# PERCY RUSTOMJI BASTA v. STATE OF MAHARASIITRA

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 35
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1971-03-16
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 267 of 1968
- **Bench:** C. A. Vaidialingam, A. N. Ray
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/percy-rustomji-basta-v-state-of-maharasiitra-5253
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Customs Act, 1962-S. 108-lnquiry under-Statement made to customs officers-Admissibility in
evidence-Evidence Act, s. 24-Person
against whom inquiry being held not "accused person" within the meaning
of s. 24-To be told to speak truth on pain of prosecution does not con.:
sritute threat.
35
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'fhe appellant was convicted for offences under the Custorns Act, 1962.
C
He challenged the legality of his conviction on the ground that bis statement to the customs authorities made on a summons issued under s. l 08
of the Act and on which the conviction was substantially based was not
admissible in evidence in vie\\'· of s 24 of the Evidence Act. It was contended that the statement was procured by threat in as much as the officer
who recorded the statement warned the appellant that he was bound to
state the truth as the officer was conducting a judicial proceeding to which
ss. 193 and 228 of the Penal Code applied.
Dismissing the appeal,
D
HELD : (i) A statement by a person against whom an inquiry is being
held under section 108 is not a statement made by a person accused of an
offenc~. Therefore, the essential ingredient to attract s. 24, namely that
the confession must be made by an accused person, is lacking in this case.
[43 DJ
Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 461
E
and lllias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 613, relied on.
(ii) A compulsion to speak the truth emanates in this case not from
the officers who recorded the statement but from the provisions of the
statute itself. What is necessary to constitute a threat under s. 24 of the
Evidence Act is that it must emanate from the person in authority. The
officers recording the statement were only doing their duty in bringing to
the notice of the appellant the provisions of the statute. [44 C-E}
F
(iii) To be told that the law required him to. tell the truth and if he
did not tell the truth he was liable to be prosecuted under s. 193 Penal
Code. for giving false evidence did not constitute a threat under s. 24 of
the Evidence Act.
(iv) Even assuming that there was an inducement or threat, the appe11ant had no basis for supposing that by making the statement he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil with reference to the proceedings
G
in respect of which an inquiry was being conducted by the CUf)toms officers.
Therefore. even on this ground s. 24 of the Evidence Act bas no application. [44 G-H]

## Text

PERCY RUSTOMJI BASTA
v.
STATE OF MAHARASIITRA
March 16, 1971
[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N. RAY, JJ.J
Customs Act, 1962-S. 108-lnquiry under-Statement made to customs officers-Admissibility in
evidence-Evidence Act, s. 24-Person
against whom inquiry being held not "accused person" within the meaning
of s. 24-To be told to speak truth on pain of prosecution does not con.:
sritute threat.
35
A
B
'fhe appellant was convicted for offences under the Custorns Act, 1962.
C
He challenged the legality of his conviction on the ground that bis statement to the customs authorities made on a summons issued under s. l 08
of the Act and on which the conviction was substantially based was not
admissible in evidence in vie\\'· of s 24 of the Evidence Act. It was contended that the statement was procured by threat in as much as the officer
who recorded the statement warned the appellant that he was bound to
state the truth as the officer was conducting a judicial proceeding to which
ss. 193 and 228 of the Penal Code applied.
Dismissing the appeal,
D
HELD : (i) A statement by a person against whom an inquiry is being
held under section 108 is not a statement made by a person accused of an
offenc~. Therefore, the essential ingredient to attract s. 24, namely that
the confession must be made by an accused person, is lacking in this case.
[43 DJ
Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 461
E
and lllias v. Collector of Customs, Madras, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 613, relied on.
(ii) A compulsion to speak the truth emanates in this case not from
the officers who recorded the statement but from the provisions of the
statute itself. What is necessary to constitute a threat under s. 24 of the
Evidence Act is that it must emanate from the person in authority. The
officers recording the statement were only doing their duty in bringing to
the notice of the appellant the provisions of the statute. [44 C-E}
F
(iii) To be told that the law required him to. tell the truth and if he
did not tell the truth he was liable to be prosecuted under s. 193 Penal
Code. for giving false evidence did not constitute a threat under s. 24 of
the Evidence Act.
