ative history indicates that the legislature, after providing broadly for the inve:.tigation and
settlement of dispu.tes on the basis of collective bargaining, recognised the need of indivi.dunl workmen of a
speedy remedy to enforce their exis~ing individual rights
and therefore inse.ted s. 33A in 1950 ands. 33C in 1956.
These two sections illustrate cases in which individual
workmen can enfor~e t~eir rights without having to take
recourse to s. 10( !) and without having to depend on their
union to espouse their case:
(2) In view of this history two considerations are relevant while construing the scope of s. 3 3C. Where industrial disputes arise between workmen acting collectively and their employers such disputes must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for
instance under s. 10(1). But having regard to the legislative policy to provide a speedy remedy to individual
workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not
be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sCJught to
be implemented
by individual workmen.
Therefore
though in determining the scope of s. 33C care should
be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall
within its purview, cases which fall, for instance, under
s. 10(1), cannot be brought under s. 33C;
(3) Section 33C which is in terms similar to ~hose
in s. 21) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of an executing
provision;
( 4) Section. 33C(l) applies to cases where money is
due to a workman under an award or settlement or under
Chapter VA of the Act already calculated and ascertained and therefore there is no dispute about its computation.
But sub-section 2 applies both to non-monetary
as well as m!lnetary benefits. In the case of nionetary
benefi~ it applies where such· benefit though due is not
calculated and there is a dispute about its calculation;
(5) Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of
workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are
entitled should be computed in terms of money even.
·though the right to the benefit on which their claim is
ll}[l968] I S:C.R. 140.
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based is dispute"d by their employers. It is open to the
Labour Court to intepret the award or settlement on
which the workmen's rights rests.'
( 6) The fact that the words of limitation used in s.
20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950 l\fe omitted ins. 33C(2) shows that the scope
of s. 33C(2) is wider than that ;ifs. 33C(l). Therefore,
whereas sub-section 1 is confined to claims arising under
an award or 8ettlement or Chapter VA, claims which can
be entertained under sub-section 2 are not so confined to
those under an award, settlement or Chapter VA.
(7) Though the court did not indicate which cases
other than those under sub-section 1 would fall under
sub-section 2 it pointed out illustrative cases which would
not fall under sub-section .2 viz. cases which would
appropriately be adjudicated under s. 10( 1) or claims
which have already been the subject-matter of £ettlement
to which ss. 18 and 19 would apply.
(8) Since proceedings under s. 33C(2) are analogous
to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called
upon to compute in terms of money the benefit clanrted by
a workman is in such cases in the position of an executing
court, the Labour Court like the ex~uting court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure,
is competent under s. 33C(2) to interpret the award or
settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award
or set:lement and it would be open to it to consider the
plea of nullity where the
award
is
made without
jurisdiction.
47
In lf_.P. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla(') this Court approvmgly referred to a passage fro111 the judgment in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. (supra), already reproduced by us, in which, inter alia, it was emphasised that Labour
Court had jurisdiction to entertain a 'claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman
and.his employer.
Again in R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills
Co. (P) Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur(") this Court after
a review ?f its previous ?ecision_s, ~pheld the jurisdiction ~f the
Labour Court to e~tertam appltcat1on for lay-off compensation
under s. 33C observmg that such jurisdiction could not be ousted
by a mere pl.ea denying the workman's claim to computation of
the benefit . m terms of .money, adding that the Labour Court
~ad to _go_ m_to. the question and determine whether on the facts
1t had 1unsd1cl!on to make the computation.
(!) A.LR. 1970 S.C. 237.
(2) A.1.R, 1972 S.C. 451.
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] 1 S.C.R.
We now turn to so_me decisions of thl: High Courts which
directly deal with this point.
In Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport
Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai( 1) Ramachandra Ayyar
J., repelled a similar contention as was raised before us by Shri
Malhotra on behalf of the appellarn.
In tl1e case cited one
Iswaran was employed as a traffic supervisor in Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd.
His services were terminated in
December, 1956 under a scheme of retrenchment.
Later, disputes were raised bet;ween the management and other workers
regarding bonus for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and a settlement was reached in April, 1958 pursuant to which the management declared additional bonus and one month's wage for each
of the two years.
