# Om Prakash Gupta v. Rat1a11 Singh

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 259
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-05-31
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/om-prakash-gupta-v-rat1a11-singh-2896
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Rent Control-Tenant availing benefit-Denyinq relationship-Jurisdiction of Rent Controller-Delhi Rent Control Act
(Act LIX of 1958), '· 15.
The appellant was sought to be evicted by the landlord
on the ground that be had habitually defaulted in the payment
of rent as well as on the ground of the bonafide requirement of
the land-lord for his own occupation.
He resisted the suit
inter alia on the ground that the premises had been let to the
v.
Their Wor~m111
Das Gupta. J
1962
December, 17
1962
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
Rat1a11 Singh
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
All
India Postal R. M. S. Union for office-cum-residential
purposes and that the tenancy of the Union had not been terminated and that the rent had not been demanded from the
Union. The appellant was directed to deposit the arrean of
rent UP·t<rdate as also to go on depositing the fllture rent
accruing due month by month. The respondent applied umler
3. lj(7) of the Ar.t for striking out the defence of the appell1nt
on the ground that he had failed to comply with the orders
directing him to deposit the rent. Rejecting the explanation
of the appellant the Additional Rent Controller ordered the
defence of the appellant to be struck out onjuly 26, 1961, and
proceeded to pass an ex-parte decree for eviction. The appellant \Vent in appeal against the order striking out the defence
which was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal both on
the ground rhat it \Vas barred by tirne as also on n1crits on
M•rch G, 1961. The appellant did n·>t take the
m~tter in
further appeal to the High Court. Against the decree for
eviction the appellant went to the Rent Control Tribunal which
dismisseol the appeal. The ap?ellant went in further appeal
to the High ~ourt which also dismissed the appeal summarily.
On special leave, it was contended that the appellant having
denied the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant,
the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter.
l/eld, that undr.r the Rent Control Law, the special
tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant existing bet .... ·ccn the parties but a rr1ere denial
by the tenant of the tenancy would not s11fficc to oust the
jurisdicti<in of the special tribunal.
It is only \vhen the tribunal conies to the conclusion that such a relationship did not
exist that it \vill have no jurisdiction.
•
l/elrl, further, that the provisions of s. 15 read with the
definition of "landlord"' enable the Rent Controller to determine the question of the relationship of lan<llord and tenant
for the benefit of the tonant and when a party has im·itcd the
Rent Controller to apply the provisions of s. 15 for his
benefit and the Rent Controller does so, he is deemed to have
decided such a person is a tenant.
·rhc proper course for a
~rson plcadin~ that he was not a tenant would be to raise the
pica and walk out of the proceedings and not to submit to
jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the appellant not having taken the
matter of striking out his defence under s. 15(7) In appeal to
the High Court the question of his beiug a tenant or otherwise
had become final and could not be reagitated.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
CIVIL APPELLATEJURISDIOTJCN: Civil Appeal
No. 541 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 31, 1962, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in S. A. 0. No. 86·D
of 1962.
A. S. R. Chari, M. K. RamamilJl'thi, D. P. Singh
and R. K. Garg, for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, F. G. Bedi and D. D. Sharma,
for respondents.
1962. December 17. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SINHA, C. J .-This appeal by special leave is
directed against the judgment and order of a learned
single Judge of the Punjab High Court summarily
dismissing the appeal filed by the. appellant, by his
order dated May 31, 1962, from the order of the
Rent Control Tribunal dated March 7, 1962, confirming that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi,
dated July 27, 1961, whereby he had dir

## Text

l S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
259
1962
peculiar circumstances of each case for the exercise
f'f discretion.
It is sufficient to say that we find
<10 reason to interfere with the Tribunal's direction
in this case that the reliefs given by it would become
effective from the date of the reference.
The Hindustan Times
Ltd., N1w Delhi
We therefore allow both the appeals in part
by modifying the Tribunal's award as regards
dearness allowance, leave rules and retirement age
and also as regards the adjustment of the interim
relief as mentioned above. In all other matters in
appeal before us the award is confirmed. The modifications made as regards dearness allowance will, as
already stated, take effect from April l, 1959. The
modifications as regards leave rules and as regards
retirement age will take effect from this date. In
both the appeals the parties will bear their own costs.
Appeals allowed in part.
