# NEW DELHI & OTHERS v. HOTEL WORKERS' UNION

- **Citation:** [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Ga.Jendra.Gadka.B, K. N. w A.NOHOO
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/new-delhi-others-v-hotel-workers-union-1782
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Employer seeking permission to dismiss
workmen as result of enquiry-Suspension of workmen pending
decision of such application by Tribunal-Validity-Workmen, if
entitled to wages during period of suspension-Grant of interim
relief-Power of Supreme Court-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (I'f'
of r947), ss. I0(4), 33.
The appellants. who were the managements of the three
hotels, decided to dismiss some of their workmen who were found
guilty of misconduct as a result of enquiries held by them and
suspended them without pay pending the receipt of the permission of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The workmen applied to the Industrial
Tribunal for the grant of interim relief pending disposal of the
applications and the Tribunal granted the relief prayed for
amounting to full wages and .a sum of Rs. 25 per head per month
in lieu of food.
The managements appealed against such grant,
but the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The
appellants came up to this court by special leave. The two
questions for decision in the appeals were, (r) whether any wages
were at all payable to the suspended workmen pending permission
being sought under s. 33 to dismiss them and the decision of the
applications under s. 33 of the Act, and, (2) whether the Industrial
Tribunal was competent to grant interim relief except by an
interim award that was published.
H e!d, that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of
master and servant the power to suspend the servant without
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of
z959
service between the master and the servant but must arise either
from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provi- The Management of
sion governing such contract.
Hotel Imperial
Hanley v. Pease & Partners, Limited, 1915 (1) K.B. 698;
v.
Wallwork v. Fielding and Ors., 1922 (2) K.B. 66; Secretary of State
Hotel Workers'
for Itidia in Council v. Surendra Nath Goswami, I.L.R. 1939 (1) Cal.
Union
46 and Rura Ram v. Divisional Superintendent, N. W.R .. I.L.R.
VII (1954) Punj. 415, referred to.
Buts. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which took
away the right of the employer to dismiss the employee except
with the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, introduced a
fundamental change in industrial law in modification of the
common law by empowering the employer by implication to
suspend the contract of employment and thus relieve himself of
the obligation to pay the wages and the employee of rendering
service, where, as a result of a proper enquiry, he came to the
conclusion that an employee should be dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances created by the enactment of s. 33 of the Act it was
just and fair that Industrial Tribunals, which had the power to
go beyond the ordinary law of master and servant, s110uld imply
such a term in the contract of employment. The result, therefore, would be that if the Tribunal granted the permission, the
suspended contract would come to an end and there would be no
further obligation on the part of the employer to pay any wages
after the date of suspension. If on the other hand, the permission was refused, the workmen would be entitled to all their
wages from the date of suspension.
Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial
Tribunal, Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v.
Brijnandan Pandey, [1956] S.C.R. Boo, referr~d to.
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [1956]
S.C.R. 916; The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Dhuban Singh,
C.A. 768/57, decided on 20+59, M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works
(P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, C. As. 746 and 747/57, decided on
29-4-59 and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, [1960] (1) S.C.R. 32
explained and relied on.
But the employer's power of suspension could not take away
the power of the Tribunal to grant interim relief to the workmen
under the Act, the words " inciden ta! thereto " occurring in
s

## Text

I959
Kamarhatty
Co., Ltd.
••
U shnath Pakrashi
Wanehoo ].
I959
Mayaz
476
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
Learned counsel for the appellant wanted to argue
that this was not a case of discharge or dismissal but
of lay-off. We did not permit him to raise this argument because the special leave was limited only to the
question set out above. The answer to that question
has already been indicated above and on that answer
the appeal must fail.
We therefore
dismiss the
appeal, but in the circumstances we make no order as
to costs of this Court.
Appeal dismissed.
THE MANAGEMENT OF HOTEL IMPERIAL,
NEW DELHI & OTHERS
v.
HOTEL WORKERS' UNION
(B. P. SINHA, P. B. GA.JENDRA.GADKA.B and
K. N. w A.NOHOO, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Employer seeking permission to dismiss
workmen as result of enquiry-Suspension of workmen pending
decision of such application by Tribunal-Validity-Workmen, if
entitled to wages during period of suspension-Grant of interim
relief-Power of Supreme Court-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (I'f'
of r947), ss. I0(4), 33.
