# Octob1r a5. P. C. Joshi Qi Another v. The State of Uttar P1'adesh Shah ]

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 63
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-04-28
- **Bench:** J. C. Sn:e
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/octob1r-a5-p-c-joshi-qi-another-v-the-state-of-uttar-p1-adesh-shah-2010
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

-lo
Criminal Trial-Defamation of tublic seroam in respect of
public function-:-Complaint_ before Sessions J!"ge by Public Prosecutor-If reqrnred to be· signed by the public servant also-Code of
Criminal Procedure, x898 (V of x898); ss. x98 and x98-B ..
-I
The Public Prosecutor, Kanpur, filed a complaint in the
Cour.t ot'Session, Kanpur, charging the appellants with having
published a news item which was false and defamatory of the
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The complaint complied with
the requirements of s. x98-B, Code of ~rimtnal Procedure. 1:he
· appellants con~ended that the complamt should have co~phed
with the requirements of s. x98 of the Code also and, as it was .
T hallwr K esari
Singh
v.
The State of
Rajasthan
<So Others
Imam .J.
Octob1r a5.
P. C. Joshi
Qi.. Another
v.
The State of
Uttar P1'adesh
Shah ].
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
not signed by the Chief Minister, the Sessions Judge had no
jurisdiction to entertain it.
·
.
Held, that it was not necessary for the Chief Minister also
to sign the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor. The nonobstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in this
Code " in sub-s. (1) of s. 198-B excludes the operation of the
other provisions of the Code relating to initiation and trial of
the offence of defamation, including s. 198. Sub-section (13) of
s. 198-B which provides that the provisions of s. 198-B shall be
in addition to and not in derogation of s. 198 merely preserves
the rig ht of the person defamed to file a complaint under s. 198.
The two sections provide alternative remedies. The provisions
in s. 198-B relating to the award of compensation to the accused
in case of false and frivolous or vexatious accusation do not
affect this conclusion. Normally it is the public servant who
moves the Government for taking proceedings and under subs. (5) he is required to be examined as a witness to support the
prosecution, and it cannot be said that he has no concern with
the lodging of a complaint under s. 198-B.
C. B. L. Bhatnag"" v. Tiu State, A.I.R. 1958 l3om. 196 and
R. Sankar v. The State, I.L.R. (1959) Kerala 195, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JUBISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 130 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave ·from the judgment and
order dated April 28, 1960, of the Allahabad High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 18615 of 1959.
N. 0. Ohatterjee, D .. P. Singh, T. S. Venkataraman,
R. K. Garg, S. 0. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi,
for the appellants.
G. S. Pathak, G. 0. Mathur and O. P. Lal, for the
respondent.
1960. October 25. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SHAH J.-Appellant No. 1 is the editor and appellant No. 2 is the printer and publisher of the "New
Age "-an English Weekly news sheet published in
Delhi. On May 15, 1959, the Public Prosecutor, Kanpur, filed a complaint in the Court of Session, Kanpur,
against the appellants charging them with having
published a news item in the issue of the " New Age "
dated November 16, 1958, knowing or having good
reasons to believe the same to be false and defa.ma..-
tory of the Chief Miniater of the State of Utta.r Pradesh " in order to ha.rm his reputation in the eyes of
I -
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
the public in genera.I a.nd among hi.s acquaintances in
particular". With this complaint was filed a.n order
under the signature of the Home Secretary to the
Government of Uttar Pradesh sanctioning under
s. 198B(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code the filing of a complaint by the Public Prosecutor for a.n
offence under s. 500, Indian Penal Code, against the
appellants in respect of the news item published on
November 16, 1958, under the caption "Explosive
situation in Kanpur". The learned Sessions Judge
toqk cognisance of the complaint. After six witnesses
were examined on behalf of the prosecution, he framed a charge against the appellants for the offence of
defamation in that they had published the news item
under the caption " Explosive situation in Kanpur "
intending to ha.rm or knowing that they

## Text

/
.2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
63
for larger sums than what were legitimately due to
him. It is contended that on these facts it could not
be said that there was a general refu&al to pay rent
within the meaning of s. 85 of the. Tenancy Act.
