# P. J. IRANI v. THE STATE OF MADRAS

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 671 of 1957
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/p-j-irani-v-the-state-of-madras-2244
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

Rent Control-Restrictions on evictio'tl--Statute empJwering
Government to exemp# any premises from restrictions -C onstitutiona~
lily-Order exempting premises-Validity-When can be challenged-Practice, whether respondent can raise question decided against
him-Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, r949
(Mad. XXV of r949), s. r3-Constitulion of India, Art. r4.
One Chad obtained a lease of a cinema house which \\'as to
expire in l\fci.y i942. In the ml::antime litigation ensuerl between
the owners of the cinema house, and the High Court appointed
receivers to administer the property.
In 1940 one I offered to
take a lease of the cinema house for zr years.
The High Court
offered C the option of taking the lease for 21 years but C was
willing to take it only for 7 years upto May 1947. Thereupon
the High Court ordered that a lease be given to C upto May
1947, and thereafter the lease be given to I upto May 196r.
In
accordance with this order t11e receivers executed t\.VO leases, one
in favour of C and a reversionary lease in favour of!. Btfore
the lease in favour of C expired the Madras (Lease & Rent
Control) Act, 1946, came into force which protected tenants in
2l
April 21.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
I96r
possession from eviction even after the expiry of their leases.
This Act was replaced by the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent
P. J. hani
Control) Act, r949, which contained similar provisions. Sec·
v.
tion r3 of the r949 Act empowered the State Government to
State of Madras "exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of
the provisions of this Act." On the application of I the Government passed an order on June 4, r952, under s. 13 exempting the
cinema house from all the provisions of the Act. Subsequently,
the reasons for making the order were given by the Government to be: (i) Chad deliberately, though he had been offered a
lease for 21 years by the High Court, taken a lease for 7 years
and he was seeking to take advantage of the Act after the
\
expiry of bis lease, (ii) C was an absentee lessee and bad several
other business and (iii) C had already been in possession for
-
5 years more than he was legitimately entitled to be.
C filed a
writ petition before the High Court for quashing the order on
the grounds that s. r3 of the Act vested in the Government an
unguided and uncontrolled discretion and violated Art. r4 of the
Constitution and that the order deprived C of the equal protection of the beneficial provisions of the Act. The High Court held
that s. r3 was not unconstitutional but that the order of the
Government was ultra vires. I appealed to the Supreme Court.
At the bearing C sought to challenge the validity of s. r3 also.
Held, that s. r3 of the Act did not violate Art. r4 and was
not unconstitutional. Enough guidance was afforded by the
preamble and the operative provisions of the Act for the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Government. The
power under s. 13 was to be exercised in cases where the protection given by the Act caused great hardship to the landlord or
was the subject of abuse by the tenant.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Sri Justice Tendolkar, [r959] S.C.R.
279 and Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [r957]
S.C.R. 605, followed.
H dd, (per Sinha, C.J., Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ.), that
the order passed by the Government under s. r3 was ultra vires
and void. An order made under s. r3 was subject to judicial
review on the grounds that (a) it was discriminatory, (b) it was
made on grounds which were not germane or relevant to the
policy and purpose of the Act, and (c) it was made on grounds
which were malafide. In the present case the grounds given for
granting the exemption were not those countenanced by the
policy or purpose of the Act. The mere fact that C had taken
the lease for 7 years and continued in possession after its expiry
was no ground for eviction as the policy of the Act was to
protect such possession. The fact that C had other business was
immaterial;

## Text

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2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force·
z96z
in a particular area cannot be accepted. The concluc·h 1
1,, .
.
,
.
b d
.J a 1
JflO)taj
s10n must follow that the present smt cu.nnot
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creed in favour of the respondent. The decisions of & Giuniug Facto>y
the High Court and the Court of First Instance u,re
v.
thus erroneous, and must be set aside.
Subbasl• CJiandrn
In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the two
Yograj Sinha
preliminary Issues are answered in favonr of the Hidayatullah J.
appellants. Under the orders of this Court, the judgment of the Civil Judge was stayed. The suit will
now be decided in conformity with our judgment.
The respondent shall pay the costs of this Court and
of the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
P. J. IRANI
v.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Rent Control-Restrictions on evictio'tl--Statute empJwering
Government to exemp# any premises from restrictions -C onstitutiona~
lily-Order exempting premises-Validity-When can be challenged-Practice, whether respondent can raise question decided against
him-Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, r949
(Mad. XXV of r949), s. r3-Constitulion of India, Art. r4.