The appellants. who were the managements of the three
hotels, decided to dismiss some of their workmen who were found
guilty of misconduct as a result of enquiries held by them and
suspended them without pay pending the receipt of the permission of the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The workmen applied to the Industrial
Tribunal for the grant of interim relief pending disposal of the
applications and the Tribunal granted the relief prayed for
amounting to full wages and .a sum of Rs. 25 per head per month
in lieu of food.
The managements appealed against such grant,
but the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The
appellants came up to this court by special leave. The two
questions for decision in the appeals were, (r) whether any wages
were at all payable to the suspended workmen pending permission
being sought under s. 33 to dismiss them and the decision of the
applications under s. 33 of the Act, and, (2) whether the Industrial
Tribunal was competent to grant interim relief except by an
interim award that was published.
H e!d, that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of
master and servant the power to suspend the servant without
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of
z959
service between the master and the servant but must arise either
from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provi- The Management of
sion governing such contract.
Hotel Imperial
Hanley v. Pease & Partners, Limited, 1915 (1) K.B. 698;
v.
Wallwork v. Fielding and Ors., 1922 (2) K.B. 66; Secretary of State
Hotel Workers'
for Itidia in Council v. Surendra Nath Goswami, I.L.R. 1939 (1) Cal.
Union
46 and Rura Ram v. Divisional Superintendent, N. W.R .. I.L.R.
VII (1954) Punj. 415, referred to.
Buts. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which took
away the right of the employer to dismiss the employee except
with the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, introduced a
fundamental change in industrial law in modification of the
common law by empowering the employer by implication to
suspend the contract of employment and thus relieve himself of
the obligation to pay the wages and the employee of rendering
service, where, as a result of a proper enquiry, he came to the
conclusion that an employee should be dismissed. In the peculiar
circumstances created by the enactment of s. 33 of the Act it was
just and fair that Industrial Tribunals, which had the power to
go beyond the ordinary law of master and servant, s110uld imply
such a term in the contract of employment. The result, therefore, would be that if the Tribunal granted the permission, the
suspended contract would come to an end and there would be no
further obligation on the part of the employer to pay any wages
after the date of suspension. If on the other hand, the permission was refused, the workmen would be entitled to all their
wages from the date of suspension.
Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial
Tribunal, Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v.
Brijnandan Pandey, [1956] S.C.R. Boo, referr~d to.
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup, [1956]
S.C.R. 916; The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Dhuban Singh,
C.A. 768/57, decided on 20+59, M/s. Sasa Musa Sugar Works
(P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, C. As. 746 and 747/57, decided on
29-4-59 and Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, [1960] (1) S.C.R. 32
explained and relied on.
But the employer's power of suspension could not take away
the power of the Tribunal to grant interim relief to the workmen
under the Act, the words " inciden ta! thereto " occurring in
s. 10(4) of the Act made it clear that interim relief, where admissible, could be granted as a matter incidental to the main question
under reference, although it might not be expressly mentioned in
the terms of.the reference.
It is not necessary to decide whether an interim relief of this
nature amounted to an interim award. Even assuming that the
Industrial Tribunal could not grant interim relief except by an
interim award which required publication that could not preclude
478
SUPREME COUI~T REPORTS [1960(1)]
z959
this Court from granting interim relief in the same manner as the
Industrial Tribunal could and ss. 15, 17 or 17A could have no
The Manag,,nent of application to such an order passed by this Court.
Hotel Imperial
Ordinarily interim relief could not be the whole relief the
v.
w0rkn1en would get in case of final success and the appellants
Hotel Workers'
should not be made to pay more than half the amount adjudged
Union
by the Industrial Tribunal as interim relief in these cases.
Wamhoo ].
CIVIL
APPELI,ATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 31-33 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated
May 28, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
Lucknow (Delhi Branch), in Appeals Nos. III. 313-315
of 1955.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-Gener<ilfor India, Jai Gop<il
Sethi, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath
and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants (in all appeals).
U.S. Pathak, V. P. Nayar and Janardan Sharma, for
the respm1.dents (in all appeals).
.
l!J59.
Mav 21.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by·
WANCHOO J.-The8e arc three appeals by special
leave from three decisions of t.he Labour Appellate
Tribunal of India. We shall dispose of them by one
judgment, as thc>y raise common points. The three
appellants arc the managements of (1) Imperial Hotel,
New Delhi, (2) Maiden's Hotel, Delhi and (3) Swiss
Hotel, Delhi, the respondents being their respective
workmen repre&ented by the Hotel Workers' Union,
Katra Shahanshahi, Chandni Chowk, Delhi.