(iv) Even assuming that there was an inducement or threat, the appe11ant had no basis for supposing that by making the statement he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil with reference to the proceedings
G
in respect of which an inquiry was being conducted by the CUf)toms officers.
Therefore. even on this ground s. 24 of the Evidence Act bas no application. [44 G-H]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 267
of 1968.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 26,
1968 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 244 of
1967.
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A. S. R. Chari, R. Nagaratnam, Janendra Lal and B. R. AgarB
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wal, for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam, J.-This appeal by the first accused, on certificate, is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court
dated September 26, 1968, in Criminal Appeal No. 244 of !967
confirming his conviction and sentence pa~sed against him by the
Presidency Magistrate, Mazgaon, Bombay for offences under s.
l 20B I.P.C. read with s. 135 of the Customs Act, 196T(Act 52 of
1962) (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) and also under s. 135
of the Customs Act in respect of the articles claimed to have been
recovered from his possession.
The short point that arises for consideration in this appeal is
whether s. 24 of the Evidence Act is a bar to the admissibility in
evidence of the statement Ex. T given by the appellant to the Customs Officers on a summons issued to him under s. 108 of the
Act.
The appellant along with six others was charged under the
sections mentioned above and aifter being found guilty was sentenced to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine
of Rs. 2,000/- for the charges under s. 120B I.P.C. read with s.
135 of the Act. He was also sentenced to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 I - for the charge
under s. 135 of the Act. The sentences were directed ·to run concurrently. In default of p&yment of fine, he was also sentenced to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for the period mentioned in
the judgment of the Presidency Magistrate.
The case against the appellant was that he and several other
persons entered into a conspiracy during the period from.June, 1963
to the end of December, 1963 to smuggle wrist watches and other
luxury goods such &s Nylon Textiles, toilet requisites, plying cards,
cigarette lighters, saffron etc. from Dubai to India through Mechanised sailing vessel and land the said imported and smuggled goods
surreptitiously a•t any coast near Bombay and then to bring the
smuggled goods to Bombay by Motor vehicles.
It was further
alleged that in pursuance to the said conspiracy such articles were
actually smuggled in the month of December, 1963. The various
parts played by the aippellant along with the other accused had
been given in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
P. W.
19, Inspector in the Rumm&ging Division Town Intelligence in
the Bombay Customs, on receipt of information in or about
December 21, 1963 about the smuggling of the goods conducted
searches in various places and seized several smuggled articles.
PERCY RUSl'OMll BASTA v. MAHARASHTRA (Vaidialingam, J.)
During the pendency of the trial, the third and the fifth accused died and the second accused who. was present for some
time later absconded necessitating separation of his trial. Some
other accused could not be traced at all.
Therefore, the trial
proceeded against the aippellant and accused Nos. 4, 6, and 7.
It is not necessary to refer to the pleas of accused Nos. 4, 6 and
7 as they have been acquitted of all the charges by the Presidency
Magistrate.
fhe appellant had filed a, lengthy written statement
on October 24, 1966 denying th!!. charges levelled against him.
He had statad that he was not in any manner concerned with any
conspiracy. He ailso denied .that any articles had been recovered
by the Customs Officers from the houses mentioned by them and
stated that in any event·he had nothing to do with any of those
articles. He pleaded that his brother Cama was inimical towards
him and thait the latter in connivance with the Customs authorities
had foisted this criminal case against him making false allegations .
. The appellant alleged that he had left Bombay for Ajmer to pay
his respects to the Darga on December 21, 1963 and returned to
Bombay on January 2, 1964, when he was apprehended by the
Customs authorities and kept in detention, in the first instaince,
till January 7, 1964. During this period of detention he was conti·
nuously harassed and interrogated by P. Ws. 5 and 19 and forced
10 put his signature on January 7, 1964 to a statement aJfeady got
written and prepared by P. W. 5. He was threatened that if he
did ~ot put his signature on the said statement, his mother and
another brother will be prosecuted. He further alleged tha.t it was
1epresented to him that the statement to which he was being asked
to put his signature was intended only to be used against the
second accused and no part of it was meant· to be used aga,inst
him. rt may be stated at this stage that the statement recorded
trom the appellant by P. Ws. 5 and 19, on Janua.ry 7, 1964 is l:lx.
