# Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr

- **Citation:** 2026 INSC 7
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2026-01-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026
- **Bench:** J.B. Pardiwala, K.V. Vishwanathan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nirbhay-singh-suliya-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-39150
- **Pages:** 28

## Headnote

Whether on facts, based on the four judicial orders of grant of bail
per se and without anything more, the authorities were justified in
removing the appellant-Judicial Officer from service.
Headnotes†
Judiciary - District judiciary - Departmental proceedings
against Judicial Officer on the allegation that extraneous
considerations actuated passing of bail orders - Mere wrong
order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself
without anything more, not a ground to initiate departmental
proceedings against Judicial Officers - Complainant lodged
complaint with the Chief Justice of the High Court inter alia
alleging that the appellant-Additional District Judge was taking
bribe through his steno for grant of bail in cases under the
Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk
liters or more - Appellant was removed from service after
27 years of unblemished service solely on the basis of four
judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties therein
on bail - Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen
other orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders
s.59-A, Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 was not referred to,
it was held that it was proved that for corrupt motive or for
some extraneous consideration bail applications were allowed
contrary to s.59-A, Excise Act - Appellant filed writ petition
before the High Court challenging the order of removal and
the order of appellate authority and prayed for reinstatement
with consequential benefits - Dismissed - Interference with:
Held: Only because an order is wrong or there is an error of
judgment, without anything more, a judicial officer should not
* Author
92
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be put through the ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a
prosecution - Merely because a different conclusion was possible
is not an indicium for misconduct - Disciplinary Authority has to
examine whether there has emerged from the record, one or more
circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms the basis
of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial
power - Appellant was held guilty of misconduct only based on
certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more - No
material on record to show that there are circumstances from
which inference could be drawn that extraneous considerations
actuated the passing of those orders of bail - The hypothesis was
drawn only on the basis that the order did not make reference
to the statutory provision expressly - Moreover, a perusal of the
four orders show that reasons were given, though there is no
express mention s.59-A (2), Excise Act - The finding that in 14
other orders he referred to s.59-A (2), Excise Act is by itself not
enough to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders in
question - It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments
and orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions
are per se dis-honest judgments - Findings in the inquiry report
are perverse and not supported by the evidence on record - High
Court erred in not interfering with the order - Order of removal, the
order of Appellate Authority and the impugned order of the High
Court set aside - Appellant shall be deemed to have continued
in service till he attained the normal age of superannuation -
Since the appellant has been kept out of service for no fault of
his, full back wages with all consequential benefits be given to
him - Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] Mere wrong order or wrong
exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without anything
more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental proceedings.
[Paras 29, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 1]
Judiciary - District judiciary - Allegations against judicial
officers - Duty of High Court - Note of caution:
Held: High Court which is vested with the supervisory control has
to exercise great caution and circumspection - Only because an
order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything

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[2026] 1 S.C.R. 91 : 2026 INSC 7
Nirbhay Singh Suliya
v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026)
05 January 2026
[J.B. Pardiwala* and K.V. Vishwanathan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether on facts, based on the four judicial orders of grant of bail
per se and without anything more, the authorities were justified in
removing the appellant-Judicial Officer from service.
