# NRJSINGHA MURARI CHAKRABORTY & ORS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1977] 3 S.C.R. 521
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-04-12
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 1971
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, P. K. Goswami, Shinghal. Jj
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/nrjsingha-murari-chakraborty-ors-v-state-of-west-bengal-7189
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

indiun Penal Code 1860-Sec. 415·420-whether Passport is a PropertyMeaning of property.
The appellants \Vere charged under section 420 read with section 120B of
the Indian Penal Code on the ground that there was a conspiracy between them
as a result of which hundreds of applications were filed for the issue of pass·
ports. The applications were made by suppressing the real facts about the
nationality and addresses of the applicants and by making false representations
in several other respects. The prosecution alleged that hundreds of passports
were issued and delivered to persons who were not entitled to have them under
the law.
Special Leave was granted limited to the question whether the pass·
ports were property within the meaning of section 420 of the
Indian Pchal
Code.
Dismissing the appeal,
B
c
HELD : I. A passport is a document which by its nature and purpose i3
a political document for the benefit of its bolder. It recognises him as a citizen
of the country granting it and is in the nature of a request to the other country
D
tor hia free passage there.
[522-C]
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Raniuratlmam (1967) 3 SCR 525 refercd to;
Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1962) 2 SCR 241 followed;
Queen Empress v.
Appasan1i (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151 and Queen Enrpres. v. Sashi Bhuslian (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 210 approved;
Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra and Other (1969) 1
E
SCk 13 followed:
Jn ~ Packiannthan A.I.R. 1920 1iad. 131 ( 1) and Local Governnze11t v.
Ganga Ram A.l.R. 1922 Nagpur 229 approved.
2. The word 'property' is defined as the right to· the use or enjoyment or
the beneficial right of disposal of anything that can be the subject of ownership,
specially ownership of tangible things. Passport is a tangible thing and is capable
of ownership. It is the property of the State so long as it is with the passport
issuing authority and has not been issued to the person concerned, and after issue
F
it becomes the property of the person to \vhom it bas been granted. Passport can
be the subject of ownership or exclusive possession and is therefore property
within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 1.P.C. [523 A-C, 524 GJ

## Text

'
•
521
NRJSINGHA MURARI CHAKRABORTY & ORS
A
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
April 12, 1977
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N, SHINGHAL. JJ.J
indiun Penal Code 1860-Sec. 415·420-whether Passport is a PropertyMeaning of property.
The appellants \Vere charged under section 420 read with section 120B of
the Indian Penal Code on the ground that there was a conspiracy between them
as a result of which hundreds of applications were filed for the issue of pass·
ports. The applications were made by suppressing the real facts about the
nationality and addresses of the applicants and by making false representations
in several other respects. The prosecution alleged that hundreds of passports
were issued and delivered to persons who were not entitled to have them under
the law.
Special Leave was granted limited to the question whether the pass·
ports were property within the meaning of section 420 of the
Indian Pchal
Code.
Dismissing the appeal,
B
c
HELD : I. A passport is a document which by its nature and purpose i3
a political document for the benefit of its bolder. It recognises him as a citizen
of the country granting it and is in the nature of a request to the other country
D
tor hia free passage there.
[522-C]
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Raniuratlmam (1967) 3 SCR 525 refercd to;
Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1962) 2 SCR 241 followed;
Queen Empress v.
Appasan1i (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151 and Queen Enrpres. v. Sashi Bhuslian (1893) I.L.R. 15 All. 210 approved;
Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra and Other (1969) 1
E
SCk 13 followed:
Jn ~ Packiannthan A.I.R. 1920 1iad. 131 ( 1) and Local Governnze11t v.
Ganga Ram A.l.R. 1922 Nagpur 229 approved.
2. The word 'property' is defined as the right to· the use or enjoyment or
the beneficial right of disposal of anything that can be the subject of ownership,
specially ownership of tangible things. Passport is a tangible thing and is capable
of ownership. It is the property of the State so long as it is with the passport
issuing authority and has not been issued to the person concerned, and after issue
F
it becomes the property of the person to \vhom it bas been granted. Passport can
be the subject of ownership or exclusive possession and is therefore property
within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 1.P.C. [523 A-C, 524 GJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 277
of 1971.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
23rd June, 1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Cr!. A. No. 45 of 1964.
