# P. SRINIV ASA NAICKER v. SMT. ENGAMMAL AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 690
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 274 of 1959
- **Bench:** K. N. Wanohoo, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/p-sriniv-asa-naicker-v-smt-engammal-and-another-2564
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

ln•oli .. ncg-Sak of iMol•enl'a properly bv offeial Rtui•ier
-.A.ppeat-Grouncia /or aetting
aaicie IM aa/e-Reoiaio,.__lfigh
Courl'1 juriaciiclion to inl<rfere wilh the ordtr of Diatricl JwlgtThe Provincial Inaolooncy A.cl, 1920 (Vo/ 1920), aa. 59(a),
68, 75.
The official receiver put the properties of the inaolvents N
and his wns for
sale, which were subject to mortgage. The
propcrlics were ultimately knocked down to the appellant
whose bid was the highest. The first respondent made an
avplication under s. 68 of the Provincial Insolvcnty Act, 1920
which was allowed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground
that the price fetched was very low. On appeal under s. 75 of
the Act the District Judge, inter alia, held that the price fetched wao not low. In revision under the proviso to 1. 75 of the
Act, the High Court did not consider whether the order of the
Discrict Judge wao according to law but accepted an offer
made by the first respondent and allowed the revision. petition.
lleld, that the power of che court under s. 68 is a judicial
power, and must be exercised on well rccogni~d principles,
justifying interference with an act of the receiver which he is
empowered to do under s. 59(a) Provincial lnwlvency Act,
1920, and the courc
mu•! not arbilrarily set aside a sale
decidecl
upon by the official receivor, unless there are good
judicial grounds to interfere with the discretion exerci~ hy
the official receiver, for example that there was fraud or
collusion between the receiver and the insolvent or intending
purchaser, or the courl is of the opinion that there were irregularicies in the conduct of the •ale which might have
affected the price fetched at the sale, or price was low as to
justify the Court to hold thac the property should not be sold
at that price.
l
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
The High Court had therefore to see whether the SubJudge's order wa• justified on these grounds and whether the.
District Judge made any mistake in law in reversing that order
otherwise the High Court cannot interfere in revision under
the proviso to s. 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, for
the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere arises only if it is of
opinion that the District Judge's order was not according to
law, and only then it can pass such order as it may think fit.
,
C!vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 274 of 1959.
Appeal by special lE>ave from the judgment
and order dated July 27,1956, of the Madras High
Court, in C.R.P. No. 90of1955.
N. 0. Chatterjee, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G.
Gopalakrishnan for the appellant.
K.N. Rajagopala Sastri, R. MahaliniJa Iyer and
M. 8. IL Aiyengar, for respondent No. I.
1960. November, 28.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave in an insolvency matter. The brief facts
necessary for present purposes are .these. S. V. N.
Nanappa Naicker and his sons were adjudged insolvents on an application of Smt. Engamma! (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). They had
preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madras
but it was dismissed on April 17, 1953. Thereafter
the official receiver took steps to sell the property
of the insolvents, which con~isted of two lots, the
first lot comprising 145 aores 10 cents of dry land
and masonry house, and the second lot, 8 acres
and odd of dry l1md. Both these properties were
subject to mortgage.
The official receiver fixed
September 28, 1953, for sale of the properties by
auction. Fifteen of the creditors were present when
the sale by auction took place, including the son of
the respondent. No request was made on that day
by anyone for postponing the sale and consequently
bids were made. The highest bid for lot 1 wllB of
Jf!Ol
P. Srinirxuo Naiektt
v.
Bmt. Enl4fllmal
WatkhooJ.
JHJ
P.BritrUJOS4 N~eUt
Y.
Sml. Entammal
Wcwhoo J.
,
692 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1~2] SUPP.
Ra. 4500/· and the highest bid for lot 2 was of
Rs.70/-. Both these hids were made by the appellant who is a brother-in-law of Nana

## Text

Iill
Birajmoha
o .. Gup14
••
n. St.,. •I Ori=
W-4H J.
IHI
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
of fact, we are not prepared to allow the pe itioners
to raise this point in arguments before us.
In the
circumstances we rcjl!ct this contention also .
.
. The I>l;titions therefore fail and are hereby
d1em1BBed with costs-one set of hearing costs.
