# NEW DELHI v. K. T. MORRIS

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1957-02-08
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 124of1959
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/new-delhi-v-k-t-morris-1609
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

r960
Bharatkhand
Textile Mfg. Co.
Ltd.
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[Hl60)
wage for each completed year of service for the period
before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic
wage for each completed year of service thereafter,
v.
subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages
Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors
or nominees as the case may be. This provision which
Association
Gajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of
r¢o
March a2.
gratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made
by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been
duly taken into account by the industrial court. We
are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the
industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities
as alleged by the appellants.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.
(P. B.
NEW DELHI
v.
K. T. MORRIS
G .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Jndu,strial Dispute-";rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute,"
Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended
by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.
The respondent workman was dismissed by his employer,
the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and
without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the
discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he
appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial
Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and
his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the
said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his
dismissal \Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.
The Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing
his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent
was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.
The question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:
-
'
A
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
Held, that the expression "workmen concerned in such dis1960
pute" occurring in s. 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, as amended, by Act 36 of 1956, includes not merely such M/s. New India
workmen as are directly or immediately concerned with the disMotors (P) Ltd.
pute, but also those on whose behalf the dispute is raised as well
v.
as those who, when the award is made, will be bound by it.
K T. Morris
Eastern Plywood Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Mfg.
Workers' Union, (1952) L.A.C. 103 and Newtone Studios Ltd. v.
Ethirajula (T.R.), (1958) I L.L.J. 63, approved.
The New ]ehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagarv. N. L. Vyas
& Others, A.LR. 1959 Born. 248, disapproved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 124of1959.
-
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated
February 8, 1957, of the Additional Industrial
Tribunal, Delhi, in Misc. I. D. Case No. 422 of 1956.
Jawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for
the appellants.
0. K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.
Umrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad
and M. R. ~rishna Pillai, for the respondent.
1960. March 22.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar ].
is directed against the order passed by the Additional
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant,
M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its
former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his
original post as field service representativt"l and to pay
him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till
the date of his reinstatement. This award has been
made on a complaint filed by the respondent against
the appellant under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes
Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). It
appears that before joining the appellant the respon~
dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to
that he was field s

## Text

r960
Bharatkhand
Textile Mfg. Co.
Ltd.
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[Hl60)
wage for each completed year of service for the period
before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic
wage for each completed year of service thereafter,
v.
subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages
Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors
or nominees as the case may be. This provision which
Association
Gajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of
r¢o
March a2.
gratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made
by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been
duly taken into account by the industrial court. We
are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the
industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities
as alleged by the appellants.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.
(P. B.
NEW DELHI
v.
K. T. MORRIS
G .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Jndu,strial Dispute-";rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute,"
Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended
by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.
The respondent workman was dismissed by his employer,
the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and
without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the
discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he
appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial
Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and
his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the
said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his
dismissal \Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.
The Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing
his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent
was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.
The question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:
-
'
A
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
Held, that the expression "workmen concerned in such dis1960
pute" occurring in s. 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, as amended, by Act 36 of 1956, includes not merely such M/s. New India
workmen as are directly or immediately concerned with the disMotors (P) Ltd.
pute, but also those on whose behalf the dispute is raised as well
v.
as those who, when the award is made, will be bound by it.
K T. Morris
Eastern Plywood Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Mfg.
Workers' Union, (1952) L.A.C. 103 and Newtone Studios Ltd. v.
Ethirajula (T.R.), (1958) I L.L.J. 63, approved.
The New ]ehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagarv. N. L. Vyas
& Others, A.LR. 1959 Born. 248, disapproved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 124of1959.
-
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated
February 8, 1957, of the Additional Industrial
Tribunal, Delhi, in Misc. I. D. Case No. 422 of 1956.
Jawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for
the appellants.
0. K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.
Umrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad
and M. R. ~rishna Pillai, for the respondent.
