# Oct. 8. 19&3 Minerva Mills Ltd v. Their Workers

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 465
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952-12-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to 143 and 156 and 157 of 1953
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan, B. K. MuKHERJEA an<l JAGANNADHADAS
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/oct-8-19-3-minerva-mills-ltd-v-their-workers-306
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Indnstrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7, 8, 10-Tribitnal canstit·11ted for fixed period-Oonstitittion of new tribimal for hearing
cases not fitlly disposed of by previoiis tribitnal-Legality-Powers
of State Government.
Under Section 7 of the Industria,l Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate Government has ample power to constitute an industrial
tribunal for a fixed period of time ancl to constitute a new tribunal
on the expiry of that period, to hear ancl dispose of all references
made to the previous tribunal whicb had not been disposed of by
that tribunal.

## Text

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s.o.:R.
SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
465
comport themselves with that dispassionate dignity
1953
and decorum which befits their high office and will Sukhdev Singh
bear in mind the oft quoted maxim that justice must
Sodhi
not only be done but must be seen to be done by all
v.
concerned and most particularly by an accused person The Chief Justice
who should always be given, as far as that is humanly and Judges of tltc
possible, a feeling of confidence that he will receive a
H.P;r;::Urt.
fair, just and impartial trial by judges who have no.
ig
personal interest or concern in his case.
Petition dismissed.
Agent for the petitioner: Ratnaparkhi Ananl
Gov·ind. ·
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
MINERVA MILLtl LTD.
v.
THEUt WORKERS.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, B. K. MuKHERJEA an<l
JAGANNADHADAS JJ.)
Indnstrial Disputes Act, 1947, ss. 7, 8, 10-Tribitnal canstit·11ted for fixed period-Oonstitittion of new tribimal for hearing
cases not fitlly disposed of by previoiis tribitnal-Legality-Powers
of State Government.
Under Section 7 of the Industria,l Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate Government has ample power to constitute an industrial
tribunal for a fixed period of time ancl to constitute a new tribunal
on the expiry of that period, to hear ancl dispose of all references
made to the previous tribunal whicb had not been disposed of by
that tribunal.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to
143 and 156 and 157 of 1953.
Appeals by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court by its Order dated the 23rd April, .1953, from the
.decision dated tile 19th December, 1952, of the Labour
Appellate Tribunal of India, Third Bench, Madras, in
Appeals Nos. Bom. 245/52, 246/52, 247/52 and 248/52.
'
1953
Oct. 8.
19&3
Minerva Mills
Ltd.
v.
Their Workers.
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[i954j
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, (J. B.
Dadachanji, with him) for the appellants in all the
appeals.
S. Mohan Kumaramangalam for the respondents in
Civil Appeals Nos. 140 to 143.
H. J. Umrigar for the respondents in Civil Appeals
Nos. 156 and 157.
1953. October 8.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
MAHAJAN J.-The Government of Mysore by a notification dated 15th June, 1951, under powers conferred
by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
constituted an Industrial Tribunal for a period of one
year consis~ing of a chairman and two members for
the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. It appointed the
following persons as chairman and members thereof:-
Chairman : Rajadharmaprasakta
T. t:lingaravelu Mudaliar.
Members : Janab Mohamed Sheriff.
Sri S. Rangaramiah.
Two disputes between the management and the
workers of the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore, and two
other disputes between the management and workers
of the Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.,
Bangalore, were referred to the said Industrial Tribunal under section 10 (1) (c) of the Act for adjudication.
Several other disputes were also referred for adjudication to the same tribunal. Till the 15th June, 1952,
when the period of one year expired, the tribunal had
only disposed of 5 out of the 22 disputes referred to
it. In the four disputes with which we are concerned
the tribunal had only framed issues and had riot proceeded to record any evidence.
· ..
On 27th:June, 1952, the Government·by another
notification constituted. another tribunal for adjudication of these disputes and. acting mider section 10
(1) (c) of the Act referrl)d all the disputes-.left .undisJ'Osetl Of by the first tribunal to the newly.constituted
+
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
tribunal.