One Chad obtained a lease of a cinema house which \\'as to
expire in l\fci.y i942. In the ml::antime litigation ensuerl between
the owners of the cinema house, and the High Court appointed
receivers to administer the property.
In 1940 one I offered to
take a lease of the cinema house for zr years.
The High Court
offered C the option of taking the lease for 21 years but C was
willing to take it only for 7 years upto May 1947. Thereupon
the High Court ordered that a lease be given to C upto May
1947, and thereafter the lease be given to I upto May 196r.
In
accordance with this order t11e receivers executed t\.VO leases, one
in favour of C and a reversionary lease in favour of!. Btfore
the lease in favour of C expired the Madras (Lease & Rent
Control) Act, 1946, came into force which protected tenants in
2l
April 21.
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
I96r
possession from eviction even after the expiry of their leases.
This Act was replaced by the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent
P. J. hani
Control) Act, r949, which contained similar provisions. Sec·
v.
tion r3 of the r949 Act empowered the State Government to
State of Madras "exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of
the provisions of this Act." On the application of I the Government passed an order on June 4, r952, under s. 13 exempting the
cinema house from all the provisions of the Act. Subsequently,
the reasons for making the order were given by the Government to be: (i) Chad deliberately, though he had been offered a
lease for 21 years by the High Court, taken a lease for 7 years
and he was seeking to take advantage of the Act after the
\
expiry of bis lease, (ii) C was an absentee lessee and bad several
other business and (iii) C had already been in possession for
-
5 years more than he was legitimately entitled to be.
C filed a
writ petition before the High Court for quashing the order on
the grounds that s. r3 of the Act vested in the Government an
unguided and uncontrolled discretion and violated Art. r4 of the
Constitution and that the order deprived C of the equal protection of the beneficial provisions of the Act. The High Court held
that s. r3 was not unconstitutional but that the order of the
Government was ultra vires. I appealed to the Supreme Court.
At the bearing C sought to challenge the validity of s. r3 also.
Held, that s. r3 of the Act did not violate Art. r4 and was
not unconstitutional. Enough guidance was afforded by the
preamble and the operative provisions of the Act for the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Government. The
power under s. 13 was to be exercised in cases where the protection given by the Act caused great hardship to the landlord or
was the subject of abuse by the tenant.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Sri Justice Tendolkar, [r959] S.C.R.
279 and Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [r957]
S.C.R. 605, followed.
H dd, (per Sinha, C.J., Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ.), that
the order passed by the Government under s. r3 was ultra vires
and void. An order made under s. r3 was subject to judicial
review on the grounds that (a) it was discriminatory, (b) it was
made on grounds which were not germane or relevant to the
policy and purpose of the Act, and (c) it was made on grounds
which were malafide. In the present case the grounds given for
granting the exemption were not those countenanced by the
policy or purpose of the Act. The mere fact that C had taken
the lease for 7 years and continued in possession after its expiry
was no ground for eviction as the policy of the Act was to
protect such possession. The fact that C had other business was
immaterial; the Government failed to consider the question
whether if C was evicted he could secure alternative accommodation where he could carry on the business which he was
carrying on in the cinema house.
...
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOH,TS
171
Per S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, J.J.
The order passed by
1961
the Government under s. r3 was a competent and legal order.
All that the court had to see was whether the power had been
P. ]. frani
used for any extraneous purpose, i.e., not for achieving the
v.
object for which the power was granted. The pnrpose of the State of 111adras
Act was to prevent unreasonable eviction and to control rent.
Where, as in the present case, there was no risk of the landlord
being able to realise illegal rent or premium the eviction would
not be unreasonable. Further, if exemption vvas refused in the
present case it 1;vould prevent the fligh Court frorn administer~
ing the property in its charge.
The order was not unfair to C
for he had been offered a lease for zr years which he declined.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 671 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dn,ted February 5, 1954, of the Madras High Court in \V rit
Appeal No. 28 of 1953.
Sachin Chaudhuri, N. A. Pallchiwala, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and P. L. Vohra, for tho appellant.
B. K. Gopalakrishnamachar n,nd 1'. ]}[. Sen, for the
respondent No. 1.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and
G. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent JI\ o. 2.
1961. April 21.
The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.,
Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ. was delivered by
Ayyangar, J. The Judgment of S. K. Das and Sarkar,
JJ., was delivered by Sarkar, J.
AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal n,gainst a jndgAyyanga' J.
mcnt of a Division Bench of the High Court of
Madras on a certificate under Arts. 132 ancl 133(1) of
the Constitution, and raises for considern ti on the constitutionn,lity of s. l!3 of the Madras Buildings (Lease
& Rent Control) Act, 1949; and the legality of an order
of the Stn,te Government passed thereunder.
The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly as
follows:
The dispute relates to premises X o. 1,
Blackers Road, ]\fount Rortd, :\fa.cl.ms-a property
which was originn,lly owned by one Sir Hn,ji Is111rcil
Sait.
In or about the year 1914 one Venlrnyyn,
obtained a len,se of this property from Sir Hn,ji Ismail
Sait and
constructed a
cinema-theatre
thereon
P. J. Irani
v.
State (lj J.ladras
Ayyangar J.
172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
which he ran under the name of "the Gaiety Theatre".
Venkayya was adjudicated an insolvent and the
Official Assignee of Madras in w horn his estate, including the leasehold interest in the suit site vested,
obtained a further lease of the property from the
representativ<'s of Sir Haji Ismail Sait who had by
then died, for a period of 9 years from Ma,rch 1926.
Thereafter the Official Assignee sold the super.structure of the theatre to one Mrs. Madan to whom he
also assigned the unexpired portion of the lease. Mrs.
Madan, subsequently, obtained a further lease of the
property from the representatives of Sir Haji Ismail
Sait's estate for a further period of 7 years from June
1935.
Mrs. Madan was thus the owner of the superstructure and the lessee of the site, with a term whieh
would expire in or about May 1942.
While one
T. S. PL. P. Chidambaram Chctty who iE: the second
respondent before us obtained a conveyance of all the
rights which Mrs. Madan possessed in the super-structure and in the lease for a sum of Rs. 36,000 under a
registered deed dated January 4, 1937, and he ran
the cinema house from then.
There was litigation between the heirs of Sir Haji
Ismail Sait, pending on the original side of High
Court of Madras, and by interim orders passed in two
suits (C. S. Nos. 280 and 286 of 1939), the High Court
appointed two advocates as Joint-Receivers to administer the property it1 suit. In the early months of
1940, one J. H. Irani, the father of P. ,J. Irani-the
appellant before us-had negotiated with the Receivers for a lease of a property adjacent to No. 1
Blackers Road with a view to construct a cinema
theatre whereon. That lease was for a period of 21
years and would have expired in or about April-May
1961. Irani offered to the Receivers to take a lease
also of the property now in dispute and on which the
Gaiety-theatre stood, also till April-May 1961.
The
Heceivers then moved the Court for directions regarding the grant of the lease. The second respondent,
whose term of lease would have expired in 1942, was
offered by the Court the option of taking a lease for 21
years from the 1st of May 1940 but he expressed his
..
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
173
unwillingness to take a lease for such a long term. He
was, however, willing to have the lease continued for
a period of 7 years from the 1st of May 1940, i.e., for
P. ]. Irani
v.
5 years beyond the term of his then existing le11se. State of Madras
The Court thereupon passed an order on ]\fay 2, 1940
reading:
"The lessee of the Gaiety Theatre (Chidambaram
Chetty) will be given a lease of seven years from
this d:tte.
They will not be given any fort.her
option. On the expiry of tlrnt period, i.e., from 2nd
May 1947 the same may be included in the lease of
J. H. Irani at the same rate of rent at which it is
being leased to the lessee of the Gaiety Theatres."
In accordance with this order the Hocoivers of the
estate of the late Sir H aji Ismail Sa it executed two
lease deeds (1) in favour of the second respondent for
a period of 7 years from May I, 1940 and (2) a rcversionary lease in favour of J. H. Irani for a period of
13 years-lit months commencing from l\fay 1, 1947,
i.e., on the expiry of the lease in favour of the second
respondent, this term being fixed so as to be coterminous with the lease of the neighbouring property
which Irani was being granted.
The term of the lease in fa vonr of the second respondent would, therefore, h"'ve ended on May 1, 1947
but before that date Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent
Control) Act 1946 (Madras XV of 1946) came into
foroe under which tenants in possession who continued in occupation of residential or non-residential
buildings could not be evicted therefrom except by
proceedings taken under the Act before designated
officers and on stated grounds which did not include
the mere expiry of the term. It is now common
ground that this enactment covered the second respondent's possession of the premises uow in dispute
and that notwithstanding the termination of the term
he was statutorily entitled to continue in possession
even after the expiry of tho lease on May l, 1947.