Iswaran having not been paid anything by
way of bonus though he had worked during those two years applied to the Labour Court for necessary relief under s. 33C(2)
of the Act. The Labour Court having granted the relief claimed.
the management approached the High Court under Art. 226 of
the Constitution questioning the _jurisdiction of the Labour Court:
to entertain Iswaran's claim.
The High Court repelled this challenge though on an other point relating to the claimant's right to
benefit under the settlement, the case was remitted back to the
Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was observed in that decision that while enacting s. 13C(2), the Legislature did not intend merely to provide a remedy for the limited class of persons
who are in actual employment on the date of the application under
that section. The words "any workman" in s. 33C(2), according
to that decision, would mean a workman who would be entitled
to benefits conferred under the Act and would necessarilv include
a discharged workman as well.
In Manicka Mudaliar · (M)
v.
Labour Court, Madras(") a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court, while hearing a writ appeal, from the decision of a learned
single Judge of that Court also upheld the competency of a petition under s. 33C(2) of the Act for arrears of salary and one
month.'s salarv in lieu of notice, although at the time of the application the ·applicant was no longer in service of the employer.
Following these Madras decisions a learned single Judge of the
Pw:jab & Haryana High Court in Bachittar Singh
v. · Central
Labour Court, Jullundur( 8 ),
a Division Bench of the Mysore
High Court in ·The Management of Government Soap Factory,
Bangalore v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Bangalore(')
and the Allahabad High Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd.,
v. Assistant Labour Commissioner, Allahabad(") took the same
view.
In the Allahabad case,
however, the provision which
directly came up for construction was s. 6H of the U.P. Industrial
(I) [1961] I L.L.J. 729.
(3) A.T.R. 1%9 Punjab 187.
(5) [1966] 11 l..L.J. 715.
(2\ [1961] I L.L.J. 59~.
(4) A.I. R. 1970 Mys. ~~>.
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N.B.C.C. v. P. s. GILL (Dua, J.)
49
Disputes Act, the language of which was considered to be identical with that of s. 33C of the Act. Incidentally it may be. pointed
out that s. 6H of the.U.P. Industrial Disputes Act has been held
to be identical with s. 3 3C of the Act even by this Court.
Shri Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, contended
that all these decisions require reconsideration because they ignore
a vital point in construing ~. 2(s) which defines "workman". This
definition has already been reproduced. Accor'.iing to the appellanfs submission these decisions have ignored the vital point that
the definition of "workman" specifically includes within its fold,
only for the purpose of a proceeding under the Act in relation to
an industrial dispute, persons who have been dismissed, discharged
or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that. dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to
thlit dispute.
Since certain categories of persons are also '.llxpressly stated not to be included in this definition the Legislature
must, 11ccording io the argument, be c01isidered to have intended
to define this word with exactitude and precision and its scope,
therefore, cannot be extended to the. dismissed, discharged or retrenched persons except strictly for the purposes of the proceedings expressly mentioned in. the inclusive clause.
The fact that
the definition also specifically excludes from its purview four categories of persons employed in an industry who would have otherwise been within the periphery of the definition shows that the
legislature intended to be meticulously precise leaving no scope for
ru1y !nt~ndment extending the literal meaning ot the language used
to di<m1ssed employees for purposes of other proceedinas not specified in s. 33C(2) of the Act. The definition. >aid Shri°Malhotnl,
is exhaustive rendering its extension impermissible.
The counsel
also commented on the recent decision of this Court in R. B.
Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur (supra). Accor4ing to Shri Malhotra this decision does not
touch the question whether a dismissed employee can be considered as a workman for the purpose of approaching. the Labour
Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act and he emphasised that this
case should be considered to be confined. to its own facts.
The
further contention pressed by Shri Malhotra was that the respondent's claim raises an industrial dispute and, therefore, it would
be more appropriate for him to claim a reference under s. l 0 of
the Act.
This contention being based only on the appellant's
denial of the claim cannot exclude the applicability of s. 33C(2).
