# PANDIA NADAR AND ORS v. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1975] 1 S.C.R. 333
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975
- **Case number:** Writ Petitions Nos. 243 to 246 of 1970
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, H. R. Khanna, K. K. Mathew, A. Alagiriswami, P. N. Bhagwati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pandia-nadar-and-ors-v-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-and-ors-6334
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Taniil Nadu Land Encroachnu:nt Act, 1905, s. 6-Procr!dure
for
eviction
if riolative of Art. 14.
Notices were issued to the petitioners under s. 6 of the Tamil Nadu
Land
Encroachment Act, 1905, for evicting the petitioners and they challenged the
constitutional validity of the Act on the basis of the decision in Northern lndia
Caterers v. Puniab. [19671 3 S.C.R. 399.
Dismissing the petitions,
HELD: Under the Tamil Nadn Act s. 2 defines 'property of government', s. 3
Javs down that any 'person who shall unauthorisedly occupy any land which is
th.e property of the Government shall be liable to pay the full assessment on the
land, s.- 5 provides for further payment of penalty, and s. 6 provides for eviction
of such person and for forfeiture of any crop or other product raised on the
land and any building or other construction erected on the land.
The eviction
was to be 1:arried out by serving a notice as provided under s. 7 after giving him.
reasonable time to vacate. There is a provision for appeal against the order of
the Collector or other officer and there is also a provision for revision by the
Government.
Section 14 provides for a right of suit by any person deeming
himself aggrieved by- any proceedings under the Act.
This Court in Magan/al Chagganlal Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bo1nbay [19751 J S.C.R. 1 considered the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A
of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, and the
Bombay
Government
Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, which provide for a
special
procedure
for
eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. The Court observed that
the mere availability of two procedures will not vitiate the special procedure and
discussed the principles as to when the statute will not be hit by Art. 14. The
Court then went on to point out that the procedures laid down by the two
Acts were not so harsh or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination would
result if resort was made to the provisions of these two Acts in some cases and
to the ordinary civil court in others; and this decision would apply on all fours
to the facts of the _present case.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos.
243 to 246 of
1970.
Petition under Art. 32 o~ the Constitution.
K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the petitioner.
Rangam, N. S. Sivan and A.
S. Govind Swaminathan, A. V.
Subhashini, for the respondents.
The Judgment c~ the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act 1905
is impugned in these petitions as uncolllltitutional and void.
Notices
have been issued to the petitioners under section 6 of that Act in order
to evict them from a certain piece of land claimed to be Government
land. The challenge to the ccinstitutional validity of the Act is based
solely on the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers
v.
334
SUPREME COURT REPORT,S
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
Punjab (1967 3 SCR 399). In that case the validity of the Punjab
Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959
was under consideration. The State had leased its premises to the
appellant therein for running a hotel and when the lease expired called
upon him to hand civer vacant possession of the premises. On the
appellant failing to do so the Collector issued a notice under s. 4 o!
the Punjab Act requiring the appellant to show cause why an order
of eviction should not be passed under s. 5. This Court while hc~ding
that "there is an intelligible differentia between occupiers and that the
classification has a reasonable relation to the object of the Act and
does not offend Art. 14" also held that "s. 5 of the Act cqnfers an
additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and thereby violates Art. 14 by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Cqllector to
resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in
occupation cjf public properties and premises for the application of the
more drastic procedure under s

## Text

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333
PANDIA NADAR AND ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.
April 30, 197 4
[A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAMI
AND P. N. BHAGWATI, JJ.]
Taniil Nadu Land Encroachnu:nt Act, 1905, s. 6-Procr!dure
for
eviction
if riolative of Art. 14.
Notices were issued to the petitioners under s. 6 of the Tamil Nadu
Land
Encroachment Act, 1905, for evicting the petitioners and they challenged the
constitutional validity of the Act on the basis of the decision in Northern lndia
Caterers v. Puniab. [19671 3 S.C.R. 399.
Dismissing the petitions,
HELD: Under the Tamil Nadn Act s. 2 defines 'property of government', s. 3
Javs down that any 'person who shall unauthorisedly occupy any land which is
th.e property of the Government shall be liable to pay the full assessment on the
land, s.- 5 provides for further payment of penalty, and s. 6 provides for eviction
of such person and for forfeiture of any crop or other product raised on the
land and any building or other construction erected on the land.