This is the result of decisions rendered in certain
proceedings between the parties to which we shall
immediately refer. Irani, the reversionary lessee called
upon the second respondent to surrender possession in
Ayyangar ].
I
~I
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96z
accordance with the conditions of his lease, but the
latter declined to do so relying upon the Act and the
P. J. Irani
,
f
d
T
v.
protection which it con erre
upon him.
hereupon
State of Madras the present appellant-P. J. Irani- as representing
the estate of his father who had by then died, filed a
Ayyangar J.
suit on the original side of the Madras High Court
(C. S. 479 of 1947) for evicting the second respondent
from the property. It may be mentioned. that the suit
was based upon the allegation that what had been
leased to Venkayya originally was a, vacant site
without any buildings and that consequently Madras
Act XV of 1946 which did not apply to leases of mere
vacant sites did not apply to protect the second respondent's possession. The suit was, however, dismissed by judgment rendered on April 22, 1948, on the
finding that a building as well as the site had been
included in the lease, which brought it within the
scope and protection of the Act. The appellant filed
an appeal against this judgment (Original Side Appeal
37 of 1948) which was also dismissed. on ,July 29, 1951,
on the same finding. Even while the appeal was still
pending before the High Court, Irani a.pplied to the
Government of Madras for exemption of the premises
from the operation of the Act.
By the date of this
application Madras Act XV of 1946 had been repealed
and its provisions substantially re.enacted in the
Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1949,
but as the provisions of the two enadmenls on the
points which arise for decision in this appeal are
identical it is sufficient if reference is made to those of
the later Act. A provision for exemption being granted from the operation of the Act by the State Government was contained in s. 13 of the Act (Madras
Buildings) Lease & Rent Control Act, 19·19), to which
we shall hereafter refer as the Act, in the following
terms:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act
the State Government may by a notification in the
Fort St. George Gazette exempt any building or
class of buildings from all or any of the provisions
of this Act."
The Government, however, by their order dated June
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R~PORTS
175
4, 1951, rejected this application for exemption on the
r96r
ground that the matter was then sub-judice.
After
.
the dismissal of the appeal by the Division Bench the
P. 1·:'""'
appellant Irani moved the Government afresh by a state of Madras
further petition filed in or about December, 1951,
praying for the same relief. The Government, by their
Ayyanga' J.
order dated June 4, 1952, granted the exemption
sought and the relevant notification which appeared
in the Fort St. George Gazette ran:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 13
of the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act
1949 (Madras Act XXV of 1949) His Excellency the
Governor of Madras hereby exempts the building
No. 1 Blackers Road, Mount Road, Madras (Gaiety
Theatre) from all foe provisions of the said Act."
And it was authenticated by the Chief Secretary to
Government. The second respondent thereupon made
a petition to the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution challenging the legality and propriety of)
this order of exemption on the principal ground that
the provision contained in s. 13 of the Act enabling
the Government to exempt particular buildings from
the operation of the Act, vested in them an unguided
and arbitrary discretion which was unconstitutional as
violative of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the affidavit
in support of the petition, the second respondent
further averred that in the order impugned "no justification has been shown for depriving the petitioner of
the beneficial provisions of the Rent Control Act".
Both the State of Madras whose order was impugned
as well as the appellant Irani for whose benefit the
order was passed were made respondents to this writ
petition. The writ petition was dismissed by a learned
Single.Judge of the High Court by order dated March
12, 1953, on the ground that the constitutional validity
of s. 13 of the Act had already been upheld by a
Division Bench of the Court in another case. The
second respondent thereafter took the matter in appeal
under cl. 15 of tt.e Letters Patent. At the time this
appeal was heard the Bench had before it, two other
appeals in which also the question whether s. 13 of the
P. ]. Trani
v.
State of ,'1 adras
Ayyongar J.
176
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
[1962]
Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution had been
raised. The three appeals were heard together and
this common point was first decided by a judgment
pronounced on October 23, 1953. The learned Judges
held that s. 13 of the Act did not offend Art. 14 of the
Constitution but that individual orders granting the
exemption might be examined to find out whether
such orders were within the policy and purpose of the
Act or whether they were discriminatory and therefore offended Art. 14. In this view the grounds upon
which exemption was granted in each of the three
cases before them were separately co1rnidered and in
the appeal by the second respondent the learned
Judges, after examining the reasons disclosed by the
Government as to why they granted exemption in the
particular case, held that those reasons were not
germane to the purpose for which the power of exemption had been vested in them and quashed the order of
exemption.
