# Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc

- **Citation:** 2025 INSC 912
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2025-07-31
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 9934 of 2025
- **Bench:** B.R. Gavai, Augustine George Masih
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/padi-kaushik-reddy-etc-v-the-state-of-telangana-and-others-etc-38467
- **Pages:** 49

## Headnote

The matters herein present a challenge to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court whereby the judgment dated
09.09.2024 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in a batch
of Writ Petitions was set aside. Whether the Division Bench erred
in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the High Court,
as Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of
hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.)
within a period of four weeks.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Tenth Schedule - Arts. 122 and 212 -
Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification
on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 - Rules 6(1), 6(2) - After
winning election of the State Legislative Assembly, three
members of BRS who won the election from their respective
constituency joined INC which eventually formed the
Government - Appellants in the lead matter filed disqualification
petitions before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly with
a common prayer that MLAs from BRS who joined the INC
be declared as disqualified from continuing as members of
the Telangana Legislative Assembly - Since the petitions for
disqualification filed by the Appellants/Petitioners were kept
pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were filed before the
High Court - The Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment
and order dated 09.09.2024, had only asked the Speaker for
fixing a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents,
personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks - However,
the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the
Single Judge of the High Court - Correctness:
Held: 1. There was absolutely no occasion for the Judges of the
Division Bench of the High Court to have interfered with the well-
* Author
1880
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reasoned order of the Single Judge, as Single Judge had only
asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings,
documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks -
The Single Judge had not even issued any direction to decide
the disqualification proceedings within a time-bound period - This
Court, therefore, find that the Division Bench of the High Court
has erred in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court. [Para 96]
2. In the instant case, it could be seen that the Speaker did not
even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the
present petitioners for a period of more than seven months and
only after the proceedings were filed before this Court, did the
Speaker find it necessary to issue notice - Non-issuance of any
notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice
only after either the proceedings were filed before this Court, or
after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by
any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner -
In light of the facts of the present case, a failure to issue any
direction to the Speaker, in view of this Court, would frustrate the
very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in
the Constitution. [Paras 92, 93, 95]
3. It is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the Constitution
Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan to Subhash Desai, consistently
hold that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue
with regard to disqualification at the first instance - This Court,
however, finds it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the
petitions pending before it within a stipulated period - It is clarified
that this Court is inclined to do so in view of the specific finding of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan
and Subhash Desai, that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating
authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution,
acts as a Tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution - There is also a finding

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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1879 : 2025 INSC 912
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc.
v.
The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 9932-9933 of 2025)
31 July 2025
[B.R. Gavai,* CJI and Augustine George Masih, J.]
Issue for Consideration
The matters herein present a challenge to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court whereby the judgment dated
09.09.2024 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in a batch
of Writ Petitions was set aside. Whether the Division Bench erred
in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the High Court,
as Single Judge had only asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of
hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing etc.)
