# NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA

- **Citation:** [2009] 6 S.C.R. 982
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2009-04-24
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 383 of 2002
- **Bench:** Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Asok Kumar Ganguly
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nepal-singh-v-state-of-haryana-25951
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

PENAL
CODE,
1860/CODE
OF
CRIMINAL
C PROCEDURE, 1973:
Sections 304-B, 498-A/378 - Wife committing suicide -
Demand of dowry alleged - Husband was charged for his
wife's death - Trial Court acquitting him, giving him benefit
0 of doubt - High Court convicting him - Power of appellate
court against acquittal - Discussed - On facts of the case,
Held: Trial Court rightly noted there was no evidence
regarding demand of dowry - High Court ought not have
interfered with the well reasoned judgment of the trial court
E directing acquittal.
According to the Prosecution, deceased and
appellant were husband and wife and that the appellant
was not satisfied with the dowry and; that there was
demand for gas connection and money. Gas connection
F was arranged. Before the money could be arranged,
deceased committed suicide by consuming poison.
Appellant was tried and the trial court acquitted him giving
benefit of doubt. On appeal by State, the High Court
convicted him for offences punishable under Sections
G 304-8, 498-A IPC. Hence the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Bare reading of Section 378 Cr.P.C.
H
982
.r
-1
·~
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
983
(appeal in case of acquittal) makes it clear that no
A
restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals
against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High
Court has full power to reappreciate, review and
reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which
B
the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own
conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact
and of law are open to determination by the High Court
in an appeal against an order of acquittal. It cannot,
however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a c
double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved to be guilty by a competent court of 1a·w.
0
Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the_
presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened
but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court. [Paras 9 and 10] [992-E-H; 993-A-B]
1.2. In Chandrappa the following general principles
E
regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:
(i) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
F
(ii) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
. power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions G
of fact and of law.
(iii) Various expressions, such as, "substanti.al and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very
strong
circumstances",
"distorted
H
A
B
c
D
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes
of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfem with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(iv) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption
in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudel'.lce that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(v) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
E
basis of the evidence on record,

## Text

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A
B
[2009] 6 S.C.R. 982
NEPAL SINGH
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 383 of 2002)
APRIL 24, 2009
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
PENAL
CODE,
1860/CODE
OF
CRIMINAL
C PROCEDURE, 1973:
Sections 304-B, 498-A/378 - Wife committing suicide -
Demand of dowry alleged - Husband was charged for his
wife's death - Trial Court acquitting him, giving him benefit
0 of doubt - High Court convicting him - Power of appellate
court against acquittal - Discussed - On facts of the case,
Held: Trial Court rightly noted there was no evidence
regarding demand of dowry - High Court ought not have
interfered with the well reasoned judgment of the trial court
E directing acquittal.
According to the Prosecution, deceased and
appellant were husband and wife and that the appellant
was not satisfied with the dowry and; that there was
demand for gas connection and money. Gas connection
F was arranged. Before the money could be arranged,
deceased committed suicide by consuming poison.
Appellant was tried and the trial court acquitted him giving
benefit of doubt. On appeal by State, the High Court
convicted him for offences punishable under Sections
G 304-8, 498-A IPC. Hence the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Bare reading of Section 378 Cr.P.C.
H
982
.r
-1
·~
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
983
(appeal in case of acquittal) makes it clear that no
A
restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the
powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals
against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High
Court has full power to reappreciate, review and
reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which
B
the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own
conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact
and of law are open to determination by the High Court
in an appeal against an order of acquittal. It cannot,
however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a c
double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved to be guilty by a competent court of 1a·w.
0
Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the_
presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened
but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court. [Paras 9 and 10] [992-E-H; 993-A-B]
1.2. In Chandrappa the following general principles
E
regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:
(i) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
F
(ii) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
. power and an appellate court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions G
of fact and of law.
(iii) Various expressions, such as, "substanti.al and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very
strong
circumstances",
"distorted
H
A
B
c
D
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes
of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfem with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(iv) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption
in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudel'.lce that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(v) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
E
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court. [Para 35] [1007-0-H; 1008-A-D]
F
Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 (4)
sec 415, relied on.
Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor(1934) 61IA398; NurMohd.
v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC
36; Surajpa/ Singh v. State 1952 SCR 193; Ajmer Singh v.