T. The statement referes to various matters concerning his relation·
ship with the other accused as well as his connection with several
articles which had been seized and which were the subject of the
charges.
We do not think it necessa•ty to refer to Ex. T in any great
detail nor to the various seizures of articles made bv the Customs
authorities. It is enough to state that the conviction of the ap·
pellant ha_s been substantially based on the confessional statement
Ex. T after finding independent corrobora.tion furnished by other
evidence on record in respect of the statements contained in Ex. T.
Objections were taken to the admissibility in evidence of Ex.
T. on. the ground that it is hit by Art. 20(3) and ss. 24 and 25
of the Evidence Act. All these objections were overruled both by
the Presidency Magistrate as well as the High Court. The findings
of the Presidency Magistrate and accepted by the High Court a.re
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that Ex. T is a voluntary statement and it was a true disclosure
made by the appellant. The allegation of the appellant that he was
forced to put his signature to Ex. T which had already been prepared by P. Ws. 5 and 19 and that he wa.s induced to put his
signature on the representation that it will be used only against
the second accused and not against the appellant, was rejected.
The further findings are that Ex. Twas a voluntary statement made
by the appellant and that his plea tha.t he was kept under illegal
detention from January 2, 1964 to ·January 7, 1964 was false. It
has also been found that Ex. T is not hit either by Art. 20(3) or
by ss. 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act.
The only contention that has been raised before us by Mr.
A. S. R. Chari, learned counsel for the appellant, is, that in view
of s. 24 of the Evidence Act, Ex. T, the statement of the appellant
recorded by the Customs authorities under the Act, is not admis·
sable in evidence at the trial for the offences in respect of which
the appellant was charged and tried.
His further contention is
that as the conviction has been based substantially on the statements contained in Ex. T, the conviction is illegal.
The other
contentions based on Art. 20(3) and s. 25 of the Evidence Act
which were taken in the High Court have not been taken before
us.
In fact those contentions are no. longer available to the appellant in view of the decisions of this Court. According to Mr.
Chari when the statement Ex. T was recorded by the Customs
officials, the appellant was in the position of an accused. It is in
evidence tha•t P. W. 5, who recorded the statement warned the
appellant that he was bound to state the truth· as the officer was
conducting a judicial proceeding to which the provisions of ss. 193
and 228 I. P. C. apply. This, according to tlie learned counsel,
amounts to a threat a.nd as the statement Ex. T ha,,s been procured
on the basis of such a threat, it is inadmissible in evidence.
On the other hand, Mr. H. R. Khanna, learned counsel for
the State has referred us to the findings recorded by the Presidency
Magistrate and a.ccepted by the High Court regarding voluntary
nature of Ex. T. The counsel also pointed out that the fact that
P. W. 5, who recorded the statement Ex. T from the appellant,
informed him that be was bound to speak the truth as it was a.
judicial proceeding to which s. 193 I. P. C. applies, does not
amount to any threat in law so as to attract s. 24 of the Evidence
Act.
We will now reter to the circumstances under which Ex. T
was recorded a.s found by both the Courts. Consequent on information received by the Customs authorities, several raids were
conducted from December 21, 1963. The appellant went to the
Customs House at about 8 A.M. on January 7, 1964. By about
PERCY RUSTOMJI BASTA v. MAHARASHTRA (Vaidialingam,J.)
8.30 A.M. summons under s. 108 of the Act was served on him.
From 11.30 A.M. onwards to about 8.30 P.M. the process of recor·
dmg of the statement Ex. T. from the appellant continued cxcep·
ting for a short break of about 2! hours for lunch, tea and other
requirements. The appellaint was. arrested immediately after his
statement Ex. T was completed.
The seizures of the ennre
contraband goods were completed by about December 25, 1963.
Though the attention of the appellant was drawn to sub-s. 4 of s.
l 08 of the Act, he was not informed or warned that his statement
was likely to be used in the event of ainy prosecution against him
for the said offence. Undoubtedly Ex. T contained various incriminating facts regarding the complicity of the appellant with the
offences alleged against him. The Inspector of Customs, P. W. 5,
who recorded the s1atement Ex. T and P. W. 19, have both ad·
mitted that they questioned the appellant till the statement Ex. T
was finally completed at 8.30 P.M. on January 7, 1964. Both of
them have also asserted tha.t they had ·not given any threat or
offered any inducement to the appellant before the statement Ex.
