# PARASRAMKA COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. lil\rf>N OF INDIA

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 136
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-08-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2532 of 1966
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatu~'.Ah, N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/parasramka-commercial-company-v-lil-rf-n-of-india-4756
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Arhitratia11 Act (10
1940), s. 14(1)-'Notice in wriling' of t11l111aki111: and signing of tire award-Copy of sig11ed award sen! to particilf operutes as such notice.
The disputes bet\\·cen the appellant and the rcsp·0ndent, arising out ol
a contract bcl\-veen them. were referred to arbitration under the arbitrati~1n
clause in the contract. The J\\'ard \\'as made and signed on April 26. 1950.
The arbitrator did not send any notice of the making and signing of th..!
[1\rard but sent a copy of the si~neO a\vard to the appellant. The appellant
acl\no\vlcdged receipt of the copy by t\\'O letters daLt:P ?\Iay 5. 1950 anci
~!av 16. 1950.
On March 30. 1951, the appellant filed an application
in the Subordinate Judge·s Court for passing a decree in
terms of lhc
a\l.:an..1.
On the question whether the application \\·as out of time, because.
under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. the application had
to be filed within 90 days of the date of service of the notice of the n1aking
of the award,
HELD : Under s. 14(1) ·of the Arbitralion Act, 1940, when
the
arbitrators have given their av.;ard. they shall sign it and shall give noricc
in \!'r;1i11g to the. parties of the making and signing the:·cof and of
th-~
amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbirtation and the
award.
The notice need not be in the form of a separate letter.
It is
sufficient, if it is in writing and intimates clearlv that the a1.vard hns been
made and signed. The noii-mention of the amoUnt of the fees ·and charges
payable in respect of the arbitration and a1,1,·ard \viii not affect ~fie notice
as it is not an essential part of it for the purpos·e of limitation.
In the
present case, s_ince the appellant had sufficient notice that the a1,1,·ard had
heen made and signed \Vhen a copy of the a"·ard signed by the arbitrator
\vas sent to the appellant, the application for passing a decree in terms of
the award was out of time.
(138 B, F-G; 139 A. C-D]

