# NAV RATTANMAL AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 324
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 454of1957
- **Bench:** P. 13. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, Ic N. W Anchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nav-rattanmal-and-others-v-the-state-of-rajasthan-2255
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

[1962]
Limitation-Sixty years for suits by the Government-Constitutionality of-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), Art. 149
-Co>istitution of India, Art. 14.
The Government filed a suit on the basis of a security bond
executed by a Government Treasurer and certain sureties who
joined in the execution of the bond. The contention in defence,
inter alia, was that art. 149 of the lndiau Limitation Act prescribing a 60 years period of limitation for suits by the Government was unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and as such the suit was barred under art. 83.
Held, that statutes cif limitation are designed for the beneficent public purpose of preventing the taking away from one
what he has been permitted to consider his own for a long time
and on the faith of which he plans his future life.
If the suit was by a private individual the suit would have
fallen under art. 83 and would have been barred by it but
different considerations arise in the case of the State and there
is a distinction between claims by the Government and those -of
private individuals. Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
which fixes a period of 60 years for suits by the Government
has a reasonable basis of classification between the Government
and private individuals, and the exact period that should be
allowed to the Government to file a suit would be a matter of
legislative policy and as such its constitutional validity cannot
be questioned under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Desai, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887,
Collector of Malabar v. Ebrahim, [1957] S.C.R. 970 and Mannalal
v. Collector of ]halwar, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 962, applied.
Crv1L
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal
No. 454of1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 16, 1954, of the Court of Judicial Commissioner,
Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1952.
·
' r
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar
Nath and I'. L. Vohra, for the appeJ!ants.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, S. K.
Kapur and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
,
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
325
1961.
April 24. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
}lav Rattanmal
AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate .
"· .
grltnted by the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, and is State of Ra1asthan
directed against the judgment of that Court dated
Ayyanga' J.
December 16, 1954 by which the decree in favour of
the respondent-Union of India-was affirmed.
Seth Lal Chand Kothari-the original first appellant in the appeal before us (he died pending this
appeal and his heirs have been brought on record as
his legal representatives -
appellants l to 6) W!J-S
appointed by the Commissioner Ajmer-Merwara as
Government Treasurer, Ajmer-Merwara, by an order
dated February 20, 1940, the treasuries to be under
his charge being two-that at Ajmer and a subtreasury at Beawar.
Before accepting office ·he
had, under the rules, to deposit Government promissory notes to the extent of Rs. 60,000 and
also execute a Security Bond for a like amount with
two sureties to cover any loss to the Government in
these treasuries.
He accordingly made the deposit,
and a security bond was executed by him on February 27, 1940 with Seth Phool Chand-who is now the
7th appellant in the appeal and one Seth Kanwar!al
Ranka who died even before the suit and was not
impleaded in it. Thereupon J,aJ Chand Kothari was
directed to take charge of the office as Treasurer and
he did so on March 6, 1940.
We are not concerned with the treasury at Ajmer,
but only with that at Beawar. Lal Chand, at the
time of his taking charge, executed a receipt headed
"charge-report" and in it is recited that he had taken
over from the previous incumbent (M. L. Patni) the
amount of cash which tallied with what had to be in
the treasury according to the books. Nothing happened between 1940 and 1948 and the business at the
treasury appeared to be proceeding regularly and
according to the rules. It may be mentioned that
there were

## Text

324
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
NAV RATTANMAL AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
IC N. W ANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
[1962]
Limitation-Sixty years for suits by the Government-Constitutionality of-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), Art. 149
-Co>istitution of India, Art. 14.
The Government filed a suit on the basis of a security bond
executed by a Government Treasurer and certain sureties who
joined in the execution of the bond. The contention in defence,
inter alia, was that art. 149 of the lndiau Limitation Act prescribing a 60 years period of limitation for suits by the Government was unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and as such the suit was barred under art. 83.
Held, that statutes cif limitation are designed for the beneficent public purpose of preventing the taking away from one
what he has been permitted to consider his own for a long time
and on the faith of which he plans his future life.
If the suit was by a private individual the suit would have
fallen under art. 83 and would have been barred by it but
different considerations arise in the case of the State and there
is a distinction between claims by the Government and those -of
private individuals. Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
which fixes a period of 60 years for suits by the Government
has a reasonable basis of classification between the Government
and private individuals, and the exact period that should be
allowed to the Government to file a suit would be a matter of
legislative policy and as such its constitutional validity cannot
be questioned under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Desai, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887,
Collector of Malabar v. Ebrahim, [1957] S.C.R. 970 and Mannalal
v. Collector of ]halwar, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 962, applied.