T was made. P. W. 5 has deposed that he drew the attention of
the a·ppellant to the last pa4"agraph of the summons issued under
s. 108 of the Act. In fact in Ex. T the appellant states that he
had received summons No. 3 of 1964 dated January 7, 1964 issued
to him under s. 108 of the Act. He has further stated that he hoo
read the summons and that he had further understood that giving
false evidence is an offence punishable under s. 193 of the Indian
Penal Code. P. W. 5 has further deposed that he had explained to
the appellant the provisions of s. 193 I. P. C. and that the statement wu~ being recorded as if he was in court and that the appellant was bound to speak the truth and that if he made a false
statement he would be prosecuted. Based upon these answers of P.
W. 5, Mr. Chari, urged that it is clear that P. W. 5 has administered a threat to the appellant and it was in consequence of such
a threat tha.t. the appellant gave the statement Ex. T and
thereby has placed himself in a grave jeopardy of action being
taken against him under the Act.
Before we refer to s. 24 of the Evidence Act, it is desirable
to advert to the relevant provisions of the Customs Act. Sections
107 and 108 are as follows :
"S. 107 Power to examine personsAny officer of customs empowered in this behalf by
general or special order of the Collector of Customs may.
during the course of any enquiry in connection . with the
smuggling of any goods,-
(a) require any person to produce or deliver any
document or thing relevant to the enquity;
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"(b) examine any person acquainted with the facts
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and circumstances of the case.
S. 108. Power to summon persons to give evidence and produce
documents-
('!) Any gazetted officer of customs shall have power
to summon any person whose attendance he considers
necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer
is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods.
(2) A summons to produce documents or other
things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents
or things of a certain description in the possession or
under the control of the person summoned.
(3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to. attend either in person or by an authorised. agent, as such
officer may direct; and all persons so summoned shall
be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting
which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents and other things as may be required:
Provided that the exemption under section 132 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be applicable to
any requisition for attendance under this section.
(4) Every such enquiry a~ aforesaid shall be deemed
to be a judicial proceeding within the me31ning of _section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code."
Section 122 of the Act deals with C'Onfiscation of goods and
levy of penalty. Section 124 deals with the procedure to be
adopted before ordering the confiscation of any goods or imposing any penalty on a•ny person. Section 135 deals with prosecution
before a criminal court in the circumstances mentioned in els.
(a) and (b) and that prosecution is without prejudice to any action
taken under the Act.
This Court had to consider in Romesh Chandra Mehta v.
State of. West Bengal(') whether an officer of customs under the
Sea Customs Act, 1878 was a police officer and whether tlie statements made to him were hit by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution
and inadmissible in evidence under s. 25 of the Evidence Act A
further question also arose whether an officer of customs acting
(0 (1!169) 2 S. C. R. 46J.
PERCY RUSTOMJI BASTA v. MAlfARASHTRA (Vaidialingam, J.)
·under the Act is in ainy event a police officer within the meaning
of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and hence the confessional statements
made to him were inadmissible in evidence. After a considera·
tion of the scheme of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, this Court held
that a Customs Officer does not exercise, when enquiring into a
.suspected infringement of the Sea Customs Act, powers of investigation which a police officer may in investigating the commission
of an offence and that he is invested with the power to enquire
into infringements of the Act primarily for the purpose of adjudi·
caiting about forfeiture and penalty. Further it was held that the
said officer has no power to investigate an offence triable by a
Magistrate a·nd that he can only make a complaint in writing
before a competent Magistrate and hence s. 25 of the Evidence
.Act has no application. It was further held that the steps taken
by the Customs Officer are for the purpose of holding an enquiry
under the Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of
goods dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties and that the
Customs Officer does not at that stage accuse the person suspected
of infringing Ike provisions of the Sea Customs Act with the com-
:mission of any offence. Finally, it was held that a person examined
under s. l 71A of the Sea Customs Act does not stand in the
character of an accused person inasmuch as there is no formal
accusation made a•gainst him by any person at that time and hence
any statement made by such a person to ai Customs Officer is not
hit by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
The scheme of the Act was also considered in the said decision an-1 some points of difference between the Act and the Sea
Customs Act. 1878 were noted.