within a period of four weeks.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India - Tenth Schedule - Arts. 122 and 212 -
Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification
on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 - Rules 6(1), 6(2) - After
winning election of the State Legislative Assembly, three
members of BRS who won the election from their respective
constituency joined INC which eventually formed the
Government - Appellants in the lead matter filed disqualification
petitions before the Telangana State Legislative Assembly with
a common prayer that MLAs from BRS who joined the INC
be declared as disqualified from continuing as members of
the Telangana Legislative Assembly - Since the petitions for
disqualification filed by the Appellants/Petitioners were kept
pending before the Speaker, writ petitions were filed before the
High Court - The Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment
and order dated 09.09.2024, had only asked the Speaker for
fixing a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents,
personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks - However,
the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the
Single Judge of the High Court - Correctness:
Held: 1. There was absolutely no occasion for the Judges of the
Division Bench of the High Court to have interfered with the well-
* Author
1880
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reasoned order of the Single Judge, as Single Judge had only
asked the Speaker to fix a schedule of hearing (filing of pleadings,
documents, personal hearing etc.) within a period of four weeks -
The Single Judge had not even issued any direction to decide
the disqualification proceedings within a time-bound period - This
Court, therefore, find that the Division Bench of the High Court
has erred in interfering with the order of the Single Judge of the
High Court. [Para 96]
2. In the instant case, it could be seen that the Speaker did not
even find it necessary to issue notices in the petitions filed by the
present petitioners for a period of more than seven months and
only after the proceedings were filed before this Court, did the
Speaker find it necessary to issue notice - Non-issuance of any
notice for a period of more than seven months and issuing notice
only after either the proceedings were filed before this Court, or
after this Court had heard the matter for the first time cannot by
any stretch be envisaged as acting in an expeditious manner -
In light of the facts of the present case, a failure to issue any
direction to the Speaker, in view of this Court, would frustrate the
very purpose for which the Tenth Schedule has been brought in
the Constitution. [Paras 92, 93, 95]
3. It is pertinent to note that all the judgments of the Constitution
Bench, right from Kihoto Hollohan to Subhash Desai, consistently
hold that the Speaker is the authority who should decide the issue
with regard to disqualification at the first instance - This Court,
however, finds it appropriate to direct the Speaker to decide the
petitions pending before it within a stipulated period - It is clarified
that this Court is inclined to do so in view of the specific finding of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan
and Subhash Desai, that the Speaker, while acting as an adjudicating
authority in Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution,
acts as a Tribunal amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution - There is also a finding of the
Constitution Bench that the Speaker/Chairman, while acting as an
adjudicating authority under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution does not enjoy the constitutional immunity as available
either under Article 122 or 212 of the Constitution. [Paras 99, 100]
4. Therefore, the impugned judgment and final order dated
22.11.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
quashed and set aside - Further, the Speaker is directed to
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
1881
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
conclude the disqualification proceedings pending against the 10
MLAs pertaining to the present appeals/petition as expeditiously
as possible and in any case, within a period of three months from
the date of this judgment. [Para 102(ii), 102(iii)]
Constitution of India - Arts. 226, 227, 136, Tenth Schedule -
Power of Speaker/Chairman to decide disqualification petitions
under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion - Discussed.
[Paras 80 to 87]
Case Law Cited
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others [1992] 1 SCR 686 : (1992)
Supp. 2 SCC 651; Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami
Prasad Maurya and Others [2007] 2 SCR 591 : (2007) 4 SCC 270;
Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra
and Others [2023] 8 SCR 857 : (2024) 2 SCC 719 - followed.
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative
Assembly and Others [2020] 2 SCR 132 : (2021) 16 SCC 503 -
relied on.
Sunil Prabhu v. The Speaker, Maharashtra State Legislative
Assembly, Writ Petition (C) No. 685 of 2023; S.A. Sampath
Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Others (2021) 16 SCC 528; Nabam
Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh
Legislative Assembly and Others [2016] 6 SCR 1; Surya Devi
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Others [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 290 :
(2003) 6 SCC 675 - referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly
(Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986; Constitution
(Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985; Constitution (Fifty-Second
Amendment) Bill, 1984.
List of Keywords
Election of State Legislative Assembly; Disqualification;
Disqualification petitions; Disqualification proceedings within a
time-bound period; Speaker/Chairman; Judicial review; Tribunal;
Reasonable period; Time-bound period; Tenth Schedule of
Constitution; Judicial complexion; Speaker acting as an adjudicating
authority; Tribunal; Quia Timet; operation successful, patient died.
1882
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
9932-9933 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2024 of the High Court
for The State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WA Nos. 1158 and
1160 of 2024
With
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 82 of 2025 and Civil Appeal No. 9934 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
C Aryama Sundaram, Dama Seshadri Naidu, Gandra Mohan Rao,
Sr. Advs., P. Mohith Rao, Ms. J Akshitha, J Venkat Sai, Eugene
S Philomene, Zafar Inayat Ganai, Rahul Jayapala Reddy,
Shubhankar Sharma, Ms. Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Vikas
Mehta, Basa Mithun Shashank, Anthony Reddy Katakam, R.V.