OM PRAKASH GUPTA
•
v.
RATTAN SINGH AND ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Rent Control-Tenant availing benefit-Denyinq relationship-Jurisdiction of Rent Controller-Delhi Rent Control Act
(Act LIX of 1958), '· 15.
The appellant was sought to be evicted by the landlord
on the ground that be had habitually defaulted in the payment
of rent as well as on the ground of the bonafide requirement of
the land-lord for his own occupation.
He resisted the suit
inter alia on the ground that the premises had been let to the
v.
Their Wor~m111
Das Gupta. J
1962
December, 17
1962
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
Rat1a11 Singh
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
All
India Postal R. M. S. Union for office-cum-residential
purposes and that the tenancy of the Union had not been terminated and that the rent had not been demanded from the
Union. The appellant was directed to deposit the arrean of
rent UP·t<rdate as also to go on depositing the fllture rent
accruing due month by month. The respondent applied umler
3. lj(7) of the Ar.t for striking out the defence of the appell1nt
on the ground that he had failed to comply with the orders
directing him to deposit the rent. Rejecting the explanation
of the appellant the Additional Rent Controller ordered the
defence of the appellant to be struck out onjuly 26, 1961, and
proceeded to pass an ex-parte decree for eviction. The appellant \Vent in appeal against the order striking out the defence
which was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal both on
the ground rhat it \Vas barred by tirne as also on n1crits on
M•rch G, 1961. The appellant did n·>t take the
m~tter in
further appeal to the High Court. Against the decree for
eviction the appellant went to the Rent Control Tribunal which
dismisseol the appeal. The ap?ellant went in further appeal
to the High ~ourt which also dismissed the appeal summarily.
On special leave, it was contended that the appellant having
denied the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant,
the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter.
l/eld, that undr.r the Rent Control Law, the special
tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant existing bet .... ·ccn the parties but a rr1ere denial
by the tenant of the tenancy would not s11fficc to oust the
jurisdicti<in of the special tribunal.
It is only \vhen the tribunal conies to the conclusion that such a relationship did not
exist that it \vill have no jurisdiction.
•
l/elrl, further, that the provisions of s. 15 read with the
definition of "landlord"' enable the Rent Controller to determine the question of the relationship of lan<llord and tenant
for the benefit of the tonant and when a party has im·itcd the
Rent Controller to apply the provisions of s. 15 for his
benefit and the Rent Controller does so, he is deemed to have
decided such a person is a tenant.
·rhc proper course for a
~rson plcadin~ that he was not a tenant would be to raise the
pica and walk out of the proceedings and not to submit to
jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the appellant not having taken the
matter of striking out his defence under s. 15(7) In appeal to
the High Court the question of his beiug a tenant or otherwise
had become final and could not be reagitated.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
CIVIL APPELLATEJURISDIOTJCN: Civil Appeal
No. 541 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated May 31, 1962, of the Punjab High
Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in S. A. 0. No. 86·D
of 1962.
A. S. R. Chari, M. K. RamamilJl'thi, D. P. Singh
and R. K. Garg, for the appellant.
G. S. Pathak, F. G. Bedi and D. D. Sharma,
for respondents.
1962. December 17. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
SINHA, C. J .-This appeal by special leave is
directed against the judgment and order of a learned
single Judge of the Punjab High Court summarily
dismissing the appeal filed by the. appellant, by his
order dated May 31, 1962, from the order of the
Rent Control Tribunal dated March 7, 1962, confirming that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi,
dated July 27, 1961, whereby he had directed the
appellant to be evicted from the premises in question.
It appears that the respondents are admittedly
the landlords of the premi~es, No. 24, Ansari Road,
Darya Ganj, Delhi. The appellant claims to have
been in occupation of the premises since prior to
1950, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. In 1955, the
respondent had instituted a suit for the eviction
of the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union, and the
appellant was also impleaded as a party to the suit.
The respondents, in 1958, made an application for
amendment of the plaint on the ground that they
had come to know that the last owner, the father
of the first respondent, had let the building to the
appellant for his residential purposes and that the
case should proceed againt him only.
But the
1962
Om Prakash Gupta
v.
Rattan Singh
Sinful, c. r.
1962
Om PrakaJh Cupla
v.