The eviction
was to be 1:arried out by serving a notice as provided under s. 7 after giving him.
reasonable time to vacate. There is a provision for appeal against the order of
the Collector or other officer and there is also a provision for revision by the
Government.
Section 14 provides for a right of suit by any person deeming
himself aggrieved by- any proceedings under the Act.
This Court in Magan/al Chagganlal Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bo1nbay [19751 J S.C.R. 1 considered the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A
of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, and the
Bombay
Government
Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, which provide for a
special
procedure
for
eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. The Court observed that
the mere availability of two procedures will not vitiate the special procedure and
discussed the principles as to when the statute will not be hit by Art. 14. The
Court then went on to point out that the procedures laid down by the two
Acts were not so harsh or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination would
result if resort was made to the provisions of these two Acts in some cases and
to the ordinary civil court in others; and this decision would apply on all fours
to the facts of the _present case.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos.
243 to 246 of
1970.
Petition under Art. 32 o~ the Constitution.
K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the petitioner.
Rangam, N. S. Sivan and A.
S. Govind Swaminathan, A. V.
Subhashini, for the respondents.
The Judgment c~ the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act 1905
is impugned in these petitions as uncolllltitutional and void.
Notices
have been issued to the petitioners under section 6 of that Act in order
to evict them from a certain piece of land claimed to be Government
land. The challenge to the ccinstitutional validity of the Act is based
solely on the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers
v.
334
SUPREME COURT REPORT,S
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
Punjab (1967 3 SCR 399). In that case the validity of the Punjab
Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959
was under consideration. The State had leased its premises to the
appellant therein for running a hotel and when the lease expired called
upon him to hand civer vacant possession of the premises. On the
appellant failing to do so the Collector issued a notice under s. 4 o!
the Punjab Act requiring the appellant to show cause why an order
of eviction should not be passed under s. 5. This Court while hc~ding
that "there is an intelligible differentia between occupiers and that the
classification has a reasonable relation to the object of the Act and
does not offend Art. 14" also held that "s. 5 of the Act cqnfers an
additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and thereby violates Art. 14 by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Cqllector to
resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in
occupation cjf public properties and premises for the application of the
more drastic procedure under s. 5." Two of the learned Judges who
constituted the Bench, Hidayatullah and Bachawat, JJ. however held
that "the unauthorised occupant is not denied equal protection of the
laws merely because the Government has the qption of proceeding
against him either by way of a suit or under the Act."
The Tamil N adu Act is entitled "an Act to provide measures for
checking unauthorized occupation of lands which are the property of
Government." Section 2 of the Act defines the property of Gc1vernment as :
"2. ( 1) All public roads, streets, Janes and paths, the
bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, oμ or beside the same, the
bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high water
mark, and of rivers, streams, nalas, lakes and tanks and all
backwaters, canals and water courses, and all standing and
flowing water, and all lands, wherever sitnated, save in so
far as the same are the property-
( a) of any zamindar, poligar, mittadar, jagirdar, shrotriemdar or inamdar or any person claiming through or holding under any of them, or
(b) of any person paying shist, kattubadi, jodi, poruppu
or quit-rent to any of the aforesaid persons, cir
( c) of any person holding under ryotwari tenure, including that of a janmi in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiri district and in the transferred territory or in any way subject to
the payment of land-revenue direct to Government, or
( d) of any other registered holder of land in proprietary
right, or
( e) of any other person holding land under grant from
the Government otherwise than by way of licence,
and, as to lands, save also in so far as they are temple
site or owned as house-site or backyard.
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PANDIA NADAR V, TAMIL NADU (Alagiriswamz, J.)
335
are and are hereby declared to be the property of Government except as may be otherwise provided by any law for
the time being in force, subject always to all rights of way and
other public rights and to the natnral and easement rights of
other land-owners, and to all customary rights legally subsisting.
(2) All public roads and streets vested in any local
authority shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be
the property of Government."
Section 3 lays down that any person who shall unauthorizedly occupy
any land which is the property of Government shall be liable to pay
the full assessment on the land. Section 5 provides for further pay·
ment by such a person of penalty. Section 6 provides for eviction of
such a person and for forefeiture of any crop c~ other product raised
on the land and any building or other construction erected on the land.