Petition# di8mi81ed.
P. SRINIV ASA NAICKER
v.
SMT. ENGAMMAL AND ANOTHER
(K. N. WANOHOO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
ln•oli .. ncg-Sak of iMol•enl'a properly bv offeial Rtui•ier
-.A.ppeat-Grouncia /or aetting
aaicie IM aa/e-Reoiaio,.__lfigh
Courl'1 juriaciiclion to inl<rfere wilh the ordtr of Diatricl JwlgtThe Provincial Inaolooncy A.cl, 1920 (Vo/ 1920), aa. 59(a),
68, 75.
The official receiver put the properties of the inaolvents N
and his wns for
sale, which were subject to mortgage. The
propcrlics were ultimately knocked down to the appellant
whose bid was the highest. The first respondent made an
avplication under s. 68 of the Provincial Insolvcnty Act, 1920
which was allowed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground
that the price fetched was very low. On appeal under s. 75 of
the Act the District Judge, inter alia, held that the price fetched wao not low. In revision under the proviso to 1. 75 of the
Act, the High Court did not consider whether the order of the
Discrict Judge wao according to law but accepted an offer
made by the first respondent and allowed the revision. petition.
lleld, that the power of che court under s. 68 is a judicial
power, and must be exercised on well rccogni~d principles,
justifying interference with an act of the receiver which he is
empowered to do under s. 59(a) Provincial lnwlvency Act,
1920, and the courc
mu•! not arbilrarily set aside a sale
decidecl
upon by the official receivor, unless there are good
judicial grounds to interfere with the discretion exerci~ hy
the official receiver, for example that there was fraud or
collusion between the receiver and the insolvent or intending
purchaser, or the courl is of the opinion that there were irregularicies in the conduct of the •ale which might have
affected the price fetched at the sale, or price was low as to
justify the Court to hold thac the property should not be sold
at that price.
l
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
The High Court had therefore to see whether the SubJudge's order wa• justified on these grounds and whether the.
District Judge made any mistake in law in reversing that order
otherwise the High Court cannot interfere in revision under
the proviso to s. 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, for
the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere arises only if it is of
opinion that the District Judge's order was not according to
law, and only then it can pass such order as it may think fit.
,
C!vIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 274 of 1959.
Appeal by special lE>ave from the judgment
and order dated July 27,1956, of the Madras High
Court, in C.R.P. No. 90of1955.
N. 0. Chatterjee, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G.
Gopalakrishnan for the appellant.
K.N. Rajagopala Sastri, R. MahaliniJa Iyer and
M. 8. IL Aiyengar, for respondent No. I.
1960. November, 28.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave in an insolvency matter. The brief facts
necessary for present purposes are .these. S. V. N.
Nanappa Naicker and his sons were adjudged insolvents on an application of Smt. Engamma! (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). They had
preferred an appeal before the High Court of Madras
but it was dismissed on April 17, 1953. Thereafter
the official receiver took steps to sell the property
of the insolvents, which con~isted of two lots, the
first lot comprising 145 aores 10 cents of dry land
and masonry house, and the second lot, 8 acres
and odd of dry l1md. Both these properties were
subject to mortgage.
The official receiver fixed
September 28, 1953, for sale of the properties by
auction. Fifteen of the creditors were present when
the sale by auction took place, including the son of
the respondent. No request was made on that day
by anyone for postponing the sale and consequently
bids were made. The highest bid for lot 1 wllB of
Jf!Ol
P. Srinirxuo Naiektt
v.
Bmt. Enl4fllmal
WatkhooJ.
JHJ
P.BritrUJOS4 N~eUt
Y.
Sml. Entammal
Wcwhoo J.
,
692 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1~2] SUPP.
Ra. 4500/· and the highest bid for lot 2 was of
Rs.70/-. Both these hids were made by the appellant who is a brother-in-law of Nana.ppa Naicker.
The reason why the two lots were sold for Rs. 4570/·
wa.s that there was an encumbrance on the entire
property of Rs. l 7,2CO/-.
The official receiver did
not close the sale on that day in the hope that some
higher offer• might be made by the creditors and
postponed it to various dates upto Oct-0ber 26, 1953.
