# NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS

- **Citation:** [2022] 11 S.C.R. 923
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2022-02-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 901 of 2022
- **Bench:** K. M. Joseph, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/new-okhla-industrial-development-authority-noida-v-yunus-ors-35705
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - ss.20-22 - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.28A, 26 - Whether the Award passed by
a Lok Adalat u/s.20 of the 1987 Act can form the basis for
redetermination of compensation as contemplated u/s.28A of the
the 1894 Act - Held: Jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat u/s.20 of LSA
Act is to facilitate a settlement of disputes between the parties in a
case, it has no adjudicatory role - The Lok Adalat by virtue of the
express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and compromise
in regard to matters which are referred to it - An Award passed by
the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is the culmination of a nonadjudicatory process - The provisions contained in s.21 by which
the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe
the Award with enforceability - The legal fiction that the Award is to
be treated as a decree goes no further - Further, the basis for
invoking s.28A of the 1894 Act is adjudication by the Court as
defined in the Act -Award passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be said
to be an award passed under Part III of the 1894 Act - An award
under Part III of the Act contemplates grounds or reasons and
therefore, adjudication is contemplated and s.26(2) of the Act is
self-explanatory - Not only must it be an award passed as a result
of the adjudication but it must be passed by 'the Court' allowing
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector -
The word 'Court' has been defined in the Act as the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government
has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform judicial functions
of the court under this Act - The Court is not the same as a Lok
Adalat - An application u/s. 28A of the Act cannot be maintained
on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat u/s.20 of the
LSA Act.
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924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 11 S.C.R.
Interpretation of Statutes - Legal Fiction - Interpretation of
- Held: When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, it becomes
a duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning - In gleaning
its meaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain the purpose of
this legislative device.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat under Section
20 is to facilitate a settlement of disputes between the parties in
a case. It has no adjudicatory role. It cannot decide a lis. All that
it can do is to bring about a genuine compromise or settlement.
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 is important insofar as the law giver
has set out the guiding principles for a Lok Adalat. The principles
are justice, equality, fair play and other legal principles. What
section 28A contemplates is a redetermination of compensation
under an award passed under Part III. Part III takes in Section
23. Section 23 deals with the matters to be taken into
consideration. Various aspects including the market value on the
date of the notification under Section 4(1) are indicated. What we
wish to emphasise is that elements of Section 23 are not in
consonance as such with the guiding principles set out in Section
19(4) of the '1987 Act' which are to guide a Lok Adalat. When
the Court deals with the matter under Section 18, in other words,
it is bound to look into the evidence and arrive at findings based
on the evidence applying the legal principles which have been
enunciated and arrive at the compensation. While it may be true
that there is reference to 'other legal principles' in Section 19(4)
of the 1987 Act, the Lok Adalat also can seek light from the
principles of justice, equity, and fair play. The Lok Adalat by virtue
of the express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and
compromise in regard to matters which are referred to it. It has
no adjudicatory role. [Paras 26, 27][944-C-H]
State of Punjab and Another. v. Jalour Singh and Others
(2008) 2 SCC 660 : [2008] 1 SCR 922; Union of India
v. Ananto (Dead) & Anr. (2007) 10 SC 748 : [2007] 3
SCR 877 - re

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 [2022] 11 S.C.R. 923
923
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (NOIDA)
v.
