# P. Jo,.ph John v. The State of T ravan&ore-Cochi11

- **Citation:** [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1011
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1952-08-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 90 of 1953
- **Bench:** Mehar Chand Mahajan C.J, MuKHERJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, Bhagwati, Jagannadhadas, Venkatarama Ayyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/p-jo-ph-john-v-the-state-of-t-ravan-ore-cochi11-293
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Arts. 166, 311, 320-0pportunity to show
cause-Consultation with Public Services · Commission-E:ctent ofTravancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132)-"'0ur
Government"-Meaning of-Covenant of United Staie of TravancoreCochin-Article 20-Application of.
.1954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of Orissa·
Bhagwati].
1954
Nov1m#r25
1954
P. Jo,.ph John
v.
The State of
T ravan&ore-Cochi11
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
An enquiry under the provisions of the Travap.core Public Servant• (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132) was held against the petitioner in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers. The petitioner took part in the proceedings, denied the charges
and raised legal objection to the competence of the Enquiry Commission to hold the enquiry. Some of the charges were held proved.
The petitioner was asked by the Chief Secretary to show cause why
he should not be removed from service. The petitioner's request for
extension of time to show cause was granted twice but refused
a
third time. On his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to
sho\.v cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, the
report of the Enquiry Commissioner was submitted to the
Public
Services Commission and the latter approved of the action proposed
to be taken against the petitioner.
The proceedings relating to the
enquiry were submitted to the
Rajpramukh and thereupon an order
in proper form for the removal of the petitioner from service was
made by the Rajpramukh and authenticated by the Chief Secretary
to Government.
Held, (i) that under the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution a civil servant is entitled to have a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself and show cause, both at the ti1ne of enquiry into the
charges brought against him and at the stage when definite conclusions have been come to on the charges and the actual punishn1ent to
follow is provisionally determined upon.
The position cannot be
characterised as anomalous if the statute conten1plates a reasonable
opportunity at more than one stage.
In the present case the petitioner had reasonable opportunity to
enter upon his defence at both the stages.
He fully availed himself
of the first opportunity, but refused to avail himself of the second
opportunity which was offered to him. All the rules of natural justice
were observed in the case.
(ii) The provisions of Art. 166(1) and (2) are directory, not
mandatory; and, in order to determine whether there has been co1npliance with the said provisions, all that is necessary to see is that
the requirements of the sub-sections are met in substance.
(iii) After the integration of the two States of Travancore and
Cochin, the expression "Our Government" means "The Coui:cil of
Ministers" under the new set up of democratic
Government in the
United State.
The Rajpramukh as the head of the State is merely
a constitutional head and
is bound to accept the
advice
of his
Ministers.
(iv) The consultation envisaged by Art. 320(3) does not extend
to review petitions which the petitioner may choose to file as many
times as he likes.
( v) The sanction of the Rajpramukh under
Art .. 20 of the
Covenant of the United State of Tranvancore-Coch1n 1s necessary
only before the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Departmental proceedings do not fall within the ambit of the said Article.
•
.
•
-
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1013
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar v. The State of
Bombay
<f 1952] S.C.R. 612), referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
90 of 1953.
Appeal under Article 132(1) of the
Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th
August, 1952, of the
High
Court
of
TravancoreCochin at Ernakulam m
Original
Petition No. 51 of
1952.
K. Thon1as and M.
R. Krishna
Pillai, for the
appellant.
Mathew P. Muricken,
Advocate-General
for
the
.State of Travancore-Cochin (T. R.
Balakrishna Ayyar
and Sardar Bahadur, with him), for the respondent.
1954. November 25.
The

## Text

f
r ,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
to stand as a candidate for election he shall not either
be employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of
the municipality or act as a legal practitioner against
the Municipality.
There is no fundamental right in
any person to stand as a candidate for election to the
Municipality.
The only
fundamental
right which is
guaranteed is
that of practising
any
profession
or
carrying on any occupation,
trade
or business. There
is no violation of the latter right in prescribing the
disqualification of the type enacted in section 16(1) (ix)
of the Act. If he wants to stand as a candidate
for
election it is but proper that he should divest himself
of his paid brief on behalf of the
Municipality or the
brief against the Municipality in which event there will
be certainly no bar to his candidature.