On all thrnm dates, the respondent's son
wa.s
present but no higher offer was made on behalf of
tho respondent. On October 26, 1953, an application
was made on behalf of the respondent praying that
the sale he postponed for another three months
apparently on the ground that there hAd been
•drought in that area for some years past and agricultural lands were not fetching good price.
The
official ;ceiver, however, saw no reason to postpone t..c sale, particularly when no higher offer
was forthcoming from the side of the respondent and
decided to knock down the properties in favour of
the appellant.
Later, an application wa.s made on behalf of
the respondent on November 18, 1953 under s. 68 of
the Provincial Insolvency Act, No. V of 1920 (herein·
after referred t-0 as the Act). The case of the respondent w11s that the sale had been made for a very
inadequate price and there had been drought in the
village for several years in the past and there
was very great stringency in the money market and
it wa.s hoped that if the sale was postponed for three
or four months, the properties would fetch a good
price of not less than Rs.15,000/-, exclusive of the
sum due on the encumbrances. The respondent also
stated that if the sale was postponed for three
months she would be prepared to bid
more than
Rs. 7500/- for the properties. There were B-Ome
other allegations in the petition suggesting collusion
between the official receiver on the one side and the
.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
insolvent and the appellant on the other. The respodent therefJre prayed that the official receiver
should be ordered not to sell the propertit>s to the
appellant at the price bid by him. The application
was opposed by the official receiver as well as by
the appellant. The official receiver contended that
he had done his best and that no higher bid could
be obtained. He also denied the allegation made
against him in the nature of collusion and also
about the manner of conducting the sale.
The Subordinate Judge allowed the application
on the ground that the price fetched was low and
that the general body of creditors to whom debts to
the extent of Rs.30,000/- were payable woul,d be
considerably prejudiced if the sale was allowed to
stand. Thus the only ground on which tho application under s. 68 was allowed was that the price
fetched was low.
Thereupon there was an appeal to the District
Judge under s. 75 of the Act. The District Judge
allowed the appeal. He pointed out that there was
nothing to show that there was any irregularity
in the conduct of the sale. He also pointed out that
there was no reason to hold that the official receiver was in any way in collusion with th'3 insolvent
and the appellant. He also pointed out that the
respondent's son was all along present and if he
really thought that the price fetched at the
auction sale
was low he could offer · a higher
price on behalf of the respondent. Finally, the
District Judge held that the Subordinate Judge
was not right in his view that the property had
been sold for a low price and gave various reasons
for coming to that conclusion.
The matter was then taken in revision under
the proviso to s. 75 of the Aot, which lays. do:wn
that "the High Court for.the purpose of s~tlBfymg
itself that an order ma.de in any appeal declded by
the District Court was according to law, may call fo;
the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it
1961
P. S rinivasa N aick1
v.
Smt. -Engammal
WanehooJ.
lNl
P. Bri,.Woso Noitkn
••
Brnl. E.,...,..1
w-hooJ.
694 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
r
thinks fit". The High Court however did not consider
the question whether the order of the District Judge
W811 according to law. It appears that before the
High Court an offer was made by the respondent
that she was prepared to deposit Rs. 9,000/- if a
fresh auction was held and would start the bid
at Rs. 9,000/-
and also that she
would pay
Rs. l,000/- to the appellant for any loBB- caused to
him. The High Court accepted this offer, though
it was of opinion that it could not be said that the
price fetched at the auction was unconscionably
low ; it however held that the price was low considering the extent and nature of the properties,
and if Rs. 9,000/- or more could be got for the
properties the creditors would receive appreciably
more as dividend. It therefore allowed the revision on the terms offered by the respondent.
It is this order of the High Court which
has been brought before us by speoial leave and
the only qu~stion that h811 been urged on behalf or
the appellant is that the High Court ha:l no juris·
diction to interfere with the order of the District
Judge unless it came to the conolusion that that
order was not aocording to law. It is contended
at the High Court's order does not show that it
applied its mind to the question whether the order
of the District Judge was according to law or not
and that the High Court seems to have been
carried a.way by the offer made by the respondent
to make minimum bid of Rs. 9,000/- for those
properties. It is pointed out however that thia
offer was made three years after the auction and
is no ind ica.tion that the price fetched in the auction in 1953 was inadequate, for prices may have
risen during this period of three years.