State of Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Atley v. State of UP. AIR
G 1955 SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (1955)
2 SCR 1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3
SCR 120; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963) 2
SCR 405; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
1973 (2) SCC 793; K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1
H SCC 355; Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996)
•
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
985
9 SCC 225; Al/arakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2002)
A
3 SCC 57; Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP. (2002) 4 SCC 85;
Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
(2002) 6 SCC 470; Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha
(2003) 12 SCC 606 and Kallu v. State of MP. (2006) 10 SCC
313, referred to.
B
2. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
.+
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, c
however, no absolute standard. What degree of
probability amounts to "proof' is an exercise particular
to each cas«;!. [Para 36] [1008-E-F]
"The Mathematics of Proof II": Glanville Williams,
Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340,
D
- »
referred to.
-I
3.1. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are'
free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot
afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute E
reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional
response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts
as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the
-.
-+
evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere
vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an
F
imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair
doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must
,1
grow out of the evidence in the case. [Para 37] [1009-BD]
_j
3.2: The concepts of probability, and the degrees of G
.,
it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
....
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an
unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
H
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 6 S.C.R.
A Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a
robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of
B trivialities would make a mockery of administration of
criminal justice. [Para 38] [1009-D-G]
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal 1988 (4) SCC 302, relied
on.
c
Krishnan and Anr. v. State represented by Inspector of
Police 2003 (7) SCC 56, referred to.
4. During cross-examination PW 5 (deceased's
father) accepted that it was not mentioned in the FIR that
D gifts and other articles were given as dowry. He accepted
that his father in law Udai Singh had settled the marriage
"- -
between the accused and the deceased. Interestingly
Udai Singh (DW1) has stated that there was no demand
from the side of the accused at the time of marriage. The
E deceased and . her parents had never complained to him
that the accused or any member of his family was raising
any demand of any kind when confronted with the
statement made during investigation. PW5 accepted that
he had not stated many vital things during investigation
~-
which for the first time he was speaking in Court. Similar
F is the position with PW7 the brother of the deceased. He
also accepted on being confronted with the statement
made during investigation that he had not stated
particularly certain relevant aspects. Similar is the
G
position with the evidence of mother of deceased (PW6).
(Para 41] (1010-D-G]
~
,.
,:..
5. As was rightly noted by the trial court there was
no evidence towards the claim regarding any demand of
dowry. That being so the High Court ought not to have
H interfered with the well reasoned judgment of the trial
,,
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
987
'l(
court directing acquittal. The reasoning of the High Court A
that something must have happened and otherwise
deceased would not have committed. suicide is clearly
indefensible. That certainly could not have been a reason
to set aside the trial Court's judgment of acquittal. [Para
42] [1010-H; 1011-A-B]
B
Case Law Reference:
(1934) 61 .IA 398
referred to
Para 12
AIR 1945 PC 151
referred to
Para 16
c
AIR 1954 SC 36
referred to
Para 17
.1952 SCR 193
referred to
Para 19
1953 SCR 418
referred to
Para 20
D
AIR 1955 SC 807
referred to
Para 22
->·
(1955) 2 SCR 1285
referred to
Para 23
(1961) 3 SCR 120
referred to
Para 24
(1963) 2 SCR 405
referred to
Para 25
E
1973 (2) sec 793
referred to
Para 26
(1979) 1 sec 355
referred to
Para 28
-~
(1996) 9 sec 225
referred to
Para 29
F
(20.021 3 sec 57
referred to
Para 30
(20021 4 sec 85
referred to
Para 31
(2002) 6 sec 470
referred to
Para 32
G
~
(2003) 12 sec 606
,..,.
referred to
Para 33
(2006) 10 sec 313
referred to
Para 34
2001 (4) sec 415
'relied on
Para 35
H
A
B
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
1988 (4) sec 302
2003 (7) sec 56
relied on
referred to
Para 38
Para 39
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 383 of 2002.
From the Judgment & Order dated 21.07.1997 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. No. 99-DBN
1993.
Sushi! Kumar, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati, Aditya Kumar,
C Aishwarya Bhati and Anmol Rani for the Appellant.
D
Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem' (for Rajesh Ranjan) and T.V.
George for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is
to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court convicting the appellant for offences punishable
under Sections 304-B, 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
E (in short the 'IPC'). He was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine with default
stipulation for the first offence. But no separate sentence was
awarded in respect of the later offence. The appellant faced trial
before learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul, and was acquitted by
~ -
F learned Sessions Judge giving him the benefit of doubt. The
State Government preferred an appeal which was allowed by
the High Court.
