# ' PARSRAM AND ANR v. SHIVCHAND AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 997
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-11-28
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/parsram-and-anr-v-shivchand-and-ors-4829
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.
341-President's power
under-Castes
specified in President's order only to be
treated as
Scheduled Castes--
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, item 9-Scheduled Castes
in Punjah-Mochis not mentioned,
chamar~ mentioned-Court
cannot
decide on evidence whether the term mochi is synonymous with the term
chamar.
Appellant No. 1 filed a petition challenging the election of the first
respondent 'from the Lambi Assembly Constituency (reserved seat)
in
the district of Ferozepur, Punjab, at the 1967 general election. It was
urged in the petition that the nomination paper of appellant No. 2 had
been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer who had held that appellant No. 2 was a mochi and as such not a member of the chamar caste
mentioned in item 9 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
issued under Art. 341 of the Constitution. It was also urged that the
Returning Officer had at first accepted the nomination
paper but bad
subsequently reviewed his own order.
The High Court dismissed the
petition, whereupon an appeal was filed in this Court.
HELD : (i) On the evidence it was not possible to hold that the Returning Officer had after announcing his decision accept:ng the nomination paper reviewed his own order afterwards.
(ii) No ground had been made out for disturbing the conclusion of
the trial court on the evidence that appellant No. 2 was a mochi and not
a member rif the chamar caste.
(iii) It was not open to this Court to scrntinise whether a
person
properly described as a mochi also fell within the caste of chama'fs and
could describe himself as such.
The question was one the determination
of which lay within the exclusive power of the President under Art. 341
of the Constitution. [1003 B-C]
Basava/ingappa v. D. Munichinnappa & Ors.
[1965] I S.C.R. 316
and Bhaiya Lal v. Harikrishen Singh & Ors.,
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
877,
applied.
Article 341 empowered the President to specify not only entire castes
races or tribes but also parts or groups within castes,
races
or tribes
which were to be treated as Scheduled Castes in relation to a particular
State or Union Territory. So far as chamars and mochis are concerned,
a reference to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 shows
that the President was not o'f opinion that they were to be considered to
belong to the same caste in all the different
States.
In several States
chamars and mochis were put on the same
footing
but' not so in the
State of Punjab. Even afte~ the. Reorganisation of the P~njab Act,. 19?6
when the question of spec1ficat1on of Scheduled Castes m the terntones
created came up for his consideration the President did not take the view
that mochis should be classed with chamars in so far as the States of
Haryana, Punjab and the Union Territory rif Chandigarh were concerned though he directed that in the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh mochis and chaman were to be placed in the same group,
[1000 E, H; 1001 A-DJ
.
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196912 s.c.R.
C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1smcT10N : Civil Appeal No. 1869 of
A
1967.
Appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People
Act 1951 from the judgment and order dated October 24, 1967
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petifion 14
of 1967.
K. P. Bhandari and Hardev Singh, for the appellants.
C. L. Lakhanpal and D. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1.

## Text

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PARSRAM AND ANR.
v.
SHIVCHAND AND ORS.
November 28, 1968
(M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. AND G. K. MITTER, J.]
Constitution of India, Art.
341-President's power
under-Castes
specified in President's order only to be
treated as
Scheduled Castes--
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, item 9-Scheduled Castes
in Punjah-Mochis not mentioned,
chamar~ mentioned-Court
cannot
decide on evidence whether the term mochi is synonymous with the term
chamar.
Appellant No. 1 filed a petition challenging the election of the first
respondent 'from the Lambi Assembly Constituency (reserved seat)
in
the district of Ferozepur, Punjab, at the 1967 general election. It was
urged in the petition that the nomination paper of appellant No. 2 had
been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer who had held that appellant No. 2 was a mochi and as such not a member of the chamar caste
mentioned in item 9 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
issued under Art. 341 of the Constitution. It was also urged that the
Returning Officer had at first accepted the nomination
paper but bad
subsequently reviewed his own order.
The High Court dismissed the
petition, whereupon an appeal was filed in this Court.
HELD : (i) On the evidence it was not possible to hold that the Returning Officer had after announcing his decision accept:ng the nomination paper reviewed his own order afterwards.
