# PATHUMMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 537
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-01-16
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pathumma-and-others-v-state-of-kerala-and-others-7391
- **Pages:** 36

## Headnote

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537
PATHUMMA AND OTHERS
A
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS
January 16, 1978
[M. H. BEG, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, v. R. KRISHNA lYER; s. MURTAZA
FAZAL Au, P. N. SHINGHAL, J.-\SWANT SINGH AND
8
V. D. TULZAPU.RKAR, JJ.]
_Kerala A.r:rlculwri.fts Dl'bt Relief Act. 1970 .~. 20-Scop,·
of-Section 20
clllllles .cle~ror~ t~ reco••er proputil's .~old to rmrcllasers i11 t'.Tt'L'Iitio11 of d~crt?e
passed m llqt~rclatiiiJ: the ~t·br owed by the ogriculturist-Rt•J•tricrion if reasonab/~-1! dt?pm·es rh_e crf(/1/ors of rlu!!'r ri.ffllt to property--Sub s. 3-/f purchaser
C
f!l prop~rty at auct1o!l lS _str~mg;r, properry to be retumed to o!fricult11rist d~htor
'!purchase mo~u:y patd wulmt .su momlt.s--Sub-.'- (6) a bona jitle alienee purchasm;: from aucllOil purcha'ier before the date of tile Act e.tempt jrom opl!ration
of the Act-Sub-s. (3 )-If \•iolar/l•t> of Art. 14 .
The statement of objects ;~nd reasons to the
Kcrala
Al!riculturists• Debt
Relief Act. 1970 states that the b~nefit~ conferred by Kern\~ Acr 31 of I 951S
were nvnilable only in r~~ct of d~bts incurred by the agriculturists before the
date of commencement of the Act. namdy Jui}' 14. 1958.
And since even after
D
this date agricultural indebtedness among the poorer sections continued to be
on the: incren~e the legislature consider(d it necessary to gh·e relief to the a_;!ncultunst~ agam-;t whom suit!! had been filcLI for recovery of debtll accrued atter
the commencement of the 1958 AcL
Se.:tion 20 (I) of the Act provides th~t where MY immo\·ablc property in which
the agriculturist had nn interest has been '>old in cxeC111ion of any decree for
recovery of a debt but possession has not actually passed from the judgmc:nt
debtor to the purchuser and the decree-holder is the purchaser
then such
E
judgment-debtor may deposit one haJf of the purchase money a.nd apply to the
Court to set aside the sale of the property and the Court shall order the sate to be
set aside and further order payment of the balance of the purchase '?toney m
kn equal insmlments in accordance with the procedure !'et out the~rn. Sub·
section (2) provide<l that where any immo\'able property in which tbe agriculluri.st had an intere~t hu been sold in e.'\ecution of nny decree for orre::u'll of
rent and the pMses.qion of the property ha!! nctually passed from the. judgment
debtor to the purchaser during the periods mentioned therein then such JUdgment·
F
debtor may d~posit one half of the purcha~e money nnd apply to th~ Court
to !et a.-.ide the sale of the properly and the court !!hall order the setttng ns1de
of the sale and for the payment of the b~llance of the rurch:1~ mon~y according to the proceduro ~t out in the sl!ction.
S\lb·scction
(3)
prOVIdes
that
where property sold in the execution of any deere~ for the reco\·cry of a debt
t~nd the decree holder is not the purchaser su-.:h JUd~m~nt-debtor may depo.<at
the purchn~e monev and apply to the court to set aside the sale of the pro~rty
und the: Court shall order the snle to be set nside.
Sub-section
(.S)
prov~;~e G
that where imprm·ement~ have been ellect~d on l~e property sold after the
be
of snl~ the value of t~uch improvement u~ dctermrned by . the Courts !!bimll 1. n
•
•
t
h
·tion .,urch·tser
u -o;ec to
de~11ed by the a pphcant for payment
~ l e
nu~.:
,.
• · 3 · shall not be
(6) provides that nn ord~r under sul?·sl!ctro_n~ II) or (2) or eli~ ·
urch.:~scr
deemed to llffccl the ri~hl!i of bona fule
ohenee!l of . the auc
n r
deriving rights bdore the daltl of publication of the llJII.
.
I tl
I
.
cJ
mort,:·rce decree n8ain!lt the
In the in.,lnnt cnscs a cn:d•tor 1:1
~>tame. u
d. btor wa!l not able to
jud~menl debtor, who \\·a~ nn a~ ricultu n~t. Smce th~~al~ of th~ ' property wn• H
pay the dccret!ll <~mount in inslnl~ents, 0, decree: fo{.ciioned and purchased by
pas'ICd by the Court.
The debtors prOp\:rly ~:.s ~omc cosei
decrc\!s
were
the l_lPPdl!lnl who w~ not th~ dccree·0h?.!fer.
1J ·on their failure to ray the
ohlatned by the crrottors tl~

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537
PATHUMMA AND OTHERS
A
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS
January 16, 1978
[M. H. BEG, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, v. R. KRISHNA lYER; s. MURTAZA
FAZAL Au, P. N. SHINGHAL, J.-\SWANT SINGH AND
8
V. D. TULZAPU.RKAR, JJ.]
_Kerala A.r:rlculwri.fts Dl'bt Relief Act. 1970 .~. 20-Scop,·
of-Section 20
clllllles .cle~ror~ t~ reco••er proputil's .~old to rmrcllasers i11 t'.Tt'L'Iitio11 of d~crt?e
passed m llqt~rclatiiiJ: the ~t·br owed by the ogriculturist-Rt•J•tricrion if reasonab/~-1! dt?pm·es rh_e crf(/1/ors of rlu!!'r ri.ffllt to property--Sub s. 3-/f purchaser
C
f!l prop~rty at auct1o!l lS _str~mg;r, properry to be retumed to o!fricult11rist d~htor
'!purchase mo~u:y patd wulmt .su momlt.s--Sub-.'- (6) a bona jitle alienee purchasm;: from aucllOil purcha'ier before the date of tile Act e.tempt jrom opl!ration
of the Act-Sub-s. (3 )-If \•iolar/l•t> of Art. 14 .
