# October 3 NIRANJAN SINGH v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 734
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1955-08-04
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals Nos. 60 and 61 of 1956
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, Jafer Imam, S. K. Das, Govinda Menon
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/october-3-niranjan-singh-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-1261
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Criminal lrial-In,,.sligation of crime-Police Reg1tlationsOase diaty-S1tbminion of t/r.t -case diar11 I<> superior officers da11 to
da11-0ontra11ention of t/r.t rule-Whether it vitiates the trial-Utl<>r
Pradeah Polict Regulation•, r. 109.
Rule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with
the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an
investigation is closed for the day- to note the time and place at
which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investi·
gation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of
Police on all days on which any proceedings are takep.
The question that bad to be decided by the court was as to
whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the
prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.
It was found that the investigating officer did not send the case
diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at
the end of the period of investigation. It was contended for the ap·
pellants that the case diary could not be relied upon ae it enabled
the officer to make alteration• during the course of the period of
investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of
(1) [1950) S.0 R. 886; [1950] I.T.R. 472.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
the UUar Pradesh Police Regulations which had resulted in prejudice, the whole trial was vitiated thereby.
Held: (1) Rule 109 of the mtar Pradesh Police Regulations has
no statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the executive
Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their
work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation and
a failure to comply with the rule relating to the submis~ion of the
police diary cannot vitiate the trial.
Hafiz Mohammad Sani and others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1931
Patna 150), approved.
Observations in Tilkeshwar Singh and others v. Tht State of
Bihar ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 1043), followed.
(2) It could not be said in the absence of compelling reasons
that because the investigating officer did not send the case diary to
the superior officers every day the same is unworthy of credit particularly in view of the fact that the courts below have cast no doubt
upon its genuin~ness.

## Text

734
SUPREME CQURT REPORTS
[1956]
1956
course of the argument, and the appellant did not
even ask for this question being referred. That apart,
Meenokshi Mills,
,
.
f h d
C
,/ J
Madurai
m view o t e ecision in ommisBioner oJ
ncome-tax
v.
v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.('), no purpose would
Th• Commissioner be served by directing a reference of this question,
o/ lncome·ta:r,
and the Tribunal was right in observing that "it is
Madra•
not even of academic interest to refer the said quesv ... katarama
tion to the High Court". On the question whether
Ayyar J.
the fixation of ratio was correct, we are of opinion
that it is a pure question of fact, and is not open to
reference under section 66(1).
In the result, the appeals fail, and are dismissed
with costs.
-
1956
October 3
NIRANJAN SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(and connected appeal)
[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and
GOVINDA MENON JJ.)
Criminal lrial-In,,.sligation of crime-Police Reg1tlationsOase diaty-S1tbminion of t/r.t -case diar11 I<> superior officers da11 to
da11-0ontra11ention of t/r.t rule-Whether it vitiates the trial-Utl<>r
Pradeah Polict Regulation•, r. 109.
Rule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with
the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an
investigation is closed for the day- to note the time and place at
which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investi·
gation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of
Police on all days on which any proceedings are takep.
The question that bad to be decided by the court was as to
whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the
prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.
It was found that the investigating officer did not send the case
diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at
the end of the period of investigation. It was contended for the ap·
pellants that the case diary could not be relied upon ae it enabled
the officer to make alteration• during the course of the period of
investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of
(1) [1950) S.0 R. 886; [1950] I.T.R. 472.
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
735
the UUar Pradesh Police Regulations which had resulted in prejudice, the whole trial was vitiated thereby.
Held: (1) Rule 109 of the mtar Pradesh Police Regulations has
no statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the executive
Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their
work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation and
a failure to comply with the rule relating to the submis~ion of the
police diary cannot vitiate the trial.
Hafiz Mohammad Sani and others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1931
Patna 150), approved.
Observations in Tilkeshwar Singh and others v. Tht State of
Bihar ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 1043), followed.
(2) It could not be said in the absence of compelling reasons
that because the investigating officer did not send the case diary to
the superior officers every day the same is unworthy of credit particularly in view of the fact that the courts below have cast no doubt
upon its genuin~ness.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeals Nos. 60 and 61 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 4, 1955, of the Allahabad High
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955 and Referred No. 31 of 1955 with connected Criminal Appeals
Nos. 299 and 307 of 1955 arising out of the judgment
and order dated February 28, 1955, of the Court of
Sessions Judge, Meerut in Criminal Sessions Trial No.
142of1954.
Jai Gopal Sethi, S. 0. Saran and G. 0. Mathur,
for appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956.
J. N. Bannerji and P. 0. Agarwala, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956.
H.J. Umrigar and 0. P. Lal, for the respondents
in both Appeals.
1956. October 3. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GovINDA MENON J.-On September 6, 1955, this
court granted the appellants herein, special leave to
appeal under art. 136( I) of the Constitution from the
judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the
1956
N ira11jan Sit1gh
".
Tiie State of
Uttar Pradesh
1956
Niranjan SittgTi
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Govinda Menon J.
736
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956)
Allahabad High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of
1955 (Reference No. 31 of 1955) connected with
Criminal Appeals Nos. 299 and 307of1955, limited tci
the question whether the failure to comply with the
rules relating to the submission of the police case
diary, vitiates the entire trial and what the consequences of such failure are. It is in pursuance to the
leave so granted, that Criminal Appeal No. 60 ofl956,
has been preferred by accused Nos. 4, 7, 1, :t, 5·& 2
(Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal
Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in
Sessions Trial No. 142of1954, in the court of Session
at Meerut and Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956, is
preferred by accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) in the
same Sessipns trial. Appellants 1 to 3 in Criminal
Appeal No. 60 ofl956 (accused Nos. 4, 7 & I, Niranjan
Singh, Tikam Singh and Kharak Singh) have been
sentenced to the extreme penalty of the law and the
remaining appellants in that appeal sentenced to imprisonment for life.
The appellant (accused No. 6)
in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, has also been sentenced to
death.
On the night between February 28, and March 1,
1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh
in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty
dacoits took part and considerable property was
looted and taken away by the dacoit.s. During the
course of this incident four ruem be rs of the family of
Atal Singh, including himself, were shot dead and
another received gun-shot wounds as a result of which
he died subsequently in the hospital. Four other
members of the family received gun-shot wounds and
incised wounds at the hands of the dacoits but they
survived as a result of treatment. in the hospital.
The prosecution case was that among the dacoits
who took part were the seven appellants in these two
appeals, as well as two others; and of them accused
No. I (Kharak Singh), accused No. 4 (NiranjanSingh),
accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) and accused No. 7
(Tikam Singh) were armed with guns and as such were
responsible for the shooting and murders. The two
others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias
-
-
'
s.c.~.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
1956
Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos. 8 & 9 respectively in the court of Sessions, were acquitted by the
h
N iranjan Singh
learned Sessions Judge, who, after an analysis of t e
v.
large volume of evidence, found that all the appellants
The state of
herein were guilty of an offence under s. 396 of the
Uttar Pradesh
Indian Penal Code and sentenced accused Nos. l,4,6
-
and 7 (Kharak Singh, Niranjan Singh, Udaibir Singh Govinda Meno,.J.
and Tikam Singh) to death and accused Nos. 2, 3 & 5
(Satpal Singh, Harpal Singh and Sardar Singh) to
imprisonment for life as herein before mentioned. On
appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.) confirmed
the convictions and sentences and diSmissed the appeals. As stated already, leave to appeal to this court
under art. 136 was granted restricted to the question
outlined by us at the beginning.
The prosecution case is that the village of Akheypur is a factious one in which one Narain Singh,
the brother of the 4th accused, was the leader of one
party and Atal Singh, one of the deceased, was the
leader of the other. Consequently the dacoity and
murders in the house of Atal Singh took place as a
matter of revenge. Shortly stated, the case put forward on behalf of the prosecution is that the appellants and others, some of whom were armed with
guns, raided the house of Atal Singh on the night in
question. The inmates of the house and others were
inflicted injuries and the dacoits after looting the
house carried away valuable property. It is not
suggested that if the facts spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, who are eye-witnesses, are true, then
an offence under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code has
not been amply proved; but the only question is whether the appellants took part in the crime.
That a dacoity took place in the house of Atal
Singh admits of no doubt and the appellants do not
deny the occurrence, but it is the case of accused
Nos. 4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that
while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the
other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the
house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object
1956
Niranjan Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Govinda Jllenon J.
738
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
of giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the
house and it was they who opened fire from that
place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their
heels as a result of the firing, and that after the
dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well
as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where
Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to
go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.
It is
further alleged that both of them went to Kithore
police station and reported the occurrence to the SubInspector Dalbir Singh (P. W. 28) who was in charge
of the police station and on the direction given by
him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information. In short, the defence is that
these two accused were good Samaritans who tried to
help the family of Atal Singh in their hour of dire
need and not the assailants.
The other appellants
denied the charge.
It is not necessary, in view of the concurrent eonclusions arrived at by the trial court and by the
learned Judges of the High Court, to restate with any
elaboration the details of the incident which culminated in the dacoity and murders. In addition to the
corroborating pieces of evidence, there are eye-witnesses who have identified some or all the accused at
the scene of crime, and it may also be stated that
some of them had received injuries at the hands of the
miscreants.
We have also a dying declaration, Exhibit P·50,
recorded by P.W. 20, a Magistrate, who also had recorded the statements of Ganga Saran (P. W. 2) and
Ranbir (P.W. 18) when they were in a serious condition, anticipating that they might not survive the
injuries but which t.hey fortunately did.
The earliest information of the crime· (Ex. P. I)
was given by Samey Singh (P.W. I) at the Police
Station Kithore at about 2 a.m. on March I, 1954. It
does not contain any details of the incident and is
confined to the statement that a dacoity was being
committed. at the house of Atal Singh in the village
and that the informant had rushed from the village
-
--
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
739
for making a report. That guns were being fired has
also been recorded in it. P.W. 28 Dalbir Singh, who
was Sub-Inspector of Police and the Station House
Officer of Police Station Kithore at that time, received
the information and reached the scene of dacoity at
about 2-30 a.m., whereupon Jhamel Kaur (P.W. 4)
handed over to him the list of the looted property
(Ex. P. 2). According to this witness, he immediately
examined P. W. 2 and other witnesses on the spot and
recorded their statements. The injured persons were
sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the
dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh
and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses. Between 2-30 a.m. and 7 or 7-30 a.m., P.W. 28, according to him, did a considerable amount of work, such
as recording the statements of all the available witnesses, sending the injured persons to the hospital
after taking their statements, holding inquests over
the dead bodies, inspecting the scene of dacoity,
finding lead shots and wads there, and taking such
things into custody, etc. By about 7 or 7-30 a.m. the
Senior Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other police officials reached
the place of incident on hearing of the dacoity and
by the time of their arrival, according to P. W. 28,
he had finished the preliminary work. He also deposes that the parchas of the case diary for the period
between March 1 and March 7, 1954, were sent all
together to the Superintendent of Police only on
March 7, and not as is enjoined by the rules every
day as and when the day's recording is complete. We
shall advert to the arguments of the learned counsel
about this circumstance at a later stage .
The prosecution case depends, mainly if not solely,
on the identification of the various accused persons
by some or all of the prosecution witnesses, in addition to the dying declaration Exhibit P. 50 and the
corroborating statements of P.W. 2, (vide Exhibit
P. 49) and P.W. 18 (vide Exhibit P. 48).
We may here summarise in very short-outline the
details of identification by the witnesses. P. W. 2
Ganga Saran identified accused Nos. I, 3, 4, 5 and 7
V6
1956
Niranjau Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Grwind a Men on /.
1956
Niranjan Singh
v.
The State of
UUar Pradesh
Govinda Menon J.
740
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
(Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar
Singh and Tikam Singh). Dharam Singh P. W. 3
identified accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) among the
dacoits and also deposes that Atal Singh told him
that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had shot him with
a gun. P. W. 4 Mst. Jhamel Kaur, in addition to
giving a list of the looted property (Exhibit P. 2),
identified accused Nos. 2 & 6 (Satpal Singh and
Udaibir Singh). P. W. 5 (Richpal Singh) states that,
among the dacoits, there were accused Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6
and 7 (Satpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh,
Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh). P. W. 7 (Om Pal)
found among the dacoits accused Nos. 2, 6 and 7. The
deposition of P:W. 9 is to the effect that he identified
accused No. 6 (UdaibiI Singh) and also that Atal
Singh told him that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had
shot him. P. 'vV. 10 Jagbir Singh identified accused
No. I (Kharak Singh). All the appellants before us
were identified by P. W. II (Ganga Bal), and P. W.
18 (Ranbir) was able to identify accused No. 6
Udaibir Singh. The result of the above analysis is
that each one of the accused bas been identified by
one or more of the prosecution witnesses. Accused
No. I (Kharak Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W.
10 and P. W. 11; accused No. 2 (Sat pal Singh) is identified by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. II; accused
No. 3 (Harpal Singh) is identified by P.W. 2 and
P.W. II; accused No. 4 (Niranjan Singh) is identified
by P.W. 2, P.W. 5and P.W. ll; accused No. 5 (Sardar
Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. ll; accused No. 6
(Udaibir Singh) by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9,
P.W. ll and P.W. 18; and accused No. 7 (Tikam
Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9
and P.W. 11.
The learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony
of these witnesses and disbelieved the story put forward by the accused and in this he had the concurrence of the High Court. Such being the case, this
court would not be justified in re-opening the finding'
about the guilt of the appellants if no question of
law is involved, or if the conclusion is not preverse
or opposed to principles of natural justice or revolt·
.
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
741
ing to judicial conscience. But Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi,
counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended
that in view of the failure of the Sub-Inspector P. W.
28 to comply with para. 109 of Ch. XI of the Uttar
Pradesh Police Regulations, which lays down that
when the investigation is closed for the day, a copy
of the case diary for the day should be sent to the
superior police officers, there has been an infraction
of a mandatory rule of law which has resulted in
prejudice and if that is so, the findings regarding the
guilt of the accused should be re-opened and this court
should reassess and assay the evidence to find out
how far the guilt of the appellants has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The question, therefore, is whether the action of
the Sub-Inspector amoun~ to a violation of a statutory duty enjoined on him. If the Uttar Pradesh
Police Regulations were a set of rules framed under
any statute, and as such have the force of law, then
a violation of any rule thereunder, may either amount
to an illegality or an irregularity which may or may
not vitiate the proceedings. The Police Act, 1861 was
enacted to reorganize the police and to make it a
more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crimes, whereby the State Government is
given authority to appoint police officers, such as the
Inspector-General, ete. Under s. 12 of that Act, the
Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time,
subject to the approval of the State Government,
frame such rules and orders as he shall deem expedient
relative to the organization, classification and distribution of the police force, the places at which the
members of the force shall reside, and the particular
services to be performed by them; their inspection,
the description of arms, accoutrements and other
necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting
and communicating by them of intelligence and information, and all such other orders and rules relative
to the police force as the Inspector-General shall,
from time to time, deem expedient for preventing
abuse or neglect of duty, and for rendering such force
efficient in the discharge of its duties. It is not ~s if
1956
N iranjan Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Prade sll
Govind; Menon J.
1956
~v iranjan Si-ngh
v.
The State of
lTttar Pratle sh
Govinda Meno'i J,
742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
these police regulations are rules framed by the
Inspector-General in accordance with section 12; but
they are the result of the State Government laying
down the mode of conduct and how the officers have
to perform their duties. Rule 109 in Chapter XI dealing with the inveRtigation of crimes enjoins upon the
police officers when an investigation is closed for the
day to note the time and place at which it closed and
also lays down that throughout the investigation the
diary must be sent daily to the Police Superintendent
on all days on which any proceedings are taken. If
the investigating officer is not himself in-charge of
the station, the diary must be sent through the officer
in-charge except when this will cause delay. It also
directs the police officer to study carefully sections 162
and 173 of the Code of Cri,minal Procedure. Nowhere
in the rules is it stated that there is any statutory
authority for the framing of rule 109, nor is it said
to form any addition to a statute, even though some
other rules are expressly stated to be statutory ones.
Such being the case, it is clear that rule 109 has no
statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the
executive Government to the police officers as to how
they must regulate their work and conduct themselves
during the course of investigation.
Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi, who appeared for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956, and Dr.
Banerjee, who appeared for the appellant-accused
No. 6, in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, put their case in this
way: According to the police officer P. W. 28, he re-
. corded t.he statements of all the eye-witnesses before
day-break, and in case the diary under s. 172 containing the statements recorded under s. 162 had been
sent to the superior police officers every day, then
that fact would vouchsafe for the correctness of that
document and it would not be possible for the officer
t,o change or alter the statements of witnesses as it
suited his desire if he wanted to do so at a later
stage. In the present case since admittedly the case
diary and the details of work during the course of
seven cln.ys had not been sent to the superior police
officers for a period of one week, it is suggested that
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
743
it is possible that it might be considered a false docu--
ment because it was not prepared then and there containing statements recorded as and when they were
made. In that case, both the learned counsel contend that the opportunity of cross-examining the
witnesses and finding out whether the names of the
accused were given at the earliest point of time has
been lost to the defence.
The result of this, according to the learned counsel, has caused irreparable
prejudice which cannot be condoned or regularised.
But the learned counsel have not been able to show to
us that para. 109 of Ch. XI of the Police Regulations
has the force of law. In this connection reference
may be made to Ch. XLV of the Code of Criminal
Procedure dealing with illegal and irregular proceedings and to s. 529 laying down irregularities which
do not vitiate proceedings, while s. 530 concerns
irregularities which vitiate proceedings. Section 537
is to .the effect that subject to the provisions contained
in the previous sections of that Chapter no finding,
sentence or order passed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Ch.
XXVII or on appeal or revision on account of among
other things any error, omission or irregularity in the
complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order,
judgment or other proceedings before or during trial
or in any inquiry or other proceedings under the Code.
There is an Explanation added that "in determining
whether any error, omission or irregularity in any
proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure
of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact
whether the objection could and should have been
raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings". It is
true that the objection was taken before the learned
Sessions Judge and, therefore, the Explanation cannot be applied. In these circumstances and on the
footing that the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations,
are merely directions regarding the course of conduct, can it be stated that a breach of it would vitiate
the trial? The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying
down the omissions or irregularities which either
vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere
1956
N iranjan Singh
v.
The State of
Vttar Pradesh
Gor;inda Menon J,
1956
N iranjan Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Govinda Menon J.
744
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
specifically say that a mistake committed by a police
officer during the course of the investigation can be
said to be an illegality or irregularity. Investigation
is certainly not an inquiry or trial before the court
and the fact that there is no specific provision either
way in Ch. XLV with respect to omissions or mistakes
committed during the course of investigation except with regard to the holding of an inquest is,
in our opinion, a sufficient indication that the legislature did not contemplate any irregularity in investigation as of sufficient importance to vitiate
or otherwise form any infirmity in the inquiry or
trial.
The learned counsel for the State ofUttar Pradesh
invited our attention to a few cases which show that
even violation of the provisions of the Code would
not amount to an illegality.
The decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial
Committee reported in Pulukuri Kotayya and Others
v. King-Emperor(') and Zahiruddinv. King-Emperor(")
lay down that a breach of sections 162 and 172 of the
Code does not amount to an illegality.
If therefore
such an omission could not vitiate a trial, it is all the
more reasonable that a failure to conform to a rule of
conduct prescribed by the State Government on police
officers cannot in any way interfere with the legality
of a trial. That failure to investigate an offence does
not necessarily prejudice an accused and therefore
any mistake or omission in conducting investigatfon
cannot vitiate a trial has been laid down in Hafiz
Mohammad Sani and Others v. Emperor('). At p. 152,
Adami J. observes as follows:-
"There can be no doubt that the Sub-Inspector
in bis procedure disobeyed certain provisions of the
law, and for that he could be punished, if the authorities deemed it fit, but I cannot find that his failure
was to the prejudice of the petitioners.
Nor can I
see how failure properly to conduct an investigation
into an offence can vitiate a trial which was started
on the final report after the investigation".
\1) [1946] L.R. 74 I.A. 65.
12) [19'7] L.R. HI.A. 80.
'8) A.LR. 1931 Pat. 150,
..
S.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
745
We are in agreement with these observations.
t956
In a recent case reported in Tilkeshwar Singh and Niranjan Singh
Others v. The State of Bihar(1), Venkatarama !\yyar
....
J. expressed the opinion that "while the failure to
The state of
comply with the requirements of section 161 (3) might
Uttar Pradesl•
affect the weight to be attached to the evidence of Govinda Menon 1.
the witnesses, it does not render it inadmissible". He
referred to the case of Bejoy Chand v. The State(2) and
agreed with the observations of the Calcutta High
Court therein.
We have no hesitation in following
those observations. Our attention was also drawn to
the case of Gajanand and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh(a), which contains statements of law helpful for
the decision of this case.
We are not prepared to say that because P.W. 28
did not send copies of his diary to the superior officers
every day, the same should be considered as a suspicious document unworthy of credit.
The learned
Judges of the High Court and the court of first
instance have ca.st no doubt upon the genuineness of
the case diary and that being the case, it is not open
to us without any compelling reasons to say that it
is spurious or suspicious.
In the "circumstances, we
do not feel justified in holding that the omission of
P. W. 28 is a violation of the provisions of a statute
or a rule having the force of law which renders the
trial invalid.
Holding therefore the point on which the special
leave had been granted, against the appellants, we
order that the appeals be dismissed.
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1043, 1047, 1048.
(2) A.LR. 1950 Cal. SSS.
(S) A.I R. 19M S.C. 695, 699.
Appeals dismissed.