Headnotes†
Judiciary - District judiciary - Departmental proceedings
against Judicial Officer on the allegation that extraneous
considerations actuated passing of bail orders - Mere wrong
order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself
without anything more, not a ground to initiate departmental
proceedings against Judicial Officers - Complainant lodged
complaint with the Chief Justice of the High Court inter alia
alleging that the appellant-Additional District Judge was taking
bribe through his steno for grant of bail in cases under the
Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk
liters or more - Appellant was removed from service after
27 years of unblemished service solely on the basis of four
judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties therein
on bail - Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen
other orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders
s.59-A, Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 was not referred to,
it was held that it was proved that for corrupt motive or for
some extraneous consideration bail applications were allowed
contrary to s.59-A, Excise Act - Appellant filed writ petition
before the High Court challenging the order of removal and
the order of appellate authority and prayed for reinstatement
with consequential benefits - Dismissed - Interference with:
Held: Only because an order is wrong or there is an error of
judgment, without anything more, a judicial officer should not
* Author
92
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be put through the ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a
prosecution - Merely because a different conclusion was possible
is not an indicium for misconduct - Disciplinary Authority has to
examine whether there has emerged from the record, one or more
circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms the basis
of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial
power - Appellant was held guilty of misconduct only based on
certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more - No
material on record to show that there are circumstances from
which inference could be drawn that extraneous considerations
actuated the passing of those orders of bail - The hypothesis was
drawn only on the basis that the order did not make reference
to the statutory provision expressly - Moreover, a perusal of the
four orders show that reasons were given, though there is no
express mention s.59-A (2), Excise Act - The finding that in 14
other orders he referred to s.59-A (2), Excise Act is by itself not
enough to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders in
question - It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments
and orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions
are per se dis-honest judgments - Findings in the inquiry report
are perverse and not supported by the evidence on record - High
Court erred in not interfering with the order - Order of removal, the
order of Appellate Authority and the impugned order of the High
Court set aside - Appellant shall be deemed to have continued
in service till he attained the normal age of superannuation -
Since the appellant has been kept out of service for no fault of
his, full back wages with all consequential benefits be given to
him - Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] Mere wrong order or wrong
exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without anything
more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental proceedings.
[Paras 29, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41, 43, 1]
Judiciary - District judiciary - Allegations against judicial
officers - Duty of High Court - Note of caution:
Held: High Court which is vested with the supervisory control has
to exercise great caution and circumspection - Only because an
order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything
more, a judicial officer should not be put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution - Merely because the order
is wrong, disciplinary action is not warranted and each case will
depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated -
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
93
Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Inference of misconduct or about extraneous considerations having
actuated, the decision cannot be drawn merely from a hypothesis
that a decision is erroneous - A wrong decision can yet be a bona
fide error of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with an
honest error of judgment - It is not the correctness of the verdict
but the conduct of the Officer in question which is determinative -
Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] High Court vested with the
supervisory control must keep in mind that a judicial officer of the
district judiciary works mostly in a charged atmosphere - A mere
wrong order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself
without anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental
proceedings. [Paras 32, 35, 1]
Directions by Supreme Court - False and frivolous complaint
against a judicial officer vis-à-vis complaints of misconduct
against the judicial officer if prima facie found to be true -
Course of action by High Courts:
Held: Strict and strong action in accordance with law should be
taken against individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint
against a judicial officer and/or if found to be engineering the
false and frivolous complaints - Such proceedings would include
in appropriate cases, proceedings for contempt of court - In case
the person filing or engineering false and frivolous complaints is a
recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart from proceedings for contempt
of court, reference to the bar council should be made for disciplinary
action - Bar councils, on receipt of such references, have to dispose
of the matter expeditiously - Equally, if the complaint of misconduct
against the judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt
action to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no
leniency should be shown if the charges are established - In
appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is warranted against
a judicial officer, the High Court should not hesitate to have the
same initiated - However, due care and caution must be exercised
by the High Court in initiating such proceedings - Only because an
order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything
more, a judicial officer should not be put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution. [Paras 28, 29]
Justice delivery system - Judiciary - District judiciary - Bail -
Exercise of discretion for grant of bail - Reluctance of trial
court judges - Fear of initiation of departmental proceedings
on mere suspicion:
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Held: Per Pardiwala, J. [Concurring] Initiation of departmental
proceedings on mere suspicion is one of the primary causes
why trial court judges are reluctant when it comes to exercising
discretion for the purpose of grant of bail - It should not happen
that because of the lurking fear in the mind of a trial court judge,
of some administrative action being taken that even in a deserving
case, well within the principles of law, bail is declined - This is
one reason why the High Courts and the Supreme Court are
flooded with bail applications - Courts of the district judiciary
wield powers necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery
system in India and when their autonomy is compromised by higher
courts and fear takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy
and the rule of law suffer - Over a period of time, the trial court
judges have exhibited tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial
function and responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion
in matters relating to bail - Courts of the district judiciary wield
powers necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery system
in India and when their autonomy is compromised by higher courts
and fear takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy and the
rule of law suffer - For functioning of democracy, an independent
judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount.