The statement of objects ;~nd reasons to the
Kcrala
Al!riculturists• Debt
Relief Act. 1970 states that the b~nefit~ conferred by Kern\~ Acr 31 of I 951S
were nvnilable only in r~~ct of d~bts incurred by the agriculturists before the
date of commencement of the Act. namdy Jui}' 14. 1958.
And since even after
D
this date agricultural indebtedness among the poorer sections continued to be
on the: incren~e the legislature consider(d it necessary to gh·e relief to the a_;!ncultunst~ agam-;t whom suit!! had been filcLI for recovery of debtll accrued atter
the commencement of the 1958 AcL
Se.:tion 20 (I) of the Act provides th~t where MY immo\·ablc property in which
the agriculturist had nn interest has been '>old in cxeC111ion of any decree for
recovery of a debt but possession has not actually passed from the judgmc:nt
debtor to the purchuser and the decree-holder is the purchaser
then such
E
judgment-debtor may deposit one haJf of the purchase money a.nd apply to the
Court to set aside the sale of the property and the Court shall order the sate to be
set aside and further order payment of the balance of the purchase '?toney m
kn equal insmlments in accordance with the procedure !'et out the~rn. Sub·
section (2) provide<l that where any immo\'able property in which tbe agriculluri.st had an intere~t hu been sold in e.'\ecution of nny decree for orre::u'll of
rent and the pMses.qion of the property ha!! nctually passed from the. judgment
debtor to the purchaser during the periods mentioned therein then such JUdgment·
F
debtor may d~posit one half of the purcha~e money nnd apply to th~ Court
to !et a.-.ide the sale of the properly and the court !!hall order the setttng ns1de
of the sale and for the payment of the b~llance of the rurch:1~ mon~y according to the proceduro ~t out in the sl!ction.
S\lb·scction
(3)
prOVIdes
that
where property sold in the execution of any deere~ for the reco\·cry of a debt
t~nd the decree holder is not the purchaser su-.:h JUd~m~nt-debtor may depo.<at
the purchn~e monev and apply to the court to set aside the sale of the pro~rty
und the: Court shall order the snle to be set nside.
Sub-section
(.S)
prov~;~e G
that where imprm·ement~ have been ellect~d on l~e property sold after the
be
of snl~ the value of t~uch improvement u~ dctermrned by . the Courts !!bimll 1. n
•
•
t
h
·tion .,urch·tser
u -o;ec to
de~11ed by the a pphcant for payment
~ l e
nu~.:
,.
• · 3 · shall not be
(6) provides that nn ord~r under sul?·sl!ctro_n~ II) or (2) or eli~ ·
urch.:~scr
deemed to llffccl the ri~hl!i of bona fule
ohenee!l of . the auc
n r
deriving rights bdore the daltl of publication of the llJII.
.
I tl
I
.
cJ
mort,:·rce decree n8ain!lt the
In the in.,lnnt cnscs a cn:d•tor 1:1
~>tame. u
d. btor wa!l not able to
jud~menl debtor, who \\·a~ nn a~ ricultu n~t. Smce th~~al~ of th~ ' property wn• H
pay the dccret!ll <~mount in inslnl~ents, 0, decree: fo{.ciioned and purchased by
pas'ICd by the Court.
The debtors prOp\:rly ~:.s ~omc cosei
decrc\!s
were
the l_lPPdl!lnl who w~ not th~ dccree·0h?.!fer.
1J ·on their failure to ray the
ohlatned by the crrottors tl~atnst the
~u 0~ an
B
·C
D
E
F
G
J{
538
. S'IJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 s.c.R .
in!>tnlments property was purchased at the auction by the d~cree-holdcrs themselws. After the purchase, improv~mcnts were rnnde by them in the propert1es.
When the debtors launched proceedings under the Act for restoration o f possession of the property on pnyment of the decretal amount, the appellants cha~lcn
!!~:d the constitutional validity of the Act.
T he H igh Court upheld the val1dtty
or s. 20 and d ismissed the wril pc!titions . .
In appeal to this Court, it wac; contended on behnlf of th~ appellants that
( l) the appclhm ts having acquired valid title to the property ••ftcr p urc~ase nt
uuction sale in execution of a dec[\!e, s. 20 which deprives them of thc1r nght
to hold property was violative of Art. 19(1 )(f), (2) though the ob\ ious obJeCt
of the Act was to give relief to debtors who filed suils for recovery of debts
· after the commencement of the 1958-Act it travel~ beyond the statement
ot
obJects nnd reasons, giving a blimkct power to the Court to set aside the:
.s;.~lc
completed even before the pas~ing of the Act nntl ( 3) s- 20(3} and ( 6) arc
viol:uive of Art. I 4 because the stmnccr dccrcc-holtlcr was selected for hosltl:!
discrimination whercns a bona ficlc alienee was exempted from the opcmtion ut
the Act.
Dismissing the <~ppcals,
(per Ueg, C. J., _Krishna Iycr, S. Murtnza Faz..'ll Ali anJ Jaswant Singh. JJ.)