G
P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das for the Appellanis.
D. N. Mukherjee and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SHINGHAL, J.-Thi> appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated June 23, 1971, upholding
H
the conviction of the appellants for offences under sections 420 znd
· 420/120B of the Penal Code but re~uci~g their sen.tences.
The charge
related to
cheating the passport 1ssumg authority of the Hooghly
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522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 3 S.C.R.
district by disho!1estly ind~cing him to _iss)le passports on the basis of
false .representations.
This Court has limited the special leave to the
que~t10n whether the passports were "property" within the meaning of
sect10n 420 of the Penal Code ?
·
.
Speaking broadly, the allegation against the appellants was that
t~ere was a conspiracy b~tween them as a result of which 1480 applications were file~ for the issue of passports from July, 1956 to April,
1957, by Muslims and Chinese nationals.
These applications were
alleged to have been made by suppressing the real facts about the
nationality and addresses of the applicants, and by making false representations in several other respects.
The prosecution alleged titat
hundreds of passports were thus issued and delivered to persons who
were not entitled to them under the law.
Some of the appellants were
alleged to be directly concerned with those applications, and it was
further alleged that the orders of the Passport Authority were obtained
by dishonest inducement and false representation.
A passport is a document which, by its nature and purpose, is a
political document for the benefit of its holder.
It recognises
him
as a citizen of the country granting it and is in the nature of a request
to the other country for his free passage there.
Its importance was
examined by this Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam(') with reference to the provisions of the Indian Passport (Entry
Into India) Act, 1920, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and tho
Rules made thereunder which were in force at the time when the
offences were said to have been committed in this case.
After referring to sectioQS 3 and 4 of the Act, and rules 4 and 5 of the Rules,
this Court observed as follows,-
" ...... possession of passport, whatever may be its
meaning or legal effect, is a necessary requisite for leaving
India for travelling abroad.
The argument that the Act does
not impose the taking of a passport as a condition of exit from
India, therefore it does not interfere with the right of a
person to leave India, if we may say so, is rather hypertechnical and ignores the realities of the situation.
Apart from the
fact that possession of passport is a necessary condition of
travel in the international community, the prohibition against
entry indirectly prevents the person from leaving India.
The State in fact tells a person living in India 'you cau leave
India at your pleasure without a passport, but you would not
be allowed by foreign countries to enter them without it and
you cannot also come back to India withoi:t. it.' No perso!'
in India can possibly travel on those cond1t10ns.
Indeed 1t
is impossible for him to do so.
1 hat apa~t, even that th~o
retical possibility of exit is expressly restncted by executive
instructions and by refusal of foreign-exchange."
There can therefore be no doubt that a passport is a document of
importance for travel abroad and is of considerable value to its holder.
(I) (1967] 3 S.C.R. 525.
•
N. M. CHAKRABORTY v. WEST BENGAL (Shinghal, /.)
523
The word "property" has been defined in the Century, Dictionary,
which is an encyclopedic lexicon
o~ the English language,
as
follows,-
"the right to the use or enjoyment or the beneficial light
of disposal of anything th~t can be the subject of ownership;
ownership; estate; especially, ownership of tangible things
.... ; anything that may be exclusively possessed and
enjoyed; ...... possessions."
As has been stated, a passport provides the several benefits mentioned
above.
It is a tangible thing and is capable of ownership.
There
can therefore be no doubt that it is "property". It is property of the
State so long as it is with the passport issuilig authority and has not
been issued to the person concerned and, after issue, it becomes the
property of the person to whom it has been granted.
Our attention has not been invited to any case where the question
now before us arose for consideration on an earlier occasion.
But a
somewhat similar question was considered by this Court in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (').
