# P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1286
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-11-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3934 of 2006
- **Bench:** Vikram Nath, Sandeep Mehta, N.V. Anjaria
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/p-anjanappa-d-by-lrs-v-a-p-nanjundappa-ors-38169
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Issue arose whether the registered release deeds are valid and
binding, and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and
share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3; whether
the document styled as the palupatti-partition deed can be relied
upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status as
well as the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment; and
what constitutes the partitionable estate and how the shares are
to be worked out inter se the parties, including the treatment of
Schedule "B" property and item no. 17 of "C" schedule and the extent
to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.
Headnotes†
Family settlement - Joint family property - Registered
release deeds document styled as the palupatti- partition
deed - Reliance - Suit for partition and separate possession -
Suit schedule properties comprised of three parts:
Schedule A-immovable properties belong to one, (now
deceased), continued as joint family properties; Schedule B -
immovable properties purchased under a registered sale deed;
Schedule C-movables, including, inter alia, an item representing
amounts realised by way of rent from the Schedule B
properties - Parties trace lineage to one-common ancester -
Dispute regarding partition of Schedule B properties - Suit
for partition and separate possession of their alleged shares
in the suit schedules, together with consequential accounts
including mesne profits by the plaintiff no. 1 and 2 -
Plaintiff contended that the said properties blended with the
income of the joint family and were also subject to partition
whereas the defendant contended that during the lifetime of
deceased registered release deed has been executed and
after deceased's death partition was recorded in a palupatti-
* Author
424
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
partition deed, pursuant to which they had been in separate
possession and enjoyment - Trial Court decreed the suit by
a preliminary decree - In appeal thereagainst, the High Court
dismissed the appeal - Correctness:
Held: Under Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought
about by an unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise,
and a writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the
fact of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent
possession - Family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied
upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed
the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral
use - Having perused the original records, including the registered
instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous
revenue extracts, both the registered release deed are duly proved
and carry legal effect - One registered release deed severed plaintiff
no. 2 from the coparcenary in 1956 and bars any claim by him to
the joint family estate, and the other severed defendant no. 3 from
the coparcenary in 1967 and bars any claim by him to the joint
family estate - In consequence, as on the death of the propositus
in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary comprised only plaintiff no. 1
and defendant no. 5 - Unregistered partition deed, including the
palupatti may be relied upon for the limited collateral purposes of
proving severance of the joint family status and title, explaining the
nature of possession, recording the arrangement made thereunder,
and evidencing the parties' subsequent conduct - Document styled
as palupatti, is admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes
of proving that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance of
joint status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 and that
each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the properties allotted
under the partition deed and shall not be treated as a conveyance
that creates or extinguishes rights by itself - Partitionable pool shall
consist of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C - Shares
over this pool fixed for plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5, each of

## Text

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[2025] 11 S.C.R. 423 : 2025 INSC 1286
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs
v.
A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3934 of 2006)
06 November 2025
[Vikram Nath,* Sandeep Mehta and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the registered release deeds are valid and
binding, and if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and
share entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3; whether
the document styled as the palupatti-partition deed can be relied
upon for collateral purposes to establish severance of status as
well as the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment; and
what constitutes the partitionable estate and how the shares are
to be worked out inter se the parties, including the treatment of
Schedule "B" property and item no. 17 of "C" schedule and the extent
to which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.