But notwithstanding the slight
difference in the powers exercised by a• 0Jstoms Officer under the
Act, it was held that the Customs Officer under the Act is not a
police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act.
It was emphasised that the proceedings taken by him are for the
purpose of holding an enquiry into suspected cases of smuggling
and that the Customs Officer is for all purposes ain officer of the
Revenue. It was laid down that as the Customs Officer under the
Act is not a police officer, the statement made before him by a
person, who is arrested or against whom ain enquiry is made, are
not covered by s. 25 of the Evidence Act. It was further laid
·down that until a complaint is filed before a Magistrate, the person
against whom an enquiry is commenced under the Customs Act
does not stand in the chairacter of a person accused of an offence
under s. 135. The discussion on this aspect is wound up by this
Court as follows :
" .. ,. ........ The Customs Officer even under the Act
of 1962 continues to remain a revenue officer primarily
concerned with the detection of smuggling and enforcement and levy of proper duties and prevention of entry
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of proper duties and prevention of entry into India of duti--
able goods without payment of duty and of goods of which
the entry is prohibited. He does not on thait account become
either a police officer, nor does the information conveyed by
him, when the person guilty of an infraction of the law
is arrested, amount to making of an accusation of an offence
against the person so guilty of infraction. Even under the
Act of 1962 a formal accusation can only be deemed to be
made when a complaint is made before a Magistrate comptttent to try the person guilty of the infraction under ss. 132.
133, 134 and 135 of the Act. Any statement made under
ss. 107 and 108 of the Customs Act by a person against
whom an enquiry is made by a Customs Officer is not a state·
ment made by a person accused of a.n offence."
From this decision it follows that a Customs Officer conducting an enquiry under ss. !07 or 108 of the Act is not a police
ofllcer and the person against whom the inquiry is made is not
an accused and the statement ma.de by such a person in that inquiry "is not a statement made by a person accused of an offence''.
The same position has been reiterated in the latter case of
Illias v. Collector of Customs, Madras.(')
Now coming to s. 24 of the Evidence Act, it runs as follows :
"Section 24 : Confession caused by inducement,
threat, or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding:
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by
any inducement, threat or promise having reference to
the charge against the accused person, proceeding from
a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of theCourt, to give the aocused person grounds which. would
appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making
it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him."
To attract the provisions of this section, the following facts·
have to be established :
(a.) that the confession has been made by an accused
person to a person in authority;
(b) that it must appear to the Court that the confession
has been obtained by reason of any inducement.
threat or promise procee_ding from a person -in au·-
thority;
(!) [1969] 2 S. C.R. 613.
PftllCY RUSTOMJI BASTA v. MAHARASHTRA (Vaidialingam, J.)
(c) that the inducement, threat or promise must ha.ve
reference to the charge against the accused person:
and
(d) the inducement, threat or promise, must,
in
the
opinion of the Court, be such that the accused in
making the confession believed or supposed that by
making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any
evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
We have already pointed out that when the appellant appeared before the Customs Officers on the morning of January 7,
1964. he was served with. a summons under s. 108 of the Act and
that it was after the receipt of the summons, the appellant gave
the statement Ex. T. From the decision in Romesh Chandra
Mehta v. State of West Bengal('), it is clear that when an
inquiry is being conducted under s. 108 of the Act, and a statement is given by a person against whom the inquiry is being held
it "is not a statement made by a• person accused of an offence
and the person who gives the statement does not siana in the
character of an accused person." Therefore the first essential fact
to be established, to attract s. 24, referred to a.hove, is lacking
in this case, as the appellant was not an "accused person".
We have already stated that it ha.s been found by both the
Coorts that the statement Ex. T is a voluntary statement made
by the appellant.
Mr. Chari attempted to bring the staitement
Ex. T under s. 24 of the Evidence Act because of P. W. 5 having
informed the appellant that the statement was. ·being recorded as
if he was a court ~.nd that the appellant was bound to speak the
truth and that if any false statement is made, he would be prosecuted. P. W. 5 has also stated that he explained s. 193 I. P. C.
to the appella.nt. According to the learned counsel this conduct
of P. W. 5 clearly amounts to a threat being administered to the
appellant.
