# No. 63 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and v. Order dated 7th November, 1950, of the High Court Mahboob Begum

- **Citation:** [1953] 1 S.C.R. 404
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1950-11-07
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JumsDICTION: Civil Appeal an!ei:,~;,. No. 63 of 1952
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sasthi 0.J, Mukhehjea, 0Handha· Sekhara Aiyar, BosE, Ghulam Hasan J
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/no-63-of-1952-appeal-from-the-judgment-and-v-order-dated-7th-november-1950-of-25
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950-Act pl'ovidina for
settl~
n&ent of dispu,tes as to succession. between 1Jrivate versons and pro~
hibiting recourse to coitrts of law.-Validity-Equality of the lawDiscriniination-Rea.sonableness-Constitution
of India.,
1950,
Art. 14 (1).
The continuance of a. dispute even for a long period of time
between two sets of rival claimants to the property of ar-private
TJBrson is not a circum'stance of such unusual nature as would invest a case with special or exceptional features and make it rt class
by itself justifying its differentiation fro1u all other cases of succession disputes, and the fact that a non-judicial authority had
made a report against one set of the claimants is not a reasonable
·ground for depriving thein by legislation of their ordinary rights
under the law and prohibiting the1n Iron1 having resort to courts'
of law for establishing their rights.·
A nobleman of J{yderllhitfl died in 1935 \Yhen it \Vas under
the rule of the N izam,
and disputes as to succession a.rose
betwe_en his legally married wife and two ladies, j\fahbooh Begum
·and i{adiran Begum, \Vho claimed to he his \Vives.
After protracted proceedings before several non-judicial bodies a report
a.dverse· to.the latter· was made in January, 1950, but before the
· Nizam could issue a firman in accordance 'Vi-'ith it, Hyderabad became a part ol the Indian Union and the Coustitution of India
.came into force.
An enact1nent called the VValiuddowla Succes-
. sion Act, 1950, w"s therefore- passed by tho Hyderabad Legislature which providecl that ''the claiins of }dahboob Begu1n and
Kadiran Begum and of their respecLive children to participate in
the distribution of the matrooka of the late N awab are hereby
dismissed" and that the above decision "cannot be called in
question in a.ny court of law":
Held, that in sin'gling out two groups of persons consisting of
t,wo ladies and their children out of those Who claimed to be related
to the late N awab and preventing them from establishing their
rights under the personal la\\' which governed the community, in
Courts of law, the Act was discriminatory; that there ¥:as no
rational or reasonable ba,sis for the discrimination, and tlle Act
contravened the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution and
was therefore void.
The analogy of private Acts of the British
S.C. R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
405
Parliament is not helpful as the British Parliament enjoys legis-
/!1511
lative omnipotence and there are no constitutional limitations on
its authority or power.
A•neerunnissa
CIVIL APPELLATE JumsDICTION:
Civil Appeal
an!ei:,~;,.
No. 63 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and
v.
Order dated 7th November, 1950, of the High Court Mahboob Begum
of Judicature at Hyderabad (Siddique, Rao and
and Oth1rs.
1
Deshpande JJ.) in Civil Case No. 9-A-5-1 of 1950.
~.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
"'·"
0. K. Daphtary,.Solicitor-General for India ( G. N. Joshi
and Ghulam Ahmad Khan, with them) for the appellants.
..
-
B. Somayya and Akbar Ali Khan (B. V. Subharayitdu,
with them) for the respondents.
1952. December 9.
'rhe J udgmeut of the Court
was delivered by
•
MUKHER.TEA J.-This appeal which has
come
before us on a certificate granted by the High Court
of Hyderaba.d under article 132 (1) of the Constitu" '
tion is directed against a judgment of a Full Bench
I
of that Court date~ November 7, 1950, passed on a
petition under article '.3'.rB- of ·the- Constitution. By
this judgment the learned Judges of the High Court
declared an Act, known as the W aliuddowla Succession
Act of 1950, void under article 13(2) of the Constitution to the extent that it affected the rights of the
present respondents l to 12 who were the petitioners
in the· article 226 proceeding.