Headnotes†
Family settlement - Joint family property - Registered
release deeds document styled as the palupatti- partition
deed - Reliance - Suit for partition and separate possession -
Suit schedule properties comprised of three parts:
Schedule A-immovable properties belong to one, (now
deceased), continued as joint family properties; Schedule B -
immovable properties purchased under a registered sale deed;
Schedule C-movables, including, inter alia, an item representing
amounts realised by way of rent from the Schedule B
properties - Parties trace lineage to one-common ancester -
Dispute regarding partition of Schedule B properties - Suit
for partition and separate possession of their alleged shares
in the suit schedules, together with consequential accounts
including mesne profits by the plaintiff no. 1 and 2 -
Plaintiff contended that the said properties blended with the
income of the joint family and were also subject to partition
whereas the defendant contended that during the lifetime of
deceased registered release deed has been executed and
after deceased's death partition was recorded in a palupatti-
* Author
424
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
partition deed, pursuant to which they had been in separate
possession and enjoyment - Trial Court decreed the suit by
a preliminary decree - In appeal thereagainst, the High Court
dismissed the appeal - Correctness:
Held: Under Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought
about by an unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise,
and a writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the
fact of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent
possession - Family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied
upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed
the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral
use - Having perused the original records, including the registered
instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous
revenue extracts, both the registered release deed are duly proved
and carry legal effect - One registered release deed severed plaintiff
no. 2 from the coparcenary in 1956 and bars any claim by him to
the joint family estate, and the other severed defendant no. 3 from
the coparcenary in 1967 and bars any claim by him to the joint
family estate - In consequence, as on the death of the propositus
in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary comprised only plaintiff no. 1
and defendant no. 5 - Unregistered partition deed, including the
palupatti may be relied upon for the limited collateral purposes of
proving severance of the joint family status and title, explaining the
nature of possession, recording the arrangement made thereunder,
and evidencing the parties' subsequent conduct - Document styled
as palupatti, is admissible and reliable for the collateral purposes
of proving that, on and from 11.02.1972, there was severance of
joint status between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 and that
each thereafter held and enjoyed separately the properties allotted
under the partition deed and shall not be treated as a conveyance
that creates or extinguishes rights by itself - Partitionable pool shall
consist of Schedule A and items 1 to 16 of Schedule C - Shares
over this pool fixed for plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 5, each of the
five daughters, predeceased daughter to be given effect in favour
of defendant no. 2 as representing her estate - Plaintiff no. 2
and defendant no. 3 take no share - Schedule B and item 17 of
Schedule C are excluded from the hotchpot - Defendant no. 5 and
defendant no. 6 shall hold these in equal halves - Judgment and
decree and the preliminary decree set aside - Fresh preliminary
decree substituted in the stated terms. [Paras 7.9, 8.2, 8.4, 8.5,
8.9, 10, 11]
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
425
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
Case Law Cited
Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC
353; Elumalai v. M. Kamala [2023] 1 SCR 261 : (2023) 13 SCC
27; Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama [2018] 10 SCR 503 :
(2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13; Yellapu Uma Maheswari v. Buddha
Jagadheeswararao (2015) 16 SCC 787; K.G. Shivalingappa v. G.S.
Eswarappa (2004) 12 SCC 189; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa
[2019] 8 SCR 212 : (2019) 6 SCC 409; Kalyani v. Narayanan
(1980) Supp. SCC 298; Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan
Singh (2006) 1 SCC 148 - referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Hindu
Succession Act, 1956.
List of Keywords
Partition; Separate possession and enjoyment; Registered release
deeds; Share entitlements; Palupatti; Partition deed; Collateral
purpose; Severance of joint status; Subsequent possession and
enjoyment; Partitionable estate; Joint family properties; Registered
sale deed; Preliminary decree; Coparcenary; Joint family estate;
Unregistered partition deed; Limited collateral use; Conveyance;
Creates or extinguishes rights; Partition by metes and bounds.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3934
of 2006
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2005 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in RFA No. 750 of 1994
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
G L Vishwanath, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Ms. Lalit Mohini
Bhat, Ms. Nayana Tara B G, Rahul Jain.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Shekhar Devasa, Sr. Adv, Radhakrishna S Hegde, Prakash
Chandra Sharma, Rajeev Singh, T. Muthanna, Manish Tiwari,
M/S. Devasa & Co.
426
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1.
The present civil appeal arises from the final judgment and decree
dated 30 August 2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 750 of 1994 (hereinafter,
"impugned judgment"), whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the judgment and preliminary decree dated 19 August
1994 rendered by the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District,
in Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 decreeing a suit for partition and
separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The appellants
before this Court are the legal heirs of late P. Anjanappa, who was
arrayed as defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, and for ease of
reference the parties shall hereinafter be described by their status
before the Trial Court, with the appellants being referred to as
defendant no. 5.
2.
The facts giving rise to the present case are set out hereafter.
2.1. The parties trace their lineage to one Pillappa, who is stated
to be the common ancestor. His widow Muniyamma was
arrayed as defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court. The plaintiffs
pleaded that Pillappa had four sons, namely plaintiff no. 1 A.
P. Nanjundappa, plaintiff no. 2 Venkataswamappa, defendant
no. 3 Sreeramappa, and defendant no. 5 P. Anjanappa, and five
daughters, namely plaintiff no. 3 Narayanamma, plaintiff no. 4
Sonnamma, plaintiff no. 5 Anjanamma, and defendant no. 4
Lakshmamma, besides one daughter who had predeceased and
whose branch was represented in the suit as defendant no. 2.
