# PIARA SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 236
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-01-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeals No. 158 and 197 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswam!, Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/piara-singh-v-state-of-punjab-4864
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

B
Evidence-Pri11ciple of
i.B·tte·estoppel-Approver's
evidence,
value
Of.
The appellant and S were charged for an olfen.ce under s. 302 I.P.C.
anti under the Explosive Substances Act.
The prosecution relied
upon
the evidence of the approver. The approver's statement was corrobow
rntcd, (a) by the rec0very of a piece of cloth which was part of the
same cloth used in the crime, (b) by the evidence of that the box was
made for the appellant, and ( c) by the evidence regarding despatch of
thL~ parcel by the appellant.· The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
~1nJ S, against which both appealed.
1'he conviction of the appellant
was upheld by the High Court, as it considered that the statement of
the- approver was corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses so far
the appellant was concerned.
But the High Court acquitted S being of
the view that there Y.'as no independent corroboration of the approver's
C\ idcnce Y.1hich lead to the inference that S was instrumental in
the
con1mission of the crime. In appeal· to this Court, the appellant contcr..Jcd that (i) the affect of acquittal of S was to weaken, if not to
dc,troy, the approver's evidence so far as it
concerned the appellant,
rd ting on the principles of issue-estoppel; and (ii) there was no corroboration of the approver's evidence so far as the appellant was concerned.
Di~.missing the appeal,
HELD: (i) For
the principle of issuc·cstoppel to arise, there must
ha\..: been distinctly raised and inevitably decided the same issue in the
earlier proceedings between the .same parties.
But the principle cannot
he invoked in the present case because the parties are djfferent and the
decision. upon any Jssue as between State and s. in the same litigation
c~1nnot operate as binding upon the State with regard to the present
appellant. [242 D·E]
Prita1n Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956 S.C, 415, and Manipur
Adntinistration v. Thokchoni Bira Singh, [1964] 7 S.C.R.' 123, fo1Jowed.
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Sa1nh(;sir(I1J1 v. Puh/ic Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, [1950] A.C.
4'~· Kin!! v. Wilkes. 77 C.L.R. 511 at pp. 518·5!9, Marz v. The Queen.
( 1~56) 96 C.L.R. 62, Again in Brown v. Robinson, (1960) SR, (N.S.W.)
297. 301, applied.
G
(ii) The application of approver's evidence has to satisfy a double
tC'>L His evidence rnu-;t show that he is a reliable witness and that is a
test
1Nhich is common to afl the \Vitncsses.
If this test is satisfied the
second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's e\·idence
nlUSl receive sufficient corroboration. It would not however. be right
to expect that such independent corroboration shciuld cover the
\vhole
of the prosecution case.
In the
present case, the High
Court
had
H
rightly applied this principle and reached the conclusion that the approYc:"s evidence was materiatly corroborated so far as the appel'lan.t v.1a·;
concerned. [243 A-Cl
PIARA SINGH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
237
A
Sarwa11 Singh v. StMe of Punjab, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 637, followed.

## Text

PIARA SINGH
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
January 8, 1969
A
(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAM! AND A. N, GROVER, JJ,J
B
Evidence-Pri11ciple of
i.B·tte·estoppel-Approver's
evidence,
value
Of.
The appellant and S were charged for an olfen.ce under s. 302 I.P.C.
anti under the Explosive Substances Act.
The prosecution relied
upon
the evidence of the approver. The approver's statement was corrobow
rntcd, (a) by the rec0very of a piece of cloth which was part of the
same cloth used in the crime, (b) by the evidence of that the box was
made for the appellant, and ( c) by the evidence regarding despatch of
thL~ parcel by the appellant.· The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
~1nJ S, against which both appealed.
1'he conviction of the appellant
was upheld by the High Court, as it considered that the statement of
the- approver was corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses so far
the appellant was concerned.
But the High Court acquitted S being of
the view that there Y.'as no independent corroboration of the approver's
C\ idcnce Y.1hich lead to the inference that S was instrumental in
the
con1mission of the crime. In appeal· to this Court, the appellant contcr..Jcd that (i) the affect of acquittal of S was to weaken, if not to
dc,troy, the approver's evidence so far as it
concerned the appellant,
rd ting on the principles of issue-estoppel; and (ii) there was no corroboration of the approver's evidence so far as the appellant was concerned.
