# OJ 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 37 MAHARASHTRA LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ORS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2010] 15 S.C.R. 37
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2010-11-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 2147-48 of 2004
- **Bench:** Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, Anil R. Dave
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/oj-15-addl-s-c-r-37-maharashtra-land-development-corporation-and-ors-v-state-of-26743
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

A
8
Forests - Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, C
1975 - ss.2 (c-i), 2(f), 3, 4, 5, 6 to 19 and 21 - "Forest" and
"private forest" - Vesting in the State - State Government
attempted to acquire the land in question as a "private forest"
amidst the efforts of the Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation to continue its quarrying operations in the area D
- Dispute as to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975
under the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975
the appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not -
Held: The provisions of the Act present no apparent conflict
with the overarching objective of vesting 'private forests' with
E
the State in the Government's efforts to protect them - The
definition of a 'forest' as enunciated in s. 2 (c-i) (ii) is an
inclusive definition and therefore, it would not be appropriate
to give it a restrictive meaning - In light of the legislative
scheme of the Act, and its provisions, it is clear that the
F
portion. of land, measuring 53 acres vested with the
respondent-State as a 'private forest' - That the area fell within
a part designated as 'forest' on the 30th of August, 1975 is
beyond dispute and is supported by the evidence on record
- Therefore, by virtue of s.2 (c-i) (ii), the portion in dispute will G
also be designated as a 'private forest' u/s. 2(f) -
The
respondent-State was only acting in accordance with the
principles envisaged in the Act - This action cannot in any
way said to be disproportionate or irrational solely because
37
H
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
it divests the appellant-Corporation of the land -
The
circumstances of this case, especially in so far as it relates
to the quarrying operations conducted by the appel/antCorporation in the said area, merit that the State protects the
interests of the general public by acquiring the land as a
B
private forest.
c
D
E
F
G
H
Interpretation of Statutes - Preamble to the Act - Held:
Is the guiding light to its interpretation.
Administrative Law - Principle of proportionality - Held:
The Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has given way
to the doctrine of proportionality - Unless the impugned
administrative action is advantageous and in public interest
such an action cannot be upheld - Any administrative
authority while exercising a discretionary power will have to
necessarily establish that its decision is balanced and in
proportion to the object of the power conferred - The test of
proportionality is concerned with the way in which the decisionmaker has ordered his priorities, i.e., the attribution of relative
importance to the factors in the case - Thus, it is not so much
the correctness of the decision that is called into question, but
the method to reach the same.
Ecology/Environment - Preservation of the eco-system
is an immutable duty under the Constitution - A fine balance
must be struck between environmental protection and
development.
The instant appeal was placed in the context of the
State Government's attempt to acquire the land in
question as a "private forest", amidst the efforts of the
Maharashtra Land Development Corporation to continue ·
its quarrying operations in the area.
The question involved in the instant appeal was as
to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975 under
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
39
MAHARASHTRA
the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975 the
A
appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The instant case is one that must seek to
attain a fine balance between the process of development
B
on the one hand, and the ecological imperative of
preserving the environment on the other. This Court has
for long been an outspoken critic of attempts to degrade
the environment, and a vocal supporter of sustainable
development. A developing country like ours cannot C
afford to ignore the growing needs of teeming millions,
but this development shall ha

## Text

_Characters 0–39,850 of 71,574. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39850 for what follows._

[201 OJ 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 37
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2147-48 of 2004)
NOVEMBER 11, 2010
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND
ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]
A
8
Forests - Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, C
1975 - ss.2 (c-i), 2(f), 3, 4, 5, 6 to 19 and 21 - "Forest" and
"private forest" - Vesting in the State - State Government
attempted to acquire the land in question as a "private forest"
amidst the efforts of the Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation to continue its quarrying operations in the area D
- Dispute as to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975
under the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975
the appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not -
Held: The provisions of the Act present no apparent conflict
with the overarching objective of vesting 'private forests' with
E
the State in the Government's efforts to protect them - The
definition of a 'forest' as enunciated in s. 2 (c-i) (ii) is an
inclusive definition and therefore, it would not be appropriate
to give it a restrictive meaning - In light of the legislative
scheme of the Act, and its provisions, it is clear that the
F
portion. of land, measuring 53 acres vested with the
respondent-State as a 'private forest' - That the area fell within
a part designated as 'forest' on the 30th of August, 1975 is
beyond dispute and is supported by the evidence on record
- Therefore, by virtue of s.2 (c-i) (ii), the portion in dispute will G
also be designated as a 'private forest' u/s. 2(f) -
The
respondent-State was only acting in accordance with the
principles envisaged in the Act - This action cannot in any
way said to be disproportionate or irrational solely because
37
H
38
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
it divests the appellant-Corporation of the land -
The
circumstances of this case, especially in so far as it relates
to the quarrying operations conducted by the appel/antCorporation in the said area, merit that the State protects the
interests of the general public by acquiring the land as a
B
private forest.