Pavan Maitreya.
Advs. for the Respondents:
T. Rajnikant Reddy, A.A.G, Mukul Rohatgi, Dr. Abhishek Singhvi,
Gaurav Agarwal, Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, S. Niranjan Reddy,
Sr. Advs., Ms. Priyansha Sharma, Lavkesh Bhambhani, Aniket Singh,
Sravan Kumar Karanam, Hitendra Nath Rath, Kumar Abhishek,
Ms. Laxmi, Ms. Aarati Sah, Ms. Diya Purohit, Ms. Neha Rai,
Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Ms. Akhila Palem Rami Reddy, Meeran
Maqbool, Vivek Rajan D.b, Sumanth Nookala, Ms. Devina Sehgal,
Kumar Vaibhaw, S.uday Bhanu, Vineet George, Ramesh Allanki,
Ms. Aruna Gupta, Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Ankit Agarwal, Koustubh
Desai, Mukesh Kumar, Yashaswi Sk Chocksey, Madhup Kumar
Tiwari, D. Abhinav Rao, Ms. Megha Shaw, Abhisek Das, Raghav
Bherwani.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
B.R. Gavai, CJI
1.
Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 2353-2354 of 2025 and SLP (C)
Diary No. 14577 of 2025.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
1883
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
2.
The appeals in the present set of matters challenge the judgment
and final order dated 22nd November 2024 passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad1 in
Writ Appeal Nos. 1157, 1158 and 1160 of 2024 whereby the Division
Bench of the High Court set aside the judgment and final order dated
9th September 2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court in a batch of Writ Petitions.
FACTS
3.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the appeals are
as under:
3.1. On 3rd November 2023, on the recommendation of the Election
Commission of India, the Hon'ble Governor of the State of
Telangana issued the notification for General Election to the
State Legislative Assembly.
3.2. Pursuant to the notification, one Danam Nagender filed his
nomination as a candidate of the Bharat Rashtra Samithi2 from
the Khairatabad Assembly Constituency on 6th November 2023.
Similarly, two others namely Venkata Rao Tellam and Kadiyam
Srihari filed their nomination from Bhadrachalam Assembly
Constituency and Ghanpur Station Constituency as candidates
of BRS on 9th November 2023.
3.3. Thereafter, on 30th November 2023, the elections were held
and the results were declared on 3rd December 2023.
3.4. The aforementioned Danam Nagender, Venkata Rao Tellam
and Kadiyam Srihari won the election from their respective
constituency. The Indian National Congress3 emerged as
the single largest party and it along with its ally formed the
Government.
3.5. It is the allegation of the appellants that on 15th March 2024,
Danam Nagender joined the INC. It is further their allegation that
the other two BRS Members of Legislative Assembly4 namely
1
Hereinafter referred to as "the High Court".
2
Hereinafter referred to as "BRS".
3
Hereinafter referred to as "INC".
4
Hereinafter referred to as "MLA".
1884
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Kadiyam Srihari and Venkata Rao Tellam also joined the INC
on 31st March 2024 and 7th April 2024 respectively.
3.6. Subsequently, the Appellants in the lead matter namely
Padi Kaushik Reddy and Kuna Pandu Vivekanand, who
are themselves MLAs belonging to BRS, filed separate
petitions under Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule read
with Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India and Rules 6(1)
and 6(2) of the Members of Telangana Legislative Assembly
(Disqualification on ground of Defection) Rules, 19865 before
the Telangana State Legislative Assembly on 18th March 2024,
2nd April 2024 and 8th April 2024. The common prayer in all the
three petitions was for a declaration from the Speaker of the
Telangana Legislative Assembly that the MLAs from BRS who
joined the INC be declared as disqualified from continuing as
members of the Telangana Legislative Assembly.
3.7. The Appellant in the connected matter, namely Alleti Maheshwar
Reddy, who is an MLA belonging to Bharatiya Janata Party6, also
filed a petition seeking the disqualification of Danam Nagender
on 1st July 2024.