HELD : There is no constitutional infirmity on the ground that the 1\ct ~~
violative of Art, 19Cl)(f). The rc!itrictions imposed arc
ckarly
rcasooablt:
within the meaning of cL (6) of that Article.
[559 A-D]
l(n) In intapreting the constitutional provisions for judging the impact ot
~10 cnactm~nt on the fund<tmcntal rights of the citizens the approach of the
Courts is to interpret the constitutional ·provisions ngai n'\t the social sl!tting ol
the country so as to show a compl\!te conc;ciuusncss nnu u~ep a ware ness ot the
growing requirements of the society, the incrcn-;ins m.-eds of the nation. the
burning problems of the day nnu lhc complex issues facing the people ~htcb the
lcgislnturl! in its wil,dotn, through bl!ncfici;tl
Jc gi~lat io n, seeks to solve_
The
judiciul npproach should be d ynamic rath o.!r thiln :llntic. p mgm;~ ti c r<~thcr than
pedantic und elastic rather th;m rigid.
h m ust ta ~ c into
con,.idcmtion
the
changing I rends of economic thought, the temper of the times and the Ji\·ins
aspira tions und feelings of the people.
This Court must stri~c a just bnlnnce
~t-w-e c:n the fundamc:nta! rights and th~ larger :.1nd broader interests of ~;ocu: cy .
[534 A·Cl
(b) The lcgb.lature i~ in a b~ttcr position to Ulllkrstuml :~nd npprcciate the
Ol!c.dS or tht: people and tO brinl! <tbout SOCial rdornto; for the unliftmcnt of the
backward and the Wt:..ako:r M:Ctions and for the improvement o( the lot of U\~
poor.
T he Court will interfere only \"hen the statute is cl~arly violutive: of the
fuooamcnt;1l. riJ:ht or when the Act is beyond th~ Jcgislacivc competence. Courts
have .ro:COAnJf>ed th.at there i!l alw&IYS u pn:o;umption tn fl\vour of the conslltUttonallty of a statute :tnd the onus to prove its invulii.lity lies o n the party a~ailing the Act.
[54-1 A -UJ
'
•
1
. .'.t
h ·oti l'rc.u-htJd "· The Atlmilli.\trctlor for r/~e! Unimt Tnritorv of Delhi (J9n2)
~
2 SCR 125 anti Muhd. f/anif Quare:,/Ji & Ors. v. 1"/u Statr (J/
Bilwr
(195~)
SCR 629 rdc:rred to.
(c) The object of thc Act bdng removal or agri~ultuml imlchtedncss nml
reduction of on~ of the important cuu~s of po-..-erty is unc.loubt.::dly in publiC
intcrc~t and the rc)triction must be prc~umcJ to ~ rd;Jsonahle.
(545 B·CJ
C b) By a lonl[ line o{ dcd~ion.; this Court has laiJ d~1wn sevc~•l teo;ts nnd
guiJclinc.s for judging the rc;1sorwblcness of restrictions.
They nrc ;
(i) Fum.I:~mcnta\ RiJ:ht:; anJ D irective Prim:ipk""\ c.:un .. titute the "con.-.dem:cf'
of lhc Comtitution.. The purpose or the latter i~ ro fix ccrtnin social nni.l c'onomic
go;.t l~ for immc:diatc attainment by bringing ubout 11
non-viol~nt social
revolution.
The Constitution aims :tt bringin~; ubou t a !'lynth~sis bct\\~~n fundamental right\ ond uircclive principles by ).!i"llll-! to the former a place of pride
and to lhe IaUer a place of permanence.
[545 F-Gl
..
·' . '
' .
' .
r
~
. . ,
~
'--·
-.
f
' . .,
•
PATHUMMA Y.· KBRALA .
539 '
Fttt~chan1 · Himmatlal & Or.~. v. State of Maltaraslura etc. (1917) 2 SCR
828. ~ts 'Holmess Kesawr~anda Blmrali Sripadagolavaru v. Stare of Kern/a (1973)
Supr. SCR 1. State of Rcrala & A.nr. v. N. M. Thoma.t & Ors. (1976) 2 SCC
310 and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbougwala (1957) SCR 874
nt ~21 referred to.
ln the instant case· the object of th.: Act being to eradicate ~tral indebtedness nml thereby se~re _the ~ommon sood of the people !ivins in object poverty •
~lcnrly ful~ls the . drrecttvcs ~n ~rts. 38 and 39(b) of the Con.~titutioo. There
IS no conflict between the d1recttves nnd the restrictions sought to be placed by
the Act, [545 E-F, 547 A] ·
(ii) The rcstricti<_?ns must not be a·rbitrnry or ex,cssi'-'e in nature ~o ~ to
so ~yo n_tl the requue~ent of th~ interest of the S!!nernl ptlbuc. Wbnt is
req!-urc~ IS. that tht: legiSlaturt.: should tnkc intdligent cure in choosing a cour~
whrch IS dact:ttcd by rc:lSon t\00 good ~onscience SO (l~ to strike a just balance
between the freedom contnincd in Art. J9(1)(f) and the socinl control pcnnitted
by ell. (5) ;md (6) of tbnt Article.
[547 B-E]
.
A
B
CM11tt11mm Roo v. The State of Madhya Prad~:.~lt (1950) SCR 759 nt 763
C
and M<•s.rr.v. Dwarka PTtiSll(/ l.Axmi Naraitt v. Th~ Sratl' of llllflr rradesil & Or.f.
(1954) SCR 803 :tt 811-12 referred to.