c
D
E
F
G
H
Interpretation of Statutes - Preamble to the Act - Held:
Is the guiding light to its interpretation.
Administrative Law - Principle of proportionality - Held:
The Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has given way
to the doctrine of proportionality - Unless the impugned
administrative action is advantageous and in public interest
such an action cannot be upheld - Any administrative
authority while exercising a discretionary power will have to
necessarily establish that its decision is balanced and in
proportion to the object of the power conferred - The test of
proportionality is concerned with the way in which the decisionmaker has ordered his priorities, i.e., the attribution of relative
importance to the factors in the case - Thus, it is not so much
the correctness of the decision that is called into question, but
the method to reach the same.
Ecology/Environment - Preservation of the eco-system
is an immutable duty under the Constitution - A fine balance
must be struck between environmental protection and
development.
The instant appeal was placed in the context of the
State Government's attempt to acquire the land in
question as a "private forest", amidst the efforts of the
Maharashtra Land Development Corporation to continue ·
its quarrying operations in the area.
The question involved in the instant appeal was as
to whether on the appointed day, i.e., 30.08.1975 under
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
39
MAHARASHTRA
the Maharashtra Private (Acquisition) Forest Act, 1975 the
A
appellant's land of 53 acres was a "private forest" or not.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The instant case is one that must seek to
attain a fine balance between the process of development
B
on the one hand, and the ecological imperative of
preserving the environment on the other. This Court has
for long been an outspoken critic of attempts to degrade
the environment, and a vocal supporter of sustainable
development. A developing country like ours cannot C
afford to ignore the growing needs of teeming millions,
but this development shall have to resonate with the
preservation of the environment. Preservation of the ecosystem is an immutable duty under the Constitution - a
/
fine balance must be struck between environmental
D
protection and development. Many regions in India are
biodiversity 'hotspots', known to host a staggering
variety of flora and fauna. However, they are under the
constant threat of environmental degradation and rapid
depletion of natural resources, due to various factors,
E
including the desire to earn quick money. Consequently,
a major challenge in this backdrop is to arrive at a
successful model of sustainable development - one that
aims to preserve the rich ecosystem, while addressing
the economic needs of the people in the region. [Paras
F
27 and 28) [56-F-H; 57-A-D]
T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (1997)
2 SCC 267 and G/anrock Estates v. State of Tamil Nadu
[Decision of Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.
242 of 1988 and 408 of 2003) - referred to.
G
2.1. The issue of whether the land in question was a
'forest' on the appointed day, has to be seen in the
~
.
context of whether the entire land that encompassed the
H
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A disputed area was a 'forest' on the said date. In this
regard the legislative scheme of the Act is required to be
seen. [Para 36] [63-C-D]
2.2. The definition of a 'forest' as enunciated in
8 Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Maharashtra Private Forest
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 specifically includes "land which is
part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was
lying within a forest on the 30th day of August, 1975". It is
already established that subsequent to proceedings
C initiated under the Bombay Salsette Estate Abolition Act,
1951, the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A was held
to be a "forest" vide an order dated 24th December, 1964.