Even if it be
taken as a restriction on his right to practice his profession of law, such restriction would be a reasonable
one and well within the ambit of artl.Cle 19 clause 5.
Such restriction would be a reasonable one
to impose
in the interests of the general public for the preservation of purity in public life.
We therefore see no substance in this contention of the appellant also.
The appeal accordingly fails
and stands dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
P. ·JOSEPH JOHN
ti.
THE STATE OF TRAVANCORE-COCHIN.
[MEHAR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS
and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution of India, Arts. 166, 311, 320-0pportunity to show
cause-Consultation with Public Services · Commission-E:ctent ofTravancore Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132)-"'0ur
Government"-Meaning of-Covenant of United Staie of TravancoreCochin-Article 20-Application of.
.1954
Sakhawat Ali
v.
The State of Orissa·
Bhagwati].
1954
Nov1m#r25
1954
P. Jo,.ph John
v.
The State of
T ravan&ore-Cochi11
1012
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
An enquiry under the provisions of the Travap.core Public Servant• (Inquiries) Act, (Act XI of 1132) was held against the petitioner in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers. The petitioner took part in the proceedings, denied the charges
and raised legal objection to the competence of the Enquiry Commission to hold the enquiry. Some of the charges were held proved.
The petitioner was asked by the Chief Secretary to show cause why
he should not be removed from service. The petitioner's request for
extension of time to show cause was granted twice but refused
a
third time. On his failure to avail himself of the opportunity to
sho\.v cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, the
report of the Enquiry Commissioner was submitted to the
Public
Services Commission and the latter approved of the action proposed
to be taken against the petitioner.
The proceedings relating to the
enquiry were submitted to the
Rajpramukh and thereupon an order
in proper form for the removal of the petitioner from service was
made by the Rajpramukh and authenticated by the Chief Secretary
to Government.
Held, (i) that under the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution a civil servant is entitled to have a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself and show cause, both at the ti1ne of enquiry into the
charges brought against him and at the stage when definite conclusions have been come to on the charges and the actual punishn1ent to
follow is provisionally determined upon.
The position cannot be
characterised as anomalous if the statute conten1plates a reasonable
opportunity at more than one stage.
In the present case the petitioner had reasonable opportunity to
enter upon his defence at both the stages.
He fully availed himself
of the first opportunity, but refused to avail himself of the second
opportunity which was offered to him. All the rules of natural justice
were observed in the case.
(ii) The provisions of Art. 166(1) and (2) are directory, not
mandatory; and, in order to determine whether there has been co1npliance with the said provisions, all that is necessary to see is that
the requirements of the sub-sections are met in substance.
(iii) After the integration of the two States of Travancore and
Cochin, the expression "Our Government" means "The Coui:cil of
Ministers" under the new set up of democratic
Government in the
United State.
The Rajpramukh as the head of the State is merely
a constitutional head and
is bound to accept the
advice
of his
Ministers.
(iv) The consultation envisaged by Art. 320(3) does not extend
to review petitions which the petitioner may choose to file as many
times as he likes.
( v) The sanction of the Rajpramukh under
Art .. 20 of the
Covenant of the United State of Tranvancore-Coch1n 1s necessary
only before the institution of civil or criminal proceedings. Departmental proceedings do not fall within the ambit of the said Article.
•
.
•
-
S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1013
Dattatreya
Moreshwar
Pangarkar v. The State of
Bombay
<f 1952] S.C.R. 612), referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
90 of 1953.
Appeal under Article 132(1) of the
Constitution
of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th
August, 1952, of the
High
Court
of
TravancoreCochin at Ernakulam m
Original
Petition No. 51 of
1952.
K. Thon1as and M.
R. Krishna
Pillai, for the
appellant.
Mathew P. Muricken,
Advocate-General
for
the
.State of Travancore-Cochin (T. R.
Balakrishna Ayyar
and Sardar Bahadur, with him), for the respondent.