Raltan Singh
Sinha, C. J.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
Subordinate Judge, before whom the suit was pend·
ing, did not permit the amendment of the plaint but
granted permission to withdraw from the suit with
liberty to bring a fresh one, by his order dated
May 8, 195\l.
Thereafter, on February 25, 1960,
the respondents made an application before the Rent
Controller, Delhi, for the eviction of the appellant
alone, without implcading the Union aforesaid as a
party. The contention of the appellant was that the
premises had been let out by the father of the first
plaintiff-respondent. to the All India Postal & R.M.S.
Union for office·cum-residential purposes and the
tenancy of the Union had never been terminated.
The appellant also alleged that he was not a tenant
and, therefore, the application for his eviction was not
maintainable. The petition for eviction was founded
on the allegation that the appellant as tenant
had made persistent default in the payment of rent
and, secondly, that the premises were bonafuie required by the respondents for their own residence, as the
first respondent was about to leave the employment
of a certain hospital which had provided him with
residential accommodation.
That is to say, the
petition for eviction was brought under s. 14(l)(a)
& (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (LIX of 1958)-
which will be referred to in the course of the judgment as the Act.
The appellant besides denying his
tenancy and asserting the tenancy of the Union
aforesaid stated that the respondents had already
got suitable accommodation and that their requirement of the prei;nises in question was not bonafide;
the notice of demand for payment of rent served on
the appellant was neither valid nor proper in law
inasmuch as he was not the tenant in respect of the
premises, and that the notice of demand should have
been served on the Union.
The appellant asserted
that he was only a licensee of the Union. and that
there was no relationship of landlord and tenant
between him and the respondents.
On April 2,
1960, the Additional Rent Controller passed an order
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
263
directing the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent
from August 1, 1958, up-to-date, at the rate of
Rs. 50/- per month, and future monthly rent, month
by month, by the 15th of every following month.
The respondents made an application on May 16,
1961, under s. 15(7) of the Act for striking out his
defence against eviction on the ground that the tenant
had failed to make the payment or deposit, as directed by the order dated April 2, 1960, aforesaid.
The
appellant denied that he had made any default in the
regular payment of rent, but also asserted that if
there was any such default it was not intentional and
was the result of a miscalculation. By his order
dated July 26, 1961, the Additional Rent Controller
ordered the defence of the appellant to be struck out.
An appeal against the order striking out his defence
was made to the Rent Control Tribunal on September 15, 1961, which was late by one day. The
learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as time-barred,
as also on merits, by its order dated March 6, 1962.
By his order dated July 17, 1961, the Additional
Rent Controller passed an ex-parte order of ejectment against the appellant holding that primci facie
the relationship of landlord and tenant had been
established, on the basis of certain rent receipts granted by the respondents to the appellant. He also held
that the respondents' personal bonafide need for
accommodation had
been
established.
Appeal
against that order was dismissed on March 7, 1962,
by the Rent Control TribunalOn May 28, 1962,
the appellant filed a second appeal in the High Court
of Punjab at Delhi against the order dated March 7,
1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his
appeal against the order of eviction.
No second
appeal was taken to the High Court in respect of
the dismissal of the appeal relating to the order dated
March 6, 1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal in respect of the order of the
Additional Rent Controller striking out his defence.
The second appeal was dismissed summarily by a .
1962
, Om Prakash Cupt•
v.
Rattan Singh
Sinha, C. J.
1962
Om Praluuh Gupl4
••
Rattan Sinzh
Sinha, C. J.
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Single Judge on May 31, 1962.
The appellant
moved this Cot:rt during the long vacation and
obtained an order from the learned Vacation Judge
granting special leave to appeal, on June 5, 1962.
A preliminary objection was taken on behalf
of the landlord-respondent that no second appeal
having been filed againts the order aforesaid of the
Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal in respect of the order of the Additional Rent Controller
striking out his defence, that order had become final
between the parties, and, therefore, this appeal was
incompetent.
As will presently appear, this question
is bound up with merit5 of the appeal and has, therefore, to be determined not as a preliminary objection
but as one of the contentions between the parties, on
the meriu of the appeal itself.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that
the authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to
entertain the proceedings, inasmuch as it was denied
that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties.
Consrquently, it was further
contended, the provisions of s. 15 (i) of the Act could
not be applied against the appellant in the absence
of a finding that he was the tenant in respect of the
premises in question.