Irani feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High
Court applied to and obtained a cenificate under
Arts. 132 and 133(1) of the Constitution and has filed
the present appeal before us.
The State of Madras
has not appealed but as a respondent has filed a statement which was repeated by Counsel on their behalf,
that they were not interested in disputing the correctness of the judgment of the High Court but left the
matter to be decided between the riva.l contestants,
viz., Irani and the second respondent.
Mr. Sachin Chowdhary, learned Counsel for the
appellant Irani, urged substantially two points before
us: (1) that the impugned order of the Government
exempting the buildings under s. 13 of the Act was
executive or administrative in its nature and not
quasi-judicial as wrongly held by the High Court, and
was, therefore, not amenable to be quashed by the
issue of a writ of certiorari, (2) assuming that the
order was quasi-judicial, still it could be quashed or
set aside only if it were mala jide or proceeded upon
grounds wholly extraneous for the purpose of the
enactment and that in the instant case neither of
these conditions was fulfilled and the High Court was
!
2 S.0 .. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
therefore not justified in setting it aside. He further
submitted that the High Court had erroneously converted itself, as it were, into a Court of appeal, put
1961
FJ. ]. Irani
v.
itself in the pla.ce of the Government and decided the Stat' of Madras
case on the basis of what the Court itself would have
done if it were the exempting authority. Learned
Counsel urged that this went beyond the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Court in the exercise of its
powers under Art. 226 even when dealing with a
quasi-judicial orde1r.
Before dealing w1i.th these points it is necessary to
mention that obvfously these arguments proceed
upon the basis that the power conferred by s. 13 of the
Act on the State Government to exempt "buildings or
class of buildings" from the operation o(the Act is
constitutionally valid. We ,'>re saying this because
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri-learned Counsel for the second
respondent disputed before us the correctness of the
decision of the High Court dated October 23, 1953,
upholding the validity of s. 13 of the Act. It is manifest therefore t,hat the point urged by Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri should first be decided before considering the
points urged in support of the appe-aL
Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, raised
an objection, to Counsel for the respondent being permitted to contest the validity of s. 13 .of the Act.
He
pointed out that the question of the va.lidity of s. 13
had been decided by a judgment rendered on October
23, 1953, and that as the respondent did .uot prefer an
appeal to this Court from that judgment, he ·was precluded from agitating this question in the appeal now
before us.
We consider this objection as without substance.
By its order dated October 23, 1953 writ
appeal 28of1953 against the decision in which this
appeal has been brought was not disposed of but was
still kept pending before the High Court for forth er
consideration and as observed by the learned Chief
Justice in that judgment:
"In this view we cannot strike down s. 111 of the
Act as inconsistent with the Constitution and void
but w.e shall have to examine each case" on its
merits".
•3
Ayyangar ].
178
SUPREME COURT REPOitt'S
[1962]
'96'
Writ Appeal 28 of 1953 was thereafterjealt with on
P 1 1
.
its merits and it was this examination which resulted
·
~. '""'
in its being allowed. In our opinim, therefore, the
state of Mad•as 'two judgments have to be read togeher and as really
part of one proceeding, thcugh fo• convenience and
Ayyangar J.
with a view to define the scope of the arguments
the Court expressed its opinilll on the Constitutional point at an earlier stase. We also consider
that it is doubtful if an appeaJwould have lain from
the judgment of the High Jourt dated October 23,
1953, and even assuming th::t it did in view of the
matters which we have setout earlier, the respondent
cannot be precluded from contesting the correctness
of the conclusion of the ligh Court, by reason of his
not having moved t}>.s Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution.
We t}vrefore consider that the respondent is entitled t' support the judgment in his
favour by attackinrthose portions of that judgment
which are against Jim.
The submissiorof Mr. Viswanatha Sastri was that
s. 13 of the Act ,onferred an unguided and arbitrary
power on GoV'mment to discriminate between one
building and another and choose at their will and
pleasure parli.c~lar buildings which would be subject
to the prov.~icns of the Act and others which would
not be so JurJect, the tenants in the latter being deprived of t!:e protection conferred on other tenants
similar!; situated. He further urged that whether or
not a T°w'r to exempt a class of buildings was valid,
becau;e ir such a case there might possibly be an elemenl of classification based on rational groundsgrornds germane to carry out the policy or purpose
ofthe fet-the same could not be predicated of the
rower '? grant exemption for individual buildings
hecaus m the latter case it would be merely an arbitrary ernrcise of power discriminating between one
buildi:g and another, or one tenant and another and
whicrwould, therefore, render the very conferment
of th• power invalid as in violation of the equal protectin of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14.
T.ll arguments addressed to us were the same as
hadJeen urged before the learned Judges of the High
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
Court and had been repelled by them. They pointed
out that it was not correct to say that the enactment
did not sufficiently disclose the policy and purpose of
the Act which furnished adequate guidance for the
basis of the exercise of the power of exemption. The
preamble to the Act ran:
"Whereas it is expedient to regulate the letting
of residential and non-residential buildings and to
control the rents of such buildings and to prevent
unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the
State".
This meant that the legislation was enacted for
achieving three purposes: (1) the regulation ofletting,
(2) the control of rents, and (3) the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants from residential and
non-residential buildings. The Act was the latest in
the series of enactments and orders dating back to
the period of the Second World War when due, inter
alia, to large scale movement of populations to urban
areas, there was an acute shortage of accommodation
in the principal towns, as a result of which tenants
ousted from buildings occupied by them on the termination of their tenancies could not find alternative
accommodation and were thrown on the streets, and
thus owners of house-property could, if left unchecked, unfairly exploit those who sought accommodation. The enactment in terms protected the rights of
tenants in occupation of buildings from being charged unreasonable rates of rent and from being unreasonably evicted therefrom. Tenants who required
this protection included, of course, those whose duration of tenancy under the ordinary law had expired
and who would, therefore, have been liable to be ejected from the buildings occupied by them. Accordingly, the definition of a "tenant" included those
who continued in possession notwithstanding their
term of tenancy had expired and even those against
whom decrees for eviction had been passed by Civil
Courts but under which eviction had not taken
place.
Though the enactment thus conferred these rights
on tenants, it was possible that the statutory protection could either have caused great hardship to a
P. ]. Irani
v.
State of Madras
Ayyangar ].
P. ]. Irani
v.
State of Mad1as
.tf.yyangar ].
180
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
landlord or was the subject of abuse by the tenant
himself. It was not possible for the statute itself to
contemplate every such contingency and make
specific provision therefor in the en~ctment. It was
for this reason that a power of exemption in general
terms was conferred on the State Government which,
however, could be used not for the purpose of discriminating between tenant and tenant, but in order to
further the policy and purpose of the Act which was,
in the context of the present case, to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. The learned Judges of
the High Court, therefore, held that while s. 13 of
the Act was constitutionally valid, any individual
order of exemption passed by the Government could
be the subject of judicial review by the Courts for
finding out whether (a) it was discriminatory so as to
offend Art. 14 of the Constitution, (b) the order was
made on grounds which were germane or relevant to
the policy itnd purpose of the Act, and (c) it was not
otherwise malafide.
We find ourselves in complete agreement with the
approach and conclusion of the learned Judges of the
High Court to the consideration of the question of the
constitutional validity of s. 13 of thB Act.
The meaning and scope of Art. 14 of the Constitution has been the subject of several decisions of this
Court, a number of which have been considered by us
in some detail in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator of
Union Territory (Writ Petition 67 etc. of 1959) in
which we have pronounced judgment today. In view
of this we find it unnecessary to traverse the same
ground except to say that in the case before us enough
guidance is afforded by the preamb!B and operative
provisions of the Act, for the exercise of the discretionary power vested in Government so as to render
the impugned section not open to attack as a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. In our judgment,
the provision now impugned belongs to the class
numbered {v} in the analysis of the decision on Art.
14 by Das C. J. in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
Tendolkar (1 ).
(t) [r959] S.C.F. 279, 300.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
"A statute may not make a classification of the
persons or things to whom their provisions are
intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of
P. 1/'""i
the Govflrnment to select or classify the persons or stat• of Madras
things for applying those provisions according to
the policy or the principle laid down by the statute
itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by
the Government in the matter of such selection or
classification. If the Government in making the
selection or classification does not proceed on or
follow such policy or principle, ..................... the
executive action but not the statute should be con·
demned B,s unconstitutional."
Possibly even a more apt precedent is that furnished
by Sardar Iooer Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1) where,
among others, the validity of s. 15 of the Rajasthan
(Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, was upheld.
That section authorised the Government to exempt
any person or class of persons from the operation of
the Act, and it was urged before this court that this
offended Art. 14. The argument was repelled, observing:
"It is argued that that section does not lay down
the principles on which exemption could be granted,
and that the decision of the matter is left to the
unfettered and
uncanalised
discretion of the
Government, and is therefore repngnant to Art. 14.