'rhe object of the impugned Act, which received the assent of H.E.H. the
Nizam as Rajpramukh of Hyderabad on April 24,
1950, was to put an end to the disputes that existed
at the, time regarding succession to the matrooka or
personal es

## Text

\ -. '
"
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
(1953)
1952
AMEERUNNISSA BEGUM AND OTHERS
\
•
v .
MAHBOOB BEGUM AND 01'HERS.
(PATANJALI SASTHI 0.J., MUKHEHJEA, 0HANDHA·
SEKHARA AIYAR, BosE and GHULAM HASAN J.J.]
Waliuddowla Succession Act, 1950-Act pl'ovidina for
settl~
n&ent of dispu,tes as to succession. between 1Jrivate versons and pro~
hibiting recourse to coitrts of law.-Validity-Equality of the lawDiscriniination-Rea.sonableness-Constitution
of India.,
1950,
Art. 14 (1).
The continuance of a. dispute even for a long period of time
between two sets of rival claimants to the property of ar-private
TJBrson is not a circum'stance of such unusual nature as would invest a case with special or exceptional features and make it rt class
by itself justifying its differentiation fro1u all other cases of succession disputes, and the fact that a non-judicial authority had
made a report against one set of the claimants is not a reasonable
·ground for depriving thein by legislation of their ordinary rights
under the law and prohibiting the1n Iron1 having resort to courts'
of law for establishing their rights.·
A nobleman of J{yderllhitfl died in 1935 \Yhen it \Vas under
the rule of the N izam,
and disputes as to succession a.rose
betwe_en his legally married wife and two ladies, j\fahbooh Begum
·and i{adiran Begum, \Vho claimed to he his \Vives.
After protracted proceedings before several non-judicial bodies a report
a.dverse· to.the latter· was made in January, 1950, but before the
· Nizam could issue a firman in accordance 'Vi-'ith it, Hyderabad became a part ol the Indian Union and the Coustitution of India
.came into force.
An enact1nent called the VValiuddowla Succes-
. sion Act, 1950, w"s therefore- passed by tho Hyderabad Legislature which providecl that ''the claiins of }dahboob Begu1n and
Kadiran Begum and of their respecLive children to participate in
the distribution of the matrooka of the late N awab are hereby
dismissed" and that the above decision "cannot be called in
question in a.ny court of law":
Held, that in sin'gling out two groups of persons consisting of
t,wo ladies and their children out of those Who claimed to be related
to the late N awab and preventing them from establishing their
rights under the personal la\\' which governed the community, in
Courts of law, the Act was discriminatory; that there ¥:as no
rational or reasonable ba,sis for the discrimination, and tlle Act
contravened the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution and
was therefore void.
The analogy of private Acts of the British
S.C. R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
405
Parliament is not helpful as the British Parliament enjoys legis-
/!1511
lative omnipotence and there are no constitutional limitations on
its authority or power.
A•neerunnissa
CIVIL APPELLATE JumsDICTION:
Civil Appeal
an!ei:,~;,.
No. 63 of 1952. Appeal from the Judgment and
v.
Order dated 7th November, 1950, of the High Court Mahboob Begum
of Judicature at Hyderabad (Siddique, Rao and
and Oth1rs.
1
Deshpande JJ.) in Civil Case No. 9-A-5-1 of 1950.
~.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
"'·"
0. K. Daphtary,.Solicitor-General for India ( G. N. Joshi
and Ghulam Ahmad Khan, with them) for the appellants.
..
-
B. Somayya and Akbar Ali Khan (B. V. Subharayitdu,
with them) for the respondents.
1952. December 9.
'rhe J udgmeut of the Court
was delivered by
•
MUKHER.TEA J.-This appeal which has
come
before us on a certificate granted by the High Court
of Hyderaba.d under article 132 (1) of the Constitu" '
tion is directed against a judgment of a Full Bench
I
of that Court date~ November 7, 1950, passed on a
petition under article '.3'.rB- of ·the- Constitution. By
this judgment the learned Judges of the High Court
declared an Act, known as the W aliuddowla Succession
Act of 1950, void under article 13(2) of the Constitution to the extent that it affected the rights of the
present respondents l to 12 who were the petitioners
in the· article 226 proceeding.