Di~.missing the appeal,
HELD: (i) For
the principle of issuc·cstoppel to arise, there must
ha\..: been distinctly raised and inevitably decided the same issue in the
earlier proceedings between the .same parties.
But the principle cannot
he invoked in the present case because the parties are djfferent and the
decision. upon any Jssue as between State and s. in the same litigation
c~1nnot operate as binding upon the State with regard to the present
appellant. [242 D·E]
Prita1n Singh v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956 S.C, 415, and Manipur
Adntinistration v. Thokchoni Bira Singh, [1964] 7 S.C.R.' 123, fo1Jowed.
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Sa1nh(;sir(I1J1 v. Puh/ic Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya, [1950] A.C.
4'~· Kin!! v. Wilkes. 77 C.L.R. 511 at pp. 518·5!9, Marz v. The Queen.
( 1~56) 96 C.L.R. 62, Again in Brown v. Robinson, (1960) SR, (N.S.W.)
297. 301, applied.
G
(ii) The application of approver's evidence has to satisfy a double
tC'>L His evidence rnu-;t show that he is a reliable witness and that is a
test
1Nhich is common to afl the \Vitncsses.
If this test is satisfied the
second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's e\·idence
nlUSl receive sufficient corroboration. It would not however. be right
to expect that such independent corroboration shciuld cover the
\vhole
of the prosecution case.
In the
present case, the High
Court
had
H
rightly applied this principle and reached the conclusion that the approYc:"s evidence was materiatly corroborated so far as the appel'lan.t v.1a·;
concerned. [243 A-Cl
PIARA SINGH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
237
A
Sarwa11 Singh v. StMe of Punjab, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 637, followed.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals No.
158 and 197 of 1968.
Appeals by certificate/special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 3, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High
B
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1967 and Murder Reference No. 45 of 1967.
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J. P. Mitter, J. C. Talwar and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant
(in both the appeals).
Kartar Singh Chawla and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent
(in both the appeals).
The Judgme~t of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J. The appellant Piara Singh and one Nand Lal
Sehgal were tried together by the Sessions Judge of Kapurthala,
who by his judgment dated 1st July, 1967 convicted the appellant
under section 302, LP .C. and sentenced him to death. The
appellant was also convicted and sentenced to 5 years' rigorous
imprisonment under section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act
and to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 326 of the
Indian Penal Code. Nand Lal Sehgal was sentenced to life imprisonment under section 302 read with sections 109 and 113,
I.P .C. and to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment under section 4 of
the Explosive Substances Act. Both the convicted persons filed
appeals in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, viz.
Criminal
Appeal No. 602 of 1967 and 601 of 1967. The State of Punjab
also filed a criminal revision No. 1006 of 1967 for enhanceme.nt
of sentence of Nand Lal Sehgal. By a common judgment dated
3rd November, 1967, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the
appellant and confirmed th~ sentence of death imposed upon him.
The High Court, however, acquitted Nand Lal Sehgal by allowing
his appeal and dismissed the revision petition filed by the State of
Punjab. These are two appeals one by certificate and the other
by special leave on behalf of the appellant Piara Singh against the
judgment of the Punjab and Hary.ana High Court dated 3rd
Novemoor, 1967.
The case of the prosecution was that one Ram Sahai P.W. 19,
wh? was the organising Secretary of Jagatjit Kapra Mills Mazdoor
U mon, Phagwara, had proceeded on hunger strike from 1st October, 1966 in front of the gate of the J agatjit Textile Mills, Phagwara (hereinafter called the Mills) in order to compel the management to accept certain demands of that Union regarding dearness
allowance, gratuity for re-employment of the labourers who had
been ·tunned out of service and the like.