Defendant no. 6 Muniswamappa is the husband of plaintiff no.
3 and is not a member of the joint family. Defendant no. 7 is
a lessee in respect of certain items of the suit properties. The
other defendants are members of the wider family as reflected
in the array of parties.
2.2. The suit schedule properties comprised of three parts. Schedule
"A" described immovable properties said to have originally
belonged to Pillappa and thereafter to have continued as joint
family properties in the hands of the coparcenary comprising
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
427
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
the parties to the suit. Schedule "B" described immovable
properties purchased under a registered sale deed dated 25
April 1974 in the joint names of defendant no. 5 and defendant
no. 6. Schedule "C" described movables, including, inter alia,
an item representing amounts realised by way of rent from the
Schedule "B" properties.
2.3. The plaintiffs' case, in brief, was that Schedule "A" properties
were joint family properties liable to partition and that Schedule
"B" properties, though standing in the joint names of defendant
no. 5 and defendant no. 6, had been acquired from and blended
with the income of the joint family and were therefore also subject
to partition. It was further asserted that defendant no. 7 had
been inducted as yearly lessee in respect of items comprised
in Schedule "B" and that defendant no. 5 had collected the
lease amounts, which were liable to be brought to account
as part of Schedule "C". The plaint also adverted to certain
agricultural operations, including a casuarina plantation, and
claimed accounting of the proceeds.
2.4. Defendant no. 5 contested the suit. His principal defences,
as pleaded were: that plaintiff no. 2 had during the lifetime of
Pillappa executed a registered release deed; that defendant
no. 3 had, in the year 1967, executed a registered release deed
relinquishing his rights in the joint family properties; and that
after the death of Pillappa in the year 1969 there had been,
on 11 February 1972, a partition between plaintiff no. 1 and
defendant no. 5 in the presence of panchayatdars, recorded in a
palupatti ('Palupatti' means partition deed or a family settlement
agreement) pursuant to which they had been in separate
possession and enjoyment and separate entries had been
made in the revenue records. Defendant no. 5 further pleaded
that Schedule "B" properties were his self-acquisitions, that
defendant no. 6 was only a name lender, and that the plaintiffs'
sisters had been given in marriage with customary expenses
and were not entitled to shares in the immovable properties.
2.5. Defendant no. 6, though not a member of the joint family,
was a joint purchaser of Schedule "B" and was impleaded on
that footing. Defendant no. 7, being the lessee in respect of
Schedule "B", was impleaded to answer the claim for rendition
428
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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of accounts of rent. The remaining defendants were added as
necessary parties to an action for partition.
2.6. On 2 July 1987, plaintiff no. 1 and plaintiff no. 2 instituted
Original Suit No. 146 of 1987 before the Court of the City Civil
Judge, Bangalore Rural District, seeking partition and separate
possession of their alleged shares in the suit schedules, together
with consequential accounts including mesne profits.
2.7. Upon service of summons, defendant no. 5 entered appearance
and contested the suit. Defendant no. 6, though he did not at
first file a written statement, lodged a counter claim asserting
half share in Schedule "B" properties as a joint purchaser and
sought a corresponding share in the amounts described as
item no. 17 in Schedule "C". Defendant no. 7 filed a written
statement admitting its status as lessee in respect of Schedule
"B" and stating that rents had been paid to defendant no. 5 until
disputes arose between defendant no. 5 and defendant no. 6,
whereafter the lessee expressed willingness to deposit rents
in court. Defendants nos. 1 to 4 did not contest the matter and
remained absent.
3.
The Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence,
decreed the suit for partition and separate possession by a preliminary
decree dated 19 August 1994. The Trial Court's decision was based
on the following reasons:
3.1. In relation to Schedule "A", the Trial Court held that the
properties were joint family properties. It rejected the defence
of a concluded partition as of 11 February 1972 on the basis
of an unregistered palupatti. The Trial Court recorded that
the document, being unregistered, could not be received in
evidence to prove either severance in status or the quantum
of shares, and that the surrounding revenue materials did not
demonstrate that the alleged partition had been acted upon.