'rhe object of the impugned Act, which received the assent of H.E.H. the
Nizam as Rajpramukh of Hyderabad on April 24,
1950, was to put an end to the disputes that existed
at the, time regarding succession to the matrooka or
personal estate of N awab Waliuddowla, a wealthy
nobleman and a high dignitary of Hyderabad, and
what, in substr.i.nce, the Act provided was to dismiss
the claims of succession to the said properties put
torward by two of the alleged wives of the late Nawab,
named Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum, and
vheir children. These ~WO ladies as well
~s ~h~ir
\ .
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953)
1952
children filed a petition before the Hyderabad High
Am,.runnissa Court under article 226 of the Constitution challengBegum
ing the validity of the Act mentioned aforesaid inter
and Others
alia on the grounds that it conflicted with the petiv.
tioners' fundamental rights guaranteed under articles
Mahboob Beguml4, 19(l)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution and pray-
. and Others.
ing for appropriate reliefs by way of declaration and
Mukherjea J. writs of certiorari and prohibition. The claim was
resisted by Ameerunnissa Begum, an admitted wife of
the late Nawab, and her children, and they are the
persons who would primarily be benefited by the
provisions of the impugned Act.
The _High Court
•substantially accepted the contentions of the petitioners and declared the Act to be void so far as it
affected them.
Against this decision the present
appeal has been taken to this court by Ameerunnissa
Begum and her children.
To appreciate the contentions that have been raised
by the parties, a brief resume of the antecedent events
leading np to the passing of the disputed legislation
would be necessary.
Nawab Waliuddowla, who was one of the Paigah
noblemen of Hyderabad and was at one time the
President of the Executive Council of the State, died
at Medina on February 22, 1935, while on a pilgrimage to Hedjaz. Besides extensive jagir ·properties
appertaining to the Paigah which fetched him an
annual income of nearly Rs. 1,36,000 he left behind
hi!ll matrooka or personal estate of considerable value.
As regards the surviving relations of. the N awab, who
could claim rights by inheritance to his estate, it is
not disputed that Ameerunnissa Begum was.one of the
legally wedded wives of the N awab and that she and
the five children which the Nawab had by her -are entitled to their legitimate shares in the properties left by
the deceased. There is also no dispute that the N awab
went through a legal marriage with a lady named
Fatima Begum who is still alive. It appears, however,
that she left her husband soon after marriage and did
not return to him any time thereafter. During the
period, which is material for our present purpose, the
j
\,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
only claim which she put forward against the estate of
19511
the Nawab was one for recovery of her dower debt Alneerunnissa
amounting to one lakh of rupees. The whole dispute
Begum
between the parties to this litigation really center
0ed
and Other•
round the point as to whether the other two ladies,
v.
namely Mahoob Begum and Kadiran Begum, who are Mahbaab Begum
respectively respondents 1 and 5 in this appeal, were
and Others,
the lawfully married wives of the late Nawab or were Mukherjea J,
they merely in his keeping as kavases or permanent
concubines? If there was no legal marriage between
them and the N awab, it is not disputed that their
children, though admittedly begotten on them by the
N awab, would not be entitled to any share in the
matrooka or personal estate left by the deceased.
This dispute first arose before the Paig_ah Trust
Committee whose duty it was to distribute the income
of the Paigah estate amongst the heirs of the late
N awab. In April, 1935, shoi:.tly after Ameerunnissa
Begum, who had accompanied her husband to Mecca,
returned to Hyderabad after the death of the latter,
the Committee addressed letters to Ameerunnissa
Begum, Fatima Begum and also to Mahboob Begum
enquiring about the wives and children left by the
N awalr. No letter, it seems, was sent to Kadiran Bi.
On a consideration of the replies given by the several
addressees and also of the statements made on their
behalf at the hearings before the Committee, the
latter submitted a report to the Executive Council of
the Nizam. '1
1he Paigah Committee proceeded on the
footing that the Nawab's marriage with Ameerunnissa
Begum was beyond dispute, but as Mahboob Begum
did not produce her marriage certificate even. after
repeated demands by the Committee, she as well as
Kadiran Bi were treated as concubines. The Committee recommended that the annual income of the
Paigah should be divid~d in the proportion of 60 to 40
amongst the legitimate and illegitimate relations of
the Nawab. 60% of the income was to go to Ameerun-
\ll~l;a, Begum and her issues and the remaining 40%
was to be paid to Mahboob and Kadira,n ais well as to
5~
1962
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953)
their children. These recommendations were approved by the Nizam in a Firman dated 9th July, 1936.