G
2. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
The marriage of Manju (hereinafter referred to as the
'deceased') was solemnised with appellant-Nepal Singh on
26.1.1989. Though Yudhishter Singh (PW5) the father of the
deceased had spent sufficient money for the marriage, accused
Nepal Singh was not satisfied with the dowry. He demanded a
H gas connection which deceased conveyed to her mother
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
989
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Lajwant (PW6) on which her father (PW5) got the gas
A
connection and gave it to Manju.
On 16.5.1991, deceased had come to Bapora (village of
her father) to attend the marriage of the d~ughter of Sh yam Pal
Singh (brother of her father). Deceased told her father (PW5)
B
and mother (PW6) that accused had completed his course and
~
wanted her to bring Rs. One lakh from them and that if she
failed to do so, accused would turn her out of the house.
Yudhishter Singh (PW5) told her that he would arrange for the
money.
c
On 23.5.1991 deceased left for Kanti (village of her inlaws) accompanied by Sunil Kumar (PW?), her brother. While
going, deceased told her father to arrange for the money
otherwise her in laws would not allow her to live.
- >
D
Since Yudhishter Singh (PW5) could not arrange money,
Manju had committed suicide by consuming some poisonous
substance. On receiving information on 26.5.1991, Yudhishter
Singh (PW5) alongwith Sarpanch-Mitter Pal and Head
Constable Rohtas Singh (PW3) met Sl-Ramji Lal (PW8) at the
E
bus stand of Ateli and Yudhishter Singh (PW5) made the above
said statement which formed the basis for registering the formal
-~
FIR. Investigation was undertaken.
'
After investigation was completed, charge sheet was filed.
Since the accused pleaded innocence, trial was held. The
F
prosecution primarily relied upon the evidence of Yudhishter
Singh (PW5) father of the deceased and Lajwant (PW6) mother
of the deceased and Sunil Kumar (PW?) brother of the
deceased. The trial court found that this was a case of suicide
1,
and little physical contact between the accused and the
G
deceased was the primary reason. It was noted that the
accused was pursuing studies till 13th May, 1991, and thereafter
he returned home. Finding the prosecution version to be
suspect, the trial court directed acquittal. As noted above State
preferred an appeal. It was the primary stand that some thing
H
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A must have happened otherwise the victim would not have
committed suicide and the fact that the accused and the
deceased could not have any sexual relationship was an
additional ground for suicide. The High Court found that the
evidence of Sunil Kumar (PW7) the brother of the deceased
B conclusively established the accusations and accordingly set
aside the order of acquittal and recorded conviction.
'
3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
~
appellant submitted that the High Court has not even discussed
c the conclusions of the trial court in the proper perspective and
even no reason was indicated as to why the High Court differed
with the view of the trial court. The allegation of dowry demand
was not stc:ited during investigation and lot of improvements
were made in court for the first time. It is in essence submitted
D
that considering the limited scope for interference with the
judgment of acquittal, the High Court should not have interfered
..( -
with the judgment of the trial court.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other
hand supported the judgment of the High Court submitting that
E the High Court has rightly analysed the evidence of PWs 5, 6
& 7 which was casually done by the trial court.
5. The parameters for dealing with an appeal against
judgment of acquittal have been laid down by this Court in
I -
I
F several cases.
6. It would be appropriate to consider and clarify the legal
position first. Chapter XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Code") deals with appeals. Section 372 expressly declares that
G no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal
~
court except as provided by the Code or by any other law for
"""
the time being in force. Section 373 provides for filing of
appeals in certain cases. Section 374 allows appeals from
convictions. Section 375 bars appeals in cases where the
H accused pleads guilty. Likewise, no appeal is maintainable in
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
991
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
petty cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits appeals by the
A
State for enhancement of sentence. Section 378 confers power
on the State to present an appeal to the High Court from an
order of acquittal. The said section is material and may be
quoted in extenso:
"378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-(1) Save as otherwise
B
provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions
of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in
any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order c
of acquittal passed ,by any court other than a High Court,
or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in
revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
D
·- :..
Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or
by any other agency empowered to make investigation
into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
the Central Government may also direct the Public
E
Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of
-~
acquittal.
(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
F
be entertained except with the leave 'of the High Court.
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal,
G
~
the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
Court.
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
H
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A
entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,
where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days
in every other case, computed from the date of that order
of acquittal.
,
B
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for
the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2).
7. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of
c appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed by
appellate courts.
· 8. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions
were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
D (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") which came up for
.( -
consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council as also before this Court. Since in the
present appeal, we have been called upon to decide the ambit
and- scope of the power of an appellate court in an appeal
E against an order of acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one
aspect only i.e. an appeal against an order of acquittal.