It seems that disputes were going on between these
hotels and their workmen for some time past about the
conditions of labour of the workmen employed therein.
Matters seem to have come to a head about the end of
September, 1955 and a strike of all the workmen in all
the three hotels took place on October 5, 1955. Before
this general strike in the three hotels, there had been
trouble in Imperial Hotel only in August, 1955. In
that connection charge-sheets were served on 22 workmen and an enquiry was held by the management
which came to the conclusion that the workmen were
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
guilty of misconduct and therefore decided to dismiss
z959
them. Consequently,. notices were served on October 4,
1955, upon these workmen informing them that the The Managem~t of
h d d 'd d t d'
.
th
b' t
Holel lmperial
management a
em e
o ism1ss
em su 1ec to
v.
obtaining permission under s. 33 of the Industrial Hotel workers'
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). It
Union
seems that this action of the management of Imperial
Hotel led to the general strike in all the three hotels ori
Wanchoo f.
October 5, 1955. Thereupon the three managements
issued notices to the workmen on October 5, 1955,
directing them to re-join their duties within three
hours failing which action would be taken against
them. As the workmen did not join within this time,
fresh notices were issued the same day asking them to
show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against them. In the meantime they were
informed that they would be under suspension. On
October 7, 1955, the three managements issued notice~
•to the workmen informing them that it had been
decided to dismiss them and that they were being
suspended pending the obtaining of permission under
s. 33 of the Act.
As the disputes between the hotels and their workmen were already under consideration of G.overnment,
an order of reference was made on October 12, 1955,
relating to Imperial Hotel. In this reference a large
number of matters were referred to adjudication including the case of 22 workmen whom the management
of the hotel had decided to dismiss on October 4, 1955.
This reference with respect to_ Imperial Hotel, however, did not refer to the workmen whom the management had decided to dismiss on October 7, 1955,
Further enquiries seem to have been made by the
management in this connection and eventually it was
decided to confirm the action taken on October 7 with
respect to nineteen workmen. These nineteen workmen had in the meantime applied under s. 33-A of the
Act on the ground that they had bee:Q. suspended without pay for an indefinite period and had thus been
punished in breach of s. 33. Thus the dispute so far
as Imperial Hotel is concerned was with respect to 44
workmen in all, 25 of whom were included in· the
480
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
r959
reference of October 12, 1955, and the remaining 19
The Management of had filed an application under s. 33-A of the Act. It
Hotel Imperial
does not appear, however, that Imperial Hotel made
v.
any application under s. 33 of the Act for permission
Hotel wo,km' to dismiss these 19 workmen; though an application
Union
under that section was made on October 22, 1955, with
Wanchoo J.
respect to 22 workmen whose dismissal was decided
upon on October 4, 1955.
So far as Maiden's Hotel is concerned, the case
relates to 26 workmen whose dismissal was finl!-lly
considered by the management to be necessary on
further enquiry after October 7, 1955.
An order of
reference was made in the case of this hotel on
November 23, 1955, in which the case of 26 workmen
was referred to the tribunal along with other matters.
Later, however, 12 of these workmen were re-employed
on December 10, 1955, and the real dispute therefore so
far as this hotel is concerned related to 14 workmen.
In the case of Swiss Hotel also there were further
enquiries after the notices of October 7. In the meantime, an application was made under s. 33-A of the
Act by the union to the conciliation officer. Eventually, it appears that on November 10, 1955, reference
was made with respect to 14 workmen to the tribunal
for adjudication.
We now come to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. In all three cases, applications were
filed on behalf of the workmen for interim relief, the
date of the application being October 22 in case of
Imperial Hotel and November 26 in case of Maiden's
Hotel and Swiss Hotel. Replies to these applications
was filed by the managements on December 5, 1955.
On the same day, the Industrial Tribunal passed an
order granting interim relief. In the case of Imperial
Hotel, it ordered that 43, out of 44 workmen, who had
applied for interim relief should be paid their wages
plus a sum of Rs. 25 per month per head in lieu of
food till final decision in the matter of the dismissal of
these workmen. In the case of Maiden's Hotel; the
management was prepared to take back 12 workmen
and they were ordered to report for duty or or before
December 10, 1955. It was also ordered that these 12
-
"
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
workmen till they were re-employed and the "remainr959
ing" 13 workmen till the decision of their case would Th M -
1 1
b
"d b
f . t .