The hunger strike of
Ram Sahai was supposed to last till death or the acceptance of the
238
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1969] 3 S.C.R.
demands by the Mills whichever was earlier. A tent had been
fixed outside the gate of the Mills and Ram Sahai used to sit on a
cot under the tent. On 4th October, 1966, at 1.45 p.m. Ram
Labhaya, Postman, P.W. 31 came there with a registered parcel
addressed to Ram Sahai. On the parcel being opened, a bomb
in~ide it exploded, as a result of which Radhey ·Sham, Shadi Lal
and Charanjit Lal died and P.W. 11 Chanan Singh, P.W. 14 Moti
Lal, P.W. 16 Madhu Parshad, P.W. 17 Tara Singh, P.W.
18
Ram Dass, P.W. 20 Muni Lal and P.W. 21 Naunihal Singh received injuries. It is alleged for the prosecution that the parcel had
been despatched by the appellant from Amritsar at the instance of
Nand Lal Sehgal and that the approver Mohinder Singh had
helped the appellant in pr.~paring the parcel contining the bomb.
The first clue in connection with the crime was obtained by
the police on 8th October, 1966 when at about 4.00 p.m., P.W.
25 Amrik Singh, a resident of Amritsar appeared before SubInspector Mohinderpal Singh P.W. 59 and made a statement that
he had known Piara Singh before and was friendly with him, that
on 3rd October, 1966, Piara Singh, who was carrying a Jhola,
which appeared to contain something bulky, met him and in
response to an invitation for tea, told Amrik Singh that he was in
a hurry to go for some work. Three or four days later, Amrik
Singh read in a newspaper regarding explosion of a bomb near the
Textile Mills Phagwara. On the 7th October, 1966, Sri Niwas.
P.W. 27 who is a deed writer, met him and told him that Piara
Singh had despatched a parcel from Amritsar.
The most important witness in the case is Mohinder Singh.
P.W. 8 who was tendered pardon under section 337 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure by the District Magistrate, Kapurthala. The
evidence of approver is to the effect that he was working in the
Mills since 1951 and three or four years later Piara Singh also
joined service in that Mills and was working as his subordinaie.
Piara Singh developed cordial relations with Nand Lal Sehgal and
used to assist him in breaking up labour strikes. One and a half
months before the occurrence, Piara Singh came to the approver's
residence and told him that Sehgal wanted one Ram Singh who
wa~ employed in the Textile Mills, Ganga Nagar, to be killed, Piara
Singh suggested the device of sending a bomb in a parcel ta the
victim and when the parcel would be opened, the bomb would
explode. About 15 days before the incident, Piara Singh again
came to the approver and told him that he had secured a bomb
·nnd he wanted to get prepared two wooden boxes, one smaller in
,;L~ than the other. The approver and Piara Singh thereafter
went to the shop of Nazar Singh, P.W. 22 a carpenter of Phagwara.
who made the box. Later in the evening they. went to the shop
•Jf Gian Singh. P.W. 23 a carpenter of village Chachoki, which is
said to be half a mile from Phagwara. Piara Singh got prepared
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P!ARA SINGH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, !.)
239
from him six picc.~s of phaties of raw wood. After it had ~ecomc
dark, Piara Singh brought to the approver's house these articles as
also a bomb saying that he had removed the fuse of the bomb rn
that if it should fall, it may not explode. On 2nd October, 1966
Piara Singh came to the approver's house at 10 p.m. and informed
him of Sehgal's intention that the bomb should now be sent ro as
to explode at Ram Sahai who was the leader of the strikers at
Phagwara.
Piara Singh thereafter prepared a wooden box from
the six pieces of phaties.
The approver described the arrangement for packing the bomb as follows :-
"Placing the fuse in the bomb after removing the
pin and placing a wire in its place, we placed it in that
box. Then the box was closed and the lid was placed on
it with Kabza a1nd Kundi. In that Kundi a nut was placed
and a bolt was fitted in it so that the box may not open.
Then the box was also tied with strings so that the
Phaties may not give way on account of the pressure of
the lever. Then from the hole, which was on one side
of the box corresponding to the wire fitted in the bomb,
the wire was pulled out. Then that wooden box was
placed in the bigger box.