(iii) No abstrnct or gencrnt pattern or a tu~ principle can be laid down
which can be of universal application und the s.,me "'ill have to vary from case
to Cilsc and with rcgurd to ~;hanging conditions, tbe values of human life. social ·
philosoph}' of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumst:mccs, all of which must enter into the judicial verdict. [547 F]
Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Naraifl v. The State of Uuur Pradesh & Ors.
D
(1954) SCR 803 nt 811-12 Statt' of Madra.~ v. V. C. ~ ow (1952) SCR 597 •
.\fnlrd. Hanif Quarc.rlii & Ors. ''· Tltc Suue of Biltar (1959) SCR 629 !lt 660
a nd The Lord Krishna Sugar Millr Ltd. & Anr. v. Th~ Union of India & Anr.
(i9tl0) 1 SCR 39 at 56 ~fcrred to.
Civ) The Court has ro examine the ·n;llurc: and extent, the purport and .content of the right. n ature of the evil sought to be remedied by the statu~. the
harm caused to the citizen .and the benefit 10 be conferred on the pen;on or the
community for whose ~nefit the legislation is passed. urgency of the evil and
E ·
the necessity to rectify the s.1me.
ln so doing the Cowl ha.o; to strike a JUSt
balance: between the restriction imposed nnd the social control eo,isaged by_
Art. l 91G).
[549 A-B}
Narendra· Kumar & Ors. v. Tbt! Unio11 of lndin & Or.r. ( 1960) 2 SCR 375
:111d BIJ(.:/wn Singh&: Ors. v. Stur~ of Punjab & Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 713 at-718
referred to.
·
(v) Th~re mu.)l be direct :md proximate nexus or a reasonable connection
F
between the r~lriclion imposed <Jnd the object sought to be nchiev-ed. In other
words. tllc Court has to see wherher by virtue of the re1triction imposed on
the rii:ht of the citizen the object of the statute is rc:tll}' fulfilled or frustrntcd.
)( there is a <lircct ncXtL" bct\l·ccn the r~triction nn<.l the obj~o-ct of the Act then
a strong presumrtion in fnvour of the comtitutionality of the Act '";11 nrise.
[549 F-Gl
1\amfappMo Koflarratltil Kodwui & Ors. v. Tl1e State o/ Madrar & Or.-..
( 1960) 3 SCR RR7 111 92K und 0 . 1\. Gllmh & A11r. v. N. 1\. Jo.tcp/1. (1963l
Supp. 1 SCH. 789 ut 705 refcm:d to.
.
G ·
(vi) Courts rTIIIJtt see whclhcr tl1e social control envisaged In (\rt. 19(6} t~
t-c in~; ciTccluntell by the restriction imposed on the fundamc~~:tl nght. .If t~e)
look: nl the restricttOm· only from the point of view of the Ctttzoen wh~ ~ nfh:c·
IC'd. it will not be n correct or safe ~tppronch ina...;nwch ns _tbe
rcstnctron
IS
bound to be irksome nnd p;tinful to the _citizen even_ ~hough 11 m?Y ~ for the
oublic ~ood. However important the nght of a cltrzcn or an tndl\ rll~al may
be, it hu~ to yield to the lorgcr inter<:sts of the country or the commuortv •
·
{550 G-H, SSt AJ
H
Jwri 1>r<L)/ra1l v. Tilt< Admilli.ttnuor /or tht• l.'niun T~rritory of Ddlli ( 1962>
-..
2 SCR 125 ttt 148 referred lo.
t)-ll-l ~SC'f .'77
r
t
!
!
f
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
l
540
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.P:.
(vii) The Court is fuJly entitled to take
into consideration
matters ot
common report. history of the times and mutters of common knowledge and
the circumstances existtag at the time of legislation.
[551 D)
Mohd. Halli/ Quaresld & Ors. v. Tile Srote of Bihar (1959)
SCR 629
referred to.
In the instant case the object of the Act being to protect the agricultunstdebtors from the clutches of the greedy creditors, is undoubtedly a laudable
object. The Act does not take away the property of the purchaser without
compensation and, therefore, his right to hold property has not been destroyed.
No exception can be taken to s. 20(2)(b) which provides for payment of the
purchase money by instalments because the debtor, on account of his poverty,
cannot p;1y the debt in a lump-sum. Secondly having regard to the cconom1c
condition of the peasantry in the State, the object sought to be achieved bemg
to remove agricultural indebtedness and amelioration of the lot of the agrtcul·
turists, it cannot be said tbat the restrictions are in any way arbitrary .or excessive or beyond the requirements of the situation.
[558 B, D, F, H, 559 AI
2. The object of the Act mentioned in the first part of the statement ot
objects and reasons clearly shows that it is comprehensive in nature nnd is not
confined to any particular situation. · In view of the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the Act, it is not neces'.iary to delve into statement of objects and
reasons. [559 G·H]
Section 20 is not violath·e of Art. 14 of the Constitution. [562 D]
3(a) Wbat Article 14 forbids is hostile discrimination and not rea.:.onable
classification.
Equality before law d~ not mean that the same set of laws
should apply to ull pcr:;ons under every circumstance ignoring differences and
disparitic.~S between men and thing~ .
lt .Jg for the State to
make
reasonable
classification which mu~t. fulftl two conditions : ( 1) the clnssification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia whkh distinguishes pcrsono; or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group; und (2) the ditlercntta
mu.o;t have a rea.c;onnble ne,.us to the object sought to be
Hchicved by the
statute. [560 C·El
· ~
Sl1ri Rmn Kri.~lma D(liiiJ ia v. Shri l u.ttic:e S. R. Tendolkar & Or.r.