It is not in dispute that P. W. 5, who recorded the confession, is a person in authority within the meaning of s. 24 of the
Evidence Act. But the question is whether, when P. W. 5 drew
the attention of the appella.nt to the fact that the inquiry is a
judicial proceeding to which s. 193 I. P. C. applies and that the
appellant must speak the truth, it can be considered to be a
threat " ...... proceeding from a person in a.uthority" under the
section.
We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Chari
that in the circumstances mentioned above any threat has proceeded from a person in authority to the appellant, in consequence
(I) (1969] 2 S. C.R. 461.
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of which the st31tement Ex. T was given. Section 108 of the Act
gives power to a Customs Officer of a gazetted rank to summon
any person to give evidence in any inquiry in connection with
the smuggling of any goods.
The inquiry made under this section is by virtue of sub-section (4) deemed to be ii judicial proce·
eding within the meaning of ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Pooal
Code.
A person summoned under s. 108 of the Act is bound
to appea•r and state the truth when giving evidence.
If he does
not answer he would render himself liable to be prosecuted under
s. 228 I. P. C. If, on the other hand, he answers and gives false
evidence, he would be liable to be prosecuted under s. 193 I. P. C.
for giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding.
In short a
person summoned under s. 108 of the Act is told by the statute
itself that under threat of crimina-1 prosecution he is bound to
~peak what he knows and state it truthfully.
But it must be
noted that a compulsion to speak the truth, even though it may
amount to a threat, emanates in this ca~e not from the officer
who recorded the statement, but from the provisions of the
statute itself. What is necessary to constitute a thre311 under s.
24 of the Evidence Act is that it must emanate from the person
iu authority.
In the ca~e before us there was no such threat
emanating from P. W. 5, who recorded the statement of P. W.
19, who was guiding the proceedings. On the contrary the officers
recording the statement were only doing their duty in bringing
to the notice of the appellant the provisions of the statute. Even
if P. W. 5 had not drawn the attention of the appellant to the
fact that the inquiry conducted by him is deemed to be a judicial
proceeding, to which s. 193 I. P. C. applies, the appellant was bound
to speak the truth when summoned under s. 108 of the Act with
· the added risk of being prosecuted, if he gave false evidence.
Further, it is to be seen that it is not every threat, inducement or promise even
emanating from the person in authority
that is hit by s. 24 of the Evidence Act. In order to a.ttract the
bar, it bas to be rnch an inducement, threat or promise, which
should lead the accused to suppose that "by maKing it he would
gain any advantage or a0void any evil of temporal nature in refe·
rence to the proceedings against him". In the case before us what is
it that the appellant has been told ? He has been told that tho law
requires him to tell the truth and if be does not tell the truth, he may
be prosecuted under s. 193 I. P. C. for giving false evidence. This,
we have held, does not constitute a threat under s. 24 of the Evidence Act. The plea of the appellant was that he '\Vas compelled
to make the statement under the threat that otherwise his mother
and a·nother brother will be prosecuted.
He has further stated
that he was induced to make the statement on the belief that it
will be used only against the second accused and not against him.
These plea~ of the appellant have been disbelieved by both the
PllRCY RUSTOMJI BASTA v. MAllAllASllTRA (VaidialiBga111, J.)
trial court and the High Court. Therefore, it follows that even
assuming that there was an inducement or threat, the appellant
had no basis for supposing tha.t by making the statement he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil with reference to the proceedings in respect of which an inquiry was being conducted by
the Customs Officers. Therefore, even on this ground also sec·
tion 24 of the Evidence Act has no application.
For a.II the above resons we hold that by the mere fact that
the Customs Officer P. W. 5, who recorded the statement Ex. T,
explained the provisions of S. !93 I. P. C. and informed the appellant that he was bound to tell the truth and that he is liable
to be prosecuted if he made a false statement, there was no threa.t
given to the appellant.
We accordingly hold that s. 24 of the
Evidence Act has no application and the statement Ex. T was
properly aidmitted in evidence in the trial of the appellant. Both
the Courts have found that there is also independent evidence
lo corroborate the truth of the statements in Ex. T. The question
of admissibility of Ex. T in evidence, having been decided against
the appellant, no other point has been argued before us.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
K.B.N.
Appeal dismissed.
B
c
D,