The Trial Court noted that entries in the revenue records
reflected possession by inheritance and management rather
than by partition, that there was no subdivision or demarcation
in accordance with a partition, and that the conduct relied upon
by defendant no. 5, including a subsequent alienation said
to discharge family debts, was inconsistent with a complete
earlier severance.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
3.2. In relation to Schedule "B", the Trial Court found that the
properties were purchased in the joint names of defendant no. 5
and defendant no. 6 under a registered sale deed dated 25 April
1974 and that the lease granted in favour of defendant no. 7
had been executed jointly by defendant no. 5 and defendant
no. 6. On an appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence,
including the admissions elicited from defendant no. 5, the Trial
Court rejected the plea that defendant no. 6 was a mere name
lender and negatived the contention that the entire of Schedule
"B" was the self-acquisition of defendant no. 5. The Trial Court
concluded that defendant no. 6 was entitled to a half share in
Schedule "B" and to a half share in the moneys represented by
item no. 17 of Schedule "C", with the remaining half of those
items forming part of the family pool for partition.
3.3. In relation to the release deeds set up by defendant no. 5, the
Trial Court held that the registered release deed attributed to
plaintiff no. 2 was not shown to have been acted upon, since
the proponent did not lead convincing evidence to establish
separation of plaintiff no. 2 from the joint family or exclusion of
his claim to partition. As regards defendant no. 3, the Trial Court
noticed the release deed and treated him as having separated
for the purpose of survivorship, yet held that he would participate
to the extent of a share in the notional accretion arising on the
death of the father. On that footing, the Trial Court declined to
exclude either plaintiff no. 2 or defendant no. 3 from the suit
entirely.
3.4. The computation of shares was undertaken on the basis that, at
the time of the death of Pillappa in the year 1969, the coparcenary
consisted of the father and three sons, namely plaintiff no. 1,
plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, with defendant no. 3 being
treated as separated for the purpose of survivorship. A notional
partition was therefore posited to the extent of 1/4 in favour of
Pillappa. The Trial Court then proceeded on the footing that
the notional 1/4th share of Pillappa devolved in equal measure
among nine sharers represented in the suit, namely plaintiff
no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, defendant no. 5, the four daughters, the
branch of the predeceased daughter represented by defendant
no. 2, and defendant no. 3. On that basis, each of the nine
received an accretion of 1/36, and plaintiff no. 1, plaintiff
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no. 2, and defendant no. 5 each took, in addition, 1/4 as their
coparcenary share, yielding a total of 5/18 for each of plaintiff
no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5, and 1/36 for each
of plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4, plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4,
defendant no. 3, and defendant no. 2. The share of defendant
no. 6 was determined separately as 1/2 of Schedule "B" and
1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule "C", outside the family pool, in
terms of the findings recorded in relation to those items.
3.5. The Trial Court directed an enquiry into mesne profits and
consequential accounts, including in respect of the lease moneys
pertaining to Schedule "B", to be worked out in the final decree
proceedings in accordance with the shares so declared.
4.
Aggrieved by the preliminary decree dated 19 August 1994, defendant
no. 5 preferred Regular First Appeal no. 750 of 1994 before the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. By the impugned judgment dated
30 August 2005, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decree of the Trial Court with the following observations:
4.1. The High Court noted the defence of defendant no. 5 that
there had been a partition on 11 February 1972 reduced into
a palupatti and that the revenue entries thereafter reflected
separate possession. Upon examining the document and the
surrounding materials, the High Court held that the palupatti,
being unregistered, was inadmissible to prove either severance
of the joint family status or the quantification of shares. It further
found, on an appraisal of the mutation extracts, record of rights,
and other revenue papers, that the entries indicated possession
by inheritance and management rather than pursuant to a
partition; that there was no phodi or sub-division ('Phodi' means
process of surveying and demarcating land) corresponding to
a partition; and that a subsequent alienation reciting discharge
of joint family debts was inconsistent with an earlier partition.
The plea of an effective partition as on 11 February 1972 was
therefore rejected.
4.2. In relation to the release attributed to plaintiff no. 2, the High
Court concurred with the Trial Court that the document had not
been shown to have been acted upon, and that there was no
reliable evidence of plaintiff no. 2 having separated so as to forfeit
a claim in partition or in the devolution of the notional share of
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
the father. As regards the release attributed to defendant no. 3,
the High Court referred to the nature of the instrument and the
applicable stamp requirements and held that the proponent had
not established its efficacy to exclude defendant no. 3 entirely.
The High Court supplemented the reasons recorded by the
Trial Court and declined to disturb the inclusion of defendant
no. 3 for purposes of computing shares.