1. f th .
f
e
anagemen o
e pa1
y way o m er1m re ie
e1r wages rom
Hotel Imperial
October 1, 1955, ;plus Rs. 25 per month per head in
v.
lieu of food.
No order was passed with respect to the Hotel Workers'
26th workman, namely, Chiranjilal sweeper. In the
Union
case of Swiss Hotel, the management was prepared to
k
f
h
d
d
Wanchooj.
ta e back six o the workmen and t ey were or ere
to report for duty on or before December 10, 1955. In
other respects, the order was in the same terms as in the
case of Maiden's Hotel.
Then followed three appeals by the three hotels
against the three orders granting interim relief.
These appeals were dismissed by the Labour Appellate
Tribunal on May 28, 1956. Thereupon the three hotels
applied for special leave to appeal to this Court, which
was granted. They also applied for stay of the order
of the Industrial Tribunal relating to payment of wages
plus Rs. 25 per month per head in lieu of food.
Stay
was granted by this Court on June 5, 1956, on condition that the employers would pay to the employees a
sum equal to half of the amount adjudged payable by
the orders dated December 5, 1955, in respect of the
arrears accrued due till then and continue to pay in
the same proportion in future until determination of
the dispute betweenj;he parties. It appears that after
this order of June 5, 1956, even those workmen who
had not been re-employed after the order of December 5, 1955, were taken back in service on July 15, 1956,
by the three hotels. Thus, 2 workmen in the case of
Swiss Hotel, 13 workmen in the case of Maiden's Hotel
and 43 workmen in the case of Imperial Hotel were
taken back in service.
The main contentions on behalf of the hotels a.re two,
namely, (1) are any wages payable at all to workmen
who are suspended pending permission being sought
under s. 33 of the Act for their dismissal ? and (2) is an
industrial tribunal competent to grant interim relief
without making an interim a.ward which should have
been published ?
482
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
z959
Re. (1).
Th M
I ·'
The contention of the appellants under this head is
'
anagemen °' th t
'
f h
k
d'
· '
Hotel Imperial
a suspens10n o t e wor men pen mg perm1ss10n
v.
under s. 33 of the Act imposes an absolute bar to the
Hotel Workers' payment of any wages to the suspended workmen. On
Union
the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the
respondents that susp'ension of workmen involving
n-·anchoo ].
non-payment of wages is not contemplated at all under
the ordinary law of master and servant in the absence
of an express term in the contract of employment to
that effect; and as in these cases there were admittedly
no standing orders providing suspension without payment of wages, it was not open to the appellants to
withhold wages as the orders of suspension made in
these cases merely amounted to this that the employers
were not prepared to take work from the workmen.
Even so, the right of the workmen to receive wages
remained and the employer was bound to pay the
wages during the period of so-called suspension. The
Industrial Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal
took the view that in the absence of an express term
in the contract of employment, wages could not be
withheld, even though the employer might suspend
the workman in the sense that he was'not prepared to
take any work from them.
The first question therefore that falls for consideration is the extent of the power of the employer to
suspend an employee under the ordinary law of master
and servant. It is now well settled that the power to
suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a servant to
work, is not· an implied term in an ordinary contract
between master and servant, and that such a power
can only be the creature either of a statute governing
the contract, or of an express term in the contraet
itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power
either as an express term in the contract or in the rules
framed under some statute would mean that the master
would have no power to suspend a w_ork,man and even
if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee
to work, he will have to pay wages during the so-called
period of suspension. Where, however, there is power
to suspend either in the contract of employment or in
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
483
the statute oi.vthe rules framed thereunder, the suspenz959
sion has the effect of temporarily suspending the
M -
1 ·
f
d
· h h
The
anagement of
re ation o master an servant wit t e consequence
H tel Imperial
that the servant is not bound to render service and
0
v.
the( master is not bound to pay. These principles of the Hotel workers'
ordinary law of master and servant are well settled
Union
and have not been disputed before us by eithel' party.
Reference in this connection may be made to Hanley
Wanchoo l·
v. Pease and Partners, Limited(1), Wallwork v. Fielding (9), Secretary. of State for India in Council v.
Surendra Nath Goswami (8) and Rura Ram v. Divisional
Superintendent: N. W. Railway(').