He also made a reference to the decision of this Court in Bennet
Coleman & Co., (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta(!) which
was concern~.d with the Workinl! Journalists (f'onditions of.Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955 and contended ·that in that decision the definitions iI1 s. 2( c) and (f) of that
(1) [1970] 1S.C.R.181.
so
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19'73] l S.C.R.
Act itook within t!ieir fold. persons who were no longer in the
employment of the1r erstwhile employer against whom their claim
~as !flade, provided the claim related to a period when they were
m his employment.
Shri Malhotra pointed out that in the reported case t~e~e was no clause in .the statutory definition including
therem for bm1ted purposes certain persons otherwise not within
the definition and excluding therefrom certain other categories of
persons who would otherwise fall within the definition. This is
how that case was sought to be distinguished from the present.
The crucfal point which requires consideration on the appellant's
:ugument is thus confined to the· precise scope and meaning of
the word "workman" used in s. 33C(2) in the background of the
definition of this word as contained in s. 2(s).
Now, it is noteworthy that s. 2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins, as is usual with m<>St of the definition
sections, with the clause, "unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context''. This clearly indicates that it is always a
matter for argument whether or not, this statutory definition is to
apply to the word "workman" as 119"..,d in the particular clause
of the Act which is under consideration,. for this word may both
be restricted or expanded by its subject matter.
Th~. context and
the subject matter in connection with which the word "workman"
is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the
question. The propriety or necessity of thus construin.e; the word
"workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in
ha1mony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may
tum to the purpose and object of s. 33C of the Act. This section
was enacted for Che purpose of enabling individual workmen to
implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights
against their employers without being compelled to have recourse
to s. 10 by raising disoutes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act ha~ accordingly
been described as a .provision which clothes the Labour Court with
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the powers similar to those of an executing court so that the workman concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing
courts, it calls for a broad and beneficial construcHon consistently
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with other provisions. of the Act, which should ~erve to advance
the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately
be pointed out that the mischief which s. 33C was designed to sup-
. press was the difficulties faced by individual workinen in getting
relief in respect of their existing rights without having reso1t to
" l 0 of the Act.
To accept the argument of the appellant, it
would always h<" open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer ro terminate the services of his employee in order
to deprive him of the benefit conferred by s. 33C and compel
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N.B.C.C. v. P. s. GlLL (Dua, J.)
51
him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference
under s. 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and
object of enacting this 11rovision This, in our view, quite clearly
brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part o: s. '1.
of the Act and such a position could hardly have been contemplated by the legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy s.
33C(2) must be so construed as to take: within its fold a workman,
who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims
rnlief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the
application.
In other words the (erm "workman" as used
in
s. 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising
. from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer.
By adopting this construction alonir can we advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and
object'of inserting s. 33C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined
to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we
approve of their approach.
According to Shri Malhotra,
in
cases where there is no dispute about the emp.loyee's right which
is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit.
Whether or not
the right of suit can b_e claimed by the employee, we are not
persuaded on the basis of this argument. to ac~ept the construction convassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit of speedy remedy uuder s. 33C(2)
of the Act.
We me a,ware of a conflict of decisions in some High Courts on
the interpretation of s. 20 read withs. 2(i) of the Minimum Wages
Act, 12 of 1948. This aspect was not canvassed before us and,
therefore, we should not be deemed to express any opinion on
the conectness or otherwise of either view.
We are referring to
this aspect only to make it clear that our deci;ion must be confined
to the construction of the provisions of the Act and we must not
be understood to have expressed any opinion on the construction
of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two single
Judges have taken divergent view; and the Kerala High Court
agreed wi1h the view that the employees under the Minimum Wages
Act need not be in the employment l)t the tim;;: of ti1eir applications
under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act wilereas the Punjab High
Court on the other hand agreed with the contrary view of the
Madras High Court. The language of s. 20 of the Minimum Wages
52
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1973] l S.C.R.
Act is not completely identical with that of s. 33C(2)of the Act
and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in the two statutes are also somewhat differently worded. Without any further
discussion on this aspect we are content to observe that this judgment should not be considered as an expression of opinion on
the interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Minimum
Wages Act.
A!. a result of the foregoing discussion, this appeal fails and
is dismissed with costs.
V,P.S.
Appeal dismissed.
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