Such eviction is to be carried out by serving a notice as provided under
section 7 after giving him a reasc1:iable time to vacate. If there is any
resistance to eviction the Collector or other officer ordering eviction
is to hold a summary inquiry into the question whether the resistance
was without any just cause. There is a provision fqr appeal against
the order of the Collector or other officer and there is also a provision
for revision by the Government. Section 14 prcivides for a right of
suit by any person deeming himself aggrieved by any proceedings
under the Act. Such in short is the scheme of the Act.
In its rcc·ont decision in Magc.nlal Clzhagganlal (P) Ltd. etc. v.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. etc. (1 ) pronounced
on 11 April, 1974, this Court had occasion to consider the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation
Act and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act. According
to the provisions of section!OSA contained in Chapter V-A there under
consideraticn:i, the Commissioner in relation to premises belonging to
or vesting in, or taken on lease by the corporation and the General
Manager (also defined as the Commissioner) of the Bombay Electric
Supply and Transport Undertaking in relation to premises of the corporation which vest in it for the purposes of that undertaking were
granted certain powers of eviction in respect of nnauthctised occupation of any corporation premises. Unauthorised occupation is defined
as occupation by any person of ccicporation premises without authority
for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any
person c& the premises after the authority under which he was allowed
to occupy the premises has expired, or has been duly determined.
Under section 105B the Commissioner, by notice served on the perscin
in unauthorised occupation, could ask him to vacate if he had not
paid for a period c& more than two months the rent or taxes law.'ully
due from him in respect of such premises; or sub-let, contrary to the
terms. or conditions of his occupation, the whcile or any part of such
premises; or committed, or is committing, such acts of waste as are
li~ely to diminish ".1aterially the value, or impair substantially the
ul!hty, of the premises; or otherwise acted in contravention of anv of
the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy
(I) [1975] I S.C'.ll. !.
336
SUPREME COURT J!EPORTS
[1975] 1 s.c.R.
such premises; or if any person is in unauthorised occupation of any
corporation premises; cir any corporation premises in the occupation
of any person are required by the corporation in the public interest.
Before making such an order the Commissioner should issue a notice
calling upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of
eviction should not be made and specify the grqunds on which the
order of eviction is proposed to be made.
The person concerned can
file a written statement and produce documents and is entitled to
appear before the Commissioner by advocate, attorney or pleader.
Perscins failing to comply with the order of eviction as well as any other
person who obstructs eviction can be evicted by force. Under section
l05C there is power to recover rent or damages as arrears of property
taxes. A person ordered to vacate qn the grounds of being in arrears
of rent or acting in contravention of the terms under which he is
aut!J.orised to occupy the premises could be allowed to continue if he
satisfies the Cc1tnmissioner. The Commissioner has, for the purpose of
holding any inquiry, the same powers as are vested in a civil court
under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit, in respect of
(a) summoning and enforcing the presence of any person and examining him on oath, (b) requiring the discovery and productic1t1 of documents, and ( c) any other matter which may be prescribed by regulations.
An appeal from every order of the Commissioner lies to the
principal Judge of the City Civil Court or such cf.her judicial officer as
the principal Judge may designate. The appeal is to be disposed of as
expeditiously as possible. Subject to the results of the appeal every
order of the Commissioner or the appellate qfficer is final. The power
to make regulations under the Act includes the power to make regulations in respect of holding of inquiries and the procedure to be
fctllowed in such appeals. The provisions of the Bombay Government
Premises (Eviction) Act are more or less similar except that they
relate to Government premises and the power to order eviction is given
!Ci the competent authority not lower in rank than that of a Deputy
Collector or an Executive Engineer appointed by the State Government. It was argued before this Court that as there were two procedures available to the Corporation and the State Government, one by
way of a suit under the ordinary law and the other under either of the
two Acts, which was harsher and more onerous than the procedure
under the ordinary law, the latter is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution in the absence of any guidelines as to which procedure may be
adopted. There also reliance was wholly placed on the decision in the
Northern India Caterers' case.
After an exhaustive discussion of all
the relevant decisions this Court came to the conclusion that the principles deducible from those decisions were as follciws :
"Where a statute providing for a more drastic procedure
different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field
covered by the ordinary prq:edure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkar's
case(!) and Sura; Mall Mohta's case( 2 ) without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to
be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Art. 14. Even there,
(l) [1952] SCR 284.