Atneerunn-i~sa
Begum
Previous to this, express intimations were give'n to
.,.a Others
tlie surviving relations of Waliuddowla under orders
v.
of the Nizam that whatever disputes might exist
Afahboob Begum
th
d'
h
t
7
1
.,,a Others.
among
em regar rng t em~ roo1ca or persona estate
of the N awab, should be decided by proper proceedMukherjea J. ings in a court of la,w and pending such decision the
estate might be kept under the supervision of the
Paigah Committee.
On the 8th February, 1938,
Mahboob Begum and her children filed a suit in the
Dar-ul-Quaza, which was a court established under
the law for deciding rights of succession, marriage,
divorce etc. of the Muslims in the Hyderabad State,
praying for a declaration that Mah boob Begum was
the legally married wife of the Nawab and the children
were his legitimate children and for other consequential reliefs in the shape of participation in the matrooka and recovery of tlie dower debt payable to Mahl:>0ob Begum. Both Ameerunnissa Begum and Kadiran
Bibi as well as their children were among the defendants impleaded in the suit. During the pendency
of the suit and before it came on for actual hearing, .
there was a Firman issued by the Nizam on the 9th
February, 1937, on the application of Ameerunnissa
Begum, directing the withdrawal of the suit from the
Dar-ul-Quaza court and the appointment of a Special
Commission consisting of Nawab Jiwan Yar Juug,
the then Chief Justice of Hyderabad and the Judge
of Dar-ul-Quaza before whom the suit was pending,
to investigate the matter and submit a report to
the Nizam through the Executive Council.
Proceedings
before
the Special
Commission
commenced on 27th March, 1939.
Kadiran Bibi filed
a plaint before the Commissiop. claiming on behalf of
herself and her children the identical reliefs which
were claimed by Mah boob Begum and her children,
and though this plaint was at first rejected by the
Commission it was subsequently entertained under
specific orders of the .Executive Council. It appearn
that Fatima Bibi also lodged a plaint in respect 9f
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RllJPORTS
409
her Mahar against the estate of the Nawab and
1952
this matter was also directed to be investigated by A
.
the Commission.
'fhe enquiry before the Commil'-
me;;:;;ssa
sion was a long affair in which a large volume of
and Others
evidence, both oral and documentary, was adduced.
v.
The Commission submitted the report on October 16, Mahboob Begum
1944, and their findings, in substance, were that both
and Others.
Mah boob Begum and Kadiran Begum were legally Mukherjea J.
married wives of ·w aliuddowla and hence they as well
as their children were entitled to have their legitimate ·shares in the matrooka.
Fatima Begum was
also held to be a legally wedded wife of the Nawab,
and as such entitled to the dower claimed by her.
When the report came up for consideration by the
Executive Council the Members of the Council were
divided in their opinion. A minority was in favour
of accepting the findings of the Commission but the
majority view was that further expert opinion should
be taken in the matter. Eventually on the advice
of the Council the Nizam directed by his Firman
dated 27th August, 1945, that the report of the
Special Commission should be scrutinised by an
Advisory Committee consisting of three persons,
namely, two Judges of the High Court and the J.Jegal
Adviser of the State. 'rhis Committee was directed
to examine fully the bulky report of the Special
Commission and submit their opinion with a view to
assist the Executive Council in coming to their decision.
They were not to take any fresh evidence or
hear any further arguments from the parties.
The
Advisory Committee submitted their report on 24th
November, 1945, and the Committee held differing
from the view taken by the Special Commission that
neither Mahboob Begum nor Kadiran Begum was
the legally wedded wife of Nawab Waliuddowla.
Despite this report, the majority of the Exe cu ti ve
Council recommended that the findings of the Special
Commission should be accepted. The Nizam accepted
this recommendation and by his Firman dated 26th
June, 1947, directed that the findings of the Special
Commission shonJU be implemented at an early date.
