# PANDIT KISH AN LAL v. GANP AT RAM KHOSLA AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 17
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1959
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J. c. SHAH, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pandit-kish-an-lal-v-ganp-at-ram-khosla-and-another-2245
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Urban Tenancy-Eviction of tenant-Application-]i.,J aintainability-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, r949 (East Punjab
Ill of r949), s. r3-Transfer of Property Act, r882 (4 of r882),
s. I08(q).
The Singer Sewing Machine Company, respondent 2 in the
appeal, was the tenant in respect of a shop under the appellant
and informed him that the company had closed its premises,
that respondent r will conduct his business in the shop, and that
he will be personally responsible for payment of rent, and in spite
of the appellant's protest and without his consent delivered
possession of the said shop room to respondent r. Thereupon the
appellant applied to the Controller under s. 13 of the East
·Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for eviction of the
respondents and the Controller directed the company to deliver
possession to the appellant. The District Court confirmed the
Controller's order but the High Court set aside the order, in a
petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution, as having been made
without jurisdiction, holding that the company had no interest
in the tenancy after August 31, 1954, and nothing had passed to
the respondent r.
Held, that the High Court was in error on both the points
and its order must be set aside.
One of the obligations of a tenant under s. 108(q) of Transfer
of Property Act, on the determination of the tenancy, is to put
the landlord in possession. If the tenant fails to do so before
the expiry of the period of notice, his tenancy continues and
cannot be terminated by an assignment in favour of another.
W. H. King v. Republic of India, (1952] S.C.R. 419, referred
to.
In the instant case, the company had not admittedly served
the notice as required by law and, therefore, did not cease to be
the tenant and since the respondent I was let into possession as
assignee he was not a trespasser and, consequently, the proceeding before the Controller was maintainable against both.
1

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
17
PANDIT KISH AN LAL
v.
GANP AT RAM KHOSLA AND ANOTHER
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J. c. SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, ,JJ.)
Urban Tenancy-Eviction of tenant-Application-]i.,J aintainability-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, r949 (East Punjab
Ill of r949), s. r3-Transfer of Property Act, r882 (4 of r882),
s. I08(q).
The Singer Sewing Machine Company, respondent 2 in the
appeal, was the tenant in respect of a shop under the appellant
and informed him that the company had closed its premises,
that respondent r will conduct his business in the shop, and that
he will be personally responsible for payment of rent, and in spite
of the appellant's protest and without his consent delivered
possession of the said shop room to respondent r. Thereupon the
appellant applied to the Controller under s. 13 of the East
·Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, for eviction of the
respondents and the Controller directed the company to deliver
possession to the appellant. The District Court confirmed the
Controller's order but the High Court set aside the order, in a
petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution, as having been made
without jurisdiction, holding that the company had no interest
in the tenancy after August 31, 1954, and nothing had passed to
the respondent r.
Held, that the High Court was in error on both the points
and its order must be set aside.
One of the obligations of a tenant under s. 108(q) of Transfer
of Property Act, on the determination of the tenancy, is to put
the landlord in possession. If the tenant fails to do so before
the expiry of the period of notice, his tenancy continues and
cannot be terminated by an assignment in favour of another.
W. H. King v. Republic of India, (1952] S.C.R. 419, referred
to.
In the instant case, the company had not admittedly served
the notice as required by law and, therefore, did not cease to be
the tenant and since the respondent I was let into possession as
assignee he was not a trespasser and, consequently, the proceeding before the Controller was maintainable against both.
1
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
356 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave fro!IY the judgment and
.,.
order dated the November 18, 1957, of the Punjab
3
April 17.
•
I96I
Pandit
f{is.hnn Lal
v.
Ganpat Ra1n
J( hos la
18
SUPRE¥E COURT REPORTS
[1962]
High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Miscellaneous
Application No. 712 of 1956.
B. D. Sharma, for appellant.
Hardev Singh and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent
No. 1.
Y. Kumar, for respondent No. 2.
1961.
April 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Shah J.
SHAH, .J.-The Singer Sewing Machine Company-
•
hereinafter referred to as the company-was, since
the year 1934, the tenant for business purposes of a
shop situate at Gurgaon in the State of Punjab and
belonging to Pandit Kishan Lal-hereinafter called
the appellant. One Ganpat l'tam Khosla-hereinafter
referred to as Khosla-was the Sales Manager of the
company.
The Legislature of the State of East Punjab enacted Act III of 1949 called the East Punjab Urban
Rent Restriction Act., 1949, to restrict the increase of
rent of certain premises situated within the limits of
urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom.
The Act granted protection to tenants of premises
used for residential and non-residential purposes. By
s. 2, cl. (i), the expression "tenant" was defined, in so
far as the definitioa is material, as meaning any person by whom or on whose account rent was payable
for a building or rented land and included a tenant
continuing in possession after the termination of the
tenancy in his favour, but did not include a person
placed in occupation of a building or rented land by
its tenant, unless with the consent of the landlord ...
... Bys. 13, the right of the landlord to evict a tenant
even in execution of a decree was restricted and the
landlord could seek to evict his tenant by an application to the Controller in certain specified circumstances set out in that section.