A bare reading of the provision also indicates that the
definition of 'forest' is an inclusive definition and
therefore, it could have a wider connotation and it would
D not be appropriate to give it a restrictive meaning. Every
word and phrase of the Act is to be understood in its
context and must be given significance so that they are
not rendered redundant. The appellant has steadfastly
maintained that the interpretation of the provisions
E cannot mean land which was a forest in the past (i.e.
before 30th August, 1975) to be a 'forest' according to the
Act. This argument might have had some force had the
time period in question related to many decades or even
a century before. The aforementioned proceedings were
F concluded in proximity to the appointed day in question,
and the character of land cannot be said to have changed
over such a relatively short period of time. It is beyond
doubt that the land which encompassed the said portion
of 53 acres belonging to the appellant-Corporation was
G a 'forest' on the appointed day. [Para 34] [61-G-H; 62-AE]
H
2.3. The appellant submitted that although the word
'Forest' was added in the Record of Right after such
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
41
MAHARASHTRA
proceedings, it was later dropped when the matter went A
up in appeal to the Commissioner. Even if this were to
be considered, it is to be noted that the preponderance
of evidence seems to indicate the land in Survey No. 345
was considered as 'forest'. This is amply supported by
documentary evidence, including the mortgage deed of B
1900, and the revenue records of the past 50 years.
Moreover, the conveyance deed dated 29.3.1975 which
was executed by the Court Receiver to the appellant,
·clearly describes the land as "piece or parcel of forest
land with structures". This is further buttressed by the c
mutation entries till 1969-70 which described the land as
a forest. Even the mutation entries from 1970-71, have
only changed the recording to 'huts, quarry and grass'
which does not in any way dispute the nature of the land.
That apart in the enquiry conducted under sub-Section(2) D
of Section 37 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it was
admitted by the Company through whom the appellant
had derived title that the land was forest land. Therefore,
there is overwhelming documentary evidence and also
contemporaneous evidence on record to prove and
E
establish that the land, in question, even in recent times
was considered as forest land and also retained its
character as such. [Para 35] [62-F-H; 63-A-C]
2.4. The Preamble to the Act, which is the guiding
light to its interpretation, also expresses similar concerns
F
as to the depletion of forest cover in the State. In this
light, it is important to construe the provisions of the Act
in tune with the purpose of its enactment. Such a rule of
interpretation has been supported by the decisions of this
Court in a catena of cases. [Para 37] [64-8-C]
G
2.5. The purpose of the statute and the intention of
the legislature in enacting the same must be of
paramount consideration while interpreting its
provisions. In this instance, moreover, the provisions of H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
the Act present no apparent conflict with the overarching
objective of vesting 'private forests' with the State in the
Government's efforts to protect them. Further, it is
important to note that the said area was being used for
qu~rrying operations by the appellant-Corporation. That
the said portion in the area of Survey 345-A measuring
209 acres is claimed to be rocky and devoid of growth
certainly does not change the character of the forest land.
It cannot be disputed that within forest areas, there exists
water bodies swamp land, grass land etc. The very
existence of such land within the forest area would and
could not change the nature and character of the forest
land and the same would still continue to be treated as
forest land. In many instances across the country, mining
and quarrying operations, while regulated, do take place
in forest land, and they can very well be considered as
forest produce. However, the harmful effects of the
ecological imbalance that may result as a consequence
of quarrying operations in a forest zone is also to be
considered. [Para 38) [65-F-H; 66-A-B]
2.6. In light of the legislative scheme of the Act, and
its provisions, it is clear that the said portion of the land,
measuring 53 acres will vest with the respondent-State
as a 'private forest'. That the area fell within a part
designated as 'forest' on the 30th of August, 1975 is
beyond dispute and is supported by the evidence on
record. Therefore, by virtue of Section 2 (c-i) (ii) of the Act,
the portion in dispute will also be designated as a 'private
forest' under Section 2(f) of the Act, and the authorities
are directed to maintain it as such. [Para 39) [66-C-D]
Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (2008) 7
SCC 502; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General
Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424;
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. L. V. A. Dixitulu
and Others (1979) 2 SCC 34 - referred to.