'
I
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1953]
19oe
'l'here was a proposal at the beginning that the mem-
-
.
bers of the Special Commission themselves should be
Ameerunnma
k d
.
l
h . fi d.
b
.
Begum
as e
t.o nnp ement t eir n mgs, ut eventually 1t
and Others
w:ts decided by a resolut10n of the Executive Council
v.
dated 22nd September, 1947, that the task of enMahboob Begum forcing the recommendations of the Commission
and Others.
should be entrusted to the Chief Justice of the
Mukherjea J. Hyderabad High Court. It appears that in subsequent communications to the Executive Council
the Nizam expressed doubt regarding the status of
Mahboob Begum and Radiran Begum and suggested
the replacement of the Firman of 26th June, 1947,
by new orders in the nature of a compromise.
The
Executive Council, however, stuck to their decision
and on 17th June, 1948, the findings of the Special
Commission were transferred to the Chief Justice for·
executing the same as early :w possible. On 2nd July,
1948, another Firman was issued by the Nizam
directing that the Chief Justice before making the
final distribution of the matrooka should submit his
report
through the Executive Council to His
Exalted Highness for his sanction.
This direction
was
embodied in a resolution of the Executive
Council dated 2nd September, 1948.
The police action in Hyderabad commenced soon
after that and it was on 25th September, 1948, after
the police action had terminated and a Military
Governor was placed in charge of the Hyderabad
State that a formal communication of the resolution
mentioned above was made to the Chief Justice.
Soon afterwards on the application of Ameerunnissa
Begum made to the Military Governor the execution
proceedings before the Chief Justice were stayed by
an order dated 16th October, 1948.
'£his stay order
was again cancelled on 5th November, 1948, and the
execution proceedings were allowed to continue.· On
5th December, 1948, the Chief Justice submitted his
report regarding the distribution of the matrooka to
the Executive Council.
Strangely, however, by a
Firman dated 24th February, l\!49, the Nizam purporting to act under the advice of the. Military
j
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
Governor directed that the findings of the three-men
196i
Advisory Committee, who differed from the views Ameerunnissa
taken by the Special Commission, should be given
Begum
effect to. In other words, the claims of Mah boob
and Others
Begum and Kadiran Begum were dismissed and
v.
Ameerunnissa Begum was directed to pay one lakh of Mahboob Begum
rupees to Fatima Begum as the dower due to the
and Others.
latter. Protest was lodged against the decision by
Mukherj~a J.
Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum and again a
Firman was issued by the Nizam under the advice
of the Military Governor on 7th of September, 1949.
By this Firman the earlier order of 24th February,
1949, was revoked and the whole case was referred
for opinion and report to Sir George Spence, the
Legal Adviser to the Military Governor, who was
directed to hear the parties and take such further
evidence as he considered necessary. The enquiry
then began before the Legal Adviser but neither
party adduced any evidence.
Sir George Spence
submitted his report on 7th January, 1950.
The
material findings and recommendations in his report
were as follows:-
" 76.
My finding on the case is that neither
Mahboob Begum nor Kadiran Begum was married
to the N awab with the result that these ladies and
their children are not entitled to participate in the
distribution of the matrooka.
77. If this finding is accepted, the order required
for its implementation would be an order dismissing
the claims of Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum
on ,the matrooka and directing Ameerunnissa Begum
to pay one lakh of rupees out of the ma,trooka to
Fatima Begum on account of Hag Mahar.''
The Constitution of India came into force on 26th
January, 1950. As Hyaerabad was integrated with
the Indian Union and the Nizam lost the absolute
power which he could exercise previously, it was no
longer within his competence to issue a Firman on
the terms of the report of Bir George Spence and
make it legally binding on the parties.
Recourse wa~
4J2
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1953]
'"""
therefore had to legislation and on April 24, 1950,
A
-
.
this impugned ·Act was passed which purported to
meerunntSsa give a legislative sanction. to the findings in the
Begum
and othm
rep"ort of Sir George Spence.
The material provision
v.
of the Act is contained in section 2, clause (1), which.
Mahboob Begum Jays down that "the claims of Mah boob Begum and
and Others.