Crv1L
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal
No. 454of1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 16, 1954, of the Court of Judicial Commissioner,
Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1952.
·
' r
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar
Nath and I'. L. Vohra, for the appeJ!ants.
G. C. Kasliwal, Advocate-General, Rajasthan, S. K.
Kapur and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
,
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
325
1961.
April 24. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
}lav Rattanmal
AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate .
"· .
grltnted by the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, and is State of Ra1asthan
directed against the judgment of that Court dated
Ayyanga' J.
December 16, 1954 by which the decree in favour of
the respondent-Union of India-was affirmed.
Seth Lal Chand Kothari-the original first appellant in the appeal before us (he died pending this
appeal and his heirs have been brought on record as
his legal representatives -
appellants l to 6) W!J-S
appointed by the Commissioner Ajmer-Merwara as
Government Treasurer, Ajmer-Merwara, by an order
dated February 20, 1940, the treasuries to be under
his charge being two-that at Ajmer and a subtreasury at Beawar.
Before accepting office ·he
had, under the rules, to deposit Government promissory notes to the extent of Rs. 60,000 and
also execute a Security Bond for a like amount with
two sureties to cover any loss to the Government in
these treasuries.
He accordingly made the deposit,
and a security bond was executed by him on February 27, 1940 with Seth Phool Chand-who is now the
7th appellant in the appeal and one Seth Kanwar!al
Ranka who died even before the suit and was not
impleaded in it. Thereupon J,aJ Chand Kothari was
directed to take charge of the office as Treasurer and
he did so on March 6, 1940.
We are not concerned with the treasury at Ajmer,
but only with that at Beawar. Lal Chand, at the
time of his taking charge, executed a receipt headed
"charge-report" and in it is recited that he had taken
over from the previous incumbent (M. L. Patni) the
amount of cash which tallied with what had to be in
the treasury according to the books. Nothing happened between 1940 and 1948 and the business at the
treasury appeared to be proceeding regularly and
according to the rules. It may be mentioned that
there were the usual periodical checks and audits by
326
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
[1962J
1961
Government officials but no impropriety was discovered during these checks or audits. On March 31, 1948,
Nav Natlanmal
v.
the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ajmer, made a
State of llaja•than check of the treasury at Bea war. The treasury staff
who ought to have been there were however absent in
Ayyangar J.
spite of their having had prior intimation of his arrival and thereupon he directed the treasury to be sealed.
There were two cash chests at this sub-treasury-one
secured with a single lock, the key of which was with
the staff of the Treasurer and the other with doublelocks, the keys of which were held, one by the employee of the Treasurer and the other by the Government Treasury Officer-the Tahsildar.
A verification
of the balance in the two chests disclosed that a sum of
7 annas, 9 pies was missing from the single-lock chest
and Rs. 84,215 from the chest with the double-lock.
The Government thereupon took proceedings to realise the missing amount from the security of Rs. 60,000
which had been under deposit.
The Government
securities were sold and they realized about rupees 58
thousands and odd leaving a sum of Rs. 25,786-13-9
still due. The Union of India thereupon filed a suitCivil Suit 125 of 1951 before the Sub-Judge First
Class, Bea war on the security bond dated February 27,
1940 against Lal Chand Kothari and Seth Phool
Chand for recovery of this sum. Several defences
were raised by the defenda,nts but they were all
rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge who granted the respondents a decree in terms prayed for in the
suit. The defendants filed .an appeal to the Judicial
Commissioner who dismissed it, but having regard to
the fact that some of the defences turned on the interpretation of the security bond <lated February 27,
1940, granted a certificate under Art. 133(1) of the
Constitution and that is how the appeal is now before
us.
Neither the factum of the loss by embezzlement nor
its amount is in question, and the only points raised
for consideration are, (1) whether on the terms of the
bond the decree in favour of the appellants could be
sustained; (2) whether the claim in the suit was not
barred by limitation. The argument on this second
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
point was that if art. 83 of the Indian Limitation Act
r96r
governed the claim it would be barred, and that the Nav Rattanmal
provision contained in art. 149 prescribing a 60-year
v.
period of limitation for suits by the Government was State of Rajasthan
unconstitutional as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is this last pleii. that has led to the appeal
Ayyangar J.
being heard by this larger Bench.