Piara Singh accused had
brought with him a piece of Khaddar cloth and a parcel was made of the bigger box in that cloth. The pieces
of Khaddar which were spare placed in between
the two boxes so that the smaller box may not move
inside the bigger box. Because of the spare pieces of
cloth were not sufficient so I gave two shirts of my ch'ildren to Piara Singh. Those shirts were of Poplin of blue
colour. Piara Singh tore one shirt into pieces and placed
those pieces also in between those boxes.
Before the
parcel was prepared in the Khaddar cloth the bigger box
was secured with nails."
At about 1 a.m. the approver and Piara Singh went to the
house of Sehgal and explained to him how they had prepared the
parcel. Piara Singh told Sehgal that when Ram Sahai would open
the parcel, the bomb would explode and he would die.
Sehgal
made over a sheet of paper to Piara Singh on which was written
t~e address of Ram Sabai.
Sehgal also gave Rs. 40/- to Piara
Smgh for expenses and instructed him that the parcel had to be
sent through the Post ~ffice at Amritsar. Next day on 3rd
Octo~er, 1966 P1.ara S~gh came to the approver in the morning
carrymg a Jhola m which he placed the parcel containing the
w~en box.
The approver took Prara Singh to the Railway
Station, Phagwara. In the evening Piara Singh returned at about
6 p.m. and told the approver that he had got the parcel despatched as directed by Sehgal from Amritsar where he had also met
Amrik Singh. Both of them then went to the house of Sehgal and
240
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
Piara Singh handed over the registration receipt to him
saying
that it should be destroyed.
At about 2 p.m. on the next day,
·i.e. 4th October, 1966, the approver learnt about the explosion of
the bomb.
,
The High Court considered that the statement of the approver
was sufficiently corroborated by the evidence of Nazar Singh
P.W. 22, Gian Singh P.W. 23, Sardara Singh P.W. 24, Amrik
Singh P.W. 25 and Sri Niwas P.S. 27 so far as the appellant was
concerned. The High Court accordingly held that charges under
ss. 302
and 326,
I.P.C.
and
section 3 of the
Explosive
Substances Act were established against the appellant. As regards
Nand Lal Sehgal the High Court took the view that there was no
independent corroboration of the
approver's
evidence
which
could reasonably lead to the inference that Sehgal was insirumental in the commission of the crime. The High Court, therefore,
acquitted Nand Lal Sehgal.
In support of his appeal Mr. Mitter contended, \n the first
place, that by reason of the acquittal of Nand Lal Sehgal the evidence given in the case concerning N and Lal Sehgal must be
totally rejected. It was contended that the evidence of the
approver so far as it concerns Nand Lal Sehgal must be eliminated.
In other words, the argument was that the effect of acquitial of
Nand Lal Sehgal was to weaken if not to destroy the approver's
evidence so far as it concerns the appellant also. In this connection Mr. Mitter relied upon the principle of issue-estoppel and
tefurred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sambasivam
v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya,('), and the decision
of this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab,(2 ) and Manipur
Administration v. Thokchom Bira Singh( 8). In our opinion,
there is no justification for this argument. It is true that
Nand Lal Sehgal was acquitted by the High Court which took
the view that the evidence of the approver was not corroborated .
so far as Nand Lal Sehgal was concerned. But there is no finding of the High Court that the approver had implicated Nand Lal
Sehgal falsely.
The High Court considered th.at there was no
legal corroboration of the approver's evidence as regards Nand Lal
Sehgal and in the absence of such corroboration it was not safe
to upheld the conviction of Sehgal. That is a different thing from
saying that the. Court found that the approver's evidence regarding
the participation of Nand Lal Sehgal is false.
In any event, the
principle of issue-estoppel has no application to )he present case.
It should be stated that the principle of issue-estoppel is different
from the pr\nciple of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit as
embodied in s. 403 of the Criminal Procedure ~ode. The prin-
(1) [19SO] A.C. 458.
(2) A.T.R. 1956 S.C. 415.
(3) [19641 7 S.C.R. 123.
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PIARA SINGH Vi PUNJAB (Ramaswami, !.)