1954. November 25.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
MEHR
CHAND
MAHAJAN
C. J.-This
appeal
by
leave of the High Court of Judicature of TravancoreCochin at Ernakulam is directed
against
an order
of
a Full Bench of that court dismissing an application
for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order
of the Government of the united State of Travancore-
·Cochin
removing the
appellent from service of the
State and permanently debarring him
from reappointment in service.
The facts giving rise to the petition
and the
appeal are these: The petitioner entered the
service
of
the erstwhile
Travancore State in the year 1928. By
promotion he became the
Executive
Engineer,
Electricity Department in
August 1937 and subsequently
Electrical Engineer to
Government in
October 1944.
He was the
Electrical Engineer to Government on the
1st July 1949 when the
States of
Travancore and Cochin were integrated by a Covenant entered into between the rulers of the two States. By an order of the
Government of the united State of Travancore-Cochin
dated the 11th August 1949, he was appointed as the
officiating Chief Engineer
(Electricity)
in the
State.
In or about September 1949 the
Government
of the
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
1954
· P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
T ravancQf't~Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
.1014
SUPREME COURT.REPORTS
[1955]
united ·State received serious
complaints
about
the
conduct and dealings of some of their senior
officers
. and
allegations
of corruption,
communalism,
etc.
were made against them. In December 1949 the Council of
Ministers
decided to take action
against the
appellant on a number of charges indicated in the resolution.
On the 22nd December
1949,
immediately
after this resolution
was passed, the
pet:1t10ner
was
informed that he was suspended from service
pending
enquiry and he was requested to hand
over charge to
Sri K. P. Sridharan
Nair forthwith.
The
petitioner
complied with this order and handed
over charge as
directed.
On the 21st March 1950 the following notification was issued :-
"Whereas
Government
are
of
op1mon
that
there are sufficient grounds
for making a formal
and
public inquiry into the truth of the imputation of misconduct of the officers mentioned below :
Government, under section 3 of the Travancore
Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, XI of 1122,
hereby
commit the said inquiry to Sri K. Sankaran, Judge,
High Court, appointed Commissioner for the purpose.
Government are further pleased under section
4
of the said
Act to
nominate Sri
T. R.
Balakrishna
Ayyar,
Government
Pleader,
High
Court, to prosecute the inquiries on their behalf.
The inquiries shall be conducted
as
early
as
possible.
The officers referred to in para. 1 supra are :
1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
·t
2. Sri P. Joseph John".
The petitioner was informed
by notice
of the
24th
April 1950 about
this inquiry.
The notification
was.
signed by Shri .K. G. Menon, Chief Secretary to
Government.
Mr. Justice
Sankaran
took . charge
as
Enquiry
Commissioner and on the 11th May 1950
forwarded ,
the articles of charges against the petitioner, the list
of witnesses and the list of documents placed before
him together with the notice regarding the commence~
ment of the enquiry to Shri K. S. Raghavan, Secre-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
tary to Government, for service on the petitioner.
A
few days before the date fixed for the commencement
of the enquiry the petitioner made an application
to
the Enquiry Commissioner for a direction to
the Prosecutor to produce the files and papers relating to the
various charges in the office of the
Commissioner
and
for permission to him and his counsel to
inspect
the
same. This application was allowed and
he and his
advocate were allowed to inspect the relevant
files in
the presence of the prosecutor or his deputy.
On the
20th May 1950 when the
enquiry
commenced,
the
petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the
charges
by a
written statement.
He was defended during
the
enquiry by Shri K. P. Abraham, a leading member
of
the Bar.
A preliminary
objection
was taken to the
Tribunal's jurisdiction
on the basis
of
Article 20 of
the Covenant entered into between the rulers of Travancore and
Cochin and it was
contended that
the
proceedingsi before the Commissioner were criminal in
nature and could not be commenced without
the sanction of the
Rajpramukh
and that its
absence
was
fatal to the enquiry.
This objection was not immediately decided by the
Commissioner but was ultimately
overruled.
On the 22nd
November
1950 the
petitioner submitted
detailed answers in writing
to the
various charges.
The enquiry concluded on the 27th
December 1950 and the
Commissioner
submitted
his
report to
Government on the 17th
February
1951.
Some of the charges were held proved,
while others
were held not established.