On August 30, 1954, the company addressed a letter
to the appellant intimating that it desired to close
down its office in Gurgaon with effect from Septemof
her 1, 1954. The relevant part of the letter ran as
follows:
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
"Now the Company has closed its agency business at Gurgaon and Mr. Khosla will be carrying on
Sewing Machine business in Gurgaon in your shop
in his personal capacity and not as a Manager of
Singer Company. In order that there may not be
any misunderstanding about, the payment of rent
in future, you are informed that from September,
1954 onwards Mr. Khosla will be personally responsible for the payment of rent of your shop."
The appellant informed the company that unless
vacant possession was delivered to him tenancy could
not be validly determined, and that the company will
be held responsible till such delivery for liability to
pay rent and that in the event of possession being
transferred to any other person, legal action will be
taken against the company. But the company delivered possession of the shop to Khosla and allowed
him to occupy the shop in his personal capacity from
September 1, 1954. Thereafter, on October 31, 1954,
the appellant applied under s. 13 of the Act to the
Controller for an order against Khosla and the company on three grounds, (1) that the company did not
require the premises any longer while the appellant
required the same for his own use, (2) that the company had neglected to pay rent ~ince September 1,
1954, and (3) that the company had assigned or sublet the shop to Khosla without the written consent of
the appellant. Khosla and the company resisted the
application contending that Khosla was the tenant of
the appellant and that in any event, on August 28,
1954, the company through its local Supervisor had
delivered possession of the shop to the appellant and
that the latter agreed to treat Khosla as his tenant
with effect from September 1, 1954. The Controller
rejected the pleas raised by Khosla and the company
and ordered that possession be delivered by the company to the appellant. In appeal to the District
Conrt at Rohtak, the order passed by the Controller
was confirmed. In a petition under Art. 227 of the
Constitution filed by Khosla in the High Court of
Judicature for ?unjab at Chandigarh, the order passed by the District Court was quashed. The High
Court was of the view that after August 31, 1954, the
1961
Pandit
Kishan Lal
v.
Gan at
am
Khosla
Shah ].
Pandit
Kishan Lal
v.
Ganpat Rain
Khosla
Shah ].
20
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
company had no interest left in the tenancy and the
tenancy being from month to month terminable at the
will of the appellant, such tenancy could not be the
subject-matter of transfer or of sub-letting. The High
Court therefore held that the order passed was without jurisdiction. In the course of the judgment, the
High Court observed tha.t full rent had been paid
even after September 1, 1954, and therefore the
ground of non-payment of rent "was not open to"
the appellant. It is accepted at the bar that in making this observation, the High Court was under a misapprehension. The rent accruing due was not paid
to the appellant, but was deposited in court. Against
the order passed by the High Court, this appeal is preferred with special leave.
The Controller and the District Court found that
the tenant of the shop in dispute was not Khosla but
the company. These two tribunals also found that
possession of the shop was handed over by the company to Khos]a without the consent of the appellant.
These findings were binding upon the High Court.
The only question which fell to be determined by
the High Court was whether by unilateral action on
its part, the company could require the appella.nt to
treat Khosla as his tenant. In our view, the High
Court misconceived the nature of the tenancy. A
tenancy except where it is at will, may be terminated
only on the expiry of the period of notice of a specified duration under the contract, custom or statute
governing the premises in question.
A tenant does
not absolve himself from the obligations of his tenancy
by intimating that as from a particular date he
will cease to be in occupation under the landlord and
that some one else w horn the landlord is not willing
to accept will be the tenant. It is one of the obligations of a contract of tenancy that the tenant will, on
determination of the tenancy, put the landlord in
possession of the property demised (see s. 108( q) of the
Transfer of Property Act).
Unless possession is delivered to the landlord before the expiry of the period
of the requisite notice, the tenant continues to hold
the premises during the period as tenant. Therefore,
by merely assigning the rights, the tenancy of the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
21
company did not come to an end. It was observed
by this court in W. H. King v. Republic of India('):
"There is a clear distinction between an assignment of a tenancy on the one hand and a relinquishment or surrender on the other. In the case of an
assignment, the assignor continues to be liable to
the landlord for the performance of his obligations
under the tenancy and this liability is contractual,
while the assignee becomes liable by reason of privity of estate. The consent of the landlord to an
assignment is not necessary, in the absence of a
contract or local usage to the contrary. But in the
case of relinquishment it cannot be a unilateral
transaction; it can only be in favour of the lessor
by mutual agreement between them. Relinquishment of possession must be to the lessor or one who
holds his interest: and surrender or relinquishment
terminates the lessee's rights and lets in the lessor."
In the present case, the company did not surrender its rights to the appellant; it sought to transfer
its rights to Khosla. The company admittedly did
not serve the notice as required by law, nor did the
appellant agree to accept the unilateral determination
of the tenancy by the company. The true position was
therefore that the company did not immediately on
the service of the notice cease to be a tenant; and
Khosla, because he was let into possession became an
assignee of the rights of the company as a tenant, and
he could not be regarded as a trespasser. The High
Court was tharefore in our view in error in holding
that the proceedings were not maintainable in the
court of the Controller for possession. Khosla being
an assignee of the tenancy rights of the conipany was
as much liable to be sued in the court of the Controller
as the company for an order in ejectment.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order
passed by the High Court and restore the order passed
by the District Court, Rohtak. The appellant will be
entitled to his costs in this court as well as in the
High Court from Khosla.
Appeal allowed.
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 419.
z961
Pandit
Kishan Lal
v.
Ganpat Ram
Khosla
Shah ].