It was also contended that the
delay of one day made in preferring the appeal to the
Rent Control Tribunal should have been condnned,
and the order refusing condonation was vitiated by
applying erroneous considerations.
Other contentions raised related to concurrent iindings of fact of
the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal
and we need not, therefore, take
notice of these
arguments.
The most important question that arises
for determination in this case is whether or not the
Rent Control authorities had
jurisdiction in the
matter in controversy in this case.
Ordinarily it is
for the Civil Courts to determine whether and, if so,
what jural relationship exists between the litigating
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
265
parties. But the Act has been enacted to provide
for the control of rents and evictions of tenants,
avowedly for their benefit and protection.
The Act
postulates the relationship of landlord and tenant
which must be a pre-existing relationship.
The
· Act
is directed to control some of the terms
and incidents of that relationship.
Hence, there
is no express provfoion in the Act
empowering
the controller, or the Tribunal, to determine whether
or not there is a relationship of landlord and tenant.
In most cases such a question would not arise for
determination by the authorities under the Act.
A
landlord must be very ill-advised to start proceedings
under the Act, if there is no such relationship of landlord and tenant. If a person in possession of the
premises is not a tenant, the owner of the premises
would be entitled to institute a suit for ejectment in
the Civil Courts, untrammelled by the provisions of
the Act. It is only when he happens to be the
tenant of premises in an urban area that the provisions of the Act are attracted. If a person moves a
Controller for eviction of a person on the ground
that he is a tenant who had, by his acts or omissions,
made himself liable to be evicted on any one of the
grounds for eviction, and if the tenant denies that the
plaintiff is the landlord, the Controller has to decide
the question whether there was a relationship of
landlord and tenant. If the Controller decides that
there is no such relationship the proceeding has to be
terminated, without deciding the main question in
controversy, namely the question of eviction.
If on
the other hand, the Controller comes to the opposite
conclusion and holds that the person seeking eviction
was the landlord and the person in possession was the
tenant the proceedings have to go on.
Under s. 15
( 4) of the Act, the Controller is authorised to decide
the question whether the claimant was entitled to an
order for payment of rent, and if there is a dispute as
to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable,
he may direct the tenalit to deposit with him the
1962
Om Prakash G11pta
v.
Rattan Singh
Sinha, C. J.
1962
Om Prahuh Gupta
••
Ballan Sinth
s;.i.a, c. ,,
266
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
amount payable until the decision of the question as
to who is entitled to that payment.
"Landlord"
has been defined under the Act as a person who is
receiver or is entitled to receive the rent of the
premises (omitting the words not necessary for our
present purposes).
If the Controller comes to the
conclusion that any dispute raised by the tenant as to
who
wa~ entitled to
receive rent
had
been
raised by
the tenant for
false
or
frivolous
reasons, he may order
the
defence
against
eviction to be struck out (s. 15 (5)).
Similarly, if
a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required
by s. 15 (2), the Controller may order the defence
against eviction to be struck out and proceed with
the hearing of the application for eviction (s. 15 (7)).
Such an order was, as already indicated, passed by
the Rent Controller in this case.
Now, proceedings
under s. 15 are primarily meant for the benefit of
the tenant, and the section authorises the Controller
after giving the parties an opportunity of being
heard, to make an order directing the tenant to pay
the amount found on calculation to be due to the
landlord or to depo~it it with the Controller, within
one month of the date or the order. Such an order
can be passed by the Controller for the benefit of
the tenant, only if the Controller decides that the
person against whom the proceedings for eviction
had been initiated was in the position of a tenant.
Thus, any order passed by the Controller, either
under s. 11> or other sections of the Act, assumes
that the Controller has the jurisdiction to make
the order, i. e., to determine the issue of relationship. In this case, when the Controller made the
order for deposit of the arrears of rent due, under
s. 15 (1), and on default of that made the order
under sub-s. (7) of s. 15, striking out the defence,
the Controller must be deemed to have decided that
the appellant was a tenant. Such a decision may
not be res judicata in a regular suit in which a
similar issue may directly arise for decision. Hence,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 267
any orders made by a Controlier under the· Act
proceed on the assumption that he has the necessary
power to do so under the provisions of the Act, which
apply and which are meant to Coptrol rents and
evictions of tenants. ·An order under s. 15 (1) is
meant primarily for the protection and benefit of
the tenant. If the appellant took his stand upon the
plea that he was not a tenant he should have simply
denied the relationship and walked out of •the
proceedings.