[Paras 2, 3]
Case Law Cited
Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another [2020] 4 SCR
888 : (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat
and Another [2016] 5 SCR 906 : (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of
India and Others v. K.K. Dhawan [1993] 1 SCR 296 : (1993) 2
SCC 56; P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others [2001] Supp. 1
SCR 369 : (2001) 6 SCC 491; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court
of Punjab and Haryana and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 396 :
(1988) 3 SCC 370; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of
Allahabad and Another [2007] 3 SCR 198 : (2007) 4 SCC 247;
Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar and Others [2019] 12
SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 640; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of
Maharashtra and Another [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 490 : (1999) 7
SCC 739 - relied on.
Abhay Jain v. High Court of Rajasthan [2022] 16 SCR 693 : (2022)
13 SCC 1 - referred to.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
List of Acts
Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915; Contract Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
District judiciary; Disciplinary Inquiry against Judicial Officers;
Disciplinary action against Judicial Officers; Departmental
proceedings against Additional District & Sessions Judge;
Disciplinary Inquiry against Additional District & Sessions Judge;
Removal from service based on judicial orders granting bail;
Findings in inquiry report perverse; Section 59-A, Madhya Pradesh
Excise Act, 1915; Misconduct; Alleged extraneous considerations;
Bail orders; Error of judgment; Wrong order; Wrong exercise of
discretion in grant of bail; No ground to initiate departmental
proceedings; Bona fide error of judgment; Seized liquor; 50 Bulk
liters; Erroneous decision; Preliminary inquiry by District Judge;
Unblemished service; Removal from service not justified; Bribe
through steno for grant of bail; Independent judiciary; District
judiciary; Bail; False and frivolous complaints against judicial
officerss; Ill-conceived or motivated complaint against judicial
officers; Complaint of misconduct against judicial officer if prima
facie found to be true; Dishonest judgments; Reinstatement
with consequential benefits; Fear of initiation of departmental
proceedings; Trial court judges reluctant in exercising discretion
for the purpose of grant of bail.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2024 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh Principal Seat at Jabalpur in WP No.
8623 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Dama Seshadri Nadu, Sr. Adv., Yash S. Vijay, Kanu Agarwal,
Chetan Kanungo, Shikhar Aggarwal, Ms. Anisha Mahajan.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Harmeet Singh Ruprah, DAG, Arjun Garg, Ms. Sagun Srivastava,
Ms. Arushi Kulshrestha, Saaransh Shukla, Ankit Rajgarhia,
Ms. Muskan Bensla, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Shashank Shekhar,
Meghraj Singh, Ratnesh Kumar.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This case highlights the unfortunate plight of a judicial officer
(appellant herein) who, after 27 years of unblemished service, was
removed from service. The sole and exclusive basis on which the
appellant has been removed are four judicial orders by which he
enlarged certain parties thereon on bail. Those four orders were
contrasted with fourteen other orders of bail and after finding that
in the four orders Section 59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act,
1915 (for short the "Excise Act") was not referred to, action has been
taken. According to the High Court, in the fourteen other orders the
appellant referred to the said Section implying thereby that he was
conscious of the existence of the said Section on the statute. Section
59-A prescribes what has now famously come to be known as "twin
conditions" for grant of bail.
3.
The question before us is whether on facts, based on the four
judicial orders of grant of bail per se and without anything more,
the authorities were justified in removing the appellant from service?
4.
The facts lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant joined service
on 31.10.1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service. The appellant scaled the ladder up and in 2003
was promoted as Additional District Judge and in September, 2008
was confirmed in the said post. On 16.05.2011, he was transferred
to Khargone, District Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First
Additional District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of
his duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail applications
under the Excise Act.
5.