As regards the first point that the suit claim was
not comprehended within the terms of the security
bond, learned Counsel made three submissions: (1) In
order to render the defendants liable, the loss sustained by the Government must be proved to have occured on or after March 6, 1940 on which date alone Lal
Chand Kothari took charge of the treasury. Though
loss to the extent set out in the plaint did occur at the
treasury in Beawar, learned Counsel urged, the plaintiff-respondent had not proved that it occurred after
March 6, 1940. In other words, the argument was
that there was no physicn,l checking on l\farch 6, 1940
when he took over and because of this one could not
be certain whether it was a loss which had occurred
during the period of the previorni incumbent in office
or could with certainty be attributed to the• period
subsequent to March 6, 1940.
This argument was
rejected by the courts below and, in our opinion, correctly. In the face of the receipt executed by Lal
Chand Kothari it wonld not be open to him to contenrl
that the recitals in it were not correcb, and in any
event it would be for him to show that it was incorrect and, of course, there was no possibility of his
establishing this.
(2) It was next urged that on the terms of the Bond
read in the context of the surrounding circumstances
Lal Chand Kothari wonlrl be liable only for the deficiency in the chest with the single-kick and not for the
Joss or embezzlement or rlefici8ncy in the othcer chest
with the double-Jock. The whole ha.sis of this argument was that the 8ecnrity deposit of Rs. 60,000 and
the security bond for the like amount executed by tho
Treasurer was an indication that it was with reference
to the amount which was the maximum in the chest
under the single-lock and from this feature it was
328
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
urged that it.was the intention of the parties that Lal
iv av Rattanmal Chand Kothari would not be responsible for any emv.
bezzlement, loss or deficiency in the other chest. This
Stat• of liajasthan submission is without any foundation, because the
liability under the Bond would depend upon its terms
Ayyangar 1 · and in the face of the language used in the document
learned Counsel realised that the submission could not
be seriously maintained.
(3) The last submission under this head was that
the loss having occurred in the chest with the doublelock, this could not have been without the connivance
of Government officials and that therefore the liability of the Treasurer was excluded. Learned Counsel
also drew our attention to the fact that the terms of
the bond made Lal Chand liable even for embezzlement
by government officers, notwithstanding that he had
no control over them. But if Lal Chand agreed to those
terms-and this is not disput~d, the terms must prevail. Apart from the terms of the security bond however, it wonld be apparent that if the key of one of
the locks was with the employee of the Treasurer the
defalcation could not have occurred without such employee's connivance or negligence. If so, the fixing
of liability upon the employer could not be characterised even as unrea.sonable a part from the liability
flowing from the terms of the Bond, and such a vicarious liability for the negligence or misconduct of his
servants, is not lessened by reason of the assistance or
negligence of Government officials.
These exhaust the points urged based on the terms
of the Bond. It remains to deal only with the contention t.hat the claim is barred by Limitation under
art. 83 of the Limitation Act on the plea that art. 149
of the Limitation Act which fixes a period of 60 years
for suits by the Government is unconstitutional as
violating Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that
there is no rational basis for treating claims by
Government differently from those of private indivi.
duals in the matter of the time within which they
eould be enforced by suit.
Learned Counsel urged that statutes of limitation
were statutes of repose and enacted to ensure that stale
2 tl.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
claitnll were <not agitated, so that after a reasonable
,96'
length of time people might proceed on the footing Nav Rallanmal
that. they would not be held liable for possible claims
v.
against them. ·Basing himself on these principles, the State of Rajasthan
argument of the learned Counsel was that for the pur-
-
pose of agitating claims no distinction could be drawn
Ayyangar J.
between Government and private individuals and that
on no. mtional basis oonld a legislation which permitted a longer period of limitation for claims by tho
State be sustained.