(1959)
SCR 279 at. 296-97 uml Slart' o.f 1\nula & Anr. v. N. M. Tltomn.o.; & Ort. ( tn6)2
,_
sec 310 refcm=d to.
~
(b) Having regard tu Ou: avov-.w obj~ct of the Act, if ·by r~a.-;oa of tltclr
poverty and economic backwardness the agriculturist--dcblor.s on: trea ted as a
!>Cpa:aw _category or class for preferential treatment in public intefl~t, the classi·
ficatlotJ IS not unn::c.on~blc.
In ntal.;ing the: classilic~tion, the !:.tgislnturc can·
not be: cxpectcLI to prov1ue an n.bstraq symmetry. All thut is necessary is that
~e cltJ>scs ha\'e ~o b:: set apart ru.;~rdt'nj; to the ncces:)llie~ and c:\ig~ncics a.o;
thctatcd by expcnencc aoo surroundmg ctrcumo;tanccs
nnd
tht=
clnssilication
should not be arbitrary, artificial or iJiusory.
[561 G-H, 562 AJ
State of W"!s/ Bengal v. Anwar A f{ S(lrkar (1952) SCR 284 at 321 referred
to.
_(c) It is wdl settled that be! ore 1.1 person can claim to b: discriminah..'\1
agam.st ilnotl.u:r he mw.t llhow that all the other pcr:o.ons are similurly suuatc
or equully. cu~urmlanced.
l.!nl~s. tho nppcllant is able to establish that he i.-.
eq~ott.-d "1th u bona fidt.' _:•ht:n~ ·~ e~·cry respect. Art. 14 " ·ill huvc no appl1~
~atwn. l.n ut.her. w~rJ,. dl~cnmmallon violative of Art. 14 can only t.nko cfi.C1.:t
'~ t}Jerc: h
d~cnmJnatron bet\\«n equals nnd not when~ unequuls nrc llcing
dJfTcr~ntly trentcd. [S62 C·Dl
Swte u! J & K v. T. N . Kl1osa & A 11r. (1974) l SCR 771 nt 783 Chiranjir
La/ Chowdll!trl v. Thr Unior1 of India & Or.Y. ( 1950) SCR 860 nt 91 t and
.So11111un f<,uf•rtt)' Co. v. Green~ 216 U.S. 400, 4 12 referred to.
~ -1
•
' f
.....
~---------------
PATHt,JMMA v. KERALA
541
· · (ci) A stranger· auction purchaser and a bona fide nlienee cannot b: satd
A
_, ..;:.,...
to be similarly situate. [563 DJ
f
l
i
~
-1f
- '·
.. -.
'
ln t_be i~tlmt c~e the stranger auction purchaser who panicipatcs in the
pcoceedmgs 111 execuuon of the decree against the debto.- bns a clear notice ot
the circumstacc1.'S under which the decree was pas'.>cd and of the fact that lhe
property ::;old was the property of the debtor, If the legislature nt a 'later stage
passes a law to restore the property to the asricutturist-dcbtor. the auction·
purchaser cannot complain. Secondly, the strnngcr auction-purchaser
kno·ws
that be bad purchased the property at a distr(!Ss sale. Thirdly even if the proB
p.:rty w~ n:'otoro:l tQ the stranger auction-purchaser, he is entitled to get the
entire purchat.e money in lump-sum includinl; the cost
before·
partjn~
wtth
~CSSIOR of the Jlroperty. This distinguishes the case from that of n dccrceholdcr-purchasl!r.
A hom1 fit/~ alienee on the other hand purchases, the pro-
~rty under negotiation; he has no notice of the d·!bt of the debtor or the c•rcumstances under which the decree was passed. [563 E. H. 564 A} "
Per Bhagwa.ti, Shinghal and Tulzapurkar, JJ concurring.
The subjc.:t-maJtcr of the Act is dearly within the purview l.lf Entry 30
(money lending and money lenders; relief of agricultural indebtednc~.<l) m!d the
Act which providL~ for the .. relief o( ind<.!htcd a!,!ricullurio;Is 'in lhc Slate ot
Kcmla .. is within the competence of the .State Legislature.
[568 G. 569 Al
J (a) Thc-rc i~ no justification for the contention tlwt Entry 30 i~ o:onfiO<!d
c
only to .subsc.tmg indebledne.'i.'> nnd would not cover the nccc!l~ity o( provitlmt=
relief of t11~ n~riculturisl'l n·ho had ,,,,t Utcir immovable prop.:rty bv Conr!
.1)
sales in execution of the decree n~;tin'>t th!!m und hnd been rendered destllutc.
Section 20 d~h with n liability owhkh h:tJ ceased nne! diJ not subsist on lh~
date the Act cam~ into force.
Hut there is nothing in Entry 30 of List II II"
show tllltl i.t will not be nttractc:.d and would not ennble the State Lcgl!.latun:
to make a law simply because the debt .of the agriculturist h:~d been paid off
under a distres~ s.a.lc.
[569 C-El
(b) An <ll(ricullurist doc.'i not ce~ to be <10 agriculturist merely because
be hns l~t bis immov:-~blo property. It cannot be ~;aid thnt the State
i.'l
not
interested in providing him nece<~<~;;~r~· relid merely because he:
h:t"
l(l!;t
his
immovable property.