(ii) No ground had been made out for disturbing the conclusion of
the trial court on the evidence that appellant No. 2 was a mochi and not
a member rif the chamar caste.
(iii) It was not open to this Court to scrntinise whether a
person
properly described as a mochi also fell within the caste of chama'fs and
could describe himself as such.
The question was one the determination
of which lay within the exclusive power of the President under Art. 341
of the Constitution. [1003 B-C]
Basava/ingappa v. D. Munichinnappa & Ors.
[1965] I S.C.R. 316
and Bhaiya Lal v. Harikrishen Singh & Ors.,
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
877,
applied.
Article 341 empowered the President to specify not only entire castes
races or tribes but also parts or groups within castes,
races
or tribes
which were to be treated as Scheduled Castes in relation to a particular
State or Union Territory. So far as chamars and mochis are concerned,
a reference to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 shows
that the President was not o'f opinion that they were to be considered to
belong to the same caste in all the different
States.
In several States
chamars and mochis were put on the same
footing
but' not so in the
State of Punjab. Even afte~ the. Reorganisation of the P~njab Act,. 19?6
when the question of spec1ficat1on of Scheduled Castes m the terntones
created came up for his consideration the President did not take the view
that mochis should be classed with chamars in so far as the States of
Haryana, Punjab and the Union Territory rif Chandigarh were concerned though he directed that in the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh mochis and chaman were to be placed in the same group,
[1000 E, H; 1001 A-DJ
.
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196912 s.c.R.
C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1smcT10N : Civil Appeal No. 1869 of
A
1967.
Appeal under s. 116-A of the Representation of the People
Act 1951 from the judgment and order dated October 24, 1967
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petifion 14
of 1967.
K. P. Bhandari and Hardev Singh, for the appellants.
C. L. Lakhanpal and D. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
Mitter, J. In the election petition out of which the present
appeal arises, the main question canv11ssed was, whether the c
nomination paper of respondent No. 8 (appellant No. 2 before
this Court) was wrongly rejected.
It is admitted that if the
rejection was wrong, the election cannot stand.
The petitioner challenged the election to the Lambi Assembly
Constituency (reserved seat) in the district of Ferozepore. There
were eight candidates, the first respondent being the returned
D.
candidate. The petition was filed by one of the unsuccessful candidates impleading the other seven candidates, and Kishan Lal
whose nomination paper was rejected.
According to the petitioner, Kishan Lal was a Hindu and being a Chamar by caste
he belonged to a scheduled caste within the meaning of paragraph 2 read with Part X of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
E
Order 1950 issued under Art. 341 of the Constitution : he had
filed a declaration under s. 33(2) of the Representation of the
People Act, stating his caste to be chamar covered by item 9 in
Part X (Punjab) of the Schedule to the Order. The said item
reads as follows :
''Chamar, Jatia Chamar, Reghar, Raigar, Ramdasi
F
or Ravidasi."
It was stated in the petition that the Returning Officer had at
first accepted the nomination paper of Kishan Lal on 21st January 1967, but subsequently, on an objection having been raised
by the first respondent on the ground that Kishan Lal was not a
member of a Scheduled Caste, the proceedings were· adjourned
till the next day when after admitting evidence, the same was
rejected on the plea that Kishan Lal was a mochi by caste. The
petitioner's case was that Chamar and mochi were not two separate castes and the word 'mochi' was applied to a chamar who
actually started workin1~ in leather. On the pleadings the learned trial Judge framed four issues:
1. Is respondent No. 8 Kishan Lal a Hindu Chamar by caste which is a scheduled caste within the
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PARSRAM V. SHIVCHAND (Mitter, J.)
meaning of Part X of the Schedule to the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950?
2. Was the nomination paper of respondent No. 8
Kishan Lal accepted by the Returning Officer and if
so, whether the Returning Officer had the power of
reviewing his order?
3. Has the nomination paper of respondent No. 8
Kishan Lal been wrongly rejected? If so, is the election of the returned candidate void?
4. Is Chamar or Mochi one and the same caste and
a scheduled caste within the meaning of Part X of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950?
999
The point canvassed before him with a good deal of force was
that the Returning Officer had sought to review his own order
passed on 21st January 1967 accepting the nomination paper
and this, he was not competent to do.