YUNUS & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 901 of 2022)
FEBRUARY 03, 2022
[K. M. JOSEPH AND
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - ss.20-22 - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.28A, 26 - Whether the Award passed by
a Lok Adalat u/s.20 of the 1987 Act can form the basis for
redetermination of compensation as contemplated u/s.28A of the
the 1894 Act - Held: Jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat u/s.20 of LSA
Act is to facilitate a settlement of disputes between the parties in a
case, it has no adjudicatory role - The Lok Adalat by virtue of the
express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and compromise
in regard to matters which are referred to it - An Award passed by
the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is the culmination of a nonadjudicatory process - The provisions contained in s.21 by which
the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe
the Award with enforceability - The legal fiction that the Award is to
be treated as a decree goes no further - Further, the basis for
invoking s.28A of the 1894 Act is adjudication by the Court as
defined in the Act -Award passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be said
to be an award passed under Part III of the 1894 Act - An award
under Part III of the Act contemplates grounds or reasons and
therefore, adjudication is contemplated and s.26(2) of the Act is
self-explanatory - Not only must it be an award passed as a result
of the adjudication but it must be passed by 'the Court' allowing
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector -
The word 'Court' has been defined in the Act as the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government
has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform judicial functions
of the court under this Act - The Court is not the same as a Lok
Adalat - An application u/s. 28A of the Act cannot be maintained
on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat u/s.20 of the
LSA Act.
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924
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 11 S.C.R.
Interpretation of Statutes - Legal Fiction - Interpretation of
- Held: When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, it becomes
a duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning - In gleaning
its meaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain the purpose of
this legislative device.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat under Section
20 is to facilitate a settlement of disputes between the parties in
a case. It has no adjudicatory role. It cannot decide a lis. All that
it can do is to bring about a genuine compromise or settlement.
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 is important insofar as the law giver
has set out the guiding principles for a Lok Adalat. The principles
are justice, equality, fair play and other legal principles. What
section 28A contemplates is a redetermination of compensation
under an award passed under Part III. Part III takes in Section
23. Section 23 deals with the matters to be taken into
consideration. Various aspects including the market value on the
date of the notification under Section 4(1) are indicated. What we
wish to emphasise is that elements of Section 23 are not in
consonance as such with the guiding principles set out in Section
19(4) of the '1987 Act' which are to guide a Lok Adalat. When
the Court deals with the matter under Section 18, in other words,
it is bound to look into the evidence and arrive at findings based
on the evidence applying the legal principles which have been
enunciated and arrive at the compensation. While it may be true
that there is reference to 'other legal principles' in Section 19(4)
of the 1987 Act, the Lok Adalat also can seek light from the
principles of justice, equity, and fair play. The Lok Adalat by virtue
of the express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and
compromise in regard to matters which are referred to it. It has
no adjudicatory role. [Paras 26, 27][944-C-H]
State of Punjab and Another. v. Jalour Singh and Others
(2008) 2 SCC 660 : [2008] 1 SCR 922; Union of India
v. Ananto (Dead) & Anr. (2007) 10 SC 748 : [2007] 3
SCR 877 - relied on.
1.2 A plea founded on estoppel arising out of a consent
decree or from an Award passed by a Lok Adalat which can
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925
perhaps be even likened to a consent decision cannot be the
basis for redetermination of the compensation. What Section 28A
indeed insists is on decision by a Civil Court as defined in Section
2(l). In other words what is made the only basis for invoking
Section 28A of the Act is an adjudication by the Court as defined
in the Act. The plea of estoppel which, ordinarily, arises from a
consent decree or Award passed by the Lok Adalat which, as
already noticed, does not involve any adjudication by a Court,
would hardly suffice. The estoppel which is referred to by this
Court applies as between the parties to the consent decree. An
Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be taken as a decree of a
Civil Court under Section 21 of the 1987 Act. What Section 28A
requires is redetermination of compensation by the Civil Court.
Therefore, the Award of the Lok Adalat, in this manner of
reasoning, is to be conflated to the adjudication contemplated
under Section 28A of the Act. [Paras 31, 32][949-E-H; 950-A]
1.3 When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, it
becomes a duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning.