It is true that that section does not itself indicate
the grounds on which exemption could be granted,
but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with
sufficient clearness the policy of the Legislature;
and as that governs s. 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said
to be unguided. Vide Harishanker Bagla v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh."
The learned Judges of the High Court were therefore, correct in their conclusion that s. 13 of the Act
was constitutionally valid but that individual orders
of Government passed under that section could be the
subject of judicial review in the manner already indicated.
(r) [1957] S.C.R. 605, 6,1,
Ayyangar J.
182
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
196r
We shall now proceed to consider the points urged
P 1 1
.
by learned Counsel for the appellant contesting the
·
~. ••••
correctness of the decision of the High Court setting
State of Mad•as aside the order of Government exempting the premises
in dispute for the reason that it was passed on grounds
Ayy••c•• J.
not germane to the purpose for which the power was
conferred, As already stated, the first point urged
was that the order granting the exemption was an
executive or an administrative order which was not
amenable to being quashed by the issue of a writ of
certiorari. We consider there is no substance in this
objection. If the High Court were right in their view
that the order of exemption was passed for reasons
which did not fall within the purpose for which the
power was conferred by s. 13 of the Act the order
itself would be one discriminatory of the second respondent as violating his fundamental right to equal
protection of the laws. In such an event Art. 226
would certainly be available to set aside such an order
which affected the fundamental right of the petitioner
before the Court. Indeed, it was on the ground that
individual orders passed by Government by virtue of
the power conferred upon it by s. 13 of the Act
were examinable by the Court for their violating Art.
14 that the constitutionality of s. 13 was upheld and
in the circumstances no objection could, therefore, be
taken to a judicial review of such individual orders.
Besides, even if the order did not violate Art. 14, still
if the High Court were right in the view that the
same was beyond the powers conferred on Government by s. 13 of the Act, we see no substance in the
contention that the Court lacks power under Art. 226
to set aside an ultra vires order vitally affecting a
person's right to statutory protection against eviction.
We do not consider that immunity from interference
by the Courts could be sought for orders which are
plainly ultra vires merely because they were passed
bona fide in the sense of being without indirect motive.
Particularly so when the power of the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not limited to
the issue of writs falling under particular groupings,
such as the certiorari, mandamus, etc., as these writs
\
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
have been understood in England, but the power is
general to issue any direction to the authorities, viz.,
for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as for
other purposes.
The second point urged was, and this was the main
point argued by learned Counsel for the appellant,-
that the learned Judges of the High Court were in
error in holding (a) that the reasons given by the
Government were not germane to the purpose or
policy of the Act and, therefore, outside the power
conferred on them bys. 13 of the Act, and (b) in constituting themselves, as it were, as- an appellate
authority and examining the reasons which induced
the Government to grant the exemption, and pronouncing upon the correctness or otherwise of these
reasons.
Before considering this argument it is necessary to
advert to a submission of the learned Counsel for the
appellant suggesting that the High Court were in
error in calling for the reasons which induced the
Government to pass the orders of exemption, though
when the reasons were before the Court it was in a
position to examine the legality of the order. We do
not consider this submission well-founded. The entire
basis for upholding the constitution&! validity of s. 13
of the Act and considering that it did not offend the
equal protection of the law guaranteed by Art. 14 of
the Constitution was, that the discretion or the power
conferred upon Government was not unguided, uncanalised or arbitrary, but that it had to be exercised
in accordance with the policy and object of the enactment gatherable from the preamble as well as its
operative provisions. The order itself might on its
face have shown that it conformed to this requirement, in which event it would have been for the party
challenging the validity of the order to establish to
the satisfaction of the Court that it was malafide or
had been passed on grounds not contemplated by or
extraneous to, the object and purpose of the enactment or the principles which should have governed
the exercise of the power. For instance, if the exemption had been in favour of a particular class of
P. ]. Irani
v.
State of Madras
Ayyangar ].
184
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962}
buildings, say those belonging to charities-religious
or secular-the classification would have been apparent
P. ]. Irani
d
v.
in the very or er of exemption. Where, however, the
State of Madras exemption granted is not of any class of buildings
which would ex facie disclose a classification, but the
exemption is of a specified building owned by A or in
which B is a tenant, then prima facie it would be disAyyangar j.
criminatory and when the legality of the order is
challenged, its intra vires character could be sustained
only by disclosing the reasons which led to the passing of the order.