9. Bare reading of Section 378 of the Code (appeal in
case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that no
t -
restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the
F powers of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against
acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full
power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at
large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded
and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both
G questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the
~
High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal.
10. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal,
there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
H the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
993
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
"!
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
A
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence
is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
B
11. Though the above principles are well established, a
different note was struck in several decisions by various High
Courts and even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we
consider some of the leading decisions on the point.
c
12. The first important decision was rendered by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. R.
Emperor [(1934) 61 IA 398)]. In Sheo Swarup, the accused
were acquitted by the trial court and the local Government
- ),
directed the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
Court from an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the old
D
Code, (similar to Section 378 of the Code). At the time of
hearing of appeal before the High Court, it was contended on
behalf of the accused that in an appeal from an order of
acquittal, it was not open to the appellate court to interfere with
E
the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge unless such
findings could not have been reached by him had there not been
-·
some perversity or incompetence on his part. The High Court,
however, declined to accept the said view. It held that no
condition was imposed on the High Court in such appeal. It
F
accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case and having
formed an opinion of its weight and reliability different from that
of the trial Judge, recorded an order of conviction. A petition
was presented to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal
~
, on the ground that conflicting views had been expressed by the Gv
High Courts in different parts of India upon the question whether
-
in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an appellate court had
the power to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to clarify the legal
•
position and accordingly upon the "humble advice of their
H
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A Lordships'', leave was granted by His Majesty. The case was,
Y'
thereafter, argued. The Committee considered the scheme and
interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code) observed that
there was no indication in the Code of any limitation or
restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers as an
B Appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as
regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal
against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though
several authorities were cited revealing different views by the
High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal,
c the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.
13. Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:
"There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view,
apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in
D
India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to
reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in
.. -
cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered',
or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity'
reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a
E
positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way
so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a
glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the
defence so as to produce a similar result."
tF
14. His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)
"Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High
Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the
conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal
G
should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the
'f- ,.
Code."
15. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts
H and stated: (IA p.404)
•
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
995
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
y
"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and
A
before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court
should and will always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as ( 1) the views of the trial
Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a
B
presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to
the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by
a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. c
To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court
in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in
accordance with rules and principles well known and
recognised in the administration of justice."
- ).
(emphasis supplied)
D
16. In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the
Committee reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra)
and held that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has
full powers to review and to reverse acquittal.
E
17. So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first
decision on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36)
- t
(though the case was decided on 14-3-1950, it was reported
only in 1954). In that case, the accused was acquitted by the
F
trial court. The Provincial Government preferred an appeal
which was allowed and the accused was convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court,
for convicting the accused, placed reliance on certain
eyewitnesses.
·~
G
~
18. Upholding the decision of the High Court and following
'~
the proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge
Bench held as follows:
•
"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot
H
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A
support the view which has been expressed in several
~
cases that the High Court has no power under Section
417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of
acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the
subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected
B
itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice."
(emphasis supplied)
;.
19. In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a twoJudge Bench observed that it was well established that in an
c appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court
had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court
D which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing
~ -
their evidence could be reversed only for very substantial and
compelling reasons.
20. In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418)
E the accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted
by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal filed by the
State. The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was
contended by him that there were "no compelling reasons" for
setting aside the order of acquittal and due and proper weight
t -
F
had not been given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial
court as regards the credibility of witnesses seen and
examined. It was also commented that the High Court
committed an error of law in observing that "when a strong
'prima facie' case is made out against an accused person it
is his duty to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence
G against him and he cannot take shelter behind the presumption
,..
~
of innocence and cannot state that the law entitles him to keep
_,
his lips sealed".
21. Upholding the contention, this Court said:
H
•
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
997
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of
A
acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is
further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial
court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that
the accused had failed to explain the circumstances
appearing against him but only for very substantial and
B
compelling reasons."
(emphasis supplied)
22. In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court
said:
c
"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the
appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal·
Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment
of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set
D
-
).
aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the
High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
--
conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established
E
rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is
not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of
·- _,
acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage
of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
F
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide
powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against
an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the
G
-
presumption of innocence with which the accused person
-4:
' ,...
starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate
stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight
to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order
..
of acquittal.
H
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those
y
principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the
judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."