In gleaning its meaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain the
purpose of this legislative device. The Court cannot allow its
mind to be boggled undoubtedly as contended by the learned
senior counsel for the respondent, in the matter of carrying the
legal fiction to its logical end. But this is not the same as holding
that the Court will not look to the object of the Act and, in particular,
the fiction in question. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat under
1987 Act is the culmination of a non-adjudicatory process. The
parties are persuaded even by members of the Lok Adalat to
arrive at mutually agreeable compromise. The Award sets out
the terms. The provisions contained in Section 21 by which the
Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe
the Award with enforceability. In view of the provisions of Section
21 by which it is to be treated as a decree which cannot be
challenged, undoubtedly, by way of an appeal in view of the
express provisions forbidding it, unless it is set aside in other
appropriate proceedings, it becomes enforceable. The purport
of the law giver is only to confer it with enforceability in like
manner as if it were a decree. Thus, the legal fiction that the
Award is to be treated as a decree goes no further. [Paras 36,
37][951-D-E; 953-D-F]
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS.
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State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others
(2017) 3 SCC 362 : [2016] 8 SCR 499 - relied on.
1.4 The Lok Adalat as constituted under Section 19(2) would
have jurisdiction inter alia to determine and to arrive at a
compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in
respect of any case pending before any Court for which the Lok
Adalat is organized. The word 'Court' in this context would mean
the court as defined in section 2(aaa), viz., a civil, criminal or
revenue court. The word 'Court' also includes any tribunal or
any authority constituted under any law for the time being in force
which for exercising judicial or even quasi-judicial functions. Thus,
the word 'Court' in the 1987 Act in the context of Section 19(5)
embraces the bodies referred to in Section 2(aaa) of 1987 Act.
The manner of taking cognizance by Lok Adalats is provided in
Section 20(1) read with Section 19(5). The Court as defined in
Section 2 (aaa) can refer the case to the Lok Adalat. Such court,
as already noticed, can be civil, criminal or a revenue court. It
can be even a tribunal or authority. When success is achieved as
a result of the holding of the Lok Adalat culminating in an award,
the words, as the case may be, in Section 21 predicates that it
may be instead of a decree of a Civil Court, an order of any other
Court. Learned counsel for the appellant would point out that if a
Criminal Court were to refer a matter under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act to the Lok Addalat and the Lok
Adalat passes an Award then such an Award would be treated as
an order of the Court. However, in this regard, we have noticed
the judgment of this Court reported in K.N. Govindan Kutty
Menon (supra). Even when the Criminal Court refers the matter
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to
make it executable, this Court has taken the view that it will be
treated as if it were a decree. If a Revenue Court or a Tribunal
which, undoubtedly, fall under Section 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act were
to refer a case to the Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) and an
award is passed it may become the order of the court/tribunal. In
other words, if the matter were finally concluded on a regular
basis, that is, without reference to the Lok Adalat, it would be an
order which would be passed. [Paras 38, 39][953-H; 954-A-F]
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1.5 Section 28A, undoubtedly, has been introduced by
parliament in the year 1984 to bring solace to those land owners
or persons having interest in land to claim the just amount due to
them even though they have omitted to file application under
Section 18 of the Act seeking enhancement. Section 28A figures
in Part III of the Act. It has a heading. The heading reads as 'Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the
award of the Court'. The very opening words in our view deal a
fatal blow to the very premise of the respondent's contention. An
award under Part III of the Act commences with a reference under
Section 18. The Court proceeds to adjudicate the reference in
particular by bearing in mind the matters which are to be
considered under Section 23 of the Act. [Paras 41, 42][955-A, DE, 954-H]
1.6 The award which is passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be
said to be an award passed under Part III. It is the compromise
arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat which
culminates in the award by the Lok Adalat. In fact, an award under
Part III of the Act contemplates grounds or reasons and therefore,
adjudication is contemplated and Section 26(2) of the Act is selfexplanatory. The next aspect is even more fatal to the case of the
respondents. Not only must it be an award passed as a result of
the adjudication but it must be passed by 'the Court' allowing
compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector.
The word 'Court' has been defined in the Act as the Principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate
Government has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to perform
judicial functions of the court under this Act. We have noticed
the composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the '1987
Act'. The Court is not the same as a Lok Adalat. [Paras 44,
45][955-G-H; 956-A-C]
1.7 The Award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself without
anything more is to be treated by the deeming fiction to be a
decree. It is not a case where a compromise is arrived at under
Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, between the
parties and the court is expected to look into the compromise
and satisfy itself that it is lawful before it assumes efficacy by
virtue of Section 21. Without anything more, the award passed
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS.