4.3. On Schedule "B", the High Court affirmed the findings that the
properties were purchased jointly in the names of defendant
no. 5 and defendant no. 6 and that the lease in favour of
defendant no. 7 was executed by both of them. Having regard
to the admissions in the evidence of defendant no. 5 and the
tenor of the documents, the High Court rejected the contention
that defendant no. 6 was a mere name lender and upheld his
entitlement to a one half share in Schedule "B" and a one half
share in the moneys represented by item no. 17 of Schedule
"C". It held that only the remaining one half of those items would
enter the family pool for partition.
4.4. On the basis of the above conclusions, the High Court affirmed
the computation adopted by the Trial Court, namely that plaintiff
no. 1, plaintiff no. 2, and defendant no. 5 would each be entitled
to 5/18 in the family pool and that plaintiff no. 3, plaintiff no. 4,
plaintiff no. 5, defendant no. 4, defendant no. 3, and defendant
no. 2 would each be entitled to 1/36, with defendant no. 6
holding 1/2 of Schedule "B" and 1/2 of item no. 17 of Schedule
"C" outside the family pool.
4.5. Consequential directions were issued for disbursal of rents
earlier deposited in respect of Schedule "B" in proportion to
the shares as affirmed, and certain ministerial corrections in
the cause title were permitted.
5.
Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the first appeal, the appellants,
who are the legal heirs of defendant no. 5 before the Trial Court, have
preferred the present civil appeal. Respondent nos. 1 to 5 herein
are plaintiff nos. 1 to 5 before the Trial Court. Respondent no. 6
herein is defendant no. 1 before the Trial Court, respondent no. 7
is defendant no. 2, respondent no. 8 is defendant no. 3, respondent
no. 9 is defendant no. 6, respondent no. 10 is defendant no. 4, and
respondent no. 11 is defendant no. 7. As already stated, the parties
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shall hereinafter be referred to by their descriptions as they stood
before the Trial Court.
6.
Having considered the pleadings, the evidence on record and the
rival submissions of the respective parties, the questions that fall for
our determination are as follows:
I.
Whether the registered release deeds dated 09.11.1956
(Ex.D 15) and 14.09.1967 (Ex.D-16) are valid and binding, and
if so, what is their legal effect on the membership and share
entitlements of plaintiff no. 2 and defendant no. 3.
II.
Whether the document dated 11.02.1972 styled as the palupatti
(Ex.D-17 with schedule Ex.D-17(a)) can be relied upon for
collateral purposes to establish severance of status as well as
the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment.
III.
Consequent upon the answers to the above, what constitutes
the partitionable estate and how the shares are to be worked
out inter se the parties, including the treatment of Schedule
"B" property and item no. 17 of "C" schedule and the extent to
which the co-ownership of defendant no. 6 is to be preserved.
7.
Issue I - Validity and effect of the two release deeds.
7.1. The parties are at variance on whether plaintiff no. 2 and
defendant no. 3 had, prior to the death of the propositus in
1969, effectively severed themselves from the joint family and
abandoned all claim to its estate (and to the father's share
upon notional partition). The plaintiffs contend that the alleged
releases were either not proved, or, if proved, were ineffectual
for want of being "acted upon." The appellant (defendant no. 5)
maintains that both instruments are registered releases executed
for consideration, as borne out by the parties' subsequent
conduct, and operate to exclude plaintiff no. 2 and defendant
no. 3 from any share.
7.2. Having perused the original records, including the registered
instruments, deposition of the parties, and the contemporaneous
revenue extracts placed before us, we are satisfied that both
Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 are duly proved and carry legal effect.
7.3. As regards Ex.D-15 (09.11.1956), it is a registered deed
by which plaintiff no. 2 unequivocally released his right and
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
interest in the joint family and in the estate of his father in
consideration of a cash payment. It recites, in clear terms, a
complete severance of all claims save the bond of blood. The
deed was produced and exhibited without objection; there was
no cross-examination of defendant no. 5 on its execution or
contents; and plaintiff no. 2 did not present himself for crossexamination to dislodge the document. In these circumstances,
the statutory presumption that attaches to a registered instrument
operates, and, in the case of Ex.D-15 which was more than
thirty years old when tendered, the presumption under Section
90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/Section 89 of the Bharatiya
Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is also attracted. The burden to rebut
the deed's genuineness and effect lay squarely on those who
impeached it. No credible rebuttal was led. This principle has
been reiterated by this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal1 in the
following terms:
"27. There is a presumption that a registered
document is validly executed. A registered document,
therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The
onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads
evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant
case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the
said presumption."