Hence, it is said that the Notification was vltra vires
the section &t)d inoperative. We do not think that
the tenants can be allowed to raise this point in this
Court. It does not appear to have been raised in
the High Court~ The High Court's judgment makes no
mention of it. Whether it is open for a Court to go
behind the notification issued under s. 85 and decide
its validity or not, this contention of the tenants raises
a question of fact as to how many tenants bad refused
to pay rent. It also raises a question of interpret&.
tion of the words "general refusal to pay " in s. 85.
None of these questions was raised at any earlier
stage. We are therefore, not inclined to allow the
tenants to raise them now.
In the result we allow the appeal with costs here·
and below.
Appeal allowed.
P. C. JOSHI AND ANOTHER
"·
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(S. K. D.&s and J. C. Sn:e:, JJ.)
-lo
Criminal Trial-Defamation of tublic seroam in respect of
public function-:-Complaint_ before Sessions J!"ge by Public Prosecutor-If reqrnred to be· signed by the public servant also-Code of
Criminal Procedure, x898 (V of x898); ss. x98 and x98-B ..
-I
The Public Prosecutor, Kanpur, filed a complaint in the
Cour.t ot'Session, Kanpur, charging the appellants with having
published a news item which was false and defamatory of the
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The complaint complied with
the requirements of s. x98-B, Code of ~rimtnal Procedure. 1:he
· appellants con~ended that the complamt should have co~phed
with the requirements of s. x98 of the Code also and, as it was .
T hallwr K esari
Singh
v.
The State of
Rajasthan
<So Others
Imam .J.
Octob1r a5.
P. C. Joshi
Qi.. Another
v.
The State of
Uttar P1'adesh
Shah ].
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
not signed by the Chief Minister, the Sessions Judge had no
jurisdiction to entertain it.
·
.
Held, that it was not necessary for the Chief Minister also
to sign the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor. The nonobstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in this
Code " in sub-s. (1) of s. 198-B excludes the operation of the
other provisions of the Code relating to initiation and trial of
the offence of defamation, including s. 198. Sub-section (13) of
s. 198-B which provides that the provisions of s. 198-B shall be
in addition to and not in derogation of s. 198 merely preserves
the rig ht of the person defamed to file a complaint under s. 198.
The two sections provide alternative remedies. The provisions
in s. 198-B relating to the award of compensation to the accused
in case of false and frivolous or vexatious accusation do not
affect this conclusion. Normally it is the public servant who
moves the Government for taking proceedings and under subs. (5) he is required to be examined as a witness to support the
prosecution, and it cannot be said that he has no concern with
the lodging of a complaint under s. 198-B.
C. B. L. Bhatnag"" v. Tiu State, A.I.R. 1958 l3om. 196 and
R. Sankar v. The State, I.L.R. (1959) Kerala 195, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JUBISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 130 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave ·from the judgment and
order dated April 28, 1960, of the Allahabad High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 18615 of 1959.
N. 0. Ohatterjee, D .. P. Singh, T. S. Venkataraman,
R. K. Garg, S. 0. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi,
for the appellants.
G. S. Pathak, G. 0. Mathur and O. P. Lal, for the
respondent.