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[2022] 11 S.C.R.
by Lok Adalat becomes a decree. The enhancement of the
compensation is determined purely on the basis of compromise
which is arrived at and not as a result of any decision of a 'Court'
as defined in the Act. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat is not a
compromise decree. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat without
anything more, is to be treated as a decree inter alia. We would
approve the view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High
Court in P.T. Thomas (supra). An award unless it is successfully
questioned in appropriate proceedings, becomes unalterable and
non-violable. In the case of a compromise falling under Order
XXIII Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes a duty of the Court to
apply its mind to the terms of the compromise. Without anything
more, the mere compromise arrived at between the parties does
not have the imprimatur of the Court. It becomes a compromise
decree only when the procedures in the Code are undergone. An
Award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act is a product of
compromise. Sans compromise, the Lok Adalat loses jurisdiction.
The matter goes back to the Court for adjudication. Pursuant to
the compromise and the terms being reduced to writing with the
approval of the parties it assumes the garb of an Award which in
turn is again deemed to be a decree without anything more. We
would think that it may not be legislative intention to treat such
an award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act to be equivalent
to an award of the Court which is defined in the Act as already
noted by us and made under Part III of the Act. An award of the
Court in Section 28A is also treated as a decree. Such an Award
becomes executable. It is also appealable. Part III of the Act
contains a definite scheme which necessarily involves adjudication
by the Court and arriving at the compensation. It is this which
can form the basis for any others pressing claim under the same
notification by invoking Section 28A. The Court cannot be
entirely oblivious to the prospect of an 'unholy' compromise in a
matter of this nature forming the basis for redetermination as a
matter of right given under Section 28A. [Paras 46-48][956-CH; 957-A-C]
1.8 An Award passed under Section (20) of the 1987 Act by
the Lok Adalat cannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A.
[Para 49][957-D]
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1.9 As far as the argument of the respondents that the award
dated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court within
the meaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of the
Act, such an argument cannot be accepted. In this case, the award
dated 12.3.2016 is the award passed by the Lok Adalat. This is
clear from the judgment of the High Court, the case of the parties
before it and the terms of the award dated 12.3.2016. In other
words, this is a case whereas as noted in the impugned judgment
LAR 6 of 2006 (Fateh Mohammaed v. State of U.P.) was referred
to the Lok Adalat, that is the Additional District and Sessions
Judge/FTC No.2, Gautam Buddh Nagar, U.P. Thus, the
proceedings dated 12.3.2016 which is relied on by the respondents
is indeed an award which is passed under Section 20 of the 1987
Act though it may appear to be an order. In other words, the
Additional District & Sessions Judge was acting as Lok Adalat.
This is so even if the decision of the High Court in Mangu Ram
was relied upon by the parties and it is also referred to in the
award. He was not disposing of the case as 'the Court' within the
meaning of Act. It also cannot be treated as an award of the Court
within the meaning of Section 20 and 21 of the '1987 Act. An
application under Section 28A of the Act cannot be maintained
on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section
20 of 1987 Act. The impugned judgments stand set aside. [Paras
50, 52][957-D-H; 958-A-B,C]
P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job AIR 2005 SC 3575 : [2005]
2 Suppl. SCR 20; Government of India v. Vedanta
Limited and Others (2020) 10 SCC 1; Attar Singh and
Another v. Union of India and Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 289:
[2009] 12 SCR 315; Tahera Khatoon (D) by LRs. v.
Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 : [1999] 1 SCR
901; Vasudave v. The Commissioner and Secretary
Government, Revenue Department & Ors. ILR 2007
KAR 4533; Chanabasappa & Anr. v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer ILR 2011 KAR 4276; Namdev v.
State of Maharashtra 2014 SC Online Bombay 4091;
Thankamma Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2017)
2 KLT 1023; K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C. D. Shaji
(2012) 2 SCC 51 : [2011] 15 SCR 447; Singirkonda
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS.