7.4. The Trial Court declined to give effect to Ex.D-15 on two grounds:
first, that the deed was not mentioned in the later palupatti;
and second, that it was not shown to have been "acted upon."
In our considered opinion, both reasons are misconceived. A
release by a coparcener for consideration operates immediately
to divest his subsisting coparcenary interest; it does not depend
for its efficacy on any further act of implementation. Silence in
a later, separate memorandum does not undo a concluded,
registered relinquishment inter partes, particularly when the
deed is produced from proper custody and stands unchallenged
in cross-examination.
7.5. We accordingly hold Ex.D-15 to be valid and binding and to
have the effect of removing plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary
1
(2006) 5 SCC 353.
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[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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from 1956 onwards. To the extent Ex.D-15 adverts to the
father's separate or future entitlement, we treat the covenant,
consideration and long-standing conduct as creating an equitable
estoppel against plaintiff no. 2 setting up a contrary claim now.
The estoppel effect of similar release deeds was observed by
this Court in Elumalai v. M. Kamala2 as follows:
"16. This Court went on to approve the view taken
by the High Court of Allahabad in Latafat Husain v.
Hidayat Husain [Latafat Husain v. Hidayat Husain,
1936 SCC OnLine All 315 : AIR 1936 All 573] . The
Court found as follows : (Gulam Abbas case [Gulam
Abbas v. Haji Kayyum Ali, (1973) 1 SCC 1] , SCC
pp. 4-5, paras 5 & 7)
"5. ... With due respect, we are unable to concur with
the view [Abdul Kafoor v. Abdul Razack, 1958 SCC
OnLine Mad 129] of the Madras High Court that a
renunciation of an expectancy, as a purported but
legally ineffective transfer, is struck by Section 23
of the Indian Contract Act. As it would be void as a
transfer at all there was no need to rely on Section
23, Contract Act. If there was no "transfer" of property
at all, which was the correct position, but a simple
contract, which could only operate in future, it was
certainly not intended to bring about an immediate
transfer which was all that the rule of Muslim law
invalidated. The real question was whether, quite
apart from any transfer or contract, the declarations in
the deeds of purported relinquishment and receipt of
valuable consideration could not be parts of a course
of conduct over a number of years which, taken as a
whole, created a bar against a successful assertion of
a right to property when that right actually came into
being. An equitable estoppel operates, if its elements
are established, as a rule of evidence preventing the
assertion of rights which may otherwise exist.
***
2
(2023) 13 SCC 27.
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435
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
7. Sir Roland Wilson, in his "Anglo Mohamadan Law"
(p. 260, para 208) states the position thus:
'For the sake of those readers who are familiar with the
joint ownership of father and son according to the most
widely prevalent school of Hindu Law, it is perhaps
desirable to state explicitly that in Mohammedan,
as in Roman and English Law, nemo est heres
viventis.........a living person has no heir. An heir
apparent or presumptive has no such reversionary
interest as would enable him to object to any sale
or gift made by the owner in possession; See Abdul
Wahid [Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi, 1885 SCC
OnLine PC 4 : (1884-85) 12 IA 91 : ILR (1885) 11 Cal
597] which was followed in Hasan Ali [Hasan Ali v.
Nazo, 1889 SCC OnLine All 29 : ILR (1889) 11 All
456] . The converse is also true : a renunciation by
an expectant heir in the lifetime of his ancestor is not
valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of
the inheritance.'
This is a correct statement, so far as it goes, of the law,
because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit
cannot bind the expectant heir's conduct in future.
But, if the expectant heir goes further and receives
consideration and so conducts himself as to mislead
an owner into not making dispositions of his property
inter vivos the expectant heir could be debarred from
setting up his right when it does unquestionably
vest in him. In other words, the principle of estoppel
remains untouched by this statement."
(emphasis supplied)
17. The property i.e. 'A' schedule, was not the
ancestral property of Shri Chandran. Shri Chandran
would have acquired rights over the same only if his
father had died intestate. He was, thus, only an heir
apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere
spes successionis ineffective to convey any right. By
the mere execution of release deed, in other words,
436
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
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in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This
is for the simple reason that the transferor, namely,
the father of the appellants did not have any right at
all which he could transfer or relinquish. However,
if his conduct was such that he could be estopped
then the execution of the release deed would imperil
his right and therefore cast an irremovable shadow
on the claim of the appellants as well unless we find
merit in other submissions of Shri Siddharth Iyer,
learned counsel for the appellants."