Kadiran Begum and of their respective children to
Mukhorjsa J. participate in the distribution of the matrooka of the
late N awab Waliuddowla are hereby dismissed".
The second clause of this section provides that a sum
of one lakh of rupees shall be paid to Fatima Begum
on account of her Haq Mahar. Under section 3, the
decisions affirmed in section 2 cannot be called in
question in any court of law and finally section 4
provides that the High Court of Hyderabad shall,
on the application of any person interested in the
decision affirmed in section 2, execute the said
decision as if it were a decree passed by itsell and such
person was a decree-holder. It is this Act which
has been pronounced to be invalid· by the High Court
of Hyderabad to the extent that it dismisses the
claims of Mah boob Begum and Kadiran Begum as
well as of their children to the personal estate of
N awab Waliuddowla.
It may be conceded that before the coming in of
the Co.nstitution, the Ni7'am of Hyderabad practically
enjoyed unfettered sovereign authority and however
much the various Firmans, which were issued by him
in connection with the present dispute, may appear
to be capricious and arbitrary, strictly speaking
they were not unconstitutional in the sense that
they were beyond his competence as the supreme
legislature in the State.
After the Constitution
came into force and prior to the setting up of a duly
constituted legislature in the Hyderabad State, the
legislative authority
undoubtedly
vested in the
N 1zam as the Rajpramukh of the State under the
provision of article 385 of the Constitution read with
article 212-A (2) inserted by the President's (Removal
of Difficulties) Order No. II dated 26th .January,
1950; but the legislative power exercisable by the
Nizam was a strictly limited power. The Rajpramukh
)
~-
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
was not only to act in conformity with the provision
w52
of article 246 of the Constitution and keep within
Ameerunni~sa
tbe bounds of the legislative sphere laid down with
Begum
reference to the entries, in the different legislative
and Othet'S
lists, but the legislation must not be in conflict with
v.
any of. the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part Mahboob Begum
III of the Constitution.
and Others._
'rhe impugned Act, as its title and preamble show, Mukherjsa J.
was passed with the avowed object of terminating the
disputes relating to succession to the estate of tbe
late N awab Waliuddowala. Although in the report
of Sir George Spence it was held that Mafiboob Begum
and Kadiran Begum were not the legally wedded
wives of the N awab and their children were not legitimate, there was no express declaration to that effect
in the operative portion of tbe Act which merely lays
down that the claims of these two ladies as well as of
their children to participate in the distribution of the
matrooka of the late Nawab ars dismissed. The legislation may be said to relate to succession and indirectly to marriage also and as such may come within the
purview of entry 5, List III of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution. It bas not been argued by Mr.
Somayya, who appeared for the respondents, that a
legislation on these topics must be a general legislation; but it "has not been disputed by either side that
no valid legislation CO!Jld be passed under these
heads which is discriminatory in its character and
offends against the equal protection clause embodied
in article 14 of the Constitution. The contention of
the learned Attorney-General is that tbe legislation in
the present case does not violate the principles of the -
equality clause and be bas attempted to combat with
"much force the decision of the High Court on this
point.
This is the main question in the case which
requires to be examined carefully.
.
r
The nature and scope of the guarantee that is
implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution have been explained and diE>cussed in more
than one decision of this court and do not require
repetition. H is well settled that a le&islature whic)l
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1953]
1952
has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an
-
.
infinite variety of humau relations must, of necessity,
Ameerunmssa h
h
f
k.
· 11
t
tt ·
·
Begum
ave t e power o ma mg spec1a
a_ws o a am part1and Others
cu Tar objects; and for that purpose it must have large
v.
powers of selection or classification of persons and
!fohboob Begumthings upon which such laws are to operate.- Mere
and Others.
differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per
-
se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of
Mukherjea, J. the equal protection• clause.
To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the
selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis having
r~gard to the object which the legislature has in
view.
The learned Attorney-General in the course of his
argument laid considerable stress upon the decision
of this court in Chiranjit Lal v. 1'he Union of India(')
and he attempted to call in his aid the two propositions recognised and relied upon in that decision, ·
namely, (1) that the presumption is always in favour
· of the constitutionality of an enactment, and (2) a law
may be constitutional even though it relates to a
single individual, family or corporation.