One Jaipal Mehta, a resident of Jaitapur, Khargone, lodged a
complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
Jabalpur. The complaint which did not set out any details of the bail
orders and which was in very general terms reads as under:-
"Subject: Regarding disposal of cases under Section
34(2) of IPC.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Sir,
In reference to above subject matter, it is requested that
First ADJ Sh. Suliya posted in Khargone, District-West
Nimar, Mandleshwar by taking bribe through his Steno
namely Anil Joshi, Clerk, is granting bails in the cases of
Section 34/2 of Excise Act i.e. of 50 Bulk Ltrs. of liquor,
whereas, ADJ/Sessions Judge has no power to allow said
bail applications. Said Bails are allowed by the High Court.
Anil Joshi, Steno challenges in each and every case that
either you bring case of 302, 307, Claim or Civil Case, I
have good setting with sir, I will get it resolved, rest you
have to pay money as per my wishes. Due to such corrupt
employee, the judiciary is getting defamed. Injustice is
being done with the aggrieved parties in place of giving
them justice. Who will be responsible for it? Previously in
the year 1995-196, the serious complaints of bribe were
also made against the said corrupt employee, on which,
no action was taken. Aforesaid employee is posted in
Khargone since last 25 years and is earning money by
doing setting with Advocates openly. If the enquiry of his
account be conducted, then, the truth will be exposed. If,
the trust of public loses confidence in judiciary then, will
be possible of military rule jungle raj."
6.
It will be seen that according to the complaint, the allegation was
that the appellant was taking bribe through his steno, namely, Anil
Joshi for grant of bail in cases under the Excise Act in which the
quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk liters or more; that the said
Anil Joshi was claiming that he will get the work done through the
appellant for extraneous consideration; that due to such corrupt
employee, the judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96,
serious complaints of bribery were made against the said employee
on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been
posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning money
through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.
7.
It appears from the counter affidavit filed before this Court by R-2 -
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, that a preliminary inquiry was
conducted by the District Judge (I & V), Indore Zone, Indore, against
the appellant and on 06.10.2012, the Principal Registrar (I & V) put
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up a note based on which it was decided to initiate departmental
proceedings against the appellant.
8.
What emerges is that in the preliminary inquiry certain orders passed
by the appellant in bail proceedings seem to have been examined
and few orders pulled out. Two charges were framed against the
appellant of which the second charge admittedly was held not proved
by the inquiry officer. The charges read as under:-
"Whereas, you Shri Nirbhay Singh Suliya while functioning as
Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, distt. Mandleshwar,
have committed following acts which if proved would
amount to grave misconduct:-
ARTICLE OF CHARGE - I
That, you, with corrupt of oblique motive or for some
extraneous considerations, while functioning as Additional
& Sessions Judge, allowed Bail Application No. 129/11
Lokesh Vs. State of MP vide order dated 1.8.11, Bail
Application No. 136/11 Babulal & Ors. Vs. State vide order
dated 4.8.11, Bail Application No.200/11 Mohan Vs. State
of MP vide order dated 7.12.11, Bail Application No. 123/12
Jitendra & Nantiya Vs. State & No. 122/12 Gulab & Ors.
Vs. State of MP, vide order dated 31-08-12, against the
provisions of Section 59-A of the M.P. Excise Act wherein
all the cases, quantity of seized liquor was 50 and more
bulk litres. On the contrary, you rejected Bail Application
No.89/11 vide order dated 16.06.2011, Bail Application No.
92/11, vide order dated 23.06.11, Bail Application No.104/11,
vide order dated 1.7.2011, Bail Application No.103/11, vide
order dated 4.7.11, Bail Application no. 111/11, vide order
dated 11.7.11, Bail Application No. 121/11, vide order
dated 21.07.11, Bail Application No.140/11, vide order
dated 12.08.11, Bail Application No. 160/11 vide order
dated 22.09.11 and six other bail applications in which the
quantity of seized liquor was 50 bulk litres or more. In this
manner you have applied double standard, malafidely, in
allowing the aforesaid bail applications.