241
ciple of issue-estoppel is a different principle, viz. where an issue
of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion
and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a
finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the
prosecution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused
for a different or distinct offence but as precluding the reception
of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is
tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be
permitted by the terms of s. 403(2), Cr.P.C. Speaking on the
principle of estoppel Dixon, J. said in King v. Wilkes(') :
"Whilst there is not a great deal of authority upon
the subject, it appears to me that there is nothing wrong
in the view that there is an issue-estoppel, if it appears by
record of itself of as exp!~ by proper evidence, that
the same point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a
previous criminal trial which is brought in view on a
second criminal trial of the same prisoner. That :;eems
to be implied in the language used by Wright, J. in
R. v. Ollis which in effect I have adopted in the foregoing statement ...... There must be a prior proceeding determined against the Crown necessarily involving an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding by the Crown against the same prisoner. The allegation of the Crown in the subsequent proceeding must
itself be inconsistent with the ac~uittal of the prisoner
in the previous proceeding. But 1f such a condition of
affairs arises I see no reason why the ordinary 1ules :if
issue estoppel should not apply. Such rules are not to
be confused with those of res judicata, which in criminal proceedings are expressed in the pleas of autre fois
acquit and autre fois convict. They are pleas which are
concerned with the judicial determination of an alleged
criminal liability and in the case of conviction with the
substitution of a new liability.
Issue-estoppel is concerned with the judicial e~tablishment of a proposition
of Jaw or fact between parties.
It depends ·upon wellkn?wn doctrines which control the relitigation of issues
which are settled by prior litigation."
In a subsequent case Marz v. The Queen( 2 ), Dixon, C.J. stated
as follows :-
"The law which gives effect to issue-estoppels is not
concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of the
finding which amounts to an estoppel still Jess with the
pro~esses of reasoni~g by which the finding was reached m fact ...... It 1s enough that an issue or issues-
(1) 77C.L.R. Sii at pp. S18-Sl9.
(2) [19S6] 96 C.L.R. 62.
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!969] 3 S.C.R.
have been directly raised and found.
Once that is
A
done, then, so long as the finding stands, if there by
any subsequent litigation between the
same parties,
no al!egations legally inconsistent with the finding may
be made by qrre of them against the other. Res judicate
pro veritme accipitur.
And .... this applies in pleas of
the Crown."
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Again in Brown v. Robinson(') Herron and Maguire, JJ. said:
"Before issue-estoppel can succeed in a case such as
this there must be prior proceeding determined against
the Crown necessarily involving an issue which again
arises in a subsequent proceeding by the Crown against
the same prisoner . . .. It depends upon an
issue
or
issues having been distinctly raised and found in the
former proceeding''.
The principle of issue-estoppel has received the approval of this
Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab(') and Manipur Administration v.
Thokchom Bira Singh(')
and several later decisions. But the principle cannot be invoked in· the present case
because the parties are different and the decision upon any issue
as between State and Nand Lal Sehgal in the same litigation
cannot operate as binding upon the State with regard to present
appellant.
For issue-estoppel to arise, there must have
been
distinctly raised and inevitably decided the same issue
in the
earlier proceedings between the same parties. In our opinion,
Mr. Mitter is unable to make good his argumeint on this aspect of
the case.
It was then contended on behalf of the appellant that there was
no corroboration of the approver's evidence so far as
he
was
concerned.
An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness
under the Indian Evidence Act.
There can be,
however,
no
doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission
of the offence introduces a serious taint in his evidence and Courts
are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it
is corroborated in material particulars
by
other jndependent
evidence. It would not, however, be right to expect that such
independent corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution case or even all the material particulars of the prosecution
case. If such a view is adopted it will render the evidence of the
accomplice wholy superfluous. On the other hand, it wiU not be
safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated
in minor particulars or incidental details because, iin such a case,
corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the
(I) (1960] S.R. (N. S. W.) 297. 301.
(2) A.1.R. 19'.6 S.C. 415.
(J) 119641 7 S.C.R. 123.
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PIARA SINGH v. PUNJAB (Ramaswami, J.)
243
main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably und safely
accepted as true.