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Surekha v. G. V. Sharma and Others 2003 SCC Online
AP 21; Union of India and Another v. Hansoli Devi
and Others (2002) 7 SCC 273 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR
324; K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012)
2 SCC 51 : [2011] 15 SCR 447; Jose Antonio Cruz
Dos R. Rodriguese and Another v. Land Acquisition
Collector and Another (1996) 6 SCC 746 : [1996] 8
Suppl. SCR 910 - referred to.
Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and others v. District
Collector and others (2021) 4 AIR Bom R 626; Thomas
Job v. Thomas 2003 (3) KLT 936 - approved.
Case Law Reference
[2008] 1 SCR 922
relied on
Para 6
(2020) 10 SCC 1
referred to
Para 6
[2009] 12 SCR 315
referred to
Para 6
[1999] 1 SCR 901
referred to
Para 9
[2011] 15 SCR 447
referred to
Para 20
[2007] 3 SCR 877
relied on
Para 27
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 20
referred to
Para 28
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324
referred to
Para 30
[2011] 15 SCR 447
referred to
Para 33
[2016] 8 SCR 499
relied on
Para 36
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 910
referred to
Para 41
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.901 of
2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.05.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.27876 of 2018.
With
Civil Appeal Nos.905, 904, 903, 906 and 902 of 2022.
Anil Kaushik, Rachit Mittal, Ms. Ritika Dawalia, Sudhir Naagar,
Advs. for the Appellant.
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Dhruv Mehta, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Advs., Pradeep Kumar Mathur,
Abhishek Thakur, Keith Varghese, Chiranjev Johri, M. K. Tiwari, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. In these batch of cases, the question which arises is whether
the Award passed by a Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the '1987 Act') can
form the basis for redetermination of compensation as contemplated
under Section 28A of the the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as 'Act'). By the impugned judgment, the High Court has
taken the view that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat can indeed
form the foundation for exercising power under Section 28A of the Act.
3. A notification came to be issued under Section 4(1) of the Act
on 21.03.1983 in respect of villages situated in Tehsil Dadri (Situation in
District Ghaziabad) for planned industrial development contemplated by
the Appellant. By the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer, which was
passed on 28.11.1984, compensation was fixed for the lands belonging
to the respondents herein inter alia at the rate of Rs.24,033 per bigha.
The respondents did not seek enhancement under Section 18 of the Act.
One Fateh Mohammed filed an application seeking reference against
the Award dated 28.11.1984. The said reference was made over to a
Lok Adalat. The reference is seen numbered as No. 6/02. The Lok
Adalat passed an Award on 12.03.2016. We may set out the terms of
the said award:
 "Today, the matter has been placed before the Lok Adalat.
Claimant Fateh Mohammed s/o Ummed Khan with his learned
Counsel Sri Jitendra Mathur and on behalf of respondents the
learned D.G.C. Civil are present in the court. The case file of this
L.A.R. case has already been clubbed/consolidated with the files
of other L.A.R. Cases, namely, L.A.R. No. 07 of 2002 Jawal
Hussain Vs. State of U.P. and Ors; L.A.R. No. 08 of 2022
Salimuddin Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. and L.A.R. No. 9 of 2002
Mohakkam Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., was passed by the
concerned Court on 268.2010 and the file of LAR No. 6/2002
had been made as Leading Case. In course of hearing, both the
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
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parties have collectively filed application for placing all the clubbed
LARs before the Lok Adalat vide application paper no. 59Ga2
with Settlement/Compromise Agreement and photocopy of the
order of Hon'ble High Court. Besides this, the learned District
Government Counsel Civil appearing on behalf of the respondents
has filed photocopy of letters (Paper no. 61Ga2 and 62Ga2) of
concerned party State Government and Noida Development
Authority whereby the learned District Government Counsel Civil
has been authorized to enter into the compromise/settlement in
the matter on behalf of the Authority and State Government.