The propositions themselves may he well founded but whether
or not they would apply to a particular. case would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case.
In Chiranjit Lal's case('), it is to be noted, the circumstances were somewhat exceptional. 'fhe legislation in
that case related to a company which was engaged in
production of a commodity vitally essential to the
community, and in judging the reasonableness of the
· classification in such cases the court has undoubtedly
to look to the social, political and economic interest
of the community as a whole. In doing so, as Prof.
Willis observed, the court will assume the existence
of any state of facts which can reasonably be conceiv-
·1ed of as existing at the time of legislation and capable
l of sustaining the classification made by it(•).
In the case before us what the legislature has done
is to single out t.wo groups of persons consisting of two
(I) (19~0] S,C.R, ~69.
(z) Willis o:q Constitq.tional Law, :p. 580,
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'r REPOR'rS
415
ladies and their respective children out of those who
1952
claim to be related to the late N awab \V a.liuddowla A1neerunnissa
aud prevent them from getting any share in the perBeg""'
sonal property of the latter to which they might be
an<l Others
entitled under the general law of the land.
They
v
claim to be wives and children of the deceased and Mahboob Beguni
as such entitled to have shares in his personal· estate
and Others.
and no competent court of law has as yet negatived Mllkherjea J.
their claims in this respect.
On what principle then,
it may be asked, was the disability imposed upon
these persons alone while the claim of the other claimants was accepted'! Nay, the legislation goes further than this and denies to these specified individuals
a right to enforce their claim in a court of law, in
accordance with the personal law that governs the
community to which they belong. They, in fact, have
been discriminated against from the rest of the com·
munity in respect of a valuable right which the law
secures to them all and the question is, on what basis
this appareB.tly hostile and discriminatory legislation
can ·be supported.
It is not suggested that it was for serving a public
purpose or securing some advantage to the commu·
nity as a whole that the legislature chose in this case
to interfere with private rights. The only purpose of
the legislation, as appears from the preamble, was to
end certain private disputes. It is true that the quarrel
between the two rival parties regarding succession
to the estate of the - deceased N awab was going on
since 1938; and after several vicissitudes, for which
the Nizam himself or his Legal Advisers were primarily responsible, there was a report prepared by the
Legal Adviser to the State in a particular way, which,
contrary to the opinion given by an earlier Special
Commission, negatived the claims of these two ladies
and their children. It is also true that because of the
introduction of the Constitution it was no longer possible for the Nizam to issue a Firman embodying
this report. 'l'hat may be the reason for passing this
JegiRlation but it would not funiish any rational basis
54
•
416
SUPREME COUR'f REPOR'fS
(1953]
1952
for the discrimination that it made.
The continu-
-
.
a.nee of a dispute even for a long period of time betAnteornnnM••
f · l 1 ·
h
f
Beguin
ween two sets o. n va c ~1mants tot e
1
propherty o
a
1
and Othors
private person is not a circumstance o sue unusua
v.
nature as would invest a case with special or excep-
!fahboob Begum tional features and make it a class by itself justifying
and Oth•rs.
its differentiation from all other cases of succession
Mukh,,J•a J. disputes. As appears from the preamble to 'he Act,
the only ground for depriving the two ladies and their
children of the benefits of the ordinary law is the fact
that there was an adverse report against them .made
by the State Legal Adviser.
'fhis ground is itself
arbitrary and unreasonable. 'fhe dispute regarding
succession to the estate of the Nawab was a legal dispute pure and simple and without determination of
the points in issue by a properly constituted judicial
tribunal a legislation based upon the report of a nonjudicial authority and made applicable to specific
individuals, who are deprived thereby of valuable
rights which are enjoyed by all other persons occupying the same position as themselves, does, in our
opinion, plainly come within the constitutional in·
hibition of article 14.
'fhe analogy of private Acts of the British Parliament, to which reference was made by the learned
Attorney-General in the course of his arguments, is
not at all helpful. The British Parliament enjoys
legislative omnipotence and there ,are no constitutional limitations upon its authority or power. There
were indeed a few statutes passed by the Provincial
Legislature in India during British days which regulated succession to the estates of certain princely
families.