## Text

136
PARASRAMKA COMMERCIAL COMPANY
v.
lil\rf>N OF INDIA
August 29, 1969
[M. HIDAYATU~'.AH, C.J. AND A, N. RAY, J.]
Arhitratia11 Act (10
1940), s. 14(1)-'Notice in wriling' of t11l111aki111: and signing of tire award-Copy of sig11ed award sen! to particilf operutes as such notice.
The disputes bet\\·cen the appellant and the rcsp·0ndent, arising out ol
a contract bcl\-veen them. were referred to arbitration under the arbitrati~1n
clause in the contract. The J\\'ard \\'as made and signed on April 26. 1950.
The arbitrator did not send any notice of the making and signing of th..!
[1\rard but sent a copy of the si~neO a\vard to the appellant. The appellant
acl\no\vlcdged receipt of the copy by t\\'O letters daLt:P ?\Iay 5. 1950 anci
~!av 16. 1950.
On March 30. 1951, the appellant filed an application
in the Subordinate Judge·s Court for passing a decree in
terms of lhc
a\l.:an..1.
On the question whether the application \\·as out of time, because.
under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. the application had
to be filed within 90 days of the date of service of the notice of the n1aking
of the award,
HELD : Under s. 14(1) ·of the Arbitralion Act, 1940, when
the
arbitrators have given their av.;ard. they shall sign it and shall give noricc
in \!'r;1i11g to the. parties of the making and signing the:·cof and of
th-~
amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbirtation and the
award.
The notice need not be in the form of a separate letter.
It is
sufficient, if it is in writing and intimates clearlv that the a1.vard hns been
made and signed. The noii-mention of the amoUnt of the fees ·and charges
payable in respect of the arbitration and a1,1,·ard \viii not affect ~fie notice
as it is not an essential part of it for the purpos·e of limitation.
In the
present case, s_ince the appellant had sufficient notice that the a1,1,·ard had
heen made and signed \Vhen a copy of the a"·ard signed by the arbitrator
\vas sent to the appellant, the application for passing a decree in terms of
the award was out of time.
(138 B, F-G; 139 A. C-D]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2532 of
1966.
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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and orcer dated
August 8, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi
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in Civil Revision No. 330-D of 1954.
B. P. Mahesh1rari and S. M. Jain, for the appellant.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ff
Hidayatullah, C.J. This is an appeal against a judgment and
order of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi
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PARASRAMKA co. v. UNION (Hidayatullah, C.J.)
I 37
(Single Judge) in a matter arising under the Aribtration Act. By
an agreement dated April 28, 1948 the appellant company entered into a contract with the Chief Director of Purchase (Food)
acting on behalf of the Government of India. It is not necessary
to give the details of this contract, because the matter was referred
to arbitration under an arbitration clause included in the agreement between the parties. The award was made and signed on
April 26, 1950.
The Arbitrator awarded Rs. 17,080-2-9 with
wsts in favour of the company.
The Arbitrator, however, did
not send a notice as such of the making and signing of the award
but sent a copy of the award signed by him to the company. The
company acknowledged the receipt of this copy by two letters
which are dated May 5 and May 16, 1950. It appears that in the
original which was retained in the office of the Arbitrator, it was
stated that there was a covering letter giving notice of the making
of the award, but the company denied that any such letter had
been sent. However, nothing much turns on it as we sh3ll show
presently.
·
After the copy of the award was received by the company, it
filed an application under s. 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi on March 30, 1951 for
making the award rule of the court. It may be mentioned that on
July 3, 1951, the Arbitrator sent the original award to the court
also.
Before the Subordinate Judge objection was taken by the
Union of India that the application of the company to the court
was delayed since such an application under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act under Art. 1'/8 of the Indian Limitation Act had to
be made within 90 days of the receipt of the notice intimating that
the award had been made and signed.
This objection prevailed
with the Subordinate Judge who rejected the application. A revision application Wa!j unsuccessfully made before the High Court
and it is the order on the revision application which is the subject
of appeal before us.
Originally the revision application went before a learned Single
Judge of the High Court. He referred the matter fo a Division
Bench which in its turn referred the case for decision to a Full
Bench. The Full Bench gave its opinion on November 17, 1961.
Althou~h the Full Bench discussed the matte1 it did not reach·
any conclusion in the case, because it felt that whether the application under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act had been made within
90 days or not, was a question of fact which has to be decided
by the learned Single Judge, and as the learned Single Judge had
not gone into that question, the matter had to go back to him.
When the case came before the learned Single Judge, he took some
evidence and examined the question in de~ail. We upheld th!Y
U Sup CI/70-10
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
,1ecision of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed
the revision
application.
It has been argued before us by Mr. B. P. Maheshwari that
the judgment under appeal is erroneous, because s. 14(1) of the
Arbitration Act requires that there should be a notice in writing
and that notice had to be something besides the award of which
a copy had been sent. He has cited a number of rulings in support
of his contention that a notice in writing is
incumbent before
limitation under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act which applies to
Art. 14( l) petitions can start. In chief, he relies upon Ratnall'a
v. Gurishiddappa Gurushantappa Magavi & Ors.('),
Puppal/a
Ramulu v. Nagidi Appelaswami & Ors.('), Jagdish v. Sunder('),
Ganga Ram v. Radha Kishan('), Badarla Ramakrishnamma &
Ors. v. Vattikonda Lakshmibayamma & Ors.(').
It is not necessary to go into the reasol'ing which made the
learned Judges in these cases to lay down that there must be a
proper notice in writing of the making of the award. That follows in fact from the words of s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act.
That section says that when the arbitrators or umpire have given
their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to
the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount
cf fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.
What will be considered a sufficient 1wtice in writing of the making
and signing of the award is a quesiton of fact. In the cited cases
emphasis sometimes has been laid upon the latter part of the
sub-section which speaks of the amount of fees and rharges payable in respect of the arbitration and award. Sometimes emphasis has been placed upon the opening words namely that there
should be a notice in writing. Reading the word 'notice' as we
generally do, it denotes merely 1n intimation to the party concerned of a particular fact.
It seems to us that we cannot limit
the words "notice in writing" to only a letter.
Notice may take
several forms.
It must, to be sufficient, be in writing and must
intimate quite clearly that the award has been made and signed.
In the present case, a copy of the award signed by the arbitrator
was sent to the company. It appears to us that the company had
sufficient notice that the award had been made and signed. In
fact the two letters of May 5 and May 16 to which we hav~
referred quite clearly show that the company knew full well that
the arbitrator had given the award, made it and signect it. In
these circumstances to insist upon a letter which perhaps was also
~ent (though there is some doubt about it) is to refine the law
(1) A.LR. ·1962 Mysore 135.
(3) l.L.R. 27 Pat. 86.
(51 l.L.R. [1958]
(2) A.LR. 1957 A.P. 11.
(4) LL.R. [1955] Punj. 402.
A.P. 166.
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PARASRAMKA co. v. UNION (Hidayatul/ah, C.J.)
139
beyond the legitimate requirements.
The only omission was that
there was no notice of the amount of the fees and charges payable in respect of arbitration and award.
But that was not an
essential part of the notice for the purpose of limitation. To emphasise the latter part as being the essential part of the notice is
to make the first part depend upon the determination of the fees
and charges and their inclusion in the notice.
A written notice
clearly intimating the parties concerned that the award had been
made and signed, in our opinion certainly starts .limitation.
In this view of the matter we are in agreement with the
decision of the learned Single Judge who has endorsed the opinion
of tne Suoordinate Judge that limitation began to run from the
receipt of the copy of the award which was signed by the Arbitrator and which gave due notice to the party concerned that the
award had been made and signed. That is how the party itself
understood when it acknowledged the copy' sent to it. Thercf0re,
the application must be treated as being out of time and the
decision of the High Court to so treat it was correct in all the
circumstances of the case.
We, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere in this appeal and it is dismissed. But we make it clear that the other part
of the case, namely what is to happen to the award sent by the
Arbitrator· himself to the court has yet to be determined and
what we say here will not affect the determination of that question. Obviously enough that matter arises under the second subsection of s. 14 and will have to be considered quite apart from
the application made by the company to have the award made
into rule of Court.
It was represented to us by Dr. Syed Mohammad that objections had been taken to the validity of the award and they remain
still for decision. Those of course must fall to the ground with
the application which we have found to be out of time. As to
whether similar objections can be raised in answer to the award
filed at the instance of the arbitrator is a question which we cannot
go into in the present appeal and no expression of opinion must
be attributed to us on that point. In the circumstances of the case
we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
V.P.S
Appeal dismissed.