On the othc:r h<~nd bis hr.:lplcss condition call~ for early
solution aml it i,... only nJttun•l that ttu: State l.cgislature should think of rch:1tn·
titating him h}' prm•idint;: the nccess;try relief under nn J\et of the! naltlr~ untter
consideration. There is nothing in th..: working of Entry 30 lo show that the
relief contcmpbtcd by il mu~l ne~L-s'\.:lrily rclalc: to nny subsi!itiMg im.lcbtedn~
ar1d would not cover the quc!ltiDn of rdid' to those who haw }().~l lhe means
of their livelihood becnuse of the dd:Jv in providing them lcgislntive relict
·
[569- F-Cil
(c) It cannot be
g:.Jin.~;aid thnt :1griculluri't'. and even.
ind\!btcJ
a!lricul-
!urists, form tho bulk or, :1t an)' mto a COt;~-~idcr:lble. p~rt of the rur.tl pu~ulallon
10 nn e-;senilidly r!.lr<il economy. nnd ~o rf n re~tr1chon 1~ rca..,onnf:-le m thciY
interest. it wouiJ ~qu:Hdy f<~ll within the purview of cl. (5) of Arl 19.
(570 F·GJ
E
F
KawsltJ{>para Ko/laratllil Koclmnl .t Ors. v. The Stat~ of Mrulras and .Ors.
!1960) 3 SCR 8B7 nnd Star,. of Antllrra Pradt•.Yh v. Kamwpalli Cllintta J'c-11/.:ata
Chafamuyya Sturrl { J 963) t SCR 156 rd~:rrcd lo.
G'
(d) Thou.saruh of suits were pending OJ!ain!it
indebted
n~riculh!ri'ls . in
\larious Court~ ond immovable~ propertie-. of n lnrge nu~ber of . ngnct!!!~,::~;~
had been wtc.l r~nd~rin~ them comph:tely hdpless.
So tf the _Sl.lte 1'f:-Ct· r lh,
pa.sl;Cd tho A~.:t in the intcre-~t of t~o .l!cncr~l ,.rm~Hc
1 to •. Prct:•~le;~;c ''r~a:<>on:
nature mention\!.(} in s, 20 tho rf'fllnctton. pto~flic
tJcr~~~ 1( of the pun:h.,.;e
~hie". Even 100, tbe section make:-, proyll<lon or rcrr~~ 0 c:l
. the purch:~scr
money, the co~ts of ~xcculion nnd lhe tmprovemen~~ ~~~adr.:n 1h)the Hi~h Court
Th ·
t · ·
a thcr-forc • rc.-ason~blc tn ewry s~nsc 11 <
-
rightl~ ~;~::td,.c ~rgur:eot t~ the contrary. (571 A-Cl
Section 20 ii not violative of Art. 14. [573 Dl
'
JI
--
'
i }
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
2(a) A comparison of sub-s-(1) with sub-s. (3) would show that the treatment to a decree-holder-purchaser is different and is less advantageous than the
treatment to a purchaser who is not a decree-holder. The former is treated as
a different class. Decree-holders very often exploit their debtors in many ways
and sales to them are generally viewed with suspicion and disfavour.
Under
O.XXI, r.72 CPC, it is not permissible for a decree-holder to bid for or purchase
the property without the express permission of the Court. The decree holder
purchaser has rightly been treated as a class by himself and that classification
B obviously has the object of benefiting the agriculturist debtor by permitting
him to deposit only half the purchase money and paying the balance in instalments.
[572 A-B]
(b) There is also justification for treating an auction purchaser at a Court
sale differently from a bona-fide alienee of the auction purchaser who derived
his rights before the date of publication of the 1968 Bill.
Such an alienee ot
the auction-purchaser could not possibly have been aware of the
hazards ot
purchasing the property of an indebted agriculturist at the time of purchase.
c
~~
(c) It is futile to contend that if the legislature has protected the iaterests
of an alienee by enacting sub-s. (6) it has made a hostile discrimination against
the auction purchaser as a class.
[573 D]
·
CrviL APPELLATE JuRISIDICTION : CiviL Appeal No. 420 of 1973.
From the · Judgment and Order dated 17-8-1972 of the Kerala
D High Court in Original Petition No. 5576 of 1970.
T. S. Krishnamoorthy lyer, S. B. Saharya, K. Ram Kumar and
V. B. Salwrya for the Appellants in C. As. 420 and 442-445/73.
V. A. Sayed Muhamed Un CA 420/73) and K. M. K. Nair for
R. 1 in all appeals and R. 2 in C. As. 442, 443 and 445 of 1973.
E
Miss Lilly Thomas RR. 3-10 and CA 445/73.
F
G
H
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by
F AZAL Au, I.-These appeals by certificate granted by the High
Court of Kerala involve a common question of law containing a challenge to the constitutionality of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief
Act, 1970 (Act II of 1970) {hereinafter referred to in short as the
Act).
The appeaUants have a-ssailed particularly section 20 of the
Act which entitles the debtors to recover the properties sold to purchasers in execution of a decree passed in liquidating the debt owed by
the agriculturists.
As the five appeals involve common questions of law we propose
to decide them by one common judgment.
·
Section 20 of the Act was assailed before the High Court oo three
grounds, namely.
1. That the Act was beyond the legisl3;tive competence of
the State legislature and did not fall within entry 30 of
the State List.
2. That the provisions of section 20 and the sub-sections
thereof were violative of Article 19 ( 1) (f) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they sought to deprive the
appellants of their right to hold property;
,.
t.
PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Fazal Ali, J.)
543
3. That sub-sections 3 anp 6 of section 20 of the Act were
A
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the stranger decree-holder was
selected
for hostile discrimination whereas a bona fide alienee
who stood on the same footing as the stranger decreeholder was exempted from the operation of the Act.