On the 5th July 1951
the
following communication was sent to the
petitioner
by the Chief Secretary to Government :-
"I am to enclose herewith a copy of the
above report and to point out that the Government agree with the findings
of the Inquiring. Commissioner on the several charges
against you.
Government
also agree with
the Commissioner that the objections
raised
by you challenging the
validity of the enquiry itself are not tenable.
2. As against the 26 charges
framed
9-89 S. C. India/59
1954
P. ]oJeph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C.J.
1954
P:Joseph]o/m
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
·Mahajan C.J.
'1016
'*Charges
Nos. XIII
to XVIII
& XX!Il
toXXV.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
against you, the nine charges* noted in the
margin have not been
established and they
are accordingly dropped.
As regards Charge
No. IX in view of the extenuating
circumstances, the irregularity is condoned.
3; It is
evident
from
the
remammg
charges, which have been established, that
you have misused your official position
as
Electrical
Engineer
to
Government
and·
shown undue fayouritism
at the expense of
State revenues, to private firms and issued
materials from Government stores to private
companies and individuals in violation of all
rules ( vide List A).
It is also evident that
departmental stores and departmental lorries
have been diverted for your personal use in
a number of cases.
(Vide List B).
You are
also found guilty of having shown defiance
and insubordination towards
the
authority
of the Government by your refusal, in connection with
the supply of power to the
Nagercoil
Electric
Supply
Corporation, to
supply certain particulars
which were called
for and which it was your duty to furnish
and by your refusal to withdraw the objectionable statement in your reply to the Government in spite of the
Government order
directing you to withdraw the same.
4. The Government
therefore
propose
to remove you from service from the date on
which you were placed under suspension with
permanent bar against future reappointment
in service.
5. You
are
requested
to show cause
within 15 days of the date of receipt of this
notice with enclosures why action should not
be taken against you as
proposed in
paragraph 4 above".
·The petitioner on receipt of this notice
applied
for
time till the 10th September 1951 for
showing cause.
Time as prayed for was allowed. On the 10th Septem-
·ber 1951 when the time granted at his own request
-
, ..
.. ""'
.J
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
was due to expire, he again applied for further time
till the 10th November 1951.
He was allowed further
time till the 24th September 1951.
On that date
he
again asked for further time till the 31st October 1951
but this request wa~ not granted.
In spite
of the fact
that the petitioner was
granted
the time which
he
originally asked for and this was further extended
by
a fortnight, he furnished no explanation
and did not
show any cause against the notice issued to him.
The
petitioner having failed to avail himself of the opportunity to show cause
against
the
action
proposed
against him, a draft of the
proceedings relating to the
enquiry was submitted to H. H. the
Rajpramukh
on
the 30th September 1951 and thereupon
an order was
issued for his removal from service
from the date
of
suspension and debarring him from reappointment to
service.
The order was in proper form as having been
made by H. H. the
Rajpramukh
and was authenticated by the Chief Secretary to Government.
This order is dated the 1st October 1951.
It may be mentioned
that before the papers were
submitted to H. H. the
Rajpramukh, the report of the
Commissioner was submitted to the
Public Services
Commission
for their
consideration.
The Public
Services
Commission
supported the action which the
Government
proposed to
take against the petitioner.
On the 9th October 1951
the petitioner was removed
from service
with
effect
from the 26th December 1949. Two months after
the
order of his removal, the petitioner submitted an application for a reconsideration of the order
removing
him from service.
This was rejected by an order dated
the 25th January 1952.
On these facts and in these circumstances an application was made before the High
Court of Travancore-Cochin at Ernakulam on the· 2nd June 1952 praying that the court may be pleased to issue a writ in the
nature of certiorari or any other writ, directions
or
orders calling for the records relating to the orders
dated the 9th October 1951 and the 25th January 1952
and to quash the same and direct the respondent to
restore the petitioner to the office which he was lawfully to hold. It was contended in the application
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. ].
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State ·of
Travancore-Cochin
Maha}an C. J,
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
that the applicant
had no reasonable
opportunity
of
?
showing cause against
his removal and that
he was
entitled to show cause twice, once after he
was found
guilty and next after the punishment had been decided and that the denial of this right rendered
the
order of dismissal illegal and void and that it offended
against the principles of natural justice.