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
43
MAHARASHTRA
3.1. The appellant-Corporation further alleged that the A
State's decision to consider the disputed land as
automatically vested with the Government was irrational
and disproportionate. However, the common yardstick to
determine whether the act on the part of the Government
violates established principles of administrative law has
B
been the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness,
employed both by English and Indian Courts. The
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness has given way
to the doctrine of proportionality. [Paras 41, 42 and 43]
[67-B-E; 68-B]
C
3.2. The principle of proportionality envisages that a
public authority ought to maintain a sense of proportion
between particular goals and the means employed to
achieve those goals, so that administrative action
impinges on the individual rights to the minimum extent D
to preserve public interest. Thus implying that
administrative action ought to bear a reasonable
relationship to the general purpose for which the power
has been conferred. The principle of proportionality
therefore implies that the Court has to necessarily go into E
the advantages and disadvantages of any administrative
action called into question. Unless the impugned
administrative action is advantageous and in public
interest such an action cannot be upheld. At the core of
this principle is the scrutiny of the administrative action
F
to examine whether the power conferred is exercised in
proportion to the purpose for which it has been
conferred. Thus, any administrative authority while
exercising a discretionary power will have to necessarily
establish that its decision is balanced and in proportion G
to the object of the power conferred. This principle has
found favour in recent times with this Court, and a
number of decisions reflect the shift towards the doctrine
of proportionality. [Paras 44 and 45] [68-F-H; 69-A-B]
H
44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R
A
3.3. The test of proportionality is concerned with the
way in which the decision-maker has ordered his
priorities, i.e., the attribution of relative importance to the
factors in the case. Thus, it is not so much the
correctness of the decision that is called into question,
B but the method to reach the same. [Para 50] [70-D-E]
3.4. In the instant case, it is seen that the decision of
the Government has been guided by the provisions in the
Act, which seek to conserve and protect private forests
in the State of Maharashtra that have been facing severe
C depletion and exploitation. Therefore, the Act, which
provides for the vesting of private forests with the
Government, does so in the general interests of the
public in tune with principles of environmental protection
and sustainable development. The respondent-State was
D only acting in accordance with the principles envisaged
in the Act. This action cannot in any way be said to be
disproportionate or irrational solely because it divests the
appellant-Corporation of the land within Survey 345-A.
The circumstances of this case, especially in so far as it
E relates to the quarrying operations conducted by the
appellant-Corporation in the said area, merit that the State
protects the interests of the general public by acquiring
the land as a private forest. [Para 51] [70-F-H; 71-A]
F
Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC
442; Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (1991)
3 SCC 213; Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v.
Employees Assn. (2007) 4 SCC 669; Charanjit Lamba v.
Commanding Officer, Southern Command and Ors. AIR 2010
G SC 2462 - referred to.
H
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v.
Wednesbury Corporation (1947) 2 All ER 680; Council of
Civil Services Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services [1985]
AC 374 - referred to.
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
45
MAHARASHTRA
Case Law Reference:
A
(1997) 2 sec 267
referred to
Paras 23, 25
(2008) 1 sec 502
referred to
Para 37
(1987) 1 sec 424
referred to
Para 37
B
(1979) 2 sec 34
referred to
Para 37
(1947) 2 All ER 680
referred to
Para 42
(1985] AC 374
referred to
Para 43
c
(1983) 2 sec 442
referred to
Para 46
(1991) 3 sec 213
referred to
Para 47
(2001) 4 sec 669
referred to
Para 48
D
AIR 2010 SC 2462
referred to
Para 49
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2147-2148 of 2004.
E
From the Judgment & Order dated 8.10.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1052 of
1998.
P.P. Rao, Jay Savla, M.P. Savla, Meenakshi Ogra, Shilpi
F
Choudhary, M. Qamaruddin, Ambar Qamaruddin, M.
Qamaruddin, Apeksha Sharan, Purshotam S.T. Utsav, Sidhu,
Fitza Moonis for the Appellant.
Shekhar Naphade, Madhavi Diwan, Sanjay Kharde and
Asha Gopalan Nair for the Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Since the issues
H
46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
raised and argued in these matters are inter-connected, we
propose to dispose both of them by this Order. Civil Appeal
No. 2147 is filed by the Maharashtra Land Development
Corporation against the State of Maharashtra seeking to
challenge the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court
B dated October 8, 2003 in Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998. Civil
Appeal No. 2148 is filed by K.N. Shaikh against the State of
Maharashtra seeking to challenge the judgment and order of
the Bombay High Court dated October 8, 2003 in Writ Petition
No. 1383 of 2002.
c
D
2. At the first stage we will deal with Civil Appeal No. 2147,
and after pronouncing the judgment herein we shall deal with
Civil Appeal No. 2148.