In the present case, when the matter was before
the appellate Court the Advocate.General filed a
memorandum setting out the reasons why exemption
was granted in the three cases before the Court. In
regard to the exemption which was the subject of
controversy in writ appeal 28 of 1953 with which we
are concerned, the memorandum which the Government filed ran:
"The Government exempted the building .......... .
.. . . . . for the following reasons:-
(!) When the High Court offered in 1940 to lease
out the premises in question for a period of 21
years, Sri Chettiar elected to take it on lease only
for a period of se.ven years, which expired in 1947.
As per the High Court's order in C. S. Nos. 280 to
286 of 1939, Sri J. H. Irani, father of Sri P. J. Irani
took a lease of the premises for a period of 13 years
11! months from 1947 and he deposited Rs. 10,000
towards ~he said lease. He is therefore entitled for
the benefits from 1948 onwards.
(2) Had not the Rent Control Act come into
force, Sri P. J. Irani would have got possession in
the ordinary course as per High Court's order and
the terms of the lease deed. The operation of the
Act is therefore really a hardship to him.
(3) Sri Chettiar is only an absentee lesBee and he
is having seve1·al other business in South India.
(4) The conduct of Sri Chidambaram Chettiar in
refusing to surrender the possession of the building
to Sri P. J. Irani who had taken a valid lease under
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
the orders of the High Court is that of a hard litigant seeking to exploit the letter of the law without much regard to bona fides; and
(5) Sri Chettiar had already managed to be in
possession of the building for five more years than
he was legitimately entitled to be."
The learned Judges of the High Court held that the
reasons which led the Government to grant the
exemption were not those which were countenanced
by the policy or purpose of the Act and that the order
of exemption was, therefore, invalid. In doing so the
learned Judges said:
"Reasons 1, 2 and 4 go together and have reference to the order of the High Court in 1940 directing the Receivers to execute a lease for seven years
to the appellant and after the expiry of that period
to grant a lease for fourteen years to the second
respondent's father. It is undoubtedly true that
but for the application of the Act, the second respondent's father would have obtained possession
of the premises after the expiry of lease in favour
of the appellant. That could be said of thousands
of cases in which the leases in favour of tenants
have expired and, but for the Act tht owners would
be entitled to obtain possession of the demised premises. If this circumstance alone is sufficient to
exempt any premises from the operation of the Act,
then the Act itself should be repealed ................. .
......... There is no policy or principle involved in
this circumstance."
We agree with the learned Judges in the view here
expressed. The mere fact that the tenant continued
in possession after the termination of the tenancy is
by itself no ground why he should be evicted from
the premises, because it is the very policy of the Act
to protect the right of tenants to continue in possession of the premises after the termination of their
term because of the great difficulty of their obtaining
alternative accommodation. The circumstance, therefore, of the termination of the second respondent's
tenancy cannot afford a justification for Government
·~
P. ]. Irani
v.
State oj Madras
Ayyangar J.
P. ]. Irani
v.
State of Madras
Ayyangar ].
186
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
to say that he deserved to be evicted. If the term had
not expired the tenant would have been entitled to
continue in possession even if the exemption were
granted.
Learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the
High Court had failed to notice that the present case
was one where there was a contest between two
tenants and not between a landlord and a tenant and
that they erred in approximating the position of the
appellant to that of the landlord. We see no force
in this contention, because a lessee of the reversion
stands in the same position as a landlord and cannot
have any higher rights, nor can the appellant derive
any assistance from the fact that the second respondent declined to be a lessee for any term longer than
seven years when that option was offered to him by
the High Court in April.May, 1940. The position of
the second respondent cannot be worse than if he had
taken a lease for a definite term of seven years with a
covenant to restore possession at the end of the
period. The fact that in May 1940, the second respondent had an option to take a lease for a longer term,
but of which he did not avail himself, does not make
any difference or render that a ground for withdrawing from him the protection of the statute.
We also agree with the learned Judges of the High
Court that ground No. 3 is not germane for granting
an exemption. As was pointed out, "the important
point to be considered by the Government was whether the appellant had not other theatres at which he
could carry on the business which he was carrying on
at the Gaiety theatre'', and this they omitted to consider. The reason why the possession of the tenant
whose term had expired was afforded statutory protec"
tion was his inability to secure alternative accom,
modation in which either to reside in the calle of
residential buildings or to carry on the business which
he was carrying on in the case of non-residential
buildings. This was therefore a relevant matter which
the Government had failed to take into account. The
High Court characterised reason No. 5 as really not a
reason at all and we agree with this observation. The
2 S.C.R.