It was further contended that the consultation
with
the
Public
~
Services
Commission
was not held in terms
of the
provisions of procedure for disciplinary action
against
Government servants and prescribed in
Article
320,
sub-section 3 ( c) of the
Constitution of India. A number of other grounds were also taken against the order
of dismissal.
The High Court negatived
all the contentions of the petitioner and dismissed the petition.
It however certified that the case involved substantial
questions of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution and was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
Mr. Thomas who argued the appeal on behalf of
the appellant raised a number of points against
the (_
validity of the order removing
the
appellant
from
service and contended that the enquiry
conducted into the charges made against
him was wholly
illegal
and void.
In our judgment, none of the points
urged
by the learned counsel was of a substantial
character
and all of them CQncerned matters of mere form and
no valid reasons have been shown for disturbing
the
decision of the High Court.
The question of the
validity of an order of removal of a person employed in a civil capacity
under
the Union or a State falls to
be
determined on the
provisions of Article 311 of
th~ Constitution of
India.
This Article is in these terms :
"(l) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India
service
or
a
civil
service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union
or a State shall be dismissed or removed
by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such
person as
aforesaid shall
be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until
he
has
been given a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
him ...................... "
It is not said that the petitioner was removed
by an
authority subordinate
to that by which
he
was appointed.
There was no
occasion to raise
this issue
because
the order of removal had been
made
by the
Rajpramukh and was expressed according to the provisions of Article 166 of the
Constitution.
The
requirement therefore of sub-clause
(1) of
Article
311
was fully satisfied.
As regards
the
question
whether
the petitioner
was .given reasonable opportunity of
showing
cause
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
~"
him, the legal position in that respect and the nature
"'
of opportunity to be granted was stated by the Privy
Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v.
I. M.
Lall(1) and it was held that when a
stage
1s
reached when definite conclusions have been
come to
as to the charges, and the actual punishment
to follow is provisionally determined on, that
the
statute
-
y
gives the civil servant an
opportunity for which subsect.ion (3) of section 240 of the
Government of India
-...
Act, 1935
(which corresponds to Article
311) makes
provision, and that at that
stage a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the civil servant concerned.
It was also held that there was no anomaly
in
the view that the ~tatute
contemplates
a
reasonable
opportunity at more than one stage.
In our opinion,
in the present case
the petitioner had reasonable
op-
.-\
portunity at both stages to enter
upon
his
defence.
1
He fully availed himself of the first opportunity
and
though a reasonable opportunity
was
also given
to
him at the second stage, he failed to avail
himself of
it and it is not open to him now to say
that
the requirements of clause (2) of Article 311 have not been
satisfied.
It was not denied that
the
petitioner
was
given by the Enquiry
Commissioner all facilities
for
entering on his defence. Before filing his written state-
,;,
ment before the
Enquiry
Commissioner the petitioner
and his counsel were afforded facility to
inspect
the
(1) [1948] F.C.R. 44.
1954
P. Joseph John
v. ~
Thi State of
Travancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1954
P. Joseph John
, ..
The Sta"te of
T rauancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1955]
various files concerning the charges
which he had to
meet.
After inspecting those files he filed a full written
statement explaining those charges.
He was
defended in the enquiry by a leading lawyer and was afforded fullest opportunity
to examine and
cross-examine
the witnesses examined
by
the
Commissioner.
He
was able to satisfy the
Enquiry
Commissioner
that
out of the charges levelled against
him a number
of
them were not established; but he failed to satisfy the
Commissioner as regards the rest and
the
Enquiry
Commissioner held them proved.
After the
enquiry
was concluded the petitioner was
furnished
with
a
copy of the report of the Commissioner and was as.ked
to show cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him.
He applied for two months' time to show
cause.
This was granted.
He made a ·further
application for further time.
This
was
also
partially
granted.
He again asked for further time which was
refused.
It is difficult to say that the time allowed to
him was not reasonable in view of the fact
that
he
had taken part in the
enquiry
before the
Commissioner and all the evidence had been taken in his presence and he had full opportunity
to
defend
himself.