On the other hand, it is contended on behalf
of the respondent that the court'a power under s. 68
in appeal from an act of the receiver is muoh
wider than the power of the court in dealing with
•
I
( 1) S.C.R.
SOPREME OOURT REPORTS
695
auction sales in execution proceedings and therefore the Subordinate Judge was right in ~etting aside
the act of the receiver in knowing down the proper·
ties to the appellant and the High Court was consequently right in setting aside the order of the District Judge and restoring that of the Subordinate
Judge.
It may be accepted that the power of the
court under s. 68 in not hedged in by those considerations which apply in cases of auction sales in
execution proceedings. Even so, the power under
s. 68 is a judicial power and must be exercised on
well recognised principles, justifying interference
with an act of the receiver which he is empowered
to do under s. 59 (a) of tbe Act.
The fact that
the act of the receiver in selling properties under
s. 59 (a) is subject to the control of the court
under s. 68 does not me;m that the court c11n arbitrarily set aside a sale decided upon by the· official
receiver. It is true that the court has to look in
insolvency proceedings to the interest in the first
place of the general body of creditors ; in the
second place to the interest of the insolvent, and
lastly, where a sale has been decided upon by
the official receive'!' to the interest of the intending
purchaser in that order. Even so; 'the decision
of the official receiver in favour of a sale should
not be set aside unless there are good grounds for
interfering with
the discretion exercised by the
official receiver. These grounds may be wider
than the grounds envisaged in auction sales in
execution proceedings. Even so, there must be
judicial grounds on which the court will act in
setting aside the sale decided upon by the official
receiver.
These grounds may be, for example,
that there was fraud or collusion between the
receiver and.the insolvent or the intending purchaser ; the court may be also interfere if it is of
opinion that there were irregularities in the conduct of the aale which might have affected the
1961
P. Srinfoasa Nai&I'
v.
Sm1. Entammal
WanclrooJ.
1961
P. Srinioa.Ja JVaicklr
••
Smt. Engammal
U'anchoo J.
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
price fetched at the sale ; again, even though there
may be no collusion, fraud or irregularity, the price
fetched may still be so low as to justify the court
to hold that the property should not be sold at
that price.
These grounds and similar other
grounds dP.pcnding upon particular circumstances
of each case may justify a court in interfering with
the act of the official receiver in the case of 11ale
by him under s. 59 (a) of the Act.
The High Court had therefore to see w hethcr
the Subordinate Judge's order was justified on these
grounds and whether the District Judge made any
mistake in law in reversing thi.t order. If the Suh·
ordinate Judge's order was not justified on these
grounds or if the District Judge made no mistake
in law in interfering with that order, the High
Court cannot interfere in revision under the proviso
to s. 75, for the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere arises only if it is of opinion that the District
Judge'H order was not according to law. If the
High Court comes to that conclusion, it can then
pass such order a.s it may think fit.
Let us therefore turn first to tho order of the
Subordinate ,Judge and see if it is justified on the
ground mentioned a.hove. Now both the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge found that there
was no rca,on to hold that there wa.s a.ny fr&ud or
collusion on the pa.rt of the official reooiver in this
case.
Further, the Subordinate Judge did not find
that there was any irregularity committed by the
oflicial receiver !n conducting the sale and the District Judge has definitely found that there was no
such irregularity. The only ground on which the
Subordinate Judge held that the ea.le should be set
aside w&s that the price fetched was low. Now if
that ground is justified, the Subordinate Judge
would have een right in interfering with the sale
proposed by the official recPiver. That matter has
been considered by the District Judge and he has
!
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
hold that there is no mason to hold that the properties were being sold for a low price. The Subodinate Judge in dealing with the question of price has
pointed out that the insolvent had valued the properties at Rs. 80,000/-, though he was conscious of
the fact that this. was properly an exaggeration. He
therefore did not bold that thr properties were
worth Rs. 80,000/-.
He came to the conclusion
that the properties would be worth at least
Rs. 40,000/- and the ma.in reason why he said so
was that the properties had been mortgaged for
over Rs. 20,000/- in 1936.