7.6. Turning to Ex.D-16 (14.09.1967), it is a registered deed by
which defendant no. 3 relinquished all his rights, title and
interest in favour of the father and the then coparceners, and
contemporaneously received seven items of property. Execution
was admitted in the pleadings; defendant no. 3 entered the
box and accepted the deed; and the instrument was exhibited.
The courts below treated Ex.D-16 with unwarranted scepticism.
The Trial Court discounted it, broadly on "not acted upon" and
recital-based reasoning. The High Court, while accepting that
the deed partook the character of an instrument of partition for
stamp purposes, declined to give effect to it on the footing that
proper valuation and stamp duty were not demonstrated and
that, in any case, it had not been acted upon. That approach
is unsustainable for multiple reasons.
7.7. Firstly, the deed is registered and was admitted in evidence;
no timely, specific objection on stamp duty was pressed to a
logical conclusion at the stage of marking, and the instrument
having been received in evidence, its admissibility on that
score cannot be re-agitated at the appellate stage. Secondly,
even if one were to regard Ex.D-16 through the lens of a family
arrangement, the law leans strongly in favour of upholding
such settlements among close relations where consideration
has passed and possession has followed. Here, there is both
consideration and unequivocal admission of execution. Thirdly,
the "acted upon" objection is misplaced on the facts and in
principle. The record shows consistent, post-1967 conduct
aligning with the break-away of defendant no. 3: he did not
assert coparcenary incidents thereafter; the subsequent family
arrangement of 11.02.1972 proceeded between plaintiff no. 1
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
437
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
and defendant no. 5; and the revenue course and dealings
which we shall discuss while considering the palupatti are plainly
inconsistent with defendant no. 3 continuing as a coparcener.
Where execution is admitted, consideration is shown, and later
conduct corroborates severance, courts ought not to defeat a
registered relinquishment by demanding proof of superadded
formalities.
7.8. We therefore disapprove the principal reasons furnished by
the Trial Court and the High Court. The Trial Court erred in
treating "non-mention" in a later document and an asserted want
of "acting upon" as fatal to Ex.D-15 and Ex.D-16 despite the
admissions and presumptions that attached to them. The High
Court compounded the error by invoking stamp characterisation
to withhold effect from Ex.D-16 after admitting it in evidence and
after acknowledging its tenor, and by failing to appreciate that
the deeds carried their own operative force and were reinforced
by subsequent conduct.
7.9. On the cumulative appraisal of record, we hold that Ex.D-15
severed plaintiff no. 2 from the coparcenary with effect from
09.11.1956 and bars any claim by him to the joint family estate.
Moreover, we also hold that Ex.D-16 severed defendant no. 3
from the coparcenary with effect from 14.09.1967 and bars any
claim by him to the joint family estate. In consequence, as on
the death of the propositus in 1969, the subsisting coparcenary
comprised only plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5. This legal
position will govern the computation of the partitionable estate
and the working of shares that we take up under Issue III.
8.
Issue II - Whether the "palupatti" proves disruption of the joint
family and the parties' subsequent separate possession and
enjoyment (collateral use).
8.1. The plaintiffs deny that there was any partition or disruption
of the joint family and contend that the writing described as
the palupatti is an unregistered partition deed that cannot be
looked at for any purpose. Defendant no. 5 asserts that Ex.D-17
records a family arrangement which contains an unequivocal
declaration of severance of status between plaintiff no. 1 and
defendant no. 5 after the earlier releases by plaintiff no. 2 and
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defendant no. 3, that the arrangement was acted upon in fact,
and that even if it is unregistered it is admissible for the limited
collateral purposes of proving disruption of joint status and
explaining the nature of subsequent possession and enjoyment.
8.2. An unregistered partition deed, including the palupatti in the
present case, may be relied upon for the limited collateral
purposes of proving severance of the joint family status and title,
explaining the nature of possession, recording the arrangement
made thereunder, and evidencing the parties' subsequent
conduct as was observed by this Court in various judgements
such as Sita Ram Bhama v. Ramvatar Bhama3, Yellapu
Uma Maheswari v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao4 and K.G.