ARTICLE OF CHARGE - II
That, you, with corrupt or oblique motive or for some
extraneous consideration allowed the first bail application
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
No. 101/2012 Pappu Vs. State of MP in Crime No. 101/2012
under section 439 of CrPC for offense punishable under
363, 366, 376(2)(g) of the IPC in a serious offence of gang
rape without assigning any sufficient reason, whereas the
accused was already facing trial in another similar crime no.
103/2012 PS Oon for offence punishable under sections
363, 366, 376(2)(g) 3 of the IPC.
Your aforesaid acts being unbecoming of Judicial Officer
amount to grave misconduct under Rule 3 of M.P. Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and are punishable under
Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control
& Appeal) Rules, 1966."
9.
A perusal of "Charge-I" reveals that the orders in the following bail
applications where Bail was granted to the applicants therein were
the basis of the gravamen of the charge:-
Bail Application Nos.
Date of Order
129/2011
01.08.2011
136/2011
04.08.2011
200/2011
07.12.2011
123/2012 & 122/2012
31.08.2012
10. The charge was that for corrupt motive or that for some extraneous
consideration, bail applications were allowed contrary to Section
59-A of the Excise Act. A contrast was made with 14 other bail
orders, where the appellant had rejected bail. It is significant to
note that among the five bail orders, Bail Application No.200/2011
that was disposed of on 07.12.2011 was actually a case where the
appellant had rejected bail. Somehow that order also made its way
into "Charge-I", as an order of grant of bail. Be that as it may. In
the list of witnesses, Jaipal Mehta was named apart from a general
statement - "any other witnesses that may be felt necessary".
11. The appellant gave his reply and dealt with each bail order that was
subject matter of the charge.
12. We have perused the actual bail orders. In the bail order in Bail
Application No.129/2011 (60 liters of liquor) the reasoning given
was as under:-
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"After hearing arguments of both the parties, Criminal
Case No.1685/11 Filed before Chief Judicial Magistrate
was perused. On perusal, it is clear that on 25.07.2011,
challan has been filed against both the Applicants/
Accused in violation of Section 34(2) of M.P. Excise Act,
and possibility of consuming time in it's trial cannot be
overruled. In view of the nature of crime, allegations, and
without commenting on the merits of evidences collected
in the present case i.e. Crime No. 232/11, and by placing
reliance on the said case laws, where trial is likely to take
time, and Applicant/Accused are theirselves [sic] being
permanent resident, there is no flight risk or tempering
evidences on their part, thereupon, it appears justifiable to
grant benefit of bail to these Applicants/ Accused Persons.
Due to this reason, the present Bail Application u/s 439
Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed."
13. Similarly, in other orders, reasons like filing of challan, the applicants
being rural farmers with no flight risk were mentioned. There was
no express reference to the twin conditions under Section 59-A(2)
of the Excise Act.
14. At the inquiry, the complainant Jaipal Mehta was not examined.
Instead the executive clerk of ADJ, Khargone Court, Gendalal
Chauhan was examined as witness No.1, in support of the charge.
The witness marked all the exhibits and categorically deposed as
under which actually was in favour of the appellant :-
"It is correct to say that while passing orders, Anil Joshi
was posted as Steno in the Court of First Additional
Sessions Judge. He is posted in Khargone since last 7-8
years, whom I know due to being my colleague. I never
seen Anil (sic) asking anyone that he has good relations
with Suliya Sahab and I will get done the work by doing
setting. None of the Advocates has told me that Anil Joshi
has setting with Suliya Sahab."
15. The appellant in defense examined the prosecutor K.P. Tripathi who
appeared in all the 18 bail applications which were subject matter
of the charge. He deposed as under:-
"I did not feel that the double standard has been adopted by
the Court. If it would happen, then, I would give my opinion
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
to the State for taking action in Hon'ble High Court. In Exh.
P-19, only one Crime i.e. Crime No.102/12 is registered
against Accused Pappu in P.S. Oon. Moreover, as per
my knowledge, no other crime is registered against this
accused. Because in Police Report, there is no mention
of registration of any other crime against him. I find the
functioning of Court to be completely impartial."