All the material on which the
Commissioner
had reported against him on the charges found proved,
was
given in the report of the
Commissioner and that was
supplied to him with a show cause notice.
The time
allowed, in our opinion, was more than sufficient
for
him to enter on his .defence
and having failed
to
do
so, he cannot be heard to sav that he was not given a
reasonable opportunity of showing
cause
against the
action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
Mr.
Thomas argued
that the
show
cause
notice
was not in accordance with the provisions of
Article
166 of the
Constitution
inasmuch
as
it
was
not
expressed to have
been
made
in the name
of theRajpramukh.
As above mentioned,
this notice
was
issued on behalf of the
Government
and was signed
by the Chief Secretary of the united State of Travancore-Cochin who had under the
rules
of
business
framed by the Rajpramukh
the charge of the portfolio
of "service and appointments" at the Secretariat level
,.,,
....
·-
'
.
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1021
in this State.
This was
m our
opinion
substantial
compliance with the directory
prov1S1ons
of
Article
166 of the Constitution.
It was held by this court in
Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The
State of Bombay(1) that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are directory only and non-compliance
with
them
does not
result in the order being invalid,
and that in order to
determine whether there is compliance with these provisions all that is necessary to be seen is whether
there
has been substantial compliance
with those requirements.
In the present case there can be no manner
of doubt that the notice signed by the Chief Secretary
of the State and expressed to be
on
behalf
of
the
Government and giving opportunity to the petitioner
to show cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him was in substantial
compliance
with
the
provisions
of the article.
The petitioner accepted this
notice and
in pursuance
of it
applied
for
further
time to put
in his defence.
He was twice
granted
this · time.
In these
circumstances,
the
contention
of Mr. Thomas that
as the notice was not
expressed
as required
under
Article 166 it was
invalid
and
therefore the
requirements
of
Article 311
were not
satisfied in this case
must be held to be
devoid
of
force.
We arc satisfied that all the
requirements
of
Article 311 have
been fully complied
with
in
this
case.
It may also be mentioned that the
High Court
held that H. H. the
Rajpramukh
had intimation of
the decision of the
Council
of
Ministers
and
the
action
proposed to be taken
against the
petitioner
and that in fact His Highness approved of
the proposed action.
Mr. Thomas further contended
that
the enquiry
at the first stage also was invalid and irregular.
He
argued that the order appointing the
Enquiry
Commissioner was not expressed in proper
form and that
the Commissioner did not conduct
the
enquiry
in
accordance
with the provisions
of the
Act. The
notification ordering an enquiry set out above was
issued after the Council of
Ministers had
passed a
resolution to that effect.
It must be presumed that in
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 612.
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
T ravancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State of
Travancore-Co'Chin
Mahajan C. J.
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]
the normal course of
business
that
resolution
was
communicated
to the
Rajpramukh.
The
order thus
substantially complies with
the requirements
of law
and in any case the effect of its not being
expressed
as directed by Article 166 does not vitiate the notification.
The appellant, as already stated, took
part in
the enquiry, defended
himself and fought every
inch
of the ground. That being so, it is not possible to hold
that he was not given reasonable
opportunity at the
first stage to defend
himself.
It was contended
that
under the Travancore Public Servants (Inquiries)
Act,
1122, it was only the Maharaja who could
make an
order under the provisions of that Act, and that the
Ministers could not take any action. Emphasis was laid
on the expression "Our
Government" in the different
provisions of the Act.
We are unable to see any force
in this contention.
The expression "Our Government"
means the Maharaja's Government,
in other
words,
the Government of the State of Travancore. After the
integration of the two States of Travancorc and Cochin
and the formation of the
United
State of
Travancore-Cochin the expression "Our Government" has to
be construed according to the new set-up of Government and when the Council of Ministers had come into
being, it is obvious that the expression "our
Government" as adapted to fit
in with the new Constitution
means "The
Council of Ministers". It is an elementary
principle
of
democratic
Government
prevailing
in
England and adopted in our
Constitution
that the
Rajpramukh or the
Governor as head of the State is
in such matters merely a constitutional
head
and
he
is bound to accept the advice of his Ministers.