3.8. Thereafter, aggrieved by the inaction/delay on part of the
Speaker in deciding the disqualification petitions, the Appellants
filed three separate Writ Petitions before the High Court being
Writ Petition Nos. 9472, 11098 & 18553 of 2024. The first two
Writ Petitions were filed on 10th April 2024 and 24th April 2024
and the third Writ Petition was filed on 9th July 2024.
3.9. On 9th September 2024, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court by a common judgment and order directed the Secretary
of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to forthwith place the
disqualification petitions before the Speaker for fixing a schedule
of hearing (filing of pleadings, documents, personal hearing
etc.) within a period of four weeks. It was further directed that
the schedule so fixed, shall be communicated to the Registrar
(Judicial) of the High Court. It was further clarified by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court that if nothing is heard within
5
Hereinafter referred to as "Disqualification Rules 1986".
6
Hereinafter referred to as "BJP".
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
1885
Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
four weeks, then the matter would be reopened suo motu and
appropriate orders would be passed.
3.10. Taking exception to the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court, the Secretary of the
Telangana Legislative Assembly preferred three separate
intra-court appeals being Writ Appeal No. 1157, 1158 & 1160
of 2024.
3.11. On 22nd November 2024, the Division Bench of the High Court
by a common judgment and final order disposed of the Writ
Appeals by setting aside the judgment and order passed by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
3.12. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeals pertaining to
disqualification petitions pending against three MLAs came
to be filed by way of special leave.
3.13. A Writ Petition has also been filed before this Court by the
Appellants in the lead matter along with a few others pertaining
to disqualification petitions pending against another seven
MLAs. The prayer in the Writ Petition is on the same lines
as the prayer by the original writ-petitioners before the High
Court i.e., to direct the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions in a time-bound manner and preferably within an outer
limit of 4 weeks. Accordingly, the Writ Petition was tagged and
heard along with the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS
4.
We have heard Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, Shri Dama Seshadri Naidu
and Shri Gandra Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Appellants/Petitioners and Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Dr.
Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, Shri Gaurav
Agrawal, Shri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondents.
5.
Shri Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellants submitted that till the time the learned Single Judge of the High
Court decided the writ petition on 9th September 2024 i.e., after a period
of almost five months from the date of filing, the Speaker had not even
issued a notice in the disqualification petitions filed by the Appellants.
It is submitted that taking into consideration this factual aspect of
1886
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the matter, the learned Single Judge had issued a direction only to
the effect that the Speaker should fix a schedule of hearing within
a period of 4 weeks from the date of the said order. It is therefore
submitted that, as such, there was no occasion for the learned
Judges of the Division Bench to have interfered with the order of
the learned Single Judge.
6.
Shri Sundaram submitted that even after the order of the learned
Single Judge, for a period of more than 4 months, the Speaker did not
take any action. It is further submitted that only after the present set
of appeals came to be filed before this Court on 15th January 2025,
a notice has been issued to the delinquent MLAs on 16th January
2025. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that under Rule 7 of the
Disqualification Rules, 1986, a copy of the Disqualification Petition is
required to be forwarded to the member in relation to whom the petition
has been made or the Leader of the Legislature Party to which the
member belongs. It is submitted that in spite of a lapse of a period
of more than 11 months from the filing of disqualification petitions,
even the statutory requirement as per Rule 7 of the Disqualification
Rules 1986 has not been complied with. It is further submitted that
since the Speaker was acting in such a lackadaisical manner, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court was completely justified
in issuing directions to the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative
Assembly to place the matter before the Speaker for fixing of the
schedule of the hearing within a period of 4 weeks.
7.
Shri Sundaram submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High
Court had rightly applied the principles as laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu
and Others7, Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad
Maurya and Others8 and Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary,
Governor of Maharashtra and Others9. The learned Senior Counsel
further submitted that the facts in the present case are squarely
identical to the facts in the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Others10.