......
"That, three Bail Applications of Excise Act have been
allowed, and out of the said Applications, 15 Applications
have been rejected. In my opinion, in the cases of Bail
marked as Exh. P-1, P-2 and P-4, those orders of allowing
bail application which have been passed in view of the facts
and circumstances of respective cases, nature of crime,
and in pursuance of the case laws of Hon'ble High Court
and Supreme Court, those orders are completely based
on merits and are relevant and true as per law. Those 15
Bail Applications which have been rejected by the Ld. Trial
Court, out of those cases, in the orders marked as Exh.
P-9, Exh. P-12, Exh. P-13, Exh. P-17 and Exh. P-18, the
case was at the initial stage of investigation."
......
"Note: Question by Enquiry Officer:-
Question: The bail orders, in which bail applications have
been allowed, whether those orders according to your
goodself or in the opinion of Public Prosecutor, are proper
or improper? What you say in this regard.
Answer: In my opinion i.e. in the capacity of Public
Prosecutor, the orders of granting bail were absolutely
proper and on proper grounds."
16. Notwithstanding the above evidence the inquiry officer held "Charge-I",
proved by recording the following findings:-
"Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid analysis, as a final
conclusion, it is proved in favour of the Department that
Delinquent Officer Sh. N.S. Suliya in the capacity of
Additional Sessions Judge, not being impartial in the
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disposal of Bail Applications for the offences of Section
34(2), 49-A of the Excise Act, and with oblique motive
and by deliberately violating the mandatory provisions
of Section 59-A of the aforesaid Act, has committed
misconduct by allowing some Bail Application Nos.
129/11, 136/11, 123/12, 122/12 and by rejecting some
bail Applications by applying double standards in malafide
and arbitrary manner, who has violated Rule 3 of the M.P.
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 196, which is punishable
under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification,
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966."
17. On 21.03.2014, a copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the
appellant and he was asked to show cause on the punishment. The
appellant filed a detailed reply by his letter dated 10.04.2014.
18. On 02.09.2014, on the recommendation of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, order was passed by the Principal Secretary, Government
of M.P., Law & Legislative Affairs Department, removing the appellant
from service. A representation/appeal filed against the said order
was rejected on 17.03.2016.
19. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur (Writ Petition No.8623/2016) challenging the
order of removal and the order of the appellate authority and prayed
for reinstatement with consequential benefits.
20. By the impugned order dated 25.07.2024, the High Court has
dismissed the Writ Petition by recording the following finding:-
"If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the
case referred to herein above, are taken note of, then a
reasonable finding arrived at by the Inquiring Authority in
the present case based on material available on record
can neither be interfered with by this Court nor can it
termed as perverse or unreasonable to such an extent
that interference can be made by this Court.
Considering the material available in the present case,
it is apparent that the petitioner was holding the post
of Additional Sessions Judge with which comes a great
responsibility and he was under obligation to conduct
himself in a manner befitting the post held by him. He was
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
under duty to conduct the proceedings of bail applications
in conformity with the provisions of law. He extended
the benefit of bail to some applicants relying on the
pronouncement of High Court and refused to grant bail
to others without considering those pronouncements. No
violation of principles of natural justice or error is found in
the procedure followed in the enquiry in the present case.
In the absence of any procedural illegality, irregularity in
the conduct of departmental enquiry, in the considered
opinion of this Court, no interference is warranted and after
considering the over all material available in the record
and in view of the settled position of law, we do not find
any reason to interfere in the order of punishment/removal
dated 02.09.2014 and the order of rejection of appeal on
17.03.2016 and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed."
21. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.
22. We have heard Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned senior counsel
assisted by Mr. Kanu Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant
and Mr. Arjun Garg, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, who ably presented the case of the
said respondent. We have perused the records, including the written
submissions and the compilation of case law filed by the parties.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: -
23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that the allegations
were directly against Anil Joshi - the Stenographer; that neither the
complainant - Jaipal Mehta nor the Stenographer was produced as
witnesses during the Departmental Inquiry and that the bail orders
which were subject matter of the inquiry were passed on valid
grounds. Even in the case of special statute "bail is the rule and jail
is the exception"; that the Inquiry Officer has examined the legality
and propriety of the orders of bail acting as an Appellate Authority.