It is well settled that the appreciation of approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test.
His evidence must
show that he is reliable witness and that is a test which is common to all the witnesses.
If this test is satisfied the second test
which still remain to be applied is that the approver'1 evidence
must receive sufficient corroboration.
(See .Sarwan 5ingh v. State
of Punjab) ( 1).
In the pres~nt case the High Court has rightly
applied this principle and reached the conclusion that the approver's evidence was materially corroborated so far as the
appellant was concerned. In the first place, the approver, satd
that while going from his house when he fled from Phagwara, he
had thrown the remaining pieces of the shirt in a cluster of sarkandas.
As a result of search A.SJ. Pritam Singh recovered torn
pieces of cloth Exs. P. 9/1 to P. 9/3 from a bush about 150 yards
from the Mill. The testimony of the expert Mr. Longia P.W. 7
shows that Exs. P. 9 / 1 to P. 9 I 3 were parts o.f the same cloth as
pieces Exs. P. 10/ 1 to P. 10/3 which were used for packing the
bomb between the inner and the outer boxes. If the approver was
not a participant to the packing of the hand grenade, he could not
possibly be in possession of the pieces of cloth Exs. P. ll/ I
to
P. 9/3. In the second place, the evidence of Nazar Singh, P. W.
22 indicates that he made the outer box for Piara Singh and was
paid Re. 1/- by him. Gian Singh, P.W. 23 also said that he had
been asked by Piara Singh to make Phaties about 4'' in length
for the preparation oi the box. Amrik Singh, P .W. 23 has also
given corroborative evidence. Piara Singh
had
met
him at
Amritsar on 3rd October, 'J 966 and told him that Piara Singh
had despatched the parcel. The testimony of Sri Niwas, P .W 27
is crucial in this case. He has corroborated the statement of the
approver in important particulars.
The evidence of Sri
Niwas.
was criticised on behalf of the appellant 'as Sri Niwas made his
statement to the police after some delay viz., on the 17th October,
1966.
On this point Sub-Inspector Mohinderpal Singh explained that earlier on 9th October, 1966, he tried lo contact Sri
Niwas, but the latter was not found in his seat in Phagwara Chowk.
He made another effort to trace him en 13th October, 1966, but
it was equally fruitless. It is tr.ue that the Sub-Inspector could
have made more strenuous efforts to trace out Sri Niwas,
but he was going to other places also in connection with the inve~tigation. The High Court has held that merely on account of
this delay the statement of Sri Niwas could not be rejected. On
the contrary the High Court has found the evidence of Sri Niwas
to be true and reliable. It is maJnifest that there is sufficient corroH' ?oration of the evidence of the approver so far as the appellant
is concerned and the argument of Mr. Mitter must be rejected on
this aspect of the case.
(I) A.LR. 1957 S.C. 637.
244
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1969] 3 S.C.R.
Lastly, it was contended that the hand grenade could not be
.arrainged in the manner stated by the approver, but that the hand
grenade was intact and when the parcel was opened, some one
may have caused it to explode. In this connection Mr. Mitter
referred to the evidence of expert Mr. Murti P.W. 6. According
to Mohinder Singh, only one hole was made 1n the inner box
through which the wire fitted in the grenade in place of the safety
pin was taken out. The argument of the appellant was that two
holes should have been made in the inner,box, but according to
the approver only one hofo was made.
It was also said that
according to the report iX the expert, bent steel wire was found
.in the first parcel whiCh was sent to him. It was argued that the
report of the expert was not consistent with the evidence of the
approver who said that the safety pin of the wire had been removed. It was suggested that Mohinder Singh would have probably
thrown the safety pin and not kept it in the box. The High Court has
examined in detail the argument of the appellant on-this point and
reached the conclusion that the statement of the approver with
regard ~o the packing of the hand grenade should be accepted as
true. The question involved is one of appreciation of evidence
and nc't a question of Jaw. In any event, we see no sufficient
reason for taking a view different from that of the High Court in
this matter.
For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in these appeals
A
B
c
D
which are accordingly dismissed.
·
E
Y.P.
Appeals dismissed.