7
(1992) Supp. 2 651
8
(2007) 4 SCC 270
9
(2024) 2 SCC 719
10
(2021) 16 SCC 503
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
It is submitted that applying the said case, the learned Single Judge
of the High Court would have been justified even in directing the
disqualification petitions to be decided within a specified period.
However, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, exercising
restraint and showing respect to the high constitutional functionary,
had only issued a direction to the Secretary of the Telangana
Legislative Assembly to place the matter before the Speaker for
fixing up the schedule of the hearing.
8.
It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that since the directions
issued by the Constitution Bench of this Court on 11th May 2023 in
the case of Subhash Desai (supra) were not complied with by the
Speaker, a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Prabhu v.
The Speaker, Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly11 on 18th
September 2023, directed to place the proceedings before the
Speaker within a period of one week from that date so as to issue
procedural directions for completing the record and setting down
a time schedule for hearing of the disqualification petitions. It is
further submitted that thereafter vide an order dated 30th October
2023, this Court in the said case of Sunil Prabhu (supra) directed
the pending proceedings under the Tenth Schedule to be concluded
and final orders to be passed in respect of Group A petitions on or
before 31st December 2023 and Group B petitions on or before 31st
January 2024. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that
the said directions were issued by a Bench presided over by the
same learned Judge (D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.), who had authored
the judgment in the case of Subhash Desai (supra).
9.
Shri Sundaram submitted that the learned Judges of the Division
Bench of the High Court, have erred in setting aside a well-reasoned
and fairly balanced judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court. He further submitted that this is a fit case wherein this Court
should issue directions to the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions within a specified period of time. He, therefore, prayed that
the appeals be allowed and appropriate directions be issued.
10. Shri Naidu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellants/Petitioners supported the arguments advanced by Shri
Sundaram.
11
Writ Petition (C) No.685 of 2023
1888
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
11. Additionally, Shri Naidu submitted that prolonging the disqualification
proceedings and not taking them to a logical end would frustrate the
very purpose of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. He
submitted that the fear with regard to the Speaker belonging to a
particular political party and as a result acting in a partisan manner
was apprehended when the Parliament was discussing the insertion
of the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution. It is submitted that Shri
A.K. Sen, the then Law Minister, had stated that the Speaker was
expected to act in an impartial manner and decide the disqualification
proceedings without any delay. Not only that but Shri A.K. Sen had
stated that if the amendment to the Constitution was to be effective,
and if the defection was to be outlawed effectively, then it was
necessary to choose a forum which would decide the matter fearlessly
and expeditiously. He further stated that the Speaker was the only
forum that was possible. In that light, the learned Senior Counsel
submitted that a situation has now arisen which would require this
Court to reconsider the issue because in many cases the Speaker
has been acting like a member of a political party and not acting
like a Tribunal. He, therefore, reiterated that this Court should direct
the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions matter within a
specified period of time.
12. Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the contrary, submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court has rightly applied the legal position as emanating
from the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in the cases
of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and
Subhash Desai (supra) and held that a court cannot issue timelines
to the Speaker for deciding the matter within a particular period. He
submitted that the High Court does not have the power of judicial
superintendence over the functioning of the Speaker as a Tribunal
under Article 227 of the Constitution. He submitted that the only
power of judicial review that is available with the High Court is under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that while exercising
the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can only examine the decision arrived at by the Speaker.
It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that it is not
permissible for the High Court to pass any order which would amount
to Quia Timet action. It is submitted that this Court in the case of
Kihoto Hollohan (supra) has categorically held that the High Court
[2025] 7 S.C.R.
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Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot pass any order which
would amount to Quia Timet action. It is, therefore, submitted that as
such any petition prior to the decision made by the Speaker would
not be tenable.
13. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that the three-Judges Bench of this
Court has wrongly decided the case of Keisham Meghachandra
Singh (supra). In that regard, it is submitted that this Court in the
case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra) did not take into
consideration the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in the
cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Rajendra Singh Rana (supra)
in the correct perspective. It is, therefore, submitted that vide the
impugned judgment and final order, the Division Bench of the High
Court has rightly distinguished the judgment of this Court in the case
of Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra).
14. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that, in any case, judicial propriety
demanded that this Court should not have delivered a judgment
as was delivered in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) inasmuch as a Bench comprising of two learned Judges on
an earlier occasion had referred the same issue to a larger Bench
by an order dated 8th November 2016 in the case of S.A. Sampath
Kumar v. Kale Yadaiah and Others12. He submitted that as a matter
of fact the judgment in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) tries to nullify what has been held by the larger Benches of
this Court in the cases of Kihoto Hollohan (supra) and Rajendra
Singh Rana (supra).
15. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that even the Constitution Bench
decision in the case of Subhash Desai (supra) does not lay down
any timeline for the Speaker for deciding a disqualification petition.
It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Division Bench of the
High Court was right in reversing the direction of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court to the Speaker to decide the disqualification
petitions within a specified period.
16. Dr. Singhvi, Shri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala, and Shri Gaurav Agrawal,
learned Senior Counsel supplemented the arguments of Shri Rohatgi
on the similar lines.
12
(2021) 16 SCC 528
1890
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17. Dr. Singhvi submitted that no judgment of this Court, including the three
Constitution Bench judgments, has given directions to the Speaker
for deciding the matter within a specified period. It is submitted
by Dr. Singhvi that the only exception in this regard is the case of
Keisham Meghachandra Singh (supra), however, it is reiterated
by the learned Senior Counsel that Keisham Meghachandra Singh
(supra) does not lay down a good law.
18. Insofar as the orders passed by the Full Bench of this Court dated
18th September 2023 and 30th October 2023 are concerned, Dr.
Singhvi submitted that the said orders do not lay down a binding
precedent. Next, Dr. Singhvi tried to distinguish the case of Rajendra
Singh Rana (supra) by stating that the facts in the said case are
totally different. It is submitted that in the case of Rajendra Singh
Rana (supra), because the term of the Assembly was coming to an
end, the Court was justified in directly deciding the disqualification
petition itself. It is further submitted that, in the present case, there
is still a long time for the term to expire and as such, there is no
urgency which requires a direction to be issued to the Speaker to
decide the matter within a particular period of time.
19. Shri Agrawal submitted that if the Parliament decides that a particular
time limit is required to be laid down for deciding the disqualification
petitions, nothing prevents the Parliament from doing so. However, the
Parliament has not yet chosen to do so and therefore it is neither the
High Court nor this Court that can issue a writ directing the Speaker
to decide the disqualification proceedings within a particular period.
20. Shri Agrawal further submitted that in any case, the learned Division
Bench of the High Court vide the impugned judgment and final
order has itself directed that the matter should be decided within a
reasonable period and as such, no interference is warranted in the
present proceedings.
21. Shri Sundaram, in rejoinder, submitted that in the present case,
the facts are glaring. It is submitted that one of the MLAs, after
being elected to the Legislative Assembly as a Member of the BRS,
contested and lost the Lok Sabha Election as a Member of the
INC but is still enjoying the Office of MLA, having contested for the
same while belonging to the BRS party. It is submitted that if such
a situation is permitted to continue only on account of not deciding
the disqualification petitions within a particular period, it would be
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Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
nothing less than playing a fraud on democracy. The learned Senior
Counsel therefore reiterated that this is a fit case wherein this Court
should direct the Speaker to decide the disqualification petitions
within a specified period of time.
22. Before we proceed to decide the matter on merits, we find it
appropriate to revisit how the matter has reached the present stage.