Civil Appeal No. 2147 of 2004
3. By the judgment in Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998, the
High Court reversed the order and concurrent findings recorded
by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 23rd April, 1985 and the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998 wherein
E
it was held that the land in question is neither "forest" nor
"private forest" as referred to in the Maharashtra Private Forests
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
4. The gamut of events that led to the passing of the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court may be
F
elaborated here. The land in question was part of an original
Survey No. 345 in village Dahisar, Maharashtra, measuring
about 650 acres. At all relevant times, it was shown as "forest
land" in the Revenue records. In or about 1947, out of 650
acres, around 365 acres was acquired for the purpose of
G creating a National Park at Borivli. Original Survey No. 345 was
subsequently divided into three survey numbers, being Survey
Nos. 345-A, 345-B and 345-C. The land which was acquired
was Survey No. 345-B. From the remaining land, land
admeasuring about 75 acres was given Survey No. 345-C and
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
47
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the land in question admeasuring about 209 acres was given A
Survey No. 345-A.
5. It is the case of the State of Maharashtra that village
Dahisar was Ex-Khot village. The whole land of Survey No. 345
of village Dahisar was originally owned by ex-khot of the area B
by name Haji Ali Kasam Agboatwala, who expired in the year
1945. Administration Suit No. 3415 of 1957 was filed in the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay and the Court Receiver,
High Court of Bombay was appointed as the Court Receiver
for administration and management of the estate belonging to
Agboatwala. In 1962, in pursuance of an order passed by the C
High Court, the suit land was sold which was purchased by one
M/s. Veekaylal Investment Company ("Company" for short) from
the Court Receiver. According to the case of the State, even
at that juncture the suit land was "forest land". In 1963-64,
proceedings were initiated under the Bombay Salsette Estate D
Abolition Act, 1951, and vide an order dated 24th December,
1964, the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A was held
"forest" and vested in the State under Section 4 of the said Act.
6. On 27th August, 1975, a notice was issued by the State E
Government to the Company under sub-Section (3) of Section
35 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 calling upon the Company,
the owner of the land, to show cause as to why notification
under sub-Section (1) of Section 35 of the Act should not be
issued for regulating and/or prohibiting the non-forest activities F
on the land. The said notice was issued in respect of total area
of land bearing Survey No. 345-A admeasuring 209 acres.
7. On 30th August, 1975, the Maharashtra Private Forests
(Acquisition) Act, 1975 came into force under which allegedly
land bearing Survey No. 345-A stood acquired and vested in G
the State Government on the appointed day i.e. August 30,
1975. Accordingly, on October 8, 1975, the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Bombay Sub-urban District, in exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Act, issued notice to the company to hand over
possession of the entire land of Survey No. 345-A admeasuring H
48
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
209 acres. The company filed a reply to the said notice
contending that the land bearing Survey No. 345-A was not
"forest", much less a "private forest". The company also called
upon the Collector to hear and decide the question as to
whether or not the land was "forest" or "private forest" and
B
whether it vested in the State Government under the Act. An
inquiry was conducted under Section 6 of the Act by the SubDivisional Officer, Bombay Suburban District, wherein notices
were issued to the company, being the owner of the land as
well as to the Court Receiver. Subsequently, by an order dated
C
12th November, 1975, the Sub-Divisional Officer held the land
to be "private forest" and also held that the land stood acquired
and vested in the State of Maharashtra. The company was,
therefore, called upon to hand over possession of the land
within 10 days to the Collector of Bombay.
D
8. The company challenged the said order passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer by filling an appeal before the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal vide its order dated 20th March, 1976 dismissed the
appeal, upholding and confirming the order passed by SubE
Divisional Officer and observing that the land in question was
"forest" within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Act of 1975.
It was also held to be "private forest" falling under Section 2(f)
of the Act and as such, stood acquired and vested in the State
of Maharashtra. The said order was never challenged in further
F
proceedings by the company and became final, conclusive and
binding on the parties.
9. It may be stated that when the question of handing over
actual and physical possession of land bearing Survey No. 345A came up, it was revealed that out of 209 acres of land of
G
Survey No. 345-A, land admeasuring about 53 acres was in
possession of the Maharashtra Land Development Corporation
(the appellant herein), and 50 acres was in possession of K.N.
Shaikh (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 2004). The
Company, in the circumstances, handed over to the
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
49
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Respondent-State, possession of land ad measuring about 106
A
acres of land out of 209 acres of Survey No. 345-A.
10. The appellant-Corporation herein objected to handing
over possession of the land which was with it. It filed
Miscellaneous Petition No. 512 of 1976 in the Bombay High
Court challenging the notice issued by Sub-Divisional Officer.