The next question that falls for consideration is
whether these principles also apply to a case. where
the master has decided to dismiss a servant, but
cannot do so at once as he has to obtain th11 permission
necessary under s. 33 of the Act and therefore suspends
the workman till he gets such permission. This brings
us to the sphere of industrial law. Ordinarily, ifs. 33
of the Act did not intervene, the master would be
entitled to exercise his power of dismissing the servant
in accordance with the law of master and servant and
payment of wages would immediately cease as the
contract would come to an end. But s. 33 of the Act
has introduced a fundamental change ill the law of
master and servant so far as c:ases which fall within
the Act are concerned; It has therefore to be seen
whether Industrial 'l'ribunals which· are dealing with
the matter under the Act must follow the ordinary law
of master and servant as indicated above or can imply
a term in the contra.ct in the peculiar .circumstances
supervening under s. 33 of the Act, to the effect that
where the master has concluded his enquiry and come
to the decision that the servant should be dismissed
and thereupon suspends him pending permission
under's. 33, he has the power to order suoh suspension,
which would result in temporarily suspending the relation of master and servant, so that the servant is not
bound to render service and the master is not bound
to pay wages. The power of Industrial Tribunal in
(1) [1915] 1 K.B. 6g8.
(3) I L.R. [1939] 1 Cal. 46.
(2) [1922] 2 K.B. 66.
(4) I.L.R. VII (1954) Punj~ 415.
484
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1960(1)]
1959
matters of this kind arising out of industrial disputes
h
-
1was considered by the Federal Court in Western India
TeManagementoA
b'l
A
•
•
Th
Ind
·z T'b
a},
H 01,1 ImpeYial
utomo i e
ssociation v.
e
ustria
ri un ,
v.
Bombay(') and the followiug observations of Mahajan, J.
Hotel Workers' (as he then was) at p. 345 are apposite:
Union
" Adjudication does not, in our. opinion, mean
wanchoo J.
adjudication according to the strict law of master
and servant. The award of the tribunal may contain
provisions for settlement of a. dispute which no Court
could order if it was bound by ordinary Jaw, but the
tribunal is not fettered in any way by these 'limitations. In Volume 1 of ' Labour Disputes and
Collective Bargaining' by Ludwig Teller, it is said
at p.,536 that industrial arbitration may involve the
extension of an existing agreement or the making of
a new one, or in general the creation of new obligation or modification of old ones, while commercial
arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to
existing agreements. In our opinion, it is a true
statement about the functions of an industrial
tribunal in la.hour disputes."
This Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Brijnandan
Pandey (') also recognised the correctnes's of the dictum
laid down in the a.hove :Federal Court decision and
observed that there was a. distinction between commercial and industrial arbitration, and after referring
to the same passage in "Labour Disputes and Collective
Bargaining " by Ludwig Teller (Vol. 1, p. 536), proceeded to lay down as follows at p. 810 :-
" A Court of law proceeds on the footing that no
power exists in the courts to make contracts for
people; and the parties must make their own contracts. The Courts reach their limit of power when
they enforce contracts which the parties have made.
An Industrial Tribunal is not so fettered and ma.v
create new obligations or modify contracts in the
interests of industrial peace, to protect legitimate
trade union activities and to prevent unfair practice
or victimisation."
(I) [1949] F.C.R. 3•1.
(•) (1956] S:C.R. Boo.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS'
485
It is clear therefore that Industrial Tribunals have
x959
the powe~ t~ go beyond th.e or?in?'ry law of master and Th• Management of
servant, if circumstances Justify it. In these cases the
Hotel Imperial
decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal has proceedv.
ed strictly on the basis of the ordinary law of master Hotel Workers'
and servant-without regard to the fundamental change
Union
introduced in that law by the enactment of s. 33 of the
Act. All the cases to which we have been referred
Wamhoo J.