23. When the matter was firstly listed on 31st January 2025, taking into
consideration that the learned Division Bench of the High Court
had directed the disqualification proceedings to be decided within a
"reasonable period", we had asked Shri Rohatgi to take instructions
from the Speaker as to within how much time he would decide the
disqualification proceedings. Thereafter, when the matter was listed
on 10th February 2025, Shri Rohatgi submitted that he was not in
a position to make any statement in that regard. The matter, upon
being mentioned on 20th February 2025, was directed to be kept for
hearing on 4th March 2025. On the said date, when the matters were
called out and after we had heard Shri Sundaram and Shri Naidu,
learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants/Petitioners at some length,
an objection was raised by Dr. Singhvi and Shri Rohatgi, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents that no "formal notice"
was issued in these matters and therefore the respondents could
not file any reply. It will be relevant to refer to paras 5 and 6 of the
order dated 4th March 2025, which read thus:
"5. No doubt that the objection is hypertechnical, however
we propose to adjourn the matter so that no objection is
raised at a subsequent point of time by the respondents
that the petitions were decided without following the
principles of natural justice.
6. We, therefore, issue a formal notice to the respondents
in both the matters, returnable on 25.03.2025."
24. Thereafter, the matter was called on 25th March 2025, 2nd April 2025
and finally on 3rd April 2025 when we concluded the hearing.
25. In this background, we proceed to consider the rival contentions.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
26. To appreciate the rival submissions, it would be apposite that we
first take a close look at the judicial decisions which hold the field.
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27. The Constitution Bench of this Court, in the case of Kihoto Hollohan
(supra), had an occasion to consider the constitutional validity of
the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution which was introduced by the
Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985. The Constitution
Bench, in the said case specifically considered the validity and scope
of Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It
will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court:
"13. .... A political party goes before the electorate with
a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the
election on the basis of such programme. A person
who gets elected as a candidate set up by a political
party is so elected on the basis of the programme
of that political party. The provisions of Paragraph
2(1)(a) proceed on the premise that political propriety
and morality demand that if such a person, after the
election, changes his affiliation and leaves the political
party which had set him up as a candidate at the
election, then he should give up his membership of
the legislature and go back before the electorate. The
same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as
an Independent candidate and wishes to join a political
party after the election."
[emphasis supplied]
28. This Court, amongst other questions, framed the following two
questions for its consideration:
"24. .....
(E) That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the
Tenth Schedule attracts the immunity under Articles 122
and 212. The Speaker and the Chairman in relation to the
exercise of the powers under the Tenth Schedule shall not
be subjected to the jurisdiction of any Court.
The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a new and
non-justiciable area of rights, obligations and remedies
to be resolved in the exclusive manner envisaged by the
Constitution and is not amenable to, but constitutionally
immune from, curial adjudicative processes.
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(F) That even if Paragraph 7 erecting a bar on the
jurisdiction of Courts is held inoperative, the Courts'
jurisdiction is, in any event, barred as Paragraph 6(1)
which imparts a constitutional 'finality' to the decision of
the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, and
that such concept of 'finality' bars examination of the
matter by the Courts.
29. One of the arguments that was advanced before this Court was that
the concept of "finality" given to the decision of the Speaker excluded
the court's jurisdiction. This Court therefore considered the question
as to whether the word "final" in paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule
rendered the decision of the Speaker immune from judicial review.
The majority judgment rendered by M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His
Lordship then was), after referring to various earlier judgments of
this Court, observed thus:
"94. It is, therefore, inappropriate to claim that the
determinative jurisdiction of the Speaker or the Chairman
in the Tenth Schedule is not a judicial power and is
within the non-justiciable legislative area. The classic
exposition of Issacs J., in Australian Boot Trade Employees
Federation v. Whybrow & Co. [(1910) 10 CLR 266, 317]
as to what distinguishes a judicial power from a legislative
power was referred to with the approval of this Court
in Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR
1958 SC 578, 611 : 1959 SCR 12 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] .
Issacs, J., stated: (CLR p. 317 quoted at AIR p. 611)
"If the dispute is as to the relative rights
of parties as they rest on past or present
circumstances, the award is in the nature of a
judgment, which might have been the decree
of an ordinary judicial tribunal acting under
the ordinary judicial power. There the law
applicable to the case must be observed. If,
however, the dispute is as to what shall in the
future be the mutual rights and responsibilities
of the parties - in other words, if no present
rights are asserted or denied, but a future rule
of conduct is to be prescribed, thus creating
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new rights and obligations, with sanctions for
non-conformity - then the determination that
so prescribes, call it an award, or arbitration,
determination, or decision or what you will, is
essentially of a legislative character, and limited
only by the law which authorises it. If, again,
there are neither present rights asserted, nor
a future rule of conduct prescribed, but merely
a fact ascertained necessary for the practical
effectuation of admitted rights, the proceeding,
though called an arbitration, is rather in the
nature of an appraisement or ministerial act."