The learned Judge did
not accept that a finalised order had been reviewed.
An exaD . mination of the document tends to support the appellant's argument about. the nomination paper having been accepted at first
but rejected subsequently.
The manner of recording the order
is suggestive of the above.
It appears that the Returning Officer at first wrote the word
'accepted' and gave the date as
21-1-1967 to the left of his signature: the endorsement rejecting
E
the nomination paper is by way of a post-script abbreviated as
"P .S." the last two lines curving over the signature.
Unfortunately,: however, for the petitioner, the Returning Officer, ahthough he appeared in court to produce some documents, was
not orally examined and we are therefore without his testimony
on the subject.
Kishan Lal who came to give evidence in this
case in support of the petition stated in his examination-in-chief
F
that:
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"At the time of the scrutiny of the nomination papers for elections in 1967 the Returning Officer at first
announced orders on my nomination papers accepting
the same.
'f!ien an objection was raised by respondent No. 1 Shiv Chand. Thereafter the Returning Offi-
"cer adjourned the matter to the next date on which after
examining evidence led by the parties he rejected the
nomination papers."
Pri'ma facie this goes to support the case of the petitioner but
in cross-examination, Kishan Lal stated:
'
. "At the. ~ime when
the nomination papers were
~mg scrut1;111sed by the Returning Officer, an objection was raised when he was writing the order."
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R.
This nullifies the effect of the statement in the examination-inchief and suggests that this objection was raised before the order
had been signed or announced.
This is strengthened by the
evidence of Shiv Chand R.W. 7. He said :
"The Returning Officer had not announced that he
had accepted the· nomination papers of Kishan Lal but
had written the word 'accepted'. This I know because
I was sitting next to him."
On this evidence, it is not possible to hold that the Returning
Officer had announced his decision
accepting the nomination
paper, but had reviewed his own order afterwards on objection
being raised and let in evidence on the next day and rejected
the nomination paper.
Before the learned trial Judge, a good deal of evidence was
adduced and arguments advanced as to whether the words
'chamar' and 'mochi' were synonymous and even if Kishan Lal
was held to be a mochi, there was no reason to exclude him
from the fold of the caste of chamars in which case his nomination paper was wrongly rejected.
For this we have to refer to
Art. 341 of the Constitution under cl. 1 of which the President
may, with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where
it is a State, after consulting the Governor of the State, by public
notification specify the castes, races or tribes or parts, or groups
within castes, races or tribes which shall for the_ purposes of the
Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to
that State or Union Territory as the case may be.
This article
empowered the President to specify not only the entire castes but
tribes or parts or groups within castes, races or tribes which were
to be treated as Scheduled Castes in relation to a particular
caste.
So far as chamars and mochis are concerned, it will be
noted from a reference to ·the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
Order, 1950 that the President was not of opinion that they
were to be considered to belong to the same caste in all the different States.
For instance, in the States of Andhra Pradesh,
Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal chamars and
mochis were put on the same footing.
Before the Reorganisation of the Punjab Act of 1966 item
9 of Part X of the Order specifying the .Scheduled Castes in the
State read-.
"Chamar, Jatia chamar, Raghar, Raigar, Ramdasi
or Ravidasi."
After the reorganisation of territories and creation of new States
by the said Act the Scheduled Castes Order was amended proA
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1001
viding for the specification of Scheduled Castes for the new
States and territories.
Tue Constitution (Scheduled Castes)
(Union Territories) Order of 1951 was also amended in 1966.
As a result of the above changes, the final position with regard
to the Scheduled Castes was as follows.
Item No. 9 remained
unaltered as regards the new States of Haryana and the Punjab.
Chamars and Mochis were put in the same class as regards the
Union- territory of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, while the position in the Union territory of Chandigarh remained the same as
in the old State of Punjab.
This shows that even when the
subject of specification of Scheduled Castes engaged the attention of the President in 1966 he did not take the view that
mochis should be classed together with chamars in so far as the
State of Haryana, Punjab and Union territory of Chandigarh
were concerned.
It is also clear that the question of inclusion
of moch.is in the Scheduled Castes was considered by him. Apart
from this, there are two decisions of this Court which conclude
the point.