It also challenged an order dated November 12, 1975 passed
B
by Sub-Divisional Officer, holding the land to be "forest" as also
judgment and order dated March 20, 1976 passed by Revenue
Tribunal confirming the order passed by Sub-Divisional Officer.
C
The orders were not challenged by the aggrieved party and they
had become final. The appellant-Corporation herein challenged
the above decisions, contending that they were inter a/ia in
violation of principles of natural justice. The said Miscellaneous
Petition No. 512 of 1976, however, came to be settled on the
basis of consent terms arrived at between the parties on 19th
April, 1984. The consent terms, inter alia, provided that fresh
inquiry will be conducted under Section 6 of the Act regarding
vesting of the property admeasuring 53 acres in possession
of the appellant-Corporation. It was also ordered that in case
the authority comes to the conclusion that the land in
possession of appellant-Corporation is a "forest" and "private
forest" and that it stood acquired and vested in the Government
of Maharashtra, the appellant-Corporation would hand over
possession of the land to the Sub-Divisional Officer.
11. In pursuance of the consent terms arrived at between
the parties, the Sub-Divisional Officer conducted fresh inquiry
under Section 6 of the Act, after issuing necessary notice to
the appellant-Corporation herein. After hearing the appellantCorporation, the Sub-Divisional Officer, by an order dated 23rd
April, 1985, held that land admeasuring 53 acres out of Survey
No. 345-A in possession of the appellant-Corporation was
neither a forest nor "private forest" and as such did not stand
acquired and vested in the Government of Maharashtra in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A
12. The Respondent State challenged the said order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer by filing an appeal before
the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, vide its judgment and order dated 29th September,
1986, allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the
B
Sub-Divisional Officer and declared that the land admeasuring
53 acres in possession of respondent No. 1 as 'forest" and
"private forest" as defined in the Act. The Tribunal also held that
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the land stood
acquired and vested in the State of Maharashtra.
c
13. Aggrieved with the order passed by Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal dated 29th September, 1986, the appellantCorporation filed Writ Petition No. 4726of1986 in the Bombay
High Court. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court vide
its judgment and order dated 13/17th March, 1992 confirmed
D
the order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, holding
that the land in possession of respondent No. 1 was "forest"
and "private forest", and as such, stood acquired and vested
in the State of Maharashtra.
E
14. The appellant-Corporation challenged the order
passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and confirmed
by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by carrying the
matter to this Court. This Court, by an order dated 27th August,
1992, allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by this
F
Court as well as by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and
remanded the matter to the Tribunal, directing it to dispose of
the appeal afresh by affording to both the parties an opportunity
of adducing additional evidence.
15. After remand, the matter was placed before the
G
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It was re-heard and vide its
judgment and order dated 4th December, 1992, the Tribunal
held that the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A admeasuring
209 acres was neither "forest" nor "private forest" and did not
stand acquired and vested in the State of Maharashtra.
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MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
51
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
16. The Department of Forest, being aggrieved by the
A
above decision of Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, filed Writ
Petition No. 2023 of 1994 in the Bombay High Court and the
High Court vide its judgment and order dated 11 /15/16/17th
April, 1996 allowed the petition and quashed and set aside the
order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal concluding that
B
the entire land bearing Survey No. 345-A, admeasuring 209
acres was "forest" and "private forest" which stood vested in
the Government of Maharashtra under the provisions of the Act
of 1975.
17. The judgment and order of the Bombay High Court
C
was again challenged by the appellant-Corporation,
approaching this Court by way of Special Leave Petition No.
14259 of 1996 and this Court vide its order dated 24th
September, 1996, again set aside the order of the High Court
and remanded the matter to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal
D
by granting liberty to the parties to lead further evidence before
the Tribunal and by directing the Tribunal to reach a decision
having regard to the material on record as also which might
be brought on record by the parties.
18. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in pursuance of
the direction issued by the Apex Court, considered the question
in the light of the rival contentions and the evidence before it
and by an order dated 21st February, 1998, and once again
held that the land in question cannot be treated as "forest" or
"private forest" under the Act of 1975, and hence no action
could be taken under the said Act. The appeal filed by the
Respondents came to be dismissed. It is that order passed
E
F
by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998
which was challenged by the respondent in Writ Petition No.
G
1052 of 1998 before the Bombay High Court.
19. The Bombay High Court, however, allowed the petition
(Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998] and decided in favour of the
State of Maharashtra, Respondent herein. In deciding the
matter, the Bombay High Court held:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
"81. The Tribunal then stated:
"In this view of the admitted position, we cannot altogether
refrain ourselves from finding some substance in the
submission of respondent No. 1 to the effect that in the
absence of any fresh evidence from the appellant, there
is no fresh material to disturb the finding of the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal as given in its last judgment of 4th
December, 1992."
With respect, the above approach of the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal is not in consonance with law and
cannot be approved. It is not open to the Tribunal to
proceed on the basis that since "there is no fresh material
to disturb the finding" of the MRT as given in its judgment
dated 4th December, 1992, the said finding called for no
interference. Once a petition was filed against the said
judgment in the High Court and the High Court set aside
that judgment and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal
directing the Tribunal to consider and decide the matter
afresh, in the eye of law, it cannot be said that there were
"findings" by the Tribunal in its earlier judgment and in
absence of "fresh evidence'', those findings need not be
disturbed. To us, therefore, it is clear that this is a
jurisdictional error committed by the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal and the order is indeed vulnerable.
... 104. On various grounds discussed by us in earlier part
of the judgment, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has
committed an error of law apparent on the face of the
record by holding that the land bearing Survey No. 345-A
of village Dahisar was neither "forest" nor "private forest"
and by taking such view, it exceeded jurisdiction and
hence, the said decision deserves to be quashed by this
Court by exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution and accordingly, the said decision is
quashed and set aside.
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
53
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
105. For the aforesaid reasons, in our opinion, the petition
A
(Writ Petition No. 1052 of 1998) deserves to be allowed
and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 21st February, 1998 in
Appeal No. Forest-3 of 1997 is quashed and set aside
and the land bearing Survey No. 345-A situate at Dahisar
B
is held to be "private forest" under the provisions of the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 and
deemed to have vested in the State Government. Rule is
accordingly made absolute. In the facts and circumstances,
however, there shall be no order to costs."
c
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellantCorporation has approached this Court by way of appeal.
20. In this appeal, we heard the learned counsel appearing
for both parties. Mr. Ashok Desai, Senior Advocate and Mr. Jay
D
Savla, appearing on behalf of the appellant-Corporation,
submitted that the findings of the Sub-Divisional Officer in
concluding that the appellant-Corporation's land was not a
'private forest' on the appointed day, i.e. 30.08.1975, would be
final, subject to the decision of the Tribunal. Such a conclusion,
E
according to the counsel for the appellant-Corporation,
stemmed from the language of Section 6 of the Act. Emphasis
was also placed by the counsel on the fact that the SubDivisional Officer, while deciding the matters, considered the
fact that the land was dropped from acquisition in earlier land
F
acquisition proceedings and it was not found suitable for the
development of a National Park.
21. According to the counsel for the appellant-Corporation,
the Indian Forest Act, 1927 clearly differentiates between
"Government Forest" and "Privately Owned Forest". While it was
G
admitted that the Government can regulate or prohibit certain
activities in such land, ownership would continue to vest with
the private party. It was the counsel's submission that there is
therefore, no automatic vesting of a privately owned forest, i.e.
"private forest'" with the Government. Learned counsel also took
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54
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A us through the reasons behind the decision of Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal to buttress his arguments. Adjudication as to
the nature of land whether it is "forest" or "private forest",
according to Counsel for the appellant-Corporation, had to be
done in accordance with the provisions of 1975 Act.
B
22. It was submitted that the respondent-State had two
opportunities in separate rounds of litigation to produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, and despite such
opportunities, no evidence was adduced. Counsel for the
C appellant-Corporation stated that twice the matter had reached
upto the highest Court of the country and that on both the
occasions, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the
appellant-Corporation, remanded the matter to the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal and granted liberty to the parties to adduce
additional evidence. It was the contention that additional
D evidence had not been led by the respondent herein but further
materials had been produced on record by the first respondent
and that if on the basis of such materials, the Tribunal had
decided the matter in favour of the appellant-Corporation,
counsel contended, the State [respondent herein] had no right
E to make grievance against such order.