Instead of that, .he took active steps
to get the protection against
eviction afforded by
Act, by having an order passed by the Controller,
giving him a locus poenitentiae by allowing further
time to make the deposit of rent outstanding against
him. The Controller, therefore, must be taken to
have decided that' there was a relationship of land,
lord and tenant between· the parties, and secondly,
that the tenant was entitled to the protection under
the Act. It is true that the Act does not in terms
authorise the authorities under the· •Act to determine
finally the question of the relationship of landlord
and tenant. The Act proceeds on the assumption
that there is such a relationship. If the relationship
is denied, the authorities · under the Act have to
determine that question aho, because a simple denial
of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction . of
the tribunals
under. the Act. · True, they an:
tribunals of the limited jurisdiction, the scope of
their power and authority being limited by the
provisions of the Statute. But a simple denial of
the relationship either by the alleged tlandlord or by
the alleged tenant would not have the effect .of
ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the
Act, because the simplest thing in the world would
be for the party interested to block 'the proceedings
under the Act to· deny the relationship of landlord and tenant.
The tribunals under the Act being
creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction
and have to function within the four-comers of the
Statute creating them. But within the provisions
1962
Om Prakash Gupla
v.
Rallan Singh·
Sinha, C. J.
1961
011 Pr.UU. Gy14
••
lie• SiofA
Su.A., C.J.
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders are final and not liable to
be questioned in collateral proceedings like a separate suit or application in execution proceedings.
In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in
the contention that as soon as the appellant denied
the relationship of landlord and tenant; the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act was completely
ousted. Nor is there any jurisdiction in the contention that the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 15 of the
Act had been erroneously applied to the appellant.
The orders under those provisions were for his
benefit and he must be deemed to have invited the
Controller to
pass those orders in his favour.
Otherwise,
he
should have walked out of the
proceedings after intimating to the Controller that
he was not interested to contest the proceedings in
as much as he was not
a
tenant, and that a
third i;>arty was the tenant. This order, of course,
will bmd only the appellant and no one else, and
as he failed to take advantage of the order passed in
his favour under s. 15 (7), he cannot make a grievance
0f it. Whether or not a delay of one day should have
been condoned was a matter of discretion with the
appellate authority, and it is not for this Court to
say that this discretion should have been exercised in
one way and not in another. The crucial question is
not whether the delay is of one day or more, but
whether or not there was any justification for
the delay. It isfor the appellate authority to determine
whether or not the appellant had satisfied it as to the
sufficiency of the ground for condoning the delay.
This question of condonation of delay is more or less
of academic interest only, because the Tribunal not
only considered the question of delay but also the
appeal on its merits, and on merits also it came to the
conclusion that there was no ground for interference
with the orden passed by the Rent Controller. Hence,
the question of condonation of delay is of no importance in this case. What is of greater importance is the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
269
merit of the decision awarding possession to the landlord. In this connection, it may be added that it
was a little inconsistent on the part of the appellant
to have taken all the advantages the Act affords to :i ··
tenant and then to turn round and to assert that the
Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter,
because he was not the tenant. The Rent Controller
had to determine the controversy as between the
parties for the purposes of disposing of the case under
the Act. If the appellant really was a tenant, he
has had the benefit of the provision of the Act,
including the six months' time as a period of grace
after an order of the Rent Controller granting the
landlord's prayer for eviction.
If he was not the
tenant, he has nothing to lose by the order of the
Rent Controller. These proceedings cannot affect
the interest of one who is not a party to the present
case. Furthermore, a second appeal lay from the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing
the appellant's appeal against the order striking out
his defence. No such second appeal was take~ to the
High Court, though as already stated a second appeal
was preferre.d against the order of the Rent Control
Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the order of
eviction. The position is that the appellate order of
the Rent Control Tribunal, dated March 6, 1962,
dismissing the appeal against the order striking out
his defence became final between the parties and is
no more open to challenge. Hence, it is no more
open to the appellant to challenge t!J.e jurisdiction of
the authorities under the Act.
In our opinion, therefore, 'there is no merit in
his appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs .
..4 ppeal dismissed.
1912
Om Prakash Gupta
••
R•ttan Si"lh
Sinha, C. J.