The appellant there applied
to the Patna University for permission to appear at the M.A. examination as a private candidate, representing that he was a graduate having
obtained the B.A. degree in 1951 and had been teaching in a school.
On that basis, an admission card was despatched for him to the Headmaster of the school. It was however found that he was neither a
graduate nor a teacher. He was prosecuted for the offence ·under
section 420 read with section 511 of the Penal Code. He contended
that his conviction was unsustainable because the admission card had
no pecuniary value and was not property. This Court repelled the
contention and held that although the admission card as such had no
pecuniary value, it had immense value to the candidate appearing in
the examination for he could not have appeared at the examination
without it, and that it was therefore property within the meaning of
section 415 of the Penal Code.
While reaching that conclusion, this
Court relied on Queen Empress v. Appasami (') and Queen Empress v.
Sashi Bhushan. (') In Appasami's case it was held that the
ticket
entitling the accused to enter the examination room was "property",
and in Sashi Bhushmi s case it was held that the term "property"
included a written certificate to the effect that the accused had attended
a course of lectures and had paid up his fees.
On a parity of reasoning, we have no doubt that looking to the importance and characteristics of a passport, the High Court rightly held that it was property
within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 of the Penal Code.
We may make a reference to lshwarlal Girdharlal Parekh v. State
of Maharashtra and others (') also.
There the question for consideration was whether an order of assessment was "property" within the
(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241.
(3) [18931!.L.R.15 All. 210.
(2) [1889] I.L.R. 12 Mad.151.
<4J [1969]1 s.~.193.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 3 S.C.R.
meaning of. section 420 I.P.C.
The charge in.that case was that the
appellant dishonestly or fradulently induced the income-true authorities
and obtained an assessment order for less income-tax than due. It
was held that the order of assessment received by an assessee was
"property", since it was of greau importance to the assessee, as containing a computation,' of his total assessable income and, as
containtion
of his tax liability.
This
Court
also
expressed
the
view that the word "property" did not necessarily mean that the
thing, of which delivery was dishonestly desired by the person who
cheats, "must have a money value or a market value, in the hand of
the person cheated". It was held that "even if the thing has ne money
value, in the hand of the person cheated, but becomes a thing of
value, in the hand of the person, who may get possession of it as a
result of the cheating practised by hini, it would still fall within the
connotation of the term 'property' in section 420 I.P.C." This decision
also lends support to the view we have taken for, as has been stated,
a passport is a valuable document.
Our attention has also been invited to In re Packianathan(') and
Local Government v. Gangaram.(2)
The accused in Packianathan's
case was prosecuted for an offence under section 419 read with section 511 of the Penal Code.
He was going to Ceylon, and he used
the permit which stood in the name of one Kumarswami, while his
own name was J. Packianathan.
On seeing the permit the Heaffl1
Officer issued a health certificate. It was held that the health certificate was "property" within the meaning of section 415 of the Penal
Code and that if a person dishonestly and fraudulently induced the
Health Officer to deliver it to him, he was guilty of an offence under
section 419 I.P.C. Local Government v. Gangaram was a case where
the accused obtained a certificate from the
Deputy
Inspector of
Schools by stating untruly that he .had passed the examination.
It was
held that the certificate was 'property' within the meaning of sections
415 and 420 I.P.C. and that the accused was guilty of an offence
punishable under section 420 I.P.C. In taking that view the Nagpur
High Court relied on Queen Empress v. Appasami (supra) and Queen
Empress v. Sashi Bhushan (supra) on which reliance was placed by
this Court in Abhayanand Mishra v.
The State of Bihar
(Supra)
referred to above.
So as passport was a tangible thing, and was a useful document,
and could be the subiect of ownership or exclusive possession, it was
"property" within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. There
is therefore nothing wrong with the view which has been taken by the
High Court and the appeal is hereby dismissed .. '_fhe appellants who
are on bail shall surrender to serve out the remammg sentence.
P.H.P.
(l) AI.R. 1920 Mad. 131 (1)
(2) A.LR. 1922 Nagpur 229.
Appeal dismissed.
...
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