23. As regards the Bombay High Court's reliance on the
decision of this Court in T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad
v. Union of India, reported at ( 1997) 2 sec 267, it was pleaded
F by the counsel for the appellant-Corporation that "forest land"
as considered by this Court in the light of the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980, must be understood according to its
literal, dictionary meaning, and must not be understood to
include any area recorded as forest in the Government records
G irrespective of ownership. Moreover, it was also contended that
the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 do not deal
with the acquisition or vesting of 'privately owned land' or 'forest'
as the case may be. Lastly, it was also contended by the
counsel for the appellant-Corporation that the notice purportedly
H issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
55
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
declaring the land to be a 'private forest' was never produced
A
in previous stages of litigation, and no opportunity to dispute
the particulars of the notice was ever provided to the appellantCorporation.
24. On behalf of the respondent-State, it was submitted
B
that in the proceedings initiated under Section 37 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, and in the enquiry held in
respect of the applicability of the Bombay Salsette Estate
Abolition Act, 1951, it was found that the land in Survey No. 345
is a forest land. Before the Mamlatdar, evidence was adduced C
by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant-Corporation, M/
s. Veekaylal Investment Company, to the effect that Survey No.
345 was a 'jungle'. It was contended by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent-State that the Company at the
time took the stand that the land in question is a jungle, and
not a waste land, with a view to prevent its vesting in the State D
Government under Section 4 of the Bombay Salsette Estate
Abolition Act, 1951. It was urged before this Court that the
appellant-Corporation, now as the successor-in-interest of M/
s. Veekaylal Investment Company is adopting a diametrical
opposite stand that the said land is not a forest land and hence
E
is not permissible.
25. Counsel for the Respondent-State also contended that
Survey No. 345-A in its entirety is part of Sanjay Gandhi
National Park Division. In view of the interim orders passed by
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the Bombay High Court from time to time, and in particular, of
the orders dated 7th May 1997 and 17th July 1999 which
applied to the said land, according to counsel for the State
Government, the land over which the State Government claimed
ownership was "forest" and "private forest" and vested in the G
State Government. It was also submitted that irrelevant and
extraneous factors have been kept in mind by the Tribunal for
coming to the conclusion that the land was not forest/private
forest. Counsel contended that the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal did not take into account and consider in their proper H
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
perspective, the relevant provisions of the Indian Forest Act,
A
1927, Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 as
well as other Acts and various decisions of the Supreme Court,
including T. V. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India,
reported at (1997) 2 sec 267.
B
26. It was also the submission of the respondent-State that
the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition)
Act, 1975 must be given an expansive interpretation in view of
the fact that the Act was introduced to ameliorate grave
concerns over the fact that private forests in Maharashtra had
C
been severely depleted due to unregulated, unrestricted and
excessive exploitation. A bare reading of the Act, it was
contended, would make it clear that the definition of "forest"
under Section 2 (c-i) (ii) includes land which was part of a forest
in addition to land which is presently part of one, and even for
lands which could be treated as forests in the future. Moreover,
D
the State submitted, the definition of 'private forests' in Section
2 (f) of the Act is not only confined to any 'forest' which is not
the property of the Government, but also includes, inter alia ,any
'land' in respect of which a notice has been issued under
Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act. As long as it was
E
established that the land was subject to such a notice, the
learned counsel contended, it was enough to vest the land in
the State Government without any enquiry.
27. This case is placed in the context of the State
F
Government's attempt to acquire the land in question as a
"private forest", amidst the efforts of the Maharashtra Land
Development Corporation to continue its quarrying operations
in the area. Therefore, this case is one that must seek to attain
a fine balance between the process of development on the one
G
hand, and the ecological imperative of preserving the
environment on the other. This Court has for long been an
outspoken critic of attempts to degrade the environment, and
a vocal supporter of sustainable development.
28. Since Independence, India has travelled a long way on
H
MAHARASHTRA LAND DEV. CORPN. v. STATE OF
57
MAHARASHTRA [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the path of progress and industrialization to achieve a better A
quality of life. A developing country like ours cannot afford to
ignore the growing needs of teeming millions, but this
development shall have to resonate with the preservation of the
environment. Mahatma Gandhi once said that earth provides
enough to satisfy every man's need but not every man's greed.
B
It is the greed of the mankind which has brought environment
degradation and pollution. Preservation of the eco-system is
an immutable duty under the Constitution - a fine balance must
be struck between environmental protection and development.
Many regions in India are biodiversity 'hotspots', known to host c
a staggering variety of flora and fauna.