This notification was not ·very happily
worded and has been the subject matter of a good
deal of comment in the courts below and also before
us. It runs thus :-
"Whereas under Notification No. L.S. 1075-L.W.
68-51-2, dated 15th June, 1951, an Industrial Tribunal
for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, was constituted for a period of one year,
And whereas the said period of one year has
expired creating a vacancy in the office of both the chairman and the two members, namely,
. Chairman : Sri T. Singaravelu Mudaliar
Members: Janab Mohamad Sheriff,
Sri S. Rangaramiah.
Now therefore in exercise of the power conferred
under sections 7 and 8 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, H.H. the Maharaja ofMysore is hereby pleased
to constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
of industrial disputes in the Mysore State in accordance with the provisions of the Act and further to
appoint the following persons as chairman and members thereof :
·
Chairman : Sri B. R. Ramalingiah.
Members: Janab Mohamed Sheriff.
Sri K. Shamaraja Iyengar.
Under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 194 7, H.H. the Maharaj a is pleased to direct that
the tribunal now constituted under this notification
shall hear and dispose of all the references made to the
previous tribunal constituted under the notification
of 15th June, 1951, and which have remained undisposed of on 15th June, 1952."
·
When the second tribunal proceeded to hear the
four disputes which are the subject matter of these
appeals, the employers raised a number of preliminary
.objections regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal to
hear and dispose of the disputes, the principal contentions being, (1) that. the time limit of one yea,r fi4ed
1963
Minerva Mills
Ltd.
v.
Their Workers.
Mahajan J,
468
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
[1954j
1963
3'linerva lr!ills
Ltd.
for the life of the first tribunal was unauthorized and
illegal and therefore the first tribunal continued to
exist in spite of the expiry of that period; (2) that
the Government could not withdraw the disputes
referred to the first tribunal from it, so long as the
members of the first tribunal were available for discharging their duties and that section 8 had no application to the facts .of this case; and (3) that the trial
of these disputes by .the newly constituted tribunal,
even if it had jurisdiction to entertain them, could not
be started from the stage at which they· were• left by
the first tribunal and should begin de novo.
v.
Their Workers.
31 ahaja·n J.
The employees contested these propositions and
contended that it was competent for the Government
to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals under
section 7 and it was open to it to prescribe that these
tribunals should function for a limited period ; that the
notification dated the 27th J·une, 1952, was valid both
under sections 7 and 8 of the Act and the second
tribunal was.properly constituted and had jurisdiction
over the disputes referred to it under section 10 ( 1) ( c)
of the Act and that there was no need for a de novo
trial in law.
The second tribunal rejected the preliminary objections raised by the employers and came to the conclusion thatthe Government was competent to constitute
the first tribunal for a limited period, that the second
tribunal was properly constituted and tha,t the references made were proper and could be proceeded with
from the stage at which the first tribunal had left them.
Against this order the employers preferred appeals to
the Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal, Nos. 245 to 248 of
19o2. They also filed writ applications under article.
226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court,
C.P. Nos. 79 and 80 of 1952-53, for the issue of writs of
prohibition prohibiting the second tribunal from pro- ·
ceeding with the adjudication of the four disputes,
the subject-matter of the appeals. The points that
arose for decision in the appeals as well as in the writ.
applications were substantially the same. In these
cirQumst,ances the High Court postponed hearing the
, .
,,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
writ applications till the appeals had been heard by the
Labour Appellate Tribunal.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order dated
19th December, 1952, dismissed all the appeals and
subsequently the High Court of Mysore by its order
dated 25th March, 1953, also dismissed the writ applications. It, however, granted the employers a certificate of leave to appeal to this court. The employers
filed applications for special leave to appeal against the
order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal passed in the
appeals before it, and this court granted special leave
to appeal by an order dated 23rd April, 1953. The
result is that we have four appeals now before us
against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
C.A. Nos. 140 to 143 of 1953 and two appeals before us
from the order of the High Court refusing the application of the employers under article 226 of the Constitution, C.A. Nos. 156 and 157 of 1953.
As all these appeals raise a common question oflaw
they can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment.
Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the employers,
contended that the four disputes between the
employers and employees that were referred to
the Industrial Tribunal constituted by the notification of 15th June, 1951, were still in law pending
before that tribunal and it was that tribunal
and that tribunal alone that could adjudicate on
them and give its award on them and that the second
tribunal constituted by the notification of 27th June,
1952, had no jurisdiction to entertain the references
or to give any awards concerning them. It was contended that under the Industrial Disputes Act there is
no power in the Government for appointing a tribunal
for a limited duration, and that its power is only
to constitute a tribunal and to refer certain disputes
to it.
It is said that in the provisions of the Act it is
implicit that a tribunal once appointed can cease to
function only after the references made to it have
bee11 exhausted, 1'..e., after it has given its award. It
1953
Minerva Milla
Ltd.
v.
Their Workers.
Mahajan J.
1953
M fnerva Mills
·Ltd,
v.
. Their TVorkers.
Mahajan J.
470
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
was further urged that there is no power in the
Government once it has made a reference under section 10 of the Act to withdraw it from the tribunal
and to hand it over to another tribunal. It was
suggested that the members of the first tribunal
should be directed to hear those references and to give
their award. In our opinion, none of these contentions
can be sustained on the provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows :
"The appropriate Government may constitute one
or more Industrial· Tribunals for the adjudication of
industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions
of this Act.
(2)
A tribunal shall consist of such number of
independent members as the appropriate Government
may think fit to appoint, and where the tribunal
consists of two or more members, one of them shall be
appointed as the chairman thereof.. .......... ".
Section 8 provides that if for any reason a vacancy
occurs in the office of the chairman or any other
member of a court or tribunal, the appropriate
Government shall, in the case of a chairman, and may,
in the case of any other member, appoint another
independent person, in accordance with the provisions
of section 6 or section 7, as the case may be, to fill the
vacancy, and the proceedings may be continued be·
fore the court or the tribunal so reconstituted. Section 7 does not restrict or limit the powers of the
Government in any manner and does not provide that
a tribunal cannot be constituted for a limited period
or for deciding a limited num her of disputes. From
the very nature and purpose for which Industrial
Tribunals are constituted it is quite clear that such
tribunals are not to be constituted permanently. It is
only when some industrial disputes arise that such
tribunals are constituted and normally such tribunals
function so long as the disputes referred to them are
not disposed of. But from this circumstance it cannot
be inferred that it is not open to the GoYernment to
fix a time limit for the life of these tribunals .in order
•
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•
S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUHT l{,EPORTS
471
to see that they function expeditiously and do not prolong their own existence by acting in a dilatory manner.
Mr. Daphtary, however, contended that though
the language of section 7 was wide enough to include
within its phraseology a power in the Government to
constitute tribunals for any period of time it thought
fit, this wide construction ofits language had been limited by the other provisions of the Act. He made reference to the provisions of section 4 which deals with conciliation officers. Sub-section (2) of section 4 provides
that a conciliation officer may be appointed for a
specified area or for specified industries in a specified
area or for one or more specified industries and either
permanently or for a limited period. It is obvious that
the nature of duties of conciliation officers being of a
different character, provision has been made that they
may be either appointed permanently or for a limited
period.
From these provisions it is difficult to infer
the same or a different intention regarding Industrial
Tribunals. '.l'hey may well be appointed ad hoc for a
particular dispute. It was for this reason that no
restriction was placed on the powers of Government
regarding the constitution of tribunals, and Government was given very wide discretion and it could
appoint them for any limited time or for a particular
case or cases as it thought fit and as the situation in a
particular area or a particular case demanded. l{eference was then made to the provisions of sections 15 to
20 of the Act for the proposition that once a reference
is made to a tribunal, the adjudication must be
concluded by that tribunal and that tribunal alone
must give the award, and that the life of the tribunal
cannot be cut short between the date of the reference
of the dispute for adjudication and the date of the
award. Section 15 provides that where an industrial
dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously
and. shall, as soon as practicable,
on
the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate
Government. \Ve u.re unable to see that any inference
6i
1953
Minerva Milla
Ltd.
v.
Their Worlcers.