with respect to the ordinary law1ofmaster and servant
had no occasion to consider the impact of s. 33 of the
Act on that law as to the power of the master to suspend. We have, therefore, to see whether it would be
reasonable for an Industrial Tribunal where it is
dealing with a case to which s. 33 of the Act applies,
to imply a term in the contra.ct giving power to the
master .to suspend a servant when the master has come
to the conclusion after necessary enquiry that the
servant has committed misconduct and ought to be
dismissed, but cannot do so because of s. 33. It is
urged on behalf of the respondents that there is nothing
in the language of s. 33 to warrant the conclusion that
when an employer has to apply under it for permission he can suspend the workmen concerned. This
argument, however, begs the question because if there
were any such provision in s. 33, it w-ould be an express provision in the statute authorising such suspension and no further question of an implied term would
arise. What we have to see is whether in the absence
of an express provision to that effect in s. 33, it will
be reasonable for an Industrial Tribunal in these
extraordinary circumstances arising. out of the effect
of s. 33 to imply a. term in the contra.ct giving power
to the employer to suspe,nd the contra.ct of employment, thus relieving himself of the obligation to pay
wages and relieving the servant of the corresponding
obligation to render service. We are of opinion that
in the peculiar circumstances which have a.risen on
account of the enactment of s. 33, it is but just and
fair that Industrial Tribunals should imply such a
term in the contract of employment.
This Court had occasion to consider this matter in
four cases, though the point was not specifically argued
486
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)]
z959
Th M --
1 ,,in the manner in which it has been argued before us
e
anagemcn o1
B
'd
·
f h
'11
Hotelimperial now.
ut a cons1 erat10n o t ese cases w1
show
v.
that, though the point was not specifically argued,
Hotel workm' the view of this Court has consistently been that in
Union
such cases a term should be implied giving power to
the master to suspend the contract of employment after
Wanchoo ].
he has come to the conclusion on a proper enquiry
that the servant should be dismissed and has to apply
to the tribunal for permission under s. 33.
In Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram
Sarup (1), there was a provision in the standing orders
for suspension for four days without pay. In actual
fact, however, the employer in that case after having
come to the conclusion that the employees should be
dismissed suspended them without pay pending permission of the tribunal and it was held that such suspension was not punishment, even though it exceeded
four days. This was the main point which was under
consideration in that case; but it was further observed
that such a suspension was only an interim measure
and would last till the application for permission to
punish the workman was made and the tribunal had
passed orders thereon. If the permission was accorded
the workman would not be paid during thll period of
suspension : but if the permission was refused1 he
woald have to be paid for the whole period.
In The Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban
Singh ('), it was pointed out.that but for this ban the
employer would have been entitled to dismiss the
employee immediately after the completion of his
enquiry on coming to the conclusion that the employee
was guilty of misconduct.
The contract of ·service
would thus be brought to an end by an immediate
dismissal after the conclusion of the enquiry and the
employee would not be entitled to any further wages.
But s. 33 steps in and stops the employer from dismissing the employee immediately on the conclusion
of his enquiry and compels him to seek permission of
the Tribunal. It was, therefore, reasonable that the
employer having done ·au that he could do to bring
the contract of service to an end should not be
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 916.
(2f C.A. 768/57, decided on April 20, 19:;9.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS
487
expected to continue paying the employee thereafter.
x959
It was pointed out that in such a case the employer T'
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pay as the time taken by the tribunal to accord perv.
mission under ·s. 33 of the Act was beyond the control Hotel Workers'
of the employer. Lastly, it was pointed out that this
Union
would not cause any hardship to the employee; for if
h
d
Wanchoo ].
t e tribunal grante permission, the employee would
not get anything from the date of his suspension without pay, while if the permission was refused he would
be entitled to his back wages from such date. Lakshmi
Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. (1) was referred to and it was
explained that the principle laid down in that case
would only apply wheres. 33 would be applicable.
In Messrs. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v.
Shobrati Khan (9), ethe view taken in the two earlier
cases was reiterated with the rider that in case the
employer did not hold an enquiry and suspend the
workman pending permission, he would have to1 go on
paying the wages till the proceedings under s. 33 were
concluded and the tribunal granted permission to
dismiss the·· workman.
In Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen (3), the rider
laid down in the case Messrs. Sasa Musa Sugar Works
(P) Ltd. (9) was· further extended to a case of an adjudication under s. 15 of the Act and it was pointed out
that if there was any defect in the enquiry by the
employer he could make good that defect by producing
necessary evidence before the tribunal ; but in that
case he will have to pay the wages up to the date of
the aW!lord of the tribunal, even if the award went in
his favour.
It is urged on behalf of the respondents that there
were at any rate some Standing Orders, particularly in
Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills LUJ. (1) and The Management
of Ranipur Colliery (') giving power to suspend for
some. period of time and therefore further suspension
might be justified on the basis of those Standing
Orders.
In the case of Messrs. Sasa Musa Sugar
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 916.
(2) ~.As. 746 .t 747/57,
<Jecjded on April 29, 19,~.
(3) [Ig6o].I S.C.R. 32.
(4) C.A. 768/57 decided
l>!l April 201 19,59·
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960(1)]
'959 •
Works (P) Ltd, ('), however, there were no Standing
Th M -
,, Orders till then in force.
The ratio of the decision in
e
anagement o, h
Hotel bnp<rial t ese cases was, however, not based on the presence or
v.
absence of the Standing Orders; for there is very little
Hotel Workers' difference in principle between the cases where StandUnion
ing Orders provided a few days suspension without pay
and the suspension was continued for a much longer
Wanchoo ].
. d
d
h
d
per10 an w ere there were no Standing Or ers providing suspension without pay. We are of opinion
that though these cases did not expressly proceed on
the basis of an implied term in the contract of employment to suspend the employee and thus suspend the
relation of master and servant temporarily, that must
be the implicit basis on which these decisions were
given. But for such a term being implied, it would
not be possible at all to lay down, as was laid down in
these cases, that if a proper enquiry had been held
and the employer had decided to dismiss the workman
and apply for permission and in consequence had suspended the workman, there would be no obligation on
him to pay wages from the date of suspension if permission was accorded to him under s. 33.
We are,
therefore, of opinion that the ordinary law of master
and servant as to suspension can be and should be held
to have been modified in view of the fundamental
change introduced by s. 33 in that law and a term
should be implied by Industrial Tribunals in the
contract of employment that if the master has held a
proper enquiry and come to the conclusion that the
servant should be dismissed and in consequence suspends him pending the permission required under s. 33
he has the power to order such suspension, thus suspending the contra.ct of employment temporarily, so
that there is no obligation on him to pay wages and
no obligation on the servant to work. In dealing with
this point the basic and decisive consideration introduced dy s. 33 must be borne in mind. The undisputed common law right of the master to dismiss his
servant for proper cause has been subjected by s. 33 to
a ban; and that in fairness must mean that, pending
the removal of the said statutory ban, the master can
(1) C.As. 746 & 747/57, decided on April 29, 1959.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
after holding a proper enquiry temporarily terminate
I959
the relationship of master and servant by suspending
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therefore that if the tribunal grants permission, the
0
v.
suspended contract would come to an end and there 'Hotel Workm'
will be no further obligation to pay any wages after
Union_
the date of suspension. If, on the other hand, the
permission is refused, the suspension would be wrong
Wanchoo J.
and the workman would be entitled to all his wages
from the date of suspension.
This, however, does not conclude the matter so far
as the grant of interim relief in these cases is concerned. Even though there may be an implied term
giving power to the employer to suspend a workman
in the circumstances mentioned above, it would not
affect the power of the tribunal to grant interim relief
for such a power of suspension in the employer would
not, on the principles already referred to above, take
lLway the power of the tribunal to grant interim relief
if such power exists under the Act. The existence of
such an implied term cannot bar the tribunal from
granting interim relief if it has the power to do so
under the Act. This brings us to the second point,
which has been canvassed in these appeals.
Re. (2).
After a dispute is referred to the tribunal under s.10 ./
of the Act, it is enjoined on it by s., 15 to hold its proceeding expeditiously and on the conclusion thereof
submit its award to the appropriate government. An
"a.ward" is defined in s. 2(b) of the Act as meaning
" an interim or final determination by an Industrial
Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question
relating thereto." Where an order referring an industrial
dispute has been made specifying the points of dispute
for adjudication, the tribunal has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto;
(s. 10(4) ). It is urged on behalf of the appellants that
the tribunal in these cases had to confine itself to
adjudicating on the points referred and that a.s the
question of interim relief was not referred to· it, it
could not adjudicate upon that. We a.re of opinion
• 6a
490
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
r959
that there is no force in this argument, in view of the
TheMa:;.mentofwords "incidental thereto" appearing in s. 10(4).
Hotel Imperial There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of
v.
reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a triHotel Wo•kers' bunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim
Union
relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to
the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto
Wanchoo ].
under s. 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in
terms to the tribunal. Thus interim relief where it is
admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the
main question referred to the tribunal without being
itself referred in express terms.