 Heard and perused the case file. It is evident from available
record that the present Reference has been filed against the Award
dated 28.11.1984 and the Hon'ble High Court, while clubbing/
consolidating all the appeals together, has disposed them off thereby
directing the concerned Authorities to determine the compensation
at the rate of Rs.297.50 per sq.yard. On the basis of the said
order, both parties have voluntarily executed, signed and verified
the Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1 and
submitted the same before the court.
 In such a situation, it is just and proper to decide the case
by passing the following order on the basis of the settlement/
compromise agreement Paper no. 60Ka1 which shall form part
of the decree: -
ORDER
 Instant Reference No. 6/2002 is hereby decided on the
basis of Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1
filed by the parties. The Settlement/Compromise Agreement shall
form part of the Decree and in the circumstances of the case,
each party to bear their own costs. One copy each of this judgment
shall be kept in the file of LAR No. 7/2002, LAR No. 8/2002 and
LAR No. 9/2002.
4. As is evident, compensation was fixed at Rs.297 per square
yard as against Rs.20 per square yard which was fixed by the Land
Acquisition Officer by his Award dated 28.11.1984. This led to the
respondents filing applications before Additional District Magistrate
seeking shelter under Section 28A of the Act. The Additional District
Magistrate rejected the applications on the basis that the Award dated
12.03.2016 passed by the Lok Adalat was on the basis of the compromise.
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This led to the writ petitions being filed by the respondents before the
High Court. It is in the said writ petitions that the impugned judgments
have been passed by the High Court finding that the Award of the Lok
Adalat would be deemed to be decree of the Civil Court and, consequently,
the respondents would be entitled to invoke Section 28A of the Act.
5. We have heard Shri Anil Kaushik, learned counsel for the
appellant. We have also heard Shri Dhruv Mehta and Shri V. K. Shukla,
learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant would point out that Section
28A is not available to be applied when there is no determination by the
Court in terms of the Act. He referred us to the definition of the word
'Court' in the Act to contend that what Section 28A contemplates is an
Award passed by such a Court. Lok Adalats, it is his contention are
constituted under Section 19 of the 1987 Act. They have no adjudicatory
or judicial function. The object of the 1987 Act is inter alia to bring
about settlement of dispute. The function of the Lok Adalat under Section
19 is essentially to bring about a compromise. An award of the Lok
Adalat, in other words, merely sets out a compromise reached between
the parties. Therefore, it cannot be treated as an Award by a Court
under the Act. He further contended that the deeming fiction in Section
21 of the 1987 Act must be confined to the purpose for which the fiction
was created. In other words, the deeming provision must be appreciated
as a legislative device to clothe the Award with enforceability as if it
were a decree. On its own terms, in other words, an Award passed by
the Lok Adalat is not a decree as contemplated in Section 28A of the
Act. He relied on judgments in State of Punjab and Another. v. Jalour
Singh and Others1, Government of India v. Vedanta Limited and
Others2 and Attar Singh and Another v. Union of India and Anr.3 in
support of his arguments.
7. He further pointed out that there is a divergence of judicial
opinion on this subject among the High Courts. He commended for our
acceptance the view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the decision
reported in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and Others v. District Collector
and Others4. He would submit that view taken by the High Courts which
have held contrary do not represent the correct position in law.
1 (2008) 2 SCC 660
2 (2020) 10 SCC 1
3 (2009) 9 SCC 289
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8. He has further a case on merits. He points out that the High
Court in the First Appeal No. 1100/04 titled as Mangu and others v.
State of U.P., awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.297 per square
yard. However, it is his contention that while the case of Mangu arose
out of the notification of the year 1991, cases arising out of the earlier
notification issued under Section 4 came to be tagged and heard as a
common batch. He points out that the review petition is already filed by
the appellant. He further contends that in the year 1982, the compensation
was fixed at Rs.20 per square yard. This computation of compensation
was upheld by the High Court and what is more, this view of the High
Court was further approved by this Court by dismissal of the special
leave petition filed against the same. However, on the basis of the facts
which were not properly appreciated the Award came to be passed by
the Lok Adalat.
9. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents
would point out, in the first place, that a perusal of the Award by Lok
Adalat would show that it would be wholly unfair on the part of the
appellant to wriggle out of a rate which, in fact, was based on a decision
of the High Court (apparently the decision in Mangu and Others). It is
further pointed out by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel, that
full effect must be given to the legal fiction. The oft quoted admonition
that the Courts must not allow their imagination to be boggled by the
prospect of stretching a legal fiction to its logical culmination was invoked.
In other words, it is the contention of Shri Dhruv Mehta that given the
fact that an Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be treated as a decree,
it matters little that what led to the Award is not analogous to the
procedure that is ordinarily contemplated in a reference under Section
18 of the Act. The fiction must have full play. Thus, being a decree of a
Civil Court, the Award of the Lok Adalat would provide firm foundation
for similarly circumstanced persons to claim benefit of Section 28A. In
this regard, he would point out that the Court must not be oblivious to the
grand command of equality to achieve which sublime goal it is that the
legislature introduced Section 28A in the first place. In other words,
having regard to the above object of making available just compensation
to those persons, who, by their ignorance, which for the large part, is
fostered by illiteracy, poverty, and backwardness, do not follow up with
the remedies open to them under the Act, are given a window of
opportunity on the basis of an Award passed enhancing the compensation
at the instance of similarly circumstanced persons. He points out there
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is no dispute that the respondents are persons whose lands have been
acquired under the same notification as was of Fateh Mohammed. He
would further highlight that Section 21 provides that said Award of a
Lok Adalat is inter alia to be treated 'as the case may be' as an order
of any other Court. The argument appears to be that Section 21 is wide
enough to embrace within its scope the Award of a Lok Adalat as an
order of the Court under Section 18 of the Act. In other words, the
award of the Lok Adalat would become an order of the Court enhancing
the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. He would
finally contend, at any rate, that should this Court be inclined to hold
against the respondents, while this Court may declare the law, it may still
not exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the appellant under
Article 136 of the constitution. In this regard, he drew support from the
decision of this Court reported in Tahera Khatoon (D) by LRs. v.
Salambin Mohammad5.
10. Shri V.K. Shukla, learned senior counsel essentially advanced
similar submissions. He would, in particular, highlight the facts which led
to the passing of the Award by the Lok Adalat, namely that, it was
accepted by the appellant that compensation can be fixed at Rs. 297 per
square yard on the basis of the judgment of the High Court which
prevailed. This fact, he points out, may not be overlooked by this Court.
He would also submit that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat would
satisfy the requirement of an application under Section 28A of the Act.
He further drew upon the powers of the Lok Adalat.
ANALYSIS
11. We may advert to the scheme of the 1987 Act, Section 2(a)
defines 'case':
(a) 'Case' includes a suit or any proceeding before a court.
Section 2(aaa) defines 'Court':
(aaa) 'Court' means a civil, criminal or revenue court and includes
any tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law for
the time being in force to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 2(d) defines Lok Adalat as meaning a Lok Adalat
organized under Chapter VI.
12. Chapter VI contains Sections 19 to 22. Section 19(1)
contemplates Lok Adalats being organised at such intervals and places
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and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as is thought fit
by the relevant bodies mentioned therein. Section 19(2) is significant as
it provides for the composition of the Lok Adalat. It reads as follows:
(2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such
number of :-
(a) Serving or retired judicial officers and
(b) Other persons, of the area as may be specified by the State
Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal
Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee,
or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee,
organising such Lok Adalats.
Sub-section (3) goes on to deal with the experience and qualification
of the persons mentioned in clause (b).
Sub-section (5) is again relevant as it indicates the jurisdiction of
the Lok Adalat:
(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive
at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in
respect of:-
(i) Any case pending before or
(ii) Any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not
brought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organized.
Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect
of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable
under any law.