(emphasis supplied)
B
23. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra [(1955) 2
SCR 1285)] the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302
and 447 IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted
by the High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court
against an order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority
c (2:1) stated: (para 1)
"It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is not enough for
the High Court to take ·a different view of the evidence;
there must also be substantial and compelling reasons
D
for holding that the trial courl was wrong."
(emphasis supplied)
... -
24. In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR
120, a three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading
E decisions on the point and observed that there was no difficulty
---
in applying the principles laid down by the Privy Council and
accepted by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that
appellate courts found considerable difficulty in understanding
the scope of the words "substantial and compelling reasons"
1·
F used in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:
"This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition
to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate
G
court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down
by the Privy Council but also must give its clear reasons
~
for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was
;Jo- -
wrong."
The Court concluded as follows:
H
•
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
999
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,..,
"9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results:
A
( 1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the
principles laid down in Shea Swarup case afford a correct
guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in
disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different
B
phraseology used ·in the judgments of this Court, such as,
(i) 'substantial and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are
not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire c
evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing
so it should not only consider every matter on record having
a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given
by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its
arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also
D
. ).
express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold ·
that the acquittal was not justified."
25. Again, in M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra (1963)
2 SCR 405, the point was raised before a Constitution Bench
of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed
E
as follows:
"17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court,
·i
however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a
cautious approach in dealing with appeals against
F
acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of
innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so,
'the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of
seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be
reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons':
G
"""
vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly
~
in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was .
·~·
observed that the interference of the High Court in an
appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only
if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do
H
t
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A
so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an
y
order of acquittal can be reversed only for 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In
appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be
remembered that these observations were not intended to
B
lay down a rigid or inflexible ru!e which should govern the
decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals.
They were not intended, and should not be read to have
intended to introduce an additional condition in clause (a)
of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said
c
observations are intended to emphasize is that the
approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal
against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord
Russell observed in Sheo Swarup the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused 'is not certainly
D
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his
trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be
A
-
construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in
every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this
E
Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1
SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before reversing
a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse."
t -
F
(emphasis supplied)
26. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court
held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the
~
G powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the
plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole
evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed,
~
it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de novo,
informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable
H innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into
J
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
1001
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
an acquittal the homage our jurisprudence owes to individual
A
liberty constrains the higher court not to upset the holding
• without very convincing reasons and comprehensive
-
consideration."
27. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court
8
observed as follows:
~
· "6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which
suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers c
of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at .
the expense of social defence and to the soothing
sentiment that all acquittals are always· good regardless
of justice to the victim and the community, demand
especial emphasis in the contemporary context of D
-
,.I..
escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has
a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden·
thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro'
the web of our law should not be· stretched morbidly to
~-
embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The
E
;
excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a
thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall
"" -+
not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts
belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of
justice will then breakdown and lose credibility with the
F
community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-
-<:
heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof
'
of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the
simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished.
·f
If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead
G
..I
to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to
-·-
a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against
indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those
who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the
,_
guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding
H
1002
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
A
the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons
...,--
it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage
of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less
than from the conviction of the innocent.. . .' In short, our
jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must
B
be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck
between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to
set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents."
.
c
(emphasis supplied)
28. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355,
the Court was considering the power of the High Court against ·
an order of acquittal under Section 378 of the Code. After
D considering the relevant decisions on the point it was stated
as follows:
A
~
,_
"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was
thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for
.E
'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used
to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and
.
compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of
'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and
sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the .
-
~
F
search for them were abandoned as a result of the
pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of
Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this
Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy
Council .in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed
G
those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
,..
this Court has consistently recognised the right of the
· appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come
...
to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations
mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup case.
Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly
H
unjust', have been used to describe the orders of acquittal
NEPAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA
1003
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
which warrant interference. But, such expressions have
A
been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise ·
the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an
order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate
court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State
B
of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v.
State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has.been said
that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may
be added the further principle that 'if two reasonable ,
conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence c
on record, the appellate court_should nqt disturb the finding ,
. t-
.
·' •
•
-
'
- -
of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It
· stems out of the furidamentai. principle· of our criminal
jurisprudence that the accusecds entitle(! to the benefit of
any reasonable doubt. If two 'rE!asonably probable and 0
eveniy balanced views of the evidence are possible, one
must necessarily concede the existence of a .reasonable
doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left
out of account. To entitle an accused person fo the benefit
of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views,
E
the possible view in favour of the accused must be as
nearly reasonably probable as that against him.