The next question is as to how the tribunal should
proceed in the matter if it decides to grant interim
relief. The definition of the word "award" shows that
it can be either an interim or final determination either
of the whole of the dispute referred to the tribunal or
of any question relating thereto. Thus it is open to
the tribunal to give an award about the entire dispute
at the end of all proceedings. This will be final determination of the industrial dispute referred to it. It is
also open to the tribunal to make an award about
some of the matters referred to it whilst some others
still remain to be decided. This will be an interim
determination of any question relating thereto. In
either case it will have to be published as required by
s. 17. Such awards are however not in the nature of
interim relief for they decide the industrial dispute or
some question relating thereto. Interim relief, on the
other hand, is granted under the power conferred on
the tribunal under s. 10(4) with respect to matters
incidental to the points of dispute for adjudication.
It is however urged on behalf of the appellants that
even if the tribunal has power under s. 10(4) of the
Act to grant interim relief of the nature granted in
• these cases it can only do so by submitting an award
under s. 15 to the appropriate government. Reference
in this connection is made to sections 15, 17 and, 17-A
of the Act. It is submitted that as soon as the tribunal maks a determination whether interim or final, it
must submit that determination to government which
has to publish it as an award under s. 17 and thereafter
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
the provisions of s. 17-A will apply. In reply the resz959
11ondents rely on a. decision of the Labour Appellate
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en erry an
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men (1), where it was held that an interim award had
0 e :
ma
not to be sent like a final award to the government Hotel Workers·
for publication and that it would take effect from the
Union
date of the order. We do not think it necessary, to
Wanehoo f.
decide for present purposes whether an order granting
interim relief of this kind is an a.ward within the
meaning of s. 2(b) and must therefore be published
under s. 17. We shall assume that the interim order
passed by the Tribunal on .December 5, 1955, could not
be enforced as it was in the nature of an award and
should have been submitted to the government and
published under s. 17 to become enforceable under
s. 17-A. It is, however, still open to us to consider
whether we should pass an order giving interim relief
in view of this alleged technical defect in the order of
the Industrial Tribunal. We have the power to grant
interim relief in the same manner as the Industrial
Tribunal could do and our order need not be sent to
government for publication, for ss. 15, 17 and 17-A do
not apply to the order of this Court just as they did
not apply to the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
which was governed by the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) ~ct, 1950 (No. XLVIII of 1950), (since
repealed). We have already mentiQned that this Court
passed an order on June 5, 1956, laying down conditions on which it stayed the operation of the order of
December 5, 1955, ma.de by the Industrial Tribunal.
We a.re of opinion that that order·is the right order to
pass in the matter of granting interim relief to the
workmen in these cases. Ordinarily, interim relief
should not be the whole relief that the workmen would
get if they succeeded finally. In fairness to the Industrial Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal we must say
that they granted the entire wages plus Rs. 25 per
mensem per head in lieu of food on the view that no
suspension was possible a.t a.11 in those cases and therefore the contra.ct of service continued and full wages
must be pa.id. Their orders might have been different
(l) [l95l] I L.L.J. aa8.
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1))
z959
if they had held otherwise. It seems to us just and
-
fair in the circumstances therefore to order that the
ThH• Ma
1
n
1•c•mmt of appellants shall pay to their respective workmen conote
mpenal
d h Jf h
.
v.
cerne
a t e amount adjudged payable by the order
Hotel workm' dated December 5, 1955, with respect to the entire
Union
period, as the case may be, from October 1, 1955 to
Wamhoo J.
December 10, 1955 or July 15", 1956, by which date, as
we have already pointed out, practically all the workmen were taken back in service. f\7 e, therefore, order
accordingly.
Lastly, it is. urged on behalf of the respondents that
as all the workmen concerned were taken back in service they should be paid full wages for the interim
period as their re-employment means that the decision
to dismiss them and the consequent order of suspension were waived. This is a matter on which we do
not propose to express any opinion. The proceedings
are so far at the initial stage and the effect of reempolyment, in the absence of full facts, on the question of waiver cannot be determined at this stage. It is
enough to point out that the order we have passed
above is an interim relief and it. will be liable to be
modified one way or the other, when the Industrial
Tribunal proceeds to make the final determination of
the questions referred to it in the light of the observations we have made on the matter of suspension. The
appeals are partly allowed and the order dated December, 5, 1955, granting interim relief is modified in the
manner indicated above. In the circumstances, we
order the parties to bear their own costs of this Court.
As more than three years have gone by in these preliminaries since the references were made, we trust that
the Industrial Tribunal will now dispose of the matter
as expeditiously as possible.
Appeals aliotced in part.