13. Section 20 must be read with Section 19(5) and Section 21.
Section 20 reads as follows:
Section 20. Cognizance of Cases by Lok Adalats
(1) Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (5)
of Section 19-(i)
(i) (a) The parties thereof agree or
(i) (b) One of the parties thereof makes an application to the
court, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and
if such court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of
such settlement or
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(ii) The court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one to
be taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat, the court shall refer
the case to the Lok Adalat: Provided that no case shall be referred
to the Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of clause (i) or clause (ii)
by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the parties.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, the Authority or Committee organising the
Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of
an application from any, one of the parties to any matter referred
to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter
needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the
Lok Adalat, for determination; Provided that no matter shall be
referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the other party.
(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section
(1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section
(2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter
and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before
it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a
compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided
by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal
principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground
that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the
parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court,
from which the reference has been received under sub-section
(1) for disposal in accordance with law.
(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground
that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the
parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat
shall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court.
(7) Where the record of the case is returned under sub-section
(5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal such reference
under sub-section (1)."
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14. Section 21 provides for the final decision by the Lok Adalat
and it reads as follows:
Section 21. Award of Lok Adalat
(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree
of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court
and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a
Lok Adalat in a case referred to under sub-section (1) of Section
20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner
provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding
on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court
against the award.
15. Shri V. S. Shukla also pointed out Section 22 of the 1987 Act
under which the Lok Adalats have the power vested in the Civil Court
as are mentioned therein.
 Section 22:
Section 22. Powers of Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat
(1) The Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of holding any
determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested
in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters,
namely: -
(a) The summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness
and examining him on oath.
(b) The discovery and production of any document.
(c) The reception of evidence on affidavits.
(d) The requisitioning of any public record or document or copy
of such record or document from any court or office and
(e) Such other matters as may be prescribed.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in
sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers
to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute
coming before it.
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(3) All proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be
judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and
228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat
shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195
and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of
1974)."
16. It will be interesting to note that Chapter VI(A) came to be
inserted by the Act 37 of 2002 with effect from 11.06.2002. Thereunder,
permanent Lok Adalats have been contemplated in respect of certain
public utility services. Suffice is only to note that unlike a Lok Adalat,
Section 22C sub-section (8) contemplates that when the parties fail to
reach an agreement, the permanent Lok Adalat is duty bound, if the
dispute does not relate to any offence, to decide the dispute.
SCHEME OF THE ACT
17. The Act provides for acquisition of land and for compensation
to be provided thereunder.
 The proceedings are commenced by a notification under Section
4. Compensation is determined with reference to the date of the said
notification. After the procedures are undergone, an Award is passed.
While Section 18 provides for a right with a person dissatisfied with the
amount inter alia awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer to seek
enhancement, Section 28A contemplates situations where a person has
not availed of the right under Section 18 but any other person has utilized
the provisions of Section 18 and obtained an enhancement. Other
conditions obtaining in Section 28A being present, a person who has not
filed application under Section 18 inter alia is entitled to claim
redetermination of the compensation. Section 28A may be noticed:
28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the award of the Court.-(1) where in an award under this
part, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation
in excess of the amount awarded by the collector under section
11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are
also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding
that they had not made an application to the Collector under section
18, by written application to the Collector within three months
from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount
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of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the
basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court:
 Provided that in computing the period of three months within
which an application to the Collector shall be made under this
sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under subsection (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons
interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard,
and make an award determining the amount of compensation
payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section
(2) may, by written application to the Collector, required that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the
Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may
be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under
Section 18.
'Court' as defined under the Act reads as follows:
(d) the expression "Court" means a principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction unless, the appropriate Government has appointed (as
it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any
specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under this
Act;
DIVERGENCE IN THE VIEWS OF THE HIGH COURTS
18. In Vasudave v. The Commissioner and Secretary
Government, Revenue Department & Ors.6, learned Single Judge of
the Karnataka High Court took the view that was guided by Section 89
of the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that the award of the Lok
Adalat is to be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court.