(2) [1965] I SCR 448
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PANDL\ NADAR v. TAMIL NADU (A/agiriswami, /.)
337
as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohtds case, a provision for
appeal· may cilre the defect. Further, jn such cases if frcm
the preamble the surrounding circumstances, as well as the
provisions of- the statute themselves explained. and amplified
by affidavits, necessary guidelines could 'be inferred as in
Saurashtra case('> and Jyoti Pershad's case(') the statute
will not be hit by Art.
14 .. The~ again where the statute
itself covers only .a class of cases as in Ha!dar's case( 3 ) and
Bajoria' case (4). the statute will not be bad. -The fact that
in such cases. the executive will choose which cases are to be
tried under the special pm::edure will not affect the validity
. of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere avail-
. ability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the
special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority."
This Court then went on to apply those ·principl~s to the statutes under
consideration in the following. words :
"The ·statute itself in the two classes of cases before us
clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is that premises belonging to the Corporation and. the Gcwernment
should. be ·subject to speedy pr0cedure in the matter of evicting unauthorized persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guiaanee for the authorities on whcan the power has.
been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the
statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves.
of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to
the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court.
Even
normally· one cannot imagine an officer having the choice
of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession
of the property quickly and the either which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative officers.
no less than the courts, do not function in a. vacuum. It ·
would be extremely unreal to hcdd that an administrative
cfficer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Govetnment property .or Municipal property rescirt to the procedure prescribed by ~he two Acts in
one case and to.the ordinary CiviJ·Court in the other. The
provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the
fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an
unrealistic fashici!l.
In considering whether th·e officers
wculd be discriminating· between one set o~ persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human be--,
haviour and not behaviour which · is abnormal. It is nc1t
every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real i:isk ·
cf discrimination that we must take into account. This is not
one of those cases where discriminatici!l is writ large on the
face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is
very improbable.· And if there. is discrimination in actual
(I) (19521 SCR 435
(3l (1960] 2 SCR 646
(2) (1962] 2 SCR 125
(4) (1954.J SCR JO ..
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1975] 1 s.c.R.
practice this Court is not powerless. Furthermore, the fact
that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is
insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants
of Government and Corporation property and provided a
special speedy procedure therefor is a clear guidance for the
authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised
occupants. We, therefore, find c1Uiselves .unable to agree
with the majority in the Northern India Caterers' case."
It then went on to point out that the procedures laid down by the two
Acts under consideration were not so harsh c~ onerous as to suggest
that a discrimination would result if resort was made to the provis10ns
of those two Acts in some cases and to the qrdinary Civil Court in
other cases in the following words :
"Even though the officers deciding these questions would
be administrative officers there is provisiclll in these Acts for
giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the
grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be
made, for the party affected to file a written statement and
produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The pro·
visions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning
and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on
oath, and requiring the discovery and productic1n of docu·
inents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected. So
is the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge of the
City Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or tc1 a District
Judge in the districts who has got to deal with the matter
as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as
was recognised in Suraj Mall Mohta's case. The main difference between the procedure before an ordinary Civil Cc1Urt
and the executive authorities under these two Acts is th'lt in
one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in law
and it might also .be that more than one appeal is available
As against that there is only one appeal available in the other
but it is also open tq the aggrieved party to resort to the High
Court under the provisions of Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the
Constitution. This is no less effective than the provision
for a second appeal. On the whole, cc111sidering the object
with which these special procedures were enacted by the
legislature we would not be prepared to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so unconscionable as to
attract the vice of discriminaticia. After all, Art. 14 does not
demand a fanatical approach. We,
therefore, hold
that
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PANDIA NADAR v. TAMIL NADU (Alagiriswami, J.)
339neither the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Muni-
. cipal Corporation Act nor the . provisions c[ the Bombay
Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are hit by Art.
14 of the Constitution."
This decision would apply on all fours tq the facts of the present case .
B
In the result the writ petitions are dismissed.
We must, however, mention that on 'behalf of the petitioners it
was contended that they were still in possession. On the other hand
on behalf er! the State it was contended that three of the petitioners.
had been evicted even befc~e this Court passed an order of stay. What•
c
ever the situation, it is open to any one of the petitioners, or such of
them as choose to do so, to f!le a suit.
V.P.S.
Petitions dismisJed •.