According to him there
seems to be some infallible rule that one must
double the mortgaged money in order to arrive at
the valuation of the properties mortgaged. The Diijtrict Judge has pointed out-and we think, rightlythat there can be no such rule. Therefore. the main
basis on which the Subordinate Judge held that the
properties were worth Rs. 40,000/- and therefore
the hid of the appellant was low, falls to the ground
as pointed out by the District Judge. The Subordinate Judge also pointed out that the insolvents
were in possession of the properties during the
pendency of the insolvency appeal and had been
depositing Rs. 2000/-
annually on the order of
the High Court in order to remain in possession.
The Subordinate Judge however did not calculate
the value of the properties on the basis that their
annual income was Rs. 2,000/-and rightly so-because the amount deposited by a litigant on the
order of a court in order to retain possession of
some prope;ty cannot necessarily lead to the inference that that was the annual income of the
property. It seems therefore that the District Judge
was.right when he held that there was no evidence
on the record which would juatify the finding of the
Subordinate Judge that the price fetched by the sale
in this case was inadequate or unreasonable. We may
add that it was open to the respondent to show to
the Subordinate Judge by well recognised methods
P. Srinivara l'laicker
'·
Smt. Entammal
Wanchoo J.
Ilf l
P. Sriftivaso NaKl:,,
v.
Sml. En1ammal
~ ....... J.
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTIS (1962) SUPP.
of valuation as to what the value of the properties
was. The Subordinate Judge should have then taken
into account the total amount of the encumbrance
on tbeae propertie8. The mortgage deed is not on
the n cord and we do not know what interest, if
any, the mortgage money carried. Before the Subordinate Judge could come to the conclusion thn.t
the price offered by the appellant was low, he had
first to find out the price of the properties by some
recognised method.
He ha.d then to find what was
the total amount of encumbrance on the properties.
If on finding these things it appeared that the difference between the two was much larger than the
price bid by the appellant, the Subordinate Judge
would have been justified in interfering with the
order of the official receiver, even if there was no
question of fraud, oollusion or irregularity in the
present oase.
But no such findin~s have beon given
by the Subordinate Judge and the District J udga
consequently was right when he said that the view
of the Subordinate Judg11 that the price fetched was
inadequate Rnd unreasonable is incorrect. Unfortunately, the High Court did not addreSB itself to the
question whether the order of the Di8trict Judge
was according to law or not. It seems to have been
impressed by the offer made by the respondent,
overlooking the fact ·that the offer of Rs. 9,000/·
as the minimum bid and Rs. 1000/· for tho appellant was being made three years after the auction
during whioh, for all that we know, the prices might
have risen. Further, the High Court has remarked
tha.t the prioe offered by the appellant was not unconscionably low but it fe It that it was still low on
a comparison with the offer made by the respondent in 1956.
As the High Court did not consider
the question whether the order of the District
Judge was acoordingto law or not and did not come
to the conclusion that that order was not according
to law, the High Court would have no jurisdiction
to interfere with tha.t order.
--
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
Learned counsel for the respondent urged that
even though the High Court may not ha"l'.e considered
the matter from this aspect, we should not interfere
with the order of the High Court if we are satisfied
that in faot the price offered by the appellant , was
low, in the circumstances prevailing in 1953. We
agree that if it was possible for us to come to the
conclusion that the price offered by the appellant
was low, there would be no reason to interfere with
the order of the High Court, even though it might
not have considered what was necessary for it to do
for interfering under the proviso to s. 75; but as we
have pointed earlier, there is no sufficient material
on the record on which we can say that the price
offered by the appellant is low. As we have already
pointed out, no attempt was made in the Subordinate
Judge's coun to value the properties by any of the
well recognised methods by which properties are
valued. Further no o.ttempt was ma.de to show the
total encumbrance on· the property. Unless the
valuation was properly made and the encumbrance
was found out, it is not possible to say that the
offer made by the appellant was low,. for that
would depend upon the difference between the value
of the properties and the a.mount of enoumbrance.
In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to
say that the order of the District Judge when he
held that the Subordinate Judge was not right in
holding that the price fetched was inadequate or un·
reason& ble, is not according to law.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the
order of the High Court and restore the order of the
District Judge. The appellant will get his costs· in
this Court from the first respondent.
·
Appeal allowed.
IllH
P. 8 rittivasa N .;&,,
v.
Smt. Eng«rnmal
WancliooJ,