In this
situation it cannot be held that the order of the
Government appointing the
Enquiry
Commissioner
was
ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
Another point
taken
by Mr.
Thomas was
that
without the sanction of the Rajpramukh the
proceedings could not be started against the petitioner and
reliance for this contention was placed on
Article 20
of the Covenant of the united
State
of
Travancore
and Cochin.
This article is in these terms :
"Except with the previous sanction of the Raj-
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1023
pramukh, no proceedings, civil
or criminal, shall be
instituted against any
person
in
respect
of any act
done or purporting to be done in the execution
of his
duty as a servant of either Covenanting
State before
the appointed day".
fhe High Court negatived this contention
with
the
following observations:
"Article 20 refers to the institution
of
civil
and
criminal
proceedings,
two
well-known
expressions
which are terms of art and clearly relate to civil and criminal proceedings before civil and criminal courts.
The
said two kinds of proceedings do not exhaust the totality of matters
which
can be
called
proceedings.
It
is only in respect of
civil
and
criminal
proceedings
that the sanction of
the
Rajpramukh
is
required
under
Article 20 of the Covenant. It is not contended
on behalf of the petitioner that the proceedings
before
the Commissioner are criminal proceedings.
The only
contention is
that they partake
of the
nature
of
criminal proceedings.
In our judgment,
Article
20 of
the Covenant does not
apply to proceedings
which
are not criminal but ·merely
partake
of
that character".
In these
observations we fully concur.
In our view
departmental
proceedings
do
not
come
within the
ambit of the Article.
Lastly it was urged that there was non-compliance
with the provisions of Article 320, clause 3 ( c) of the
Constitution which provides that on
all disciplinary
matters affecting a person serving under the
Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil
capacity,
including memorials or petitions relating
to
such matters, the Union
Public
Service
Commission
or the State Public Service
Commission, as
the case
may be, shall be consulted.
In this case
the
Public
Service Commission was in fact consulted in the matter
of the action proposed
against
the
pet1t1oner
by
removing him.
The
Public
Service
Commission
agreed to the proposed
action.
This
consultation
and the
agreement as
before the petitioner was asked
to show cause why he should not be removed from
service.
The complaint .of the petitioner is that the
1954
P. Joseph John
v.
The State qf
T ravancore-Cochin
Mahajan C. J.
195~ '
P. Joseph John .
v.
TheSta.1of
T ravancore-Cochi1'
Mahajan C. J.
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1955]:
consultation . with
the
Public
Service
Commission
should ·have been after he
was asked to show cause
but the petitioner did not show cause and that
being
so, no question arose of consulting the
Public
Service
Commission over again.
It was contended
that
the
Public Service Commission should have
been consulted
on the review petition.
To accede to his
argument
will mean that the
State
will have
to
consult the
Public Service
Commission as many times as he may
choose to file
review
petitions.
In our opinion
the
consultation envisaged by
Article 320 does not extend
so far. In this case the report of the
Commissioner
was placed before the Public Service Commission and
the latter approved
of the
action
proposed
to
be
taken. The appellant
was given another
opportunity
to show cause but he did not avail
himself
of that
opportunity or
submit any explanation or show
any
cause on which the Public Service
Commission
could
be consulted.
The order
of
dismissal
having
been
made there was in the
circumstances
no
further
necessity to consult the
Public
Service
Commission.
In our opinion therefore
there is no force
in this contention as well.
After having examined all
the arguments of Mr.
Thomas, we are of the opinion that all the rules of
natural justice were fully observed
during the
enquiry in this case, and the
petitioner had
the fullest
opportunity to
put in his defence
both
before
the
Enquiry
Commissioner and
against
the
action
proposed to be taken against him.
It was by reason
of
his own default that he failed to avail himself of the
second opportunity.
He put in a belated
review
but
such a review is not provided for under the
rules and
in .our opinion, it was not necessary
to
consult
the
Public Service
Commission at that stage.
Such petitions are not within the contemplation of the Constitution.
For the reasons given above
this appeal fails
and
is dismissed.
In the
circumstances of the
case
we
make no order as to costs.
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Appeal dismissed.
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