That the departmental witness Gendalal Chauhan and the public
prosecutor in their deposition did not support the charge and finally
it was contended that merely because on a given set of facts, a
different conclusion is possible, is no ground to indict a Judicial
Officer. It was further submitted that wrong exercise of jurisdiction
or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law cannot be the basis
for initiating disciplinary proceedings.
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CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2 - THE HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH:-
24. The learned Counsel for the respondent no. 2 - the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh submitted that the procedure for Inquiry has been
duly followed; that the consistent view of this Court has been that the
Court will not function as an Appellate Court over the Inquiry report
and the only consideration was whether the Inquiry had been fairly
conducted after giving due opportunity to the delinquent. It was further
submitted that Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act was not even referred
to in the bail orders in question, while in the other bail orders it was
mentioned while rejecting bail. The learned counsel submitted that
the Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion that the conduct of the
appellant was not impartial and the appellant violated the mandate
of Section 59-A and applied double standards in a mala fide and
arbitrary manner. It was submitted that a judicial officer is required to
maintain a very high standard of devotion to duty. So contending, it
was pleaded that the impugned order did not call for any interference.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION: -
25. The questions for consideration are whether the order removing the
appellant from service based on the inquiry report is justified in law
and whether any good ground has been made out for interference?
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: -
26. The present is the case of a Disciplinary Inquiry against the senior
Judicial Officer. Before we set out the parameters laid down by this
Court as to in what circumstances a Judicial Officer can be subjected
to penalty in the discharge of his duties, it is apposite to make certain
preliminary observations.
27. A fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary, as
much as an independent judiciary itself is the foundation on which
rule of law rests. A judicial Officer is tasked with the onerous duty
of deciding cases. Invariably one party to the case would lose and
go back unhappy. Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting
to settle scores may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary
also has tremendous work pressure and works under trying working
conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most of the
Judicial Officers give their very best while discharging their duties.
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
28. Instances have also emerged from different parts of the country, where
not just disgruntled parties but some mischievous elements in the Bar
have also resorted to intimidatory tactics against the members of the
Trial Judiciary by engineering false and anonymous complaints. Strict
and strong action in accordance with law should be taken against such
individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint against a judicial officer
and/or if found to be engineering the false and frivolous complaints.
Such proceedings would include in appropriate cases, proceedings
for contempt of court. In case the person filing or engineering false
and frivolous complaints is a recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart
from proceedings for contempt of court, reference to the bar council
should be made for disciplinary action. Bar councils, on receipt of
such references, have to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
29. Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer
is prima facie found to be true, prompt action to initiate disciplinary
proceeding should be taken and no leniency should be shown if
the charges are established. Not only this, in appropriate cases
where criminal prosecution is warranted against a judicial officer,
the High Court should not hesitate to have the same initiated. That
is the only way to weed out black-sheeps sullying the fair name of
the judiciary. Due care and caution must be exercised by the High
Court in initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only
because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without
anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the ordeal of a
disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.
30. It is trite to recall the observations of this Court in Sadhna
Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another.1:-
"20. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion
cannot constitute "misconduct". Any "probability" of
misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary
material, even though, the standard of proof would obviously
not be on a par with that in a criminal trial. While applying
these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to consider the
existence of differing standards and approaches amongst
different Judges. There are innumerable instances of
judicial officers who are liberal in granting bail, awarding
1
(2020) 11 SCC 760
106
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compensation under MACT or for acquired land, back
wages to workmen or mandatory compensation in other
cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-oriented judicial
approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast
aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer.
21. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours
being a country, wherein countless complainants are
readily available without hesitation to tarnish the image
of the judiciary, often for mere pennies or even cheap
momentary popularity. Sometimes, a few disgruntled
members of the Bar also join hands with them, and
the officers of the subordinate judiciary are usually
the easiest target. It is, therefore, the duty of the High
Courts to extend their protective umbrella and ensure
that the upright and straightforward judicial officers
are not subjected to unmerited onslaught.
26. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end
result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether
the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification
(monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by
extraneous considerations while conducting the
process is of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is
possible that a judicial officer can indulge in conduct
unbecoming of his office whilst at the same time giving
an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such
unbecoming conduct can either be in the form of a
Judge taking a case out of turn, delaying hearings
through adjournments, seeking bribes to give parties
their legal dues, etc. None of these necessarily need to
affect the outcome. However, importantly in the present
case, a perusal of the charge-sheet shows that no such
allegation of the process having been vitiated has been
made against the appellant."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Rajasthan2, this Court quoted with
approval the observations in Sadhna Chaudhary (supra).
2
(2022) 13 SCC 1
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
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Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
32. When false allegations fly thick and fast, the judicial officers cannot
react. Here is where the High Court which is vested with the supervisory
control has to exercise great caution and circumspection. As to what
the parameters are, when the High Court on the Administrative side
is faced with such a scenario, has been felicitously set out by Chief
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud J. speaking for the Court in R.R. Parekh v.
High Court of Gujarat and Another3 as under: -
"16. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been
actuated by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to
be determined upon a careful appraisal of the material on
the record. Direct evidence of corruption may not always
be forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of
this nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of
law or procedure may well be indicative in a given case of
a motivated, if not reckless disregard of legal principle. In
the absence of a cogent explanation to the contrary, it is
for the disciplinary authority to determine whether a pattern
has emerged on the basis of which an inference that the
judicial officer was actuated by extraneous considerations
can be drawn. Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial
officer have to be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust
common sense must guide the disciplinary authority. At one
end of the spectrum are those cases where direct evidence
of a misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to
the existence of an incriminating trail must be carefully
scrutinised to determine whether an act of misconduct is
established on the basis of legally acceptable evidence. Yet
in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being actuated
by a corrupt motive may not be available. The issue which
arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances
from which an inference that extraneous considerations
have actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn.
Such an inference cannot obviously be drawn merely
from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. A wrong
decision can yet be a bona fide error of judgment.
Inadvertence is consistent with an honest error of
3
(2016) 14 SCC 1
108
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judgment. A charge of misconduct against a judicial
officer must be distinguished from a purely erroneous
decision whether on law or on fact. The legality of a
judicial determination is subject to such remedies
as are provided in law for testing the correctness
of the determination. It is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the officer which is in
question. The disciplinary authority has to determine
whether there has emerged from the record one or
more circumstances that indicate that the decision
which forms the basis of the charge of misconduct
was not an honest exercise of judicial power. The
circumstances let into evidence to establish misconduct
have to be sifted and evaluated with caution. The threat of
disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate the honest
and independent officer. Yet on the other hand, there is a
vital element of accountability to society involved in dealing
with cases of misconduct. There is on the one hand a
genuine public interest in protecting fearless and honest
officers of the District Judiciary from motivated criticism
and attack. Equally there is a genuine public interest in
holding a person who is guilty of wrongdoing, responsible
for his or her actions. Neither aspect of public interest
can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of the
integrity of the administration of justice."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. As held in R.R. Parekh (supra), it should be borne-in-mind that
inference of misconduct or about extraneous considerations having
actuated, the decision cannot be drawn merely from a hypothesis that
a decision is erroneous. It has been held that a wrong decision can yet
be a bona fide error of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with
an honest error of judgment. Ultimately, it is not the correctness of the
verdict but the conduct of the Officer in question which is determinative.
34. It is apposite to recall the observations of this Court in Union of
India and Others vs. K.K. Dhawan4, which has been followed in
4
(1993) 2 SCC 56
[2026] 1 S.C.R.
109
Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others5. This Court in K.K. Dhawan
(supra), while illustrating certain cases for which disciplinary action
can be initiated, took care to administer a note of caution also. In
K.K. Dhawan (supra), this Court held:-
"28.