1960. March 22.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar ].
is directed against the order passed by the Additional
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant,
M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its
former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his
original post as field service representativt"l and to pay
him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till
the date of his reinstatement. This award has been
made on a complaint filed by the respondent against
the appellant under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes
Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). It
appears that before joining the appellant the respon~
dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to
that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier
Automobiles Ltd., Bombay. The respondent joined
the services of the appellant sometime in May 1954
as Works Manager. Before he joined the services of
the appellant he had been told by the appellant by
its letter dated March 27, 1954, that the appellant
would be willing to pay him Rs. 350 per month and
something more by way of certain percentage on
business. He was, however, asked to interview th~
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
r9~0
appellant; an interview followed and the respondent
was given a letter of appointment on May 6, 1954.
ill /s. New India
W k h
M
Moiv" (P) Ltd. By this letter he was appointed as
or s op r anager
v.
in the appellant's firm on three months' probation
K: r. Mo,,is
subject to the terms and conditions specified in the
. --
. letter of appointment (Ex. W-2). The respondent
Ga;endragadk., J. continued in this post till February 28, 1955, when
he was given the assignment of the appellant's field
service organiser with effect from March 1, 1955.
A
letter of appointment given to him on 28 - 2 - 1955
set forth the terms and conditions of his new assignment. It appears that on April 18, 1956, the management of the appellant ·called for an explanation of the
respondent in respect of several complaints. An
explanation was given by the respondent. It was,
however, followed by another communication from
the appellant to the respondent setting forth specific
instances of the respondent's
conduct for which
explanation was demanded. The respondent again
explained and disputed the correctness of the charges.
On June 30, 1956, the respondent's services were terminated on the ground.that the appellant had decided
to abolish the post of field service representative. It
is this order which gave rise to the respondent's
complaint under s. 33A of the Act.
The complaint
was filed on July 18, 1956. The respondent invoked
s. 33A because his case was that at the time when his
services were terminated an industrial dispute was
pending between the appellant and 7 of its employees
and the respondent was one of the workmen concerned
in the said industrial dispute.
The said industrial
dispute had reference to the termination of the services
of the said 7 employees who were working with the
appellant as apprentices. On their behalf it was
alleged that their termination of service was improper
and illegal and that was referred to the industrial
tribunal for its adjudication on August 20, 1955. The
said dispute was finally decided on January 2, 1957.
With the merits of the said dispute or the decision
·thereof we are not concerned in the present appeal.
According to the respondent, since he was a workman
concerned in the said dispute s. 33(l)(a) applied and
it was not open to the appellant to terminate his
l
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
services save with the express permission in writing
1960
of the authority before which the said dispute was 111 /s. New India
pending. It was on this basis that he ·made his Motors (PJ ua.
complaint under s. 33A of the Act.
v.
Before the tribunal the appellant urged that the
K. T ~r::_orris
respondent was not a workman as defined by the Gajeniragadkar 1.
Act, and on the merits it was contended that the
appellant had to abolish the post of the field service
organiser owing to the fact that a part of the agency
work of the appellant had been lost to it. On the
other hand, the respondent contended that he was a
workman under the Act and the plea made by the appellant about the necessity to abolish his post was not
true and genuine. His grievance was that his services
were terminated solely because he had taken interest
...,
in the complaint of the 7 apprentices which had given
rise to the main industrial dispute and had in fact
given evidence in the said dispute on behalf of the
said apprentices. 'l'he tribunal has found that the
respondent is a workman under the Act, that there was
no evidence to justify the appellant's contention that it
had become necessary for it to abolish the respondent's post, and that it did appear that the respondent
~
had been discharged because the appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in supporting the
7 apprentices in the main industrial dispute. As a
result of these findings the tribunal has ordered the
appellant to reinstate the respondent.
'l'he question as to whether the respondent is a
workman as defined by s. 2(s) of the Act is a question of fact and the finding recorded by the tribunal
>
on the said question, after considering the relevant
evidence adduced by the parties, cannot be successfully challenged before us in the present appeal. The
respondent has given evidence as to the nature of the
work he was required to do as field service organiser .
. The letter of appointment issued to him in that
behalf expressly required, inter alia, that the respondent had, if need be, to check up and carry out
necessary adjustments and repairs of the vehicles
sold by the appellant to its customers and to obtain
signatures of responsible persons on the satisfactien
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
T96o
forms which had been provided to him. The respondent swore that he looked after the working of the
At,·s. New India
Moto" (P) Ltd. workshop and assisted the mechanics and others in
v.
their jobs.
He attended to complicated work himself
K. 1'. Morris
and made the workmen acquainted with Miller's special
.
-
tools and equipment needed for repairs and servicing
Ga;cndrngadkar J. of cars. He denied the suggestion that he was a
member of the supervisory staff. On this evidence
the tribunal has based its finding that the respondent
was a workman under s. 2(s), and we see no reason
to interfere with it.
Then, as to the appellant's case that it had to
abolish the post of the respondent as it had lost the
agency of DeSoto cars from Premier Automobiles,
there is no reliable evidence to show when this agency
was actually lost.
Besides, the fact that the appellant
has appointed a Technical Supervisor after discharging the respondent is also not without significance.
Furthermore, the appellant is still the agent for Plymouth and Jeeps and the tribunal is right when it has
found that it still needed a field representative to look
after servicing of sold cars at outside stations. On
the other hand, the evidence of the respondent clearly
shows that he supported the case of the 7 apprentices
and that provoked the appellant to take the step of
terminating his services. The process of finding fault
with his work appears to have commenced after the
appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in
that behalf. We are, therefore, satisfied that the
tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that
the dismissal of the respondent is not supported on
any reasonable ground, and in fact is due to the
appellant's indignation at the conduct of the respondent in the main industrial dispute between the appellant and its 7 employees. If that be the true position
the industrial tribunal was justified in treating the
dismissal of the respondent as mala fide.
It has, however, been urged before us by the appellant that the complaint made by the respondent under
s. 33A is not competent. It is common ground that a
complaint can be made under s. g3A only ifs. 33 has
been contravened, and so the appellant's argument is
that s. 33(l)(a) is inapplicable because the respoudent
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
was not a workman concerned in the main indus'trial
z96o
dispute, and as such his dismissal cannot be said to Mfs. New India
contravene the provisions of the said section. Indeed Motors (P) Ltd.
the principal point urged before us by the appellant
v.
is in regard to the construction of s. 33(1)(a) of the
l{, T. Morris
Act. Was the respondent a workman concerned with
. -
the main industrial dispute? That is the point of Ga1endragadkar J.
law raised for our decision and its decision depends
upon the construction of the relevant words used in
s. 33(1)(a).
Section 33(l){a) as it stood prior to the amendment
of 1956 provided, inter alia, that during the pendency
of any proceedings before a tribunal, no employer
shall alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned
in the said dispute the conditions of service applicable
to them immediately before the commencement of the
said proceedings, save with the express permission in
writing of the tribunal. Section 33 has been modified
from time to time and its scope has been finally
limited by the amendment made ):>y Act 36 of 1956.
With the said amendments we are, however, not concerned. The expression "the workmen concerned in
such dispute " which occurred in the earlier section
has not been modified and the construction which we
would place upon the said expression under the unamended section would govern the construction of
the said expression even in the amended section.
What does the expression " workmen concerned in
such dispute" mean ? The appellant contends that
the main dispute was in regard to the discharge of
7 apprentices employed' by the appellant, and it is only
the said 7 apprentices who were concerned in the said·
dispute. The respondent was not concerned in the
said dispute, and so the termination of his services
cannot attract the provisions of s. 33(l)(a). Prima
facie the argument that " workmen concerned in such
dispute" should be limited to the workmen directly
or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the
effect of its material and relevant provisions this
limited construction of the clause in question qannot
be accepted.
z960
A1 /s. New India
1\1 otors (P) Ltd.
v.
K. T. Morris
· Gajendragadkar ].
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
Let us first consider the definition of the industrial
dispute prescribed by s. 2(k). It means, inter alia,
any dispute or difference between employers and
workmen which is connected with the employment or
non-employment, or the terms of employm(mt, or with
the conditions of labour, of any person. It is wellsettled that before any dispute between the employer
and his employee or employees can be said to be an
industrial dispute under the Act it must be sponsored
by a number of workmen or by a union representing
them. It is not necessary that the number of workmen of the union that sponsors the dispute should
represent the majority of workmen. Even so, an individual dispute cannot become an industrial dispute
at the instance of the aggrieved individual himself. It
must be a dispute between the employer on the one
hand and his employees acting collectively on the
other. This essential nature of an industrial dispute
must be borne in mind in interpreting the material
clause in s. 33( 1 )(a).
Section 18 of the Act is also relevant for this purpose. It deals with persons on whom awards are
binding. Section 18(3) provides, inter alia, that an
award of a tribunal which has become enforceable
shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute, (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the
proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned
without proper cause; and (c) where a party referred
to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or
part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which
the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all
persons who subsequently become employed in that
establishment or part. It is thus clear that the award
passed in an industrial dispute raised even by a
minority union binds not only the parties to the dispute but all employees in the establishment or part of
the establishment, as the case may be, at the date of
the dispute and even those who may join the establishment or part subsequently. Thus the circle of persons
bound by the award is very much wider than the
parties to the industrial dispute. This aspect of the
•
"
•
..1'
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
matter is also relevant in construing the material
I96°
words in s. 33(1)(a).
M/s. New Intlia
In this connection the object of s. 33 must also he Motors (P) Ltd.
borne in mind. It is plain that by enacting s. 33 the
v.
Legislature wanted to ensure a fair and satisfactory
K. T. Morris
enquiry of the industrial dispute undisturbed by any
. --
action on the part of the employer or the employee Ga;endragadkar J.
which would create fresh cause for disharmony between
them. During the pendency of an industrial dispute
status quo should be maintained and no further
element of discord should be introduced. That
being the object of s. 33 the narrow construction of
the material words used in s. 33{l)(a) would tend to
defeat the said object. If it is held that the workmen
concerned in the dispute are only those who are
directly or immediately concerned with the dispute it
would leave liberty to the employer to alter the terms
and conditions of the remaining workmen and 'that
would inevitably introduce further complications which
it is intended to avoid. Similarly it would leave liberty
to· the other employees to raise disputes and that again
is not desirable. That is why the main object underlying s. 33 is inconsistent with the narrow construction
sought to be placed by the appellant on the material
words used in s. 33(1)(a).
Even as a matter of construction pure and simple
there is no justification for assuming that the workmen
concerned in such disputes must be workmen directly
or immediately concerned i:a the said disputes. We do
not see any justification for addingthe further qualification of direct. or immediate concern which the
narrow construction necessarily assumes. In dealing
with the question as to which workmyn ca.n be said to
be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear
in mind the essential condition for the. raising of an
industrial dispute itself, and if an industrial dispute
can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on
their own or through. their union then it would be
difficult to resist the . conclusion that all those who
sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. As we have
already pointed out this construction is harmonious
with the definition prescribed by s. 2(s) and with the
provisions contained in s. 18 of the Act. Therefore,
46
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960)
z96o
we are not prepared to hold that the expression
"workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited
M/s. New India
Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv.
cerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion,
R. T. Morris
that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf
.
-
the dispute has been raised as well as those who would
Ga;endrngadkar f. be bound by the award which may be made in the
March 23.
said dispute.
It appears that the construction of the relevant
clause had given rise to a divergence of opinion in
industrial courts, but it may be stated that on the
whole the consensus of opinion appears to be in favour
of the construction which we are putting on the said
clause. In Eastern Plywood Manufaeturing Co. Ltd. v.
Eastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1 ) the
appellate tribunal has referred to the said conflict of
views and has held that the narrow construction of
the clause is not justified. The High Court of Madras
appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone
Studios.Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R.) (')).On the other hand,
in The New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v.
N. L. Vyas & Ors.('), the Bombay High Court has
adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons
which we have already explained we must hold that
the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA
MUNICIPALITY
v.
LALJI RAJA AND SONS.
( K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Municipality-Unwholesome food-Seized 11nder warrant-If can
be directed to be destroyed-Bengal Municipal Act, r932(Ben. Act. XV
of.r932), ss. 430, 43r(2).
The respondents were the owners of an oil seed pressing
factory situated within the limit of a·municipality.
They used
to import mustard seeds from different areas and they also held a
(1) (1952) L.A.C. rn3.
(2) (1958) I L.L.J. 63.
(3) A.I.R. 1959 Born. 248·