Mr. Krishnamoorty Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants
has
B
not pressed point No. 1 relating to the legislative competence of the
legislature and ha:s fairly conceded that in view of the dcc~sion of this
Court in the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of lv1aharashtra etc. (1) the constitutionality of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act,
1976 which contained similar or rather harsher pr~wis:ons as the Act
was uphclrf by this Court. . In' these circumstances, it will not be
necessary for us to examine this question any further.
C
B~fore however taking up the other two points raised by counsel
for the appellants which were pressed before us in this Court it may be
necessary to set out the approach which a Court has to make and the
principles by which it has to be guided in such mat!ers.
fCourts Interpret the; constitutional provisions against the social setting of the
country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness
D
of the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the
l)ation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing
the people which the legislature in it~ wisdom, through beneficia,} legislation, seeks to solve.
The judicial approach should be dynamic
rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than
rigid.
It must take into consideration the changing trends of economic
thought, the temper of the times and the living aspirations and feelings
E
of the people. This Court while acting as a sentinel on the quivive to
protect fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country
must try to strike a just balance between the fundamental ri~hts and
the larger and broader interests of society, so that when such
right
clashes with the ~larger interest of the countrv it must yield to the latter.
Emphasising the role of Courts in such· matters this Court in the
case of lyoti Prashad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of
F
Delhi(2) observed as follows :-
"where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts Jaws,
which in its wisdom, is considered necessary for the solution
of what after all is a very human problem the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the context of the issues which
faced the legislature.
In the construction of such laws and
G
particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have
necess£lrilv to approach it from the point of view of furthering
the social interest which it is the purpose of the leo:i~lation to
promote, for the Courts are not, in these matters. functi01ling as it were in vacuo. but as parts of a society which is trying, by enacted law. to solve its problems and achieve social
concord and peaceful adiustment and thus furtherino: the
H
moral and material progress of the community as q whole."
-(i )[1o71jT(C.R. 828.
(2) /1962] 2 S.C.'R. 125 at 14~.
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1978) 2 S.C.R.
A
It is ob11ious that the legislature is in the best position w understand
and appredalt lhc needs of the people as enjoim:d by the Con~lltution
to bring abou! social reforms for the upliftment of the backward and
the weaker se<:t!ons of the society and for the improvement of the lot
of poor people. The Court will, therefore, interfere in this process
._
only when the statute is clearly violative of the right conferred on the
citizen under Part III of the Constitution or when the Act is beyond the
B
legislative competence of the legislature or ~mch other grounds. It is
for this reason that the Courts have recognised tha~ ther::- ~s ;1lways a
/-
(~
D
E
F
G
presumption in favOu:( of the constitutionality of a statute :md the onus
to prove its invalidity lies on the party which assails the same. In the
~
case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. The State of Bihar(l) while
adveninl! to tl1is w;peci Das, C.J. as he then was, speaking for 1he Court
uh~erved as follow~ :-
"The pronouncement of this Court
further establish,
amongst other things, that there is 'always a presumption in
favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and that the
burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has
been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The
Courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need's of its own
people. that its laws are directed to problems made manifest
by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds".
It is in tk light·of these principles that we have to appru~_.,:,n the impact of the Act on the fundamental rights of the citizen conferred on
him by Part Til of the Constitution.
1 he first lJianl of argument by learned Cl)unsel for the appellants
is that the 1\ct was violative of Article 19 (1 ) (f)
~Jf the Constitution
inasmuch as it takes away the right to hold property as guaranteed by
Article 1 ~1(1 )(f). Article 19(1) (f) may be extncted thus :-
"All citizens shaH have the ri~t
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property".
It was contended that in the present case the appellants had acquired
valid title to the property after having purchased it at tho auction sale
in execution of a decree against the debtors.
After the sale the propert1~s vested in the appellants and the law which invaded their right
to hold the property was clearly violative of ~~rticle 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution. There can be no doubt that Article 19 guarantees ail the
seven freedoms to the citizen of the country including the right to hold,
acquire and dispose of property. It must, however, be remembered
that :Article 1 <) confers an absolute and unconditional right which 1s
sub.iec't oniy 1o reasonable restrictions to be placed by Parliament or
the legislature in pub1ic intere·st. Oause (5) of Article 19 runs thus:
H
"Notll,ing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said
clause shall effect the: operation of any existing Jaw in so far as
(I) rJ959] S.C. R. 629.
PATHUMMA V. KERALA (Fazal Ali, J.)
545
it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law imposing,
A
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-c1auses either in the interests of the
general public or for the protection of the interests of any Schd-uled Tribe".
A perusal of this clause manifestly reveals that the right conferred
by Article 19(1) (f) is conditioned by the various factors mentioned in
dause ( 5). The Constitution permits reasonable restrictions. to be
placed on the right in the interest of the general public or for th~ protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe. The State in the instant
case daims protection under clause (5) by submitting that th~ provisions contained in the Act amount to. reasonable restrictions for the
general good of rm important part of the community, namely, the poor
agriculturist debtors. The object of the Act, according to the State, is
to remove agricultural indebtedness and thereby to eradicate one of the
important causes of poverty in this country. Such an object is undoubtedly in public interest, and, therefore, the restriction contained
in the Act must be presumed to be a reasonable restriction. This Court
has considered this question on several occasions during the last 2!
decades and has laid down several tests guidelines to indicate what
in a particular circumstance can be regarded as a reasonable restriction. One of the tests laid down by this Court is that, in judging the
reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by dause (5) of Article 19,
the Ccnrt has to bear in mind the Directive Principles of State Policy.
It will be seen that Article 38 contains a clear directive to the State to
promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as possible a social order in which justice, social, economic and
political shall inform aU the institutions of national life. Article 39 (b)
contains a direction to secure that the ownership and control of the
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good.