Shivalingappa v. G.S. Eswarappa5. The same has been clearly
expounded by this Court in Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa6 in
the following paras:
"9.4. It is required to be noted that the deed dated
23-4-1971, under which the suit property had gone/
devolved in favour of Krishnappa, was reduced in
writing before the panchayat and panchas, and the
same was signed by the village people/panchayat
people and all the members of the family including
even the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff disputed that
the partition was not reduced in writing in the form of
document Ext. D-4, on considering the entire evidence
on record and even the deposition of the plaintiff
(cross-examination), he has specifically admitted that
the oral partition had taken place in the year 1971.
He has also admitted that he has got the share which
tallies with the document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4).
Execution of the document/partition deed/Palupatta
dated 23-4-1971 has been established and proved
by examining different witnesses. The High Court has
refused to look into the said document and/or consider
3
(2018) 15 SCC 130 at Para 13.
4
(2015) 16 SCC 787 at Para 16.
5
(2004) 12 SCC 189 at Para 14.
6
(2019) 6 SCC 409.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.
439
P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
document dated 23-4-1971 (Ext. D-4) solely on the
ground that it requires registration and therefore as
it is unregistered, the same cannot be looked into.
However, as observed by this Court in Kale [Kale v.
Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119] that
such a family settlement, though not registered,
would operate as a complete estoppel against the
parties to such a family settlement. In the aforesaid
decision, this Court considered its earlier decision
in S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai [S.
Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973)
2 SCC 312] in which it was observed as under: (S.
Shanmugam Pillai case [S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K.
Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312] , SCC pp.
319 & 321, paras 13 & 22)
"13. Equitable, principles such as estoppel, election,
family settlement, etc. are not mere technical rules of
evidence. They have an important purpose to serve
in the administration of justice. The ultimate aim of
the law is to secure justice. In the recent times in
order to render justice between the parties, courts
have been liberally relying on those principles. We
would hesitate to narrow down their scope.
***
22. As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's
Family Charities case [T.V.R. Subbu Chetty's Family
Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 797] ,
that if a person having full knowledge of his right as
a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which
settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents
at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go
back on that agreement when reversion actually
falls open."
9.5. As held by this Court in Subraya M.N. [Subraya
M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705 : (2016) 4
SCC (Civ) 163] even without registration a written
document of family settlement/family arrangement
can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining
440
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the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the
parties. In the present case, as observed hereinabove,
even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted that
the oral partition had taken place on 23-4-1971 and
he also admitted that 3 to 4 panchayat people were
also present. However, according to him, the same
was not reduced in writing. Therefore, even accepting
the case of the plaintiff that there was an oral partition
on 23-4-1971, the document, Ext. D-4 dated 23-41971, to which he is also the signatory and all other
family members are signatory, can be said to be a
list of properties partitioned. Everybody got right/
share as per the oral partition/partition. Therefore, the
same even can be used as corroborative evidence
as explaining the arrangement made thereunder
and conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court has
committed a grave/manifest error in not looking into
and/or not considering the document Ext. D-4 dated
23-4-1971."
8.3. We have perused the original Ex.D-17 and its schedule
Ex.D 17(a) as they stand on the trial record. Plaintiff no. 1
admitted his signature, which was marked in evidence as Ex.D 6.
The signatures of defendant no. 5 and the mother were also
marked. The writing bears the attestation of panchayatdars
and was written by the village accountant. At the stage of
production, the Trial Court permitted Ex.D-17 and Ex.D-17(a)
to be marked for collateral purpose. The surrounding materials
from 1972 onwards are consistent with that position. There
are mutation and revenue entries that refer to the post-1972
arrangement and to the earlier releases. Revenue records,
including RTCs and index extracts, stand separately in the
names of plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5 for the very survey
numbers that Ex.D-17(a) allots to them. Separate residence
and separate cooking from 1972 were admitted. Plaintiff no. 1
independently mortgaged lands that fell to his share. Plaintiff
no. 1 independently acquired and alienated property after 1972.
In 2014, plaintiff no. 1 executed a relinquishment in favour
of the municipal authority and independently monetised the
transaction through transfer of development rights. The lands
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P. Anjanappa (D) By Lrs v. A.P. Nanjundappa & Ors.
allotted under Ex.D-17(a) lie in different villages and no survey
number is common between plaintiff no. 1 and defendant no. 5.
This bears upon the objection based on the absence of partition
by metes and bounds.
8.4. The governing principles in such cases are well settled. Under
Hindu law, severance of joint status can be brought about by an
unequivocal declaration reduced to writing or otherwise, and a
writing evidencing such disruption is admissible to prove the fact
of disruption, the arrangement, and the character of subsequent
possession.