It is, no doubt, true that Lord Kenyon described
statutes of limitation as "Statutes of repose" (vide per
Dallas, C. J. in Tolson v. Kaye(')) and Bramwell, B. as
"Statutes of peace" (Hunter v. Gibbons (')), though
sometimes contrnry opinions have been expressed. In
re Baker ('), Cotton, L. J. observed that pleas of limitation would never be looked npon with any favour
since they are used to defeat debts clearly due. It is
however unnecessary t.o examine further the theory
underlying statutes of limitation. We shall proceed
on the generally accepted basis that they are designed .to effectuate a beneficent public purpose, viz., to
prevent the taking away from one what he has for
· long been permitted to consider his own and on the
faith of which he plans his life, habits and expenses.
This however does not militate against there being
a rational basis for a distinction being drawn between
the claims of the State and the claims of the individual in the matter of a provision.pf a bar of limitation for enforcing them .. In cor1sidefing this matter two
points have to be kept separate: (I) whether a distinction could be drnwn or a classification supported
·between the provision of any variation in the time
that should be available. for enforcing; claims by private individuals and e!a.ims by the State, (2) whether,
if such a classification were good, the period of 60
years provided by art. 149 of the Indian Limitation
Act is such a Jong period of time as to be nnreasonable. We are drawing attention to the distinction
between these two points because learned Counsel laid
(1) ('IS22) 2-Brod, & B. 217, 223: 129 E.R. 1267. 1269.
(2) (1856) 16 L.J. Ex. r, 5.
(3) (1890J 44 Ch. D. 262, 270.
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
r96r
much stress on the fact that the period of limitation
Nav Tlattanmal fixed by art. 149 was 60 years and that this was an
v.
unreasonably long period of time. If learned Counsel
State of Rajasthan is right in his submission that there is no mtional
basis for placing private individuals and the GovernAyyangar J.
ment in different classes while framing a legislation
providing for limitation for actions he might succeed;
but if he is wrong there and the correct view is that
there is a rational basis of classification, then the
period that should be allowed to the Government to
file a suit would be a matter of legislative policy and
could not be brought within the scope or purview of
a challenge under Art. 14 or imked of any other article in the Constitutirm.
It; is sufficirmt therefore if we
confine ourseh-cs to the first point, vi1,., whether there
is a raliorrnl basis for treating the Government differently as reg::mls the period within which claims
might be put in ;;;1it. between tlrn Government. on the
on0 hand and private iudivitlu>tls on the other.
First and foremost there is this feature that the
Limitation Act, though a s~atute of repose and intended for quieting titles, and in th11t sense looks at the
prohl0m from the point of view of tho defemhnt with
a view to provide for him a security against stale
claims, >tddresses itself at the same time also to the
position of the plaintiff. Thus, for instance, whore the
pl>tintiff is unrler a legal disability to institute a suit
by reason of his being a minor or being insane or an
idiot, it makes provisions for tho extension of the
period taking into >tccount th:it disability. Similarly,
public interest in a cbim being protected is taken into
account by s. 10 of the Act by providing that there
shall be no period of limitation in tho c>tse of express
trusts. It is not n<'cessary to go into the details of
these provisions but it is sufficient to state that the
approach here is from the point of view of protecting
the enfor·ccabilit.y of claims which, if the ordinary
rules applied, woulrl become barred by limitation. It
is in great part on this principle that it is said that
subj8ct to statutory provision, while the maxim vigilantibus et non r!orrnientibu.s jum 8u.bveniunt is >t rule
for the subject, the maxim nulliirn tempits occurit regi
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
is in general applicable to the Crown. The reason
t961
assigned was, to quote Coke, that the State ought not
to suffer for the negligence of its officers or for their Nav Rallanmal
fraudulent collusion wiLh the adverse party. It is state of ~ajasthan
with this background that the question of the speciltl
provision contained in art. 149 of the Act has to be
Ayyangor J.
viewed. First., we have the fact that in the case of the
Government, if a claim becomes barred by limitation,
the loss falls on the public, i.e., on the community in
general and to the benefit of the private individual
who derives advantage by the lapse of time. This
itself would appear to indicate a sufficient ground for
differentiating between the claims of an individual
and the claims of the community at large. Next, it
may be mentioned that in the case of governmental
machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move
as quickly as in the case of individuals.