Indisputably; the object of the Act is to
eradicate rural indebtedness and thereby to secure tl1e common ~ood
of people Jiving in abject poverty. The object, therefore, clearly'-fulfils the directive laid down in Articles 38 and 39(b) of the Constitution
as referred to above.
In fact in the case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala(l
1
) all the Judges constituting the Bench have
with one voice given the Directive Principles contained -in the Constitution a place of honour.
Hegde and Mukherjea. JJ. as they then were
have said that the fundamental rights and the Directive Principles constitute the "conscience" of our Constitution. The purpose of the
Directive Principles is to fix certain socio and economic goals for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent social revolution.
Chandracbud, J. observed that our Constitution aims at bringing about
a synthesis between 'Funda!mental Rights' and the. 'Directive Prjnci-·
pJe& of State Policy' by giving tD the fanner a place of pride. and to
the latter a place of permanence.
.
In a latter case State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors.(::)
(1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 one of us (Fazal Ali, l) after analysing the
(1) [1973] Supp. S.C.R. I.
(2) [1979] 2 s.c.c. 310.
B
c
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F
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546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
Judgment delivered by all the Judges in the Kesvananda Bharati's
case (supra) on the importance of the Directive Principles observed
as follows :
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
"In view of the principles adumbrated by this Court it is
clear that the Directive Principles form the fundamental
feature and the social conscience of the Constitution and the
Constitution enjoins upon the State to implement these directive principles.
The directives thus provide the
policy.
the guidelines and the end of socio-ec;onomic freedom of
Art~cles 14 and 16 are the means to implement the policy to
achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the directive
principles.
So .far as the courts are concerned where there
is no apparent inconsistency between the directive principles
contained in Part III, which in fact supplement each other,
there is no difficulty in putting a hannonious construction,
which advances the object of the Constitution.
Once this
basic fact is kept in mind, the interpretation of Articles 14
and 16 and their scope and ambit become as dear as day".
In the case of The State of Bombay v. R.M.D. ChamarbaugwoW.(l)
this Court while stressing the importance of directive· principles contained in the Constitution observed as follows :
"The avowed purpose of our constitution is to create a
welfare State. The directive principles of State policy set
forth in Part IV of our Constitution enjoin upon the State
the duty to strive to promote the welfare of the. people by
securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social
order i:11- which justice, social, economic and political, 8hall
inform all the institutions of the national ltfe".
In the case of Fa,tehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of l\-1aharashtra etc. (supra) the Constitution Bench of this Court observed
as fo1lows :
"lncorporation of Directive Principles of State
Policy
casting the high duty upon the State to strive to promote the
welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice--social, ceo~
nomic and political-shaJ! inform all the institution!; of the
national life:, is not idle print but ~ommand to action.
We
can never forget, except at our peril, that the Constitution
obligatr·s the State to ensure an adequate means of live'lih0od
to its citizens and to see that the health and strengrh of
workers, men and women, are not abused, that exploitation,
moral and material, shall be extradited. Jn
short, State
action defending the weaker sections from social injustice
and all forms of exploitation and raising the standard of living
of the people, nece5sarily imply that economic
activities~
attired as trade or business or commerce, can be de-recognised as trade or business."
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 874 at 921.
r
..
PATHUMMA v. KERALA (Fazal Ali} J.)
In the instant case, therefore, we are not able to see any conflict betA
ween the directive princples contained in Article 38 and 39(b) and
the rcstr;ctions placed by the Act.
In the case of The State of Bombay
& Anr. v. P. N. Bulsara( 1) this Court observed as follows ~-
''In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed
by the Act, one has to bear in mind the directive principles
of State policy set forth in Article 47 of the Constitution."
B
Another test which has been laid down by this Court is that restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general public. In the case of
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(2) this Court observed as follows :-
"The phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should
not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is
required in the interests of the public.
The word 'reasonable' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is,
the
choice of a course which reason dictates.
Legislation which
arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to
contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a
proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Article
19(1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of
ArticJe 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality."
What is required is that the legislature takes intelligent care and
deliberation in choosing a course which is dictated by reason and good
conscience so as to strike a just balance between the freedom contained
in Article 19 (1) and the social control permitted by clauses (5) and
(6) of Article 19. This view, was reiterated in the case of Messrs.
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(3)
It has also been pointed out by this Court that in order to judge
the quality of the reasonable-ness no abstract or general pattern or a
fixed principle can be bid down so as to be of universal application and
the same will have to vary from case to case and with regard to changing conditions, the value of human life, social philosophy of the Consti~
t\Jtion, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances
all
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
In other words, the
position is that the Court has to make not a rigid or dogmatic but an
elastic and pregmatic approach to the facts of the case and to
take
an over-all view of aU the circumstances, factors and issues facing the
situation. In the case of State of Madras v. V. G. Row(4) the Court
observed as follows :-
"It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test
of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to
--·-· each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard,
(l) [1951] S.C.R 682.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 759 at 763.
(3) [1954} S.C.R. 803 at 811-12.
(4) [1952] S.C.R. 597.
,C
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548
SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
or. general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicabJe t? all cases.
The nature of the right alleged to have
been mfnnged, the underlying purpose of the restrictions impos<:d, the extent . and urgency of the evil sought to be reme<!ted thereby, the disproportion of the jmposition, the prevahlmg conditions at the time, should all enter into th2 judiciB
al verdict.
In evaluating such elusive factors and forming
their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circum-
~
stances of a given case, it is inevitable that the special philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in
\
the decision should play an important part.>t
'1
This view was endorsed in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi & Ors.
c
v.