1960. October 25. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SHAH J.-Appellant No. 1 is the editor and appellant No. 2 is the printer and publisher of the "New
Age "-an English Weekly news sheet published in
Delhi. On May 15, 1959, the Public Prosecutor, Kanpur, filed a complaint in the Court of Session, Kanpur,
against the appellants charging them with having
published a news item in the issue of the " New Age "
dated November 16, 1958, knowing or having good
reasons to believe the same to be false and defa.ma..-
tory of the Chief Miniater of the State of Utta.r Pradesh " in order to ha.rm his reputation in the eyes of
I -
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
65
the public in genera.I a.nd among hi.s acquaintances in
particular". With this complaint was filed a.n order
under the signature of the Home Secretary to the
Government of Uttar Pradesh sanctioning under
s. 198B(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code the filing of a complaint by the Public Prosecutor for a.n
offence under s. 500, Indian Penal Code, against the
appellants in respect of the news item published on
November 16, 1958, under the caption "Explosive
situation in Kanpur". The learned Sessions Judge
toqk cognisance of the complaint. After six witnesses
were examined on behalf of the prosecution, he framed a charge against the appellants for the offence of
defamation in that they had published the news item
under the caption " Explosive situation in Kanpur "
intending to ha.rm or knowing that they were likely to
harm the reputation of the Chief Minister of Uttar
Pradesh. The appellants then applied to the High
Court of Judicature at Alla.ha.bad praying that the
order of the Court of Session framing a charge for the
offence of defamation be set aside. They submitted
that there was no evidence that . the Home Secretary
to the Government of Uttar Pradesh had applied his
mind to the facts of: the case before sanctioning prosecution of the appellants; that in any event, the publication ·was not defamatory of the Chief Minister in
respect of his conduct in the discharge of his duties as
Chief Minister an<l that the complaint filed by the
Public Prosecutor not having been signed by the Chief
Minister who was the aggrieved person, the Sessions
Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
The High Court rejected all the contentions raised
by the appellants. Against the order rejecting the
contentions, this appeal with special leave under Art.
136 of the Constitution is preferred by the appellants.
We may state that the observations made by the
High Court that whether the publication of the news
item in the issue of the "New Age" dated November
16, 1958, under the ca.pti_on " Explosive situation in
Kanpur " was defamatory of the Chief Minister in
respect of his conduct in the discharge of his duties
9
P. C. Joshi
& Another
v.
The State of
flttar Prades/1
Shah j.
P. C. ]osli
& .Attolll11
v.
Tlt.1 Slot• of
Utt•• Prodesh
ShaA J,
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
as Chief Minister were made only for the purpose of
deciding the application in revision submitted to them
and were not intended to record a final decision as to
the defamatory character of that publication. It
will be for the Trial Judge when the case is tried
before him to arrive at a oonclusioil on the materials
placed before him whether the publication is defamatory of the Chief Minister in respect of his conduct in
the discharge of his public functions.
The plea that the eanction was accorded by the
Home Secretary to the filing of the complaint without
applying his mind is without substance. Siddiqi, an
allllistant in the Home Department to the Government
· of Uttar Pradesh, has deposed that he had received
the papers in connection with the . sanction for the
prosecution of the two appellants from ~he Superintendent, Home Department, with" notings ",that he
had taken the "notings " and the relevant papers
including the offending issue to the Deputy Secretary,
that the Deputy Secretary had also made his note on
those papers, and that thereafter he-the witnesshad taken those papers to M. G. Kaul, Home Secretary, who had perused the" notings" and the note of
the Deputy Secretary as also the. article in question
and after looking into the papers had approved the
draft sanction.
It is not disputed that the Home Secretary was
authorised to sanction a complaint for defamation of
a Minister of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The
evidence clearly discloses that the Home Secretary
had applied his mind to all the material facts before
him and had then granted the sanction. Mere production of a document whioh sets out the names of
the persons to be prosecuted and the provisions of
the statute alleged to be contravened, and purporting
to bear the signature of an officer competent to grant
the sanction where such sanction is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not invest
the court with jurisdiction to try the offence. If the
facts which constitute the charge do not appear on
the face of the sanction, it must be established by
extraneous evidence that those fa.eta were placed
_,I
/
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
67
before the authority competent to grant the sanction
and that the authority applied his mind to those facts
before giving sanction. In the present case, the facts
constituting the charge appear on the face of the
sanction ; and evidence has also been led that the
facts were placed before the sanctioning authority,
that, the authority considered the facts and sanctioned
the prosecution.
•
Section 198B which deals with a certain category
of the offences of defamation of high dignitaries of
the State, and of Ministers and public servants in
respect of their conduct in the discharge of public
functions was incorporated in the Code by Act XXVI
of 1955. Prior to the incorporation of s. 198B, the
only condition precedent to the entertainment of a
complaint of defamation by a court CODlpetent in that
behalf was prescribed by s. 198, viz., that there had
to be a complaint by the person aggrieved before the
eourt took cognisance of that offence. By s. 198B,
several conditions precedent to the trial of offences
falling within that section are prescribed. The
material clauses of s. 198B are sub-es. (1), (3) and (4).
(1) :- " notwithstanding anything cootained in this
Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI
of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) (other
than the offence of defamation by spoken words) is
alleged to have been committed against the President
or the Vice-President, or the Governor or Rajpramukh
of a State, or a :Minister or any other -public servant
employed in connection with the affairs of the Union
or of a State, in respect of his conduct in the discharge
of bis public functions, a Court of Session may take
cognisance o~ such offence, without the accused being
committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing
made by the Public Prosecutor.
(3) :-No complaint under sub-s. (l) shall be made by
the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction,-
,
(a) in the case of the President or the Vice-President
or the Governor of a State, of any Secretary to the
Government authorised by him i~ this behalf;
1960
P. C. Joshi
6- Anollltr
v.
Th• Slat• of
Ullar Pradesh
Shah J.
P. C. Joshi
b Anothel'
v.
The State· of
Uttar Pradesh
Shah J.
•
68
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[1961]
(b) in the case of a Minister of tho Central Government or of a State Government, of the Secretary to
the Council of Ministers, if any, or of any Secretary to
the Government authorised in this behalf by the
Government concerned; (c) in the case of any other
public servant employed in connection with the affairs
of the Union or of a State, of the Government concerned.
(4) :-No Court of Sessio1_1 shall take cognisance of
an offence under sub.s. (I) unless the complaint is
made within six months from the date on which the
offence is alleged to have been committed.
This section provides for a special procedure for tho
trial ·of the offence of defamation of certain specified
classes of persons. The conditions necessary for the
applicability of sub-a. (I) of s. 198B are:
(1) that the defamation is not by spoken words ;
(2) that the offence is alleged to have been committed against the President, or the Vice-President, or the
Governor or Rajpramukh of a State, or a Minister or
any other public servant employed in connection with
the affairs of the Union or of a State;
(3) that the defamation is in respect of the person
defamed in the discharge of his public functi_ons;
(4) that a complaint is made in writing by the
Public Prosecutor;
(5) that the complaint is made by the Public Prosecutor with the previous sanction of the authorities
specified in sub-s. (3); and
(6) that the complaint is made within six months
from the date on which the offence is committed.
The Court of Session may entertain a complaint of
defamation of the high dignitaries and of Ministers
and public servants in respect of their conduct in the
discharge of their public functions only if these conditions exist. Section 198 requires that a complaint for
defamation may be initiated by the person aggrieved
and no period of limitation is prescribed in that behalf. Such a complaint can only be entertained by a
Magistrate of the First Class. But s. 198-B in the
larger public interest, has made a departure from that
rule; the accusation ·is to be entertained not by a
I
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
69
Mitgistrate, but by the Court of Session without a
committal within six months of the date of the offence
on a complaint in writing by the Public Prosecutor
with the previous sanction of the specified authorities.
It is manifest that by the non-obstante clause, " notwithstanding anything contained in this Code" in
sub-s. (1), the operation of diverse provisions of the
Code relating to the initiation and trial of the offence
of defamation is excluded and prime. facie s. 198 is
one of those provisions. It is however urged on behalf
of the appellants that sub.s. (13) of s. 198-B makes
the provisions of s. 198 applicable to a complaint for
defamation of persons specified ins. 198-B(J) and provides that cognisance of the offence of defa.n111tion
cannot be taken by a court except upon a complaint
by the person aggrieved, and that the Chief Minister
of Utta.r Pradesh alleged to be the party aggrieved
uot having signed the complaint the Court of Session,
Kanpur, had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the
complaint. Sub-section (13) provides th~t "the provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in
derogation of, those of s. 198 ". In our judgment, this
clause is enacted with a view to state ex abundanti cautela that the right of a party aggrieved by publication of
a defamatory statement to proceed undeP s. 198 is not
derogated by the enactment of s. 198-B. The expressions, "in addition to" and "not in derogation of"
mean the same thing-thats. 198-B is an additional
provision and is not intended to take a.wa.y the right of
a person aggrieved even if he belongs t.o the specified
classes and the offence is in respect of his conduct in
the discharge of his public functions, to· file a complaint in the manner provided by s. 198. " Derogation" means, taking away, lessening or impairing the
authority, position or dignity, and the context in
in which sub-s. (13) occurs clearly shows that the
provisions of s. 198-B do not impair. the remedy
provided by s. 198. It means that by s. 198-B the
right which an aggrieved person has to file.a complaint before a Magistrate under s. 198 for the
offence of defamation, even if the aggrieved person
belongs to the specified classes and the defamation
P. C. Joshi
& Another
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Shah ].
P. C. Jo&hi
c£. A"olAer
v.
The 5141• of
V ttar Prod1sA
Shh J.
70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
is in respect of his conduct in the discharge of
hie public functions, is not taken away or impaired.
If sub-a. (13) be construed as meaning that the provi.
eions of a. 198B are to be read as supplementary to
those of s. 198, the non-obstante clause with which
sub-s. (1) of s.198B commences is rendered wholly
sterile, and unleBB the context compels such an interpretation, the court will not be justified in adopting it.
There is again inherent indication in ss. 198and 198B,
which supports the view thats. 198B was not intended
to be supplementary to s. 198, but was intended to
provide an alternative remedy in the case of defama.
tion of persona set out in that section. The expression "complaint" as defined in s. 4, cl. (h) of the Code
means "the allegation made orally or in writing to a
Magidrate with a view to his taking action under this
Code that some person, whether known or unknown,
has committed an offence ...... ". Every complaint of
an offence has to be made to a Magistrate competent
to take cognisance thereof and not to a Court of
Session. A Court.of Session under the Code of Crimi.
nal Procedure unless otherwise expressly provided, is
not competent to entertain a complaint; it can only
try a criminal case committed to it. The expression
" complaint" in a. 198 is manifestly used in the
meaning as defined by s. 4(h). Even a superficial
examination of the contention raised by the appellants
reveals that if effect be given to it, the utmost confu.
sion would result in working out the provisions of the
Code. If beside the complaint filed by the Public
Prosecutor under a. 198B, there must also be a com.
plaint by the person aggrieved, two courts would
simultaneously be seized of two distinct complaints
for the same offence. The complaint by the Public
Prosecutor under s. 198B would undoubtedly lie in the
Court of Session and the complaint under s. 198 would
lie in the court of a Magistrate, because it is a Magistrate who alone can take cognisance of the offence of
defamation under s. 198. Thereafter, the complaint
under s. 198 may have to be committed to the Court
of Session by the Magistrate and it is only after the
case is committed to the Court of Session that on the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
71
complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor, the case may
proceed. The Legislature could not have intended
that in respect of the same offence, there should he
two complaints, one in the Court of Session and
another in the court of a Magistrate-and either both
should be tried, or the proceedings should be consolidated after committal.
Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants
upon sub-as. (6) to 11 of s. 198B which provide for the
award of compensation to the person accused if the
court is satisfied that the accusation is false and
either frivolous or vexatious, and it was submitted
that the Legislature could not have intended that a
person who was not the complaina.nt and who was not
directly concerned with the proceedings may still be
required if so ordered by the court to pay compensation. But sub-s. (5) which provides that a person
against whom the offence is alleged to have been
committed shall, unless the court for reasons to be
recorded otherwise directs, be examined as a witness
for the prosecution, clearly indicates that the question
whether the complaint was false and either frivolous
or vexatious may fall to be determined only if the
person complaining to be defamed actively supports
the complaint. It cannot therefore be said thats. 198~
provides for compensation being awarded against a
person who is not concerned with the complaint.
Section 198B is enacted to provide machinery-for
vindicating the conduct of high dignitaries, Ministers
and public servants when they are exposed to defamatory attacks. The section contemplates the institution
of proceedings for defamation of two different classes
of persons, (1) high dignitaries like the President, the
Vice-President, the Governors and Rajpramukhs and
(2) Ministers and public servants. it is not disputed
that a provision which enables a prosecution to be
launched by the State, and at State expense for defamation of members of the first class, having regard
to their status in public life, is pre-eminently designed
in the public interest, and it would be entirely appropriat.e that any question of a.warding compensation
should be raised, even if the complaint for defamation
P. C. Joshi
& Another·
v.
The Slate of
U ttar Pradesh
Shah j.
72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
be found to be false and frivolous or vexatious.
There can be no doubt that in a. democratic set up,
:· ~~!.~:!;
in order to maintain purity of public behaviour and
v.
administration, charges of improper conduct against
r960
The State of . persons in the second class, in so far as. such charges
Uttar Pradesh relate to the discharge of their public functions should
Shah J.
be investigated. It is also in the public interest that
in vindicating his character or conduct, the person
defamed should not ordinarily be called upon to bear
the burden of what may turn out an expensive and
long drawn out proceeding, nor for obvious reasons
ahoulrl he have control over the proceeding. In the
vindication of the character or conduct of a private
individual who is defamed, the State is primarily not
concerned : the party aggrieved may, if he is so
minded, take proceedings for obtaining relief.
But
in the investigation of defamatory charges against
Ministers and public servants in the discharge of their
public functions, the State is as vitally concerned as
the individual defamed. The Legislature has therefore authorised the State to take upon itself the power
in appropriate cases to prosecute the offenders. But
lest this procedure be abused, provision has been
made for the examination of the person defamed and
for awarding against him compensation if it be found
that the complaint was false and frivolous or vexatious. Normally, a Minister or a public servant defamed
in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public
functions would himself move the Government under.
which he functions for ta.king proceedings for vindicating his character or conduct. The complaint eo ·
nomine in cases under a. 198B, is undoubtedly the
Public Prosecutor, but the complaint may, when the
person defamed is a. Minister or a public servant, properly be regarded a.a filed a.t the instance of such
Minister or public servant. He has in any case to support the accusation by evidence, and his conduct is
exposed to judicial scrutiny. In this context, it would
be difficult to hold that a person who has either been
instrumental in the initiation of a. complaint, or in
any event has to support it by his evidence, ha.a no
concern with the lodging of the complaint. The court
I
•
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
73
would obviously award compensation only if it is satisfied that the claim made by the person posing to be
aggrieved is false and either frivolous or vexatious.
Section 198B does not provide that before taking
cognisance of a complaint, the complaint shall be
signed by any person other than the Public Prosecutor. In terms, it contemplates a complaint ih writing
by the Public Prosecutor and of no one else and it
would be an unwarranted addition to sub-s. (1) of the
words " and also by the person aggrieved " if the contention urged on behalf of the appellants were accepted. The Legislature not having chosen to provide
that the complaint of the Public Prosecutor shall also
be signed by the person aggrieved, we will not be
justified in the absence of compelling reasons to so
hold.
The observation made by Mr. Justice Bavdekar in
0. B. L. Bhatnagar v. The State (1) "What s. 198B(l3)
......... means~ ..... is that any complaint which may ·be
made under s. 198B muitt also satisy the provisions of
s. 198, that is, the complaint will have to. be made
both by the persob aggrieved, and by the Public Prosecutor'', and by Mr. Justice Raman Nayar in
R. Sanker v. The State (9) that a complaint by a person
aggrieved is not dispensed with even in regard to
cases falling under s. 198B, do not, in our judgment,
correctly interpret sub-s. (13) of s. ,198B.
In the view taken by us, this appeal must fail and
is dismissed.
.Appeal dismissed.
(I) A.I.a. 1958 Boin. 196.
(2) I.L.lt. (1959) Kerala 195,
IO
P. C. ] os/li
& Another
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
S/lah ].