Apart from
the delay occurring in the proper officers ascertaining
that a cause of action has accrued-Government
being an impersonal body, before a claim is launched
there has to be inter-departmental correspondence,
consultations, sanctions obtained according to the
rules. These necessarily take time and it is because
of these features which are sometimes characterised
as red-tape that there is delay in the functioning of
government offices. It is precisely for this reason that
we have from the earliest Civil Procedure Codes provisions which find place in the Code of 1908, like
0. 27, rr. 5 and 7 reading:
"0. 27. r. 5. The Court in fixing the day for the
Government to answer to the plaint, shall allow a
reasonable time for the necessary communication
with the Government through the proper channel,
and for the issue of insti·uctions to the Government
Pleader to a pp ear and answer on behalf of the
Government and may extend the time at its discretion.
O. 27. r. 7(1). Where the defendant is a public
officer and, in receiving tho summons, considers it
proper to make a reference to the Government before
answering the plaint, he may apply to the Court to
.t96r
Nav Rattanmal
v.
Stale of Rajasthan
Ayyangar .J.
~32
SUPREME cotJR'l' REPORTS
[19621
grant such extension of the time fixed in the summons as may be necessary to enable him to make
such reference and to receive orders thereon through
~he proper channel.
(2) Upon such application the Court shall extend
the time for so long as appears to it to be necessary."
These matters apart, the ratio underlying the special
provisions for summary recovery of amounts due to
Government without resort to suits by a procedure not
available for enforcing the dues of private individuals,
like the "Revenue Recovery Acts" and "Public Demands Recovery Acts" which have been on the statute book
for over a century is also similar, viz., the interest
of the public and of the community in realising what
is due to it expeditiously; and the constitutional validity of such provisions have been sustained by this
Court. In Purshottam Govindji H alai v. Desai (1) this
Court held that s. 13 of the .Bombay Land Revenue
Act, 1876, by virtue of which a person had been
arrested in pursuance of a warrant issued for recovery
of a demand certified under s. 46(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, in Collector of Malabar v. Ebrahim (') the arrest of a defaulter in respect of an income-tax demand under s. 48 of the Madras Revenue
Hecovery Act was held not to offend Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Perhaps another decision of this Court
of more immediate relevance, in which the point now
raised that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the claims of the Government and the
claims of private individuals-was considered and
negatived, is Urnt in 1liannalal v. Collector, Jahalwar (')
in which judgment was delivered on December 7,
1960. In this last case .it was urged before this Court
that the summary mode of recovery of amounts due
to the Government for which provision was made by
the Rajasthan Public Recovery Act there impugned
-a mode of recovery which was not available to the
private citizen-contravened the equal protection of
(1) [1955) 2 s c.R ss7.
(21 [1957) s.c.R. 970.
(3) (1961) 2 S.C.R. 96>.
' ·' I ,_
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 and this contention
z961
whas repe
11
lled. The argumf ent ofblearn.ed Cdoubnsel for Nav llattanmal
t e appe ants has there ore to
e reiecte
oth on
v.
the ground of principle as well as on the ratio under- State of Rajasthan
lying the decisions of this Court.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Ayyangar J.
Appeal dismissed.
JAVER CHAND AND OTHERS
v.
PUKHRAJ SURAN A
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO,
RAGHUBAR DAYAL and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)_
Document-Hundi-Inadequatcly stamped- Exhibited -Admissibility-Objection when to be raised-Courts 1 if can revise or
review order admitting document-M arwar Stamp Act, 1914, ss. 9
and II-Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, ss. 35 proviso (a), 36.
The respondent admitted the execution of two Hundis in
suit which were tendered and marked as exhibits but denied
consideration and raised the plea that the "hundis exhibited
were inadmissible in evidence as at the time the suit was filed in
1949 they had not been stamped according to the Stamp Law.
When the hundis were executed in December, 1946, the Marwar
Stamp Act of 1914 was in force "and ss. 9 and II of that Act
authorised the court to realise the full stamp duty and penalty
in case of unstamped instruments produced in evidence, whereupon the documents were admissible in evidence.
The High Court pointed 9ut that after coming into force of
the Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, (Similar to Indian Stamp Act)
which had amended the 1914 Act, the hundis in question could
not be admitted in evidence in view of the provision of s. 35
proviso (a) of the Marwar Stamp Act, 1947, even on payment of
duty and penalty and the appellant could not take advantage
of s. 36 of the 1947 Stamp Act, because the admission of the
two hundis was a pure mistake as the Trial Court had lost
sight of the 1947 Stamp Act and the appeal Court could go
behind the orders of the Trial Court and correct the mistake
made by that Court.
Held, that once the Court, rightly or wrongly decided to
43
Ig6z
April 25,