Mahajan J.
19/;3
1Y.linerva Mills
Ltd.
v.
Their Workers.
Maha;'an J.
472
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
can be raised from the provisions of the section supporting the contention of Mr. Daphtary. This is a
provision directing the tribunal to function expeditiously and give its award as soon as possible.
Section 20( 3) is in these terms :-
"Proceedings before a tribunal shall be deemed to
have commenced on the date of the reference of dispute
for adjudication and such proceedings shall be deemed
to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A."
This section lays down the date or the terminus a
quo for the termination and commencement of the
proceedings. It is difficult to see that it in any way
cuts the power of the Government to appoint a tribunal for a limited duration. Reference was also made
to the provisions of section 33 which relate to the
conditions of service during the pendency of the proceedings in adjudication. It is provided therein that
there shall be no change in the conditions~ of service
of the workmen pending adjudication. In our opinion,
the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court
were right in holding that from these provisions it
could not be held that it was implicit in section 7 that
the Government could not withdraw a dispute referred
to a tribunal or make the appointment of a tribunal
for a limited period of time. In our opinion, under
the provisions of section 7, the appropriate Government has ample power of const.ituting a tribunal for a
limited time, intending thereby that its life would
automatically come to an end on the expiry of that
time.
The contention therefore of Mr. Daphtary that
the notification appointing the first tribunal for a
period of one year was illegal and that the first tribunal continues to exist is without force.
His further
contention that the Government could not withdraw
the dispute referred to the first tribunal so long as the
members of the first tribunal were available and could
not hand it over to the second tribunal· cannot also be
sustained.
,
·'
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'r HEPOR'l'S
473
Mr. Daphtary then contended that in any case the
1953
notification issued on 27th June, 1952, was defective and Minerva Mills
illegal and by its force the second tribunal was not pro.
Ltd.
perly constituted. Emphasis was laid on the words of
v.
the notification wherein it was said that on the expiry of Their Workers.
one year a vacancy in the office of both the chairman
and the two members had occurred and that in exercise
1l!ahajan J.
of the powers conferred by sections 7 and 8, H.H. the
Maharaja of Mysore was pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of industrial disputes
in the Mysore State in accordance with the provisions
of the Act and further to appoint the following persons
as chairman and members. It is true that this notification is not happily worded.
When the life of the
first tribunal automatically came to an end by efflux
of time, no question of vacancy in the office really
arose and it was _.1ot a case falling under sub-clause (2)
of section 8 but the situation that arose fell within the
ambit of Seetion 7. Substantially the notification must
be taken to have been made under Section 7 and in
express language it says that the Government is pleased
to constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of
industrial disputes in the Mysore State in accordance
with the provisions of the Act. Heferences to section 8
and to a vacancy in the notification are in the nature
of surplusages and are the result of confused thinking
on the part of those responsible for this notification.
The
last paragraph of the
notification makes
the matter clear beyond any doubt. It says that
under section 10 ( 1) ( c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
H. H. the Maharaja is pleased to direct that the tribunal now constituted under this notification shall hear
and dispose of all the references made to the previous
tribunal constituted under the notification of 15th June,
1951, and which have remained undisposed of on 15th
June, 1952. This notification does not say that this
new tribunal cannot hear the dispute de no'l{6r· If any
prejudice is caused to the employers, it wilhooe open to
the newly constituted tribunal to begin the liearing of
the disputes from the very first stage but as it is clear
that all that happened to these disputes when they,
were pending before the first tribunal was that only
1963
.. '\f inerva Mills
Ltd.
v.
Their Workers.
Mahajan J.
474
SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S
[1954]
issues were framed, and if any party has any objection
to those issues, it will be open to the newly constituted
tribunal to reframe those issues. The point was not
very much emphasized by Mr. Daphtary and is really
of academic interest.
l!'or the reasons given a hove, in our opinion, there is
no force in any one of these appeals.
All of them are
accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of
the case we make no order as to costs.
Appeals dismissed.
Agent for the appellants in all the appeals:
Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind.
Agent for the respondents in all the appeals:
S. Subramanian.
..
•'
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