The Bijni Succession Act (Act II of 1931)
passed by the Assam Legislature is an enactment of
this type and it did shut out the rights of certain
persons who claimed the Bijni estate under the law of
inheritance.
But at that time the Governor-General
of India had express authority under the provisions of
the Government of India Act, 1915, to authorize the
Provincial Legislatures to make laws regarding subjects of a private nature.
Quite apart from this, no.
•
..
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
question of infraction of the equal protection rule
1952
could arise in pre-Constitution day, s.
We are not Anieerunnissa
unmindful of the fact that the presumption is in
Begum
favour of the constitutionality of an enactment; bi.it
and Other•
when on the face of it a piece of legislation is
v,
palpably unreasonable and discriminatory and the Mahboob Begu"'
selection or classification made by it cannot be
and Others.
justified on any conceivable or rational ground, the Mukherjea .r.
court has got to invalidate the enactment on the
ground of its violating the equal protection clause.
'fhe learned Attorney-General contended before us
that the High Court was wrong in holding that there
was a concluded decree in the present case in favour
of respondents 1 to 12 on the basis of the recommendations of the Special Commission, and that this
decree was a property within the meaning of law of
which these respondents have been deprived by the
impugned legislation. 'fhe point is not free from
doubt, and much could be said on both sides.
We
think, therefore, that it would not be proper on our
part to express any opinion upon it in the present
appeal. We understand that the respondents have
filed an execution application in the City Civil Court
of Hyderabad which has ordered that execution
should proceed and that objections have been taken
to this application by the present appellants who
have raised inter alia the point that there is no final
and effective decree which is capable of execution.
f...s the point is still pending hearing by the Ci vii
Court of Hyderabad, we do not desire to influence
their decision in any way by expressing any opinion
on this matter.
We only desire to state that notwithstanding the observations made by the High Court
referred to above, the question shall be treated as an
open one .. The applicability of article 14 of the
Constitution in the present case" is, however, not at
all dependent upon the fact as to whether or not the
respondents have already acquired property in the
shape of a decree. 'fheir claim to the estate of the
late Nawab which they wanted to assert under the
general law of the land is itself a valuable right, and
418
SOPREME COOR'l' REPOR'l'S
(19531
1952
the deprivation of that right by a piece of discriminatory legislation would be sufficient to bring the
Ameeruiinissa
· h ·
h
·
l
case wit m t e purview of artic e 14 of the ConstiBagut1i
and OthM s
tution.
v.
Having regard to the view that we have taken, it
!Iahboob Begum is unnecessary to consider whether the impugned
and ot1iccs.
legislation violates the provisions of article 31(1) or
Mukh.,jea J. article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 'l'he result is
that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
1952
Dec. 10.
. Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for respondents Nos. 1 to 12: M. &. K.
Sastri.
AJMER SINGH
v.
'l'HE STATE OF PUNJAB.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAG WATI J J.]
Crirninal Procedzire Code, 1898, SS. 842, 417--AJJ1Jeal aaa,inst
acquittal-Inte1Jerence-Guidina pri nciple-Cri·minal trio l-Exaniina tion of· acciisefl-D·nty of Court-Irregular exam.inationValirlity of trial-Question of prejudice.
After an order of a.cqnittal has heon ma.de tho presumption of
innocence is further re-inforcocl by that orde1', and that- being so,
the trial court's decision cannot be reversed 1nerely on the ground
that the accused had failed to expla.in the cil'cumstances appearing
against him but only for very substantial and cOn:1pelling reasons.
In an appea.1 under s. 487, Criminal Procedure Code, tho High ,
Court bas full po\ver to revie"v t.he evidence upon 'vhich the ordtir
of acquittal \Vas founded .
. The duty of a Sessions Judge under s. 342; Criminal Pro·
cedure Code, to examine the accused is not discbargitd by merely
l'eading over the questions put to the accuB;ed in tbe ,l\Iagistrate's
Court and his answers, and by asking hjm whether he bas to say
anything about them. It is also not a sufficient compliance with
the section to generally ask the accused that, having heard the
vrosecution evidence what he has to say about it. Re p:iust be
questioned separately about each material circumstance which is
intended to be used against him.
The whole object of the section