95. In the present case, the power to decide disputed
disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) is pre-eminently
of a judicial complexion.
96. The fiction in Paragraph 6(2), indeed, places it in the
first clause of Article 122 or 212, as the case may be.
The words "proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings
in the legislature of a State" in Paragraph 6(2) have
their corresponding expression in Articles 122(1) and
212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunity from mere
irregularities of procedures.
97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule
was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any
intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct
of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of
members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1). The very
deeming provision implies that the proceedings of
disqualification are, in fact, not before the House;
but only before the Speaker as a specially designated
authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) is not the
decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval
by the House. The decision operates independently
of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its
creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore,
no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial
scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman
exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule.
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Padi Kaushik Reddy Etc. v. The State of Telangana and Others Etc.
98. But then is the Speaker or the Chairman acting
under Paragraph 6(1) a Tribunal? "All tribunals are not
courts, though all courts are tribunals". The word "courts"
is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in
an organised State for the Administration of Justice. By
Administration of Justice is meant the exercise of judicial
power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to
punish "wrongs"........"
[emphasis supplied]
30. It can thus be seen that this Court, in unequivocal terms, has held
that it was inappropriate to claim that the determinative jurisdiction
of the Speaker/Chairman in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
was not a judicial power and was within the non-justiciable
legislative area. This Court, in no unclear terms, held that the power
to decide disputed disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) of the
Tenth Schedule to the Constitution was pre-eminently of a judicial
complexion. This Court, thereafter, referred to the provision of
Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution and the fiction in
Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. This
Court observed that these provisions attract immunity from mere
irregularities of procedures. Then, in paragraph 98, this Court posed
a question as to whether the Speaker/Chairman, acting in Paragraph
6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, is a Tribunal or not.
31. Thereafter, this Court referred to various judgments distinguishing
between the Courts and Tribunals and observed thus:
"100. By these well known and accepted tests of what
constitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting
under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal."
32. It can thus be seen that this Court, in unequivocal terms, has held
that the Speaker/Chairman, acting under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution is a Tribunal. The Constitution Bench
thereafter insofar as Questions (E) and (F) are concerned, came to
the following conclusion:
"109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and
the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/
Chairman under Paragraph 6, the scope of judicial
review under Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the
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Constitution in respect of an order passed by the
Speaker/Chairman under Paragraph 6 would be
confined to jurisdictional errors only viz., infirmities
based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala
fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice
and perversity.
110. In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is
available on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6
and also having regard to the constitutional intendment and
the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e.
Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available
at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the
Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not
be permissible. Nor would interference be permissible
at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings. Exception
will, however, have to be made in respect of cases
where disqualification or suspension is imposed
during the pendency of the proceedings and such
disqualification or suspension is likely to have
grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and
consequence.
111. In the result, we hold on contentions (E) and (F):
That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing
for an additional grant (sic ground) for
disqualification and for adjudication of disputed
disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable
constitutional area. The power to resolve such
disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is
a judicial power.
That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule,
to the extent it seeks to impart finality to
the decision of the speakers/Chairmen is
valid. But the concept of statutory finality
embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract
from or abrogate judicial review under
Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution
insofar as infirmities based on violations of
constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-
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compliance with Rules of Natural Justice
and perversity, are concerned.
That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2)
of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity
analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of
the Constitution as understood and explained in
Keshav Singh case [(1965) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1965
SC 745] to protect the validity of proceedings
from mere irregularities of procedure.