In Basavalingappa v. D. Munichinnappa and others(') an
election petition was filed challenging the election of the first
respondent inter alia on the ground that he was not a member
of any of the scheduled castes mentioned in the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.
Respondent No. 1 claimed
that he belonged to the scheduled caste listed as 'Bhovi' in the
Order.
Tue appellant, on the other hand contended that respondent No. 1 was a Voddar by caste and that Voddar was not a
scheduled caste specified in the order and consequently, he could
not stand for election from a scheduled caste constituency.
It
was held by this Court that it was not open to anyone to seek
for any modification in the order by producing evidence to show.
(for example) that though caste alone was mentioned in the
order, caste B was also a part of caste A, and as such to be
deemed to be included in caste A. This Court also pointed out
that "wherever one caste has another name it has been mentioned in brackets after it in the Order.
Therefore, generally
speaking, it would not be open to any person to lead evidence
to establish that caste B is part of caste A notified in the Order."
In the peculiar circumstances of this case, evidence was allowed
to be led to identify the caste specified in the Order because
the Order referred to a Scheduled Caste known as Bhovi in the
Mysore State as it was before 19 5 6 and therefore it had to be
accepted that there was some caste which the President intended
to include after consultation with Rajpramukh in the Order,
when the Order mentioned the caste Bhovi as a scheduled caste.
But when it was not disputed specifically that there was no caste
(l)J[l965] l_S.C.R. 316.
1002
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R.
known as Bhovi in the Mysore State before 1956, the only
course open to courts was to find which caste was meant by
Bhovi by taking evidence.
A point very simila.r to th~ one before u.s c.ame up .for consideration in this Court m Bhmya Lal v. Hanknshen Singh and
others('). There, the appellant's election was
challenged on
the ground that he belonged to the Dohar caste and was n~t
a chamar.
Dealing with this point,
it was stated by this
Court:
". . . the plea that the Dohar caste is . a su~
caste of the Chamar caste cannot be entertained m
the present proceedings in virtue of the Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950."
Reference was then made to Art. 341 of the Constitution els. 1
and 2 and it was said:
"In order to determine whether or not a particular
caste is a scheduled caste within the meaning of Art.
341, one has to look at the public notification issued
by the President in that behalf.
In the present case,
the notification refers to Chamar, Jatav or Mochi and
so in dealing with the question in dispute between the
parties, the enquiry which the Election Tribunal can
hold is whether or not the appellant is a Chamar, Jatav
or Mochi.
The plea that though the appellant is not
a Chamar as such, he can claim the same status by
reason of the fact that he belongs to the Dohar caste
which is a sub-caste of the Chamar caste,
cannot be
accepted. It appears to us that an enquiry of this kind ·
would not be permissible having regard to the provisions contained in Art. 341."
These judgments are binding on us and we do not therefore
think that it would be of any use to look into the gazetteers and
the glossaries on the Punjab castes and tribes to which reference was made at the Bar to find out whether mochi and chamar
in some parts of the State at least meant the same: caste although
there might be some difference in the professions followed by
their members, the main difference being that Chamars skin
dead animals which mochis do not.
However that may be, the
question not being open to agitation by evidence and being one
the determination of which lies within the exclusive power of
the President, it is not for us to examine it and come to a conclusion that if a person was in fact a mochi, he could still claim
to belong to the scheduled caste of chamars and be allowed to
(1) [196512 S.C.R. 877.
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contest an election on that basis. Quite a lot of evidence was
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adduced orally and also by documents before the learned trial
Judge to show that Krishan Lal was a chamar and not a mochi.
The learned Judge examined the evidence thoroughly and we do
not propose to do the same again. In his view Krishan Lal was
a mochi and not a chamar and we do not see any reason why we
should come to any different conclusion.
Once we hold that it is not open to this Court to scrutinise
whether a person who is properly described as a mochi also falls
within the caste of chamars and can describe himself as such,
the question of the impropriety of the rejection of his nomination paper based on such distinction disappears.
In this case,
Krishan Lal was found to be a mochi and not a chamar and
therefore his nomination paper was rightly rejected.
He tried
to prove by evidence that he was a chamar but he did not succeed